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ABSTRACT 
 
  This thesis examines a number of issues concerning the free trade doctrine, regionalism 
and Regional Free Trade Areas (FTAs), with a special focus on the ASEAN Free Trade Area 
(AFTA). This study is broadly divided into three parts. The first part examines the doctrine of free 
trade from the perspectives of ideological belief as well as theoretical expositions, and how these 
influence trade policies of many countries throughout the history of trade. The second part of the 
study analyses the forces that influence the formation of regionalism and regional FTAs all over 
the world. In the first and second parts, an extensive survey of the existing literature is 
undertaken to unearth relevant ideas and events, which are important to policy makers and the 
general public.  
 
  The third part of the study deals primarily with empirical investigation of the economic 
effects brought about by the formation of regional FTAs. Two main issues are examined in this 
part. The first issue is the assessment of the effects that regional FTAs have on trade of members 
against other countries that do not become members of any economic groupings. The second 
issue is the examination of the effect of AFTA on trade of member vis-à-vis non-member 
countries. In addition, this part also examines the question of whether AFTA “creates” or 
“diverts” trade. For the purpose of addressing issues grouped in this part of the study, a gravity 
model is employed to answer the questions of interest. This part of the study covers a period of 24 
years (1980-2003). Cross sectional data involving 990 pairs of countries, which trade with each 
other, are used in regression analysis based on the Ordinary Least Square technique.  
 
  Findings from the first and second parts of the study indicate that trade between countries 
during the era of mercantilism (1500s-1750s) was carried out under enormous restrictions in 
consonance with the thinking of that time. However, by the end of eighteenth century the 
economic arguments in favour of free trade began to be accepted, resulting in the adoption of the 
free trade idea into the commercial policies of many countries, particularly in Europe in the 
middle of nineteenth century. The period characterized by unilateral free trade regimes lasted 
only about three decades, as protectionist elements made a return into trade policy formulation 
in the 1870s. The period of liberal trade policy regimes came to a complete end at the breakout 
of the First World War in 1914, and the protectionist trade policies of many countries continued 
to strengthen their grip until the Second World War. xii
  After WW2 ended in 1945, many countries realised that security and the orderly conduct 
of international trade were important to ensure continuous prosperity of the world. This led to 
series of negotiations involving major trading countries that resulted in the establishment of the 
GATT in 1947. The main thrust behind this initiative was that all trading nations must cooperate 
to liberalize their trade policies, reflecting the idea that countries should move towards adopting 
“freer” trade policy than the regime they adopted in the 1930s and the early 1940s.    
 
At the end of 1990s the world once again observed agreement amongst prominent trade 
economists for the case of pursuing free trade policy. This is due to the renewed recognition by 
economists of two important propositions: (1) if market failures remain unfixed, then pursing free 
trade policy can harm rather that help, and (2) if market failures are fixed through suitable 
policy interventions, then free trade can be used to exploit the potential gains from trade. Within 
the second proposition, economists emphasis that if market failures arise in domestic markets, 
then the most appropriate policy interventions would be to devise policies targeting at correcting 
those domestic market failures, while free trade is maintained externally. 
Findings from empirical assessment of the effects of regional FTAs on trade indicate that 
economic theory might be able to approximate reality. One important result of this part of the 
study suggests that three regional FTAs, AFTA, CER and MERCUSOR have had an intra-bloc 
trade intensifying effect in recent years, particularly since the early 2000s. This implies that trade 
among members of these economic groupings is higher than their trade with other countries. 
Meanwhile, the EU and NAFTA do not show an intra-bloc trade intensifying effect for any part of 
the study period. The other important result obtained by this study suggests that although AFTA 
member countries trade with each other, comparatively, more than their trade with the rest of the 
world, the intensity of trade between them is less pronounced for the period after the formation of 
AFTA. This implies that AFTA has the characteristic of an “open trading bloc”. Lastly, the 
finding of this part of the study also suggests that AFTA essentially creates rather than diverts 
trade. This means that AFTA’s establishment does not only increase trade among member 
countries but it also boosts trade with the rest of the world.         xiii
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1  The Context of the Study 
International trade has a long historical record, not only from the perspective of the actual 
trade that has been carried out between politically independent countries around the world, but 
also from the perspective of the evolution and debates about trade as an ideological belief which 
influenced economists, policy makers and the general public. The evolution and debates over 
trade as an ideological belief, which subsequently have greatly influenced on trade policies of 
many countries, may broadly be divided into three main eras: (1) the era of mercantilism, which 
was dominant from the 1500s through 1750s, (2) the era of classical economics (from the 1770s 
until 1870s) and (3) the era of neoclassical economics (from 1870s up to the present). 
Since international trade has been given great emphasis (in part because of its importance 
to help improving economic wellbeing of many countries), it is imperative to investigate how the 
thinking about trade has evolved (and changed) over these three eras encompassing the past five 
centuries. Against this backdrop, this thesis attempts to examine the evolution of thinking about 
trade as an ideological belief as well as its influence over trade policy formulation across many 
countries of the world. In addition, this thesis also attempts to empirically examine the economic 
effects brought about by the formation of economic regionalism and regional free trade areas, two 
concepts that revolve around the idea of free trade, which have been pervasive in the twentieth 
century with a special emphasis on the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA).                 2
1.2 Background   
Trade between countries can be traced to the early period of the first century in which 
trading activities were carried out intensively among cities around the Mediterranean Sea.
1 
During these early trading years the social position of traders was, however, low due to negative 
perception about commerce in the eyes of moral philosophers and Christian theologians, who 
viewed trade as having potentially harmful effects on human morality.  
The early Christian Fathers, like the Greek and Roman philosophers
 before them, treated 
economics as a branch of ethics.
2 Viner (1978, 35) noted that they were hostile to commerce as it 
was “associated with fraud and avarice, catering to luxury, and a potential source of moral 
corruption and deterioration of manners”. They were even more hostile to foreign trade. St. 
Ambrose wrote: “God did not make the sea to be sailed over, but for the sake of the beauty of the 
element. The sea is tossed by storms; you ought, therefore, to fear it, not to use it … use it for 
purposes of food, not for purposes of commerce” (cited in Irwin 1996, 17). The negative view on 
merchants, in particular, and trade in general, lessened towards the beginning of the sixteenth 
century as the contribution of trade to economic wellbeing was gradually accepted by the 
majority of the people.   
Economic thinking on international trade may broadly be categorised into two contrasting 
perspectives. One is mercantilist economics, which was at one time dominant, especially during 
                                                 
1 Plutarch (1927, 299) wrote around A.D. 100 indicating the existence of intensive trade during the Greco-Roman 
empire: “…the sea brought the Greeks the wine from India, from Greece transmitted the use of grain across the sea, 
from Pheonicia imported letters as a memorial against forgetfulness, thus preventing the greater part of mankind 
from being wineless, grainless, and letterless.” 
 
2 For example, Aristotle (1932, 51) wrote in Politics in 310 BC condemning the use of money arose from exports and 
imports and treated such non-barter trade as “justly discredited for it is not in accordance with nature, but involves 
men taking things from one another”.    
   3
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries; the other is orthodox classical-neoclassical economics. 
Fundamentally, mercantilists argue that international trade is indispensable and important 
because it improves national prosperity by creating wealth and richness. These could be achieved 
by instituting policies aimed at promoting exports to foreign countries while at the same time 
restraining imports. They argue that exports improve the prosperity and economic wealth whereas 
imports impoverish the people and nation (Child 1693, 160; Pollexfen 1697, 40). Meanwhile, 
mercantilists strongly disfavour the importation of processed goods from foreign countries, 
arguing that it is more beneficial to produce them at home using either local or imported raw 
materials or a combination of both. 
While mercantilists assign too much weight towards exports in their thinking, arguing that 
exports are good but imports are bad, “orthodox” economists in contrast, give an equal weight to 
both exports and imports, expounding that both are equally good. Economists argue that both 
exports and imports are good because they contribute equally to increase economic wealth. The 
exposition that both exports and imports are not only good but also important for economic well-
being is, essentially, the main force behind the idea that all countries in the world should embrace 
free trade. 
The emergence of the idea of free trade is primarily associated with Adam Smith. Since 
the emergence of this idea, which Smith convincingly argued through the use of abstract analysis 
and reasoning in the Wealth of Nations (1776), discussion on international trade among 
economists has been elevated to the level of a doctrine.
3 Since the era of Smith, the doctrine of 
                                                 
3 There is no unique definition of free trade. However, a definition provided by Irwin (1996, 5) is fairly 
comprehensive: “In theoretical terms, free trade generally means that there are no artificial impediments to the 
exchange of good across national markets and that therefore the prices faced by domestic producers and consumers 
are the same as those determined by the world market (allowing for transportation and other transaction costs). In 
practical terms, free trade describes a policy of the nation-state toward international commerce in which trade 
barriers are absent, implying no restrictions on the import of goods from other countries or restraints on the export of 
domestic goods to other markets”.    4
free trade has not only been well-accepted by economists, but for many it has an “iconic status” 
(Krugman 1998, 22). Although the doctrine of free trade has established itself as the orthodoxy in 
the field of economics since the era of classical economics, the opponents of free trade, ranging 
from hostile protectionists to mere market sceptics, emerged time and again with new objections 
(Bhagwati 1998, 1). Moreover, since the period where mercantilist economics was dominant until 
the present time, free trade has faced enormous obstacles to gaining acceptance by politicians and 
policy makers, who influence trade policy formulation of governments in many parts of the 
world. 
Throughout history, the conduct of trade between nations has frequently been interspersed 
with periods heavily influenced by protectionism. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, 
when mercantilist thinking was dominant, trade policy regimes all over the world were heavily 
characterized by protectionist elements. The grip of protectionism loosened somewhat by the end 
of eighteenth century after many people were convinced that free trade was essentially a good 
idea, due in part to the work of economists such as Smith, David Ricardo and John Stuart Mill. 
Consequently, one of the most notable events which occurred in the history of trade was probably 
the adoption of the free trade idea into the commercial policy of Britain in the middle of 
nineteenth century, in particular when the country successfully repealed the protectionist Corn 
Laws in 1846.  
The economic prosperity enjoyed by Britain in the years following its adoption of free 
trade policy induced other countries in Europe to adopt similar trade policy regimes. In particular 
many European countries undertook initiatives to form bilateral trade arrangements with other 
countries aimed at encouraging and promoting trade. Therefore, between 1861 and 1868, almost 
all countries in Western and Central Europe embraced interlocking trade agreements, popularly 
known as the “network of Cobden treaty” (Bairoch 1993, 23; Gomes 2003, 255). One important   5
feature of all these agreements was the incorporation of the Most-Favoured-Nation (MFN) 
clause, which entitled a party to the lowest duties granted to any other party to any other 
agreements. 
The liberal trade regime in the middle of nineteenth century lasted only about three 
decades as the 1870s saw the return of protectionist elements in commercial policies of many 
countries. The strengthening trend of protectionism continued from the 1870s until the out break 
of the First World War (WW1) in 1914 (Capie 1994, 10). Although WW1 ended in 1918, 
protectionism continued to strengthen its grip in commercial policy formulation as many 
countries leaned towards inward looking and “beggar-my-neighbour” attitudes as regard to 
economic affairs with foreign countries. Ever increasing tension over the conduct of trade among 
many countries especially in Europe in this period was arguably one of the factors which 
contributed to the occurrence of the Second World War (WW2) which broke out in 1939 
(Penrose 1953). 
After WW2 ended in 1945, many countries realised that the security and orderly conduct 
of international trade were a necessity in order to ensure sustained economic prosperity for the 
world. Soon after the conclusion of WW2, negotiations on trade relations began to ensure the 
expansion of world trade, this time under the stewardship of the United States.
4 One of the most 
important negotiations was the one that took place in Geneva in 1947 which aimed at coming up 
with a harmonized international order for the conduct of trade. The negotiations reached 
agreement on some core principles over the conduct of international trade such as non-
discrimination, national treatment, and common rules governing anti-dumping and custom 
                                                 
4 The US emerged form WW2 as the most powerful country in the world both in terms of economic and military 
powers replacing Great Britain. Naturally, therefore, the US was expected to take a leadership role in world 
economic affairs by many other countries.    6
valuation, whereby, these elements were then incorporated into the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT). 
Another important initiative undertaken by a number of countries with the purpose of, 
among others, promoting trade between countries after WW2 was the establishment of regional 
trading arrangements. The signing of regional trading agreements arguably occurred in two 
waves. The first wave began in the 1950s and lasted until the beginning of the 1970s while the 
second started in the mid-1980s (Bhagwati 1993, 22-51). The first wave emerged in Europe with 
the signing of the Treaty of Rome in 1957 involving Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of 
West Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands to establish the European Economic 
Community (EEC).  
In contrast to the first wave of regionalism which started in Europe, the second wave of 
regionalism started in the American continents, following a change in the attitude of the US in 
relation to international trade affairs. In the middle of 1980s the US made a conversion from 
pursuing a multilateral-only trade policy it adopted since the formation of the GATT into 
extensive involvement in all facets of trade relations with other countries – multilateral, regional 
and bilateral. This was indeed a major change since during the first wave of regionalism two 
specific proposals were advanced for the formation of free trade areas on a regional basis 
involving the US. These two proposals were the establishment of the North Atlantic Free Trade 
Area and the Pacific Free Trade Area. But none of these materialized because the US opposed the 
proposals. The change came in 1985, when the US signed a free trade agreement with Israel and 
this was followed by the signing of a similar agreement with Canada in 1988.   
Thereafter, regionalism has proliferated in many parts of the world. In Latin America, the 
new Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR) was created in 1991 while old preferential   7
trade agreements (PTAs) like the Andean Pact (ANDEAN) and the Central American Common 
Market (CACM) started a process of renewal in the late 1980s and early 1990s.  In Africa new 
PTAs were formed on the basis of old ones. For example, in 1994 the Union Economique et 
Moretaire Quest, Africaine (UEMOA) was created out of the Communaute Economique de l’ 
Afrique Occideutale (CEAO), and the Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa 
(COMESA) was revived, expanding preferential trade areas for Eastern and Southern Africa 
States (Soloaga and Winters 2001, 2).  In Asia the members of the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN) formed the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) in 1992, and it soon 
became a prominent regional FTA. 
AFTA is probably the most active economic grouping in the whole of Asia. Since its 
establishment AFTA member countries have made considerable progress towards achieving a 
complete economic integration although at times it faced problems and obstacles primarily due to 
unwillingness of some member countries to honour their commitments agreed to under the AFTA 
agreement. The original goal of AFTA was to progressively reduce tariffs on goods traded among 
members to between zero and 5 percent within 15 years starting from January 1993. Under 
AFTA, trade liberalization activities are implemented through a mechanism called Common 
Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT). 
The CEPT divides goods into two categories: (1) fast-track goods for which tariffs would 
be reduced to 0 to 5 percent within 7 or 10 years depending on whether the prevailing tariff was 
below or above 20 percent, and (2) normal-track goods for which tariffs would be reduced more 
slowly within the 15-years timeframe. Subsequently, during the 1993 and 1994 ASEAN Summit 
Meetings, tariff liberalization programs were accelerated. Member countries agreed that the 
liberalization of tariffs on goods in the fast-track should be completed by 2000, and goods in the 
normal-track by 2003 instead of 2008. These trade liberalization schedules apply equally to the   8
original six ASEAN members, Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand and 
Singapore. Four newer member countries of ASEAN, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam 
are allowed longer time frames for their tariff liberalization schedules. 
Pursuing “freer” trade through the establishment of regional FTAs reflects a general 
thinking among economic policy makers to favour a more open and liberal trade policy regimes. 
The emergence of this idea is, however, far from being able to be equated with the idea of free 
trade as originally expounded by Smith. While the idea of free trade is essentially a unilateral 
action, in which it is to its own benefit for a country to pursue free trade with others, the idea of 
freer trade underpinning regionalism initiatives is hinged on the principles of reciprocity between 
members and discrimination against non members. In addition, regionalism initiatives are 
viewed, albeit to a lesser extent, as posing a threat to multilateralism initiatives pursued under the 
auspices of the GATT (and since 1995 WTO) with the aim of achieving freer trading regimes 
based on the principle of non discrimination for all member countries. 
The establishment of a regional FTA carries with it welfare implication not only for 
members who join the grouping but also for the rest of the world. There is a continuing debate 
over the effects that regional FTAs have on members as well as non members. The received 
wisdom among economists is that non member countries have nothing to gain (instead, they 
might lose out) from the formation of a regional FTA, but opinions are divided whether such 
initiatives improve the welfare of members.   
The welfare implication of regional FTAs was first theorized by Viner (1950). In his 
examination over the formation of customs unions, Viner expounds the concept of “trade 
creation” and “trade diversion”. According to him the establishment of custom unions would 
bring different welfare implication to members as compared to non members. Under Viner’s   9
(1950, 43) framework, trade creation is associated with welfare gains to member countries 
through the expansion of trade between partners in accordance with comparative advantage due 
to a shift in the location of production from a high cost member country to a lower cost member 
country. In contrast, trade diversion could result in welfare lost not only to non members but 
members as well because of a shift in the location of production from a low cost third country to 
a higher cost member country. 
1.3 Objectives 
This thesis aims to examine a number of economic issues concerning free trade doctrine, 
regionalism and regional FTAs, in which a specific focus is given to the ASEAN Free Trade Area 
(AFTA). Broadly categorised, this study can be divided into three parts. The first part examines 
the evolution and changes of thinking on trade as an ideological belief and its influence over 
trade policy formulation throughout the history of trade. In this part four issues are analysed and 
examined: 
1)  Analysing the mercantilist thinking of trade (between countries) in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries, when mercantilist economics was dominant; 
2)  Examining the emergence of free trade idea in the middle of eighteenth century, 
especially the expositions of free trade theory by such prominent classical economists as 
Adam Smith, David Ricardo and John Stuart Mill;  
3)  Analysing the theoretical advancements of free trade doctrine as well as debates over its 
virtues in neoclassical economics beginning from the era of Alfred Marshall up to the 
present time; 
4)  Examining actual trade policies and practices across countries during the eras of 
mercantilism, classical and neoclassical economics;   10
The second part of the study analyses the forces that influence the formation of 
regionalism and regional FTAs as well as examines their economic effects as documented by 
prominent empirical research. Specifically another four broad issues are examined in this second 
part: 
1)  Scrutinizing historical evolution and proliferation of regionalism and regional trading 
arrangements; 
2)  Discussing the issue of regionalism versus multilateralism. This includes the position of 
the General Agreement of Tariff and Trade (GATT) on regional trading arrangements 
including those in existence prior to the signing of the agreement as well as arrangements 
to be established in future; 
3)  Surveying empirical research on the economic effects of regionalism and regional FTAs; 
4)  Examining the forces that influence the thinking of leaders of ASEAN countries in 
agreeing to the formation of AFTA in 1992. 
The third part of the study deals primarily with the empirical investigation of the 
economic effects brought about by the formation of regional FTAs. Two main problems are 
examined in this part. The first problem is the assessment of the effects that regional FTAs have 
on trade of member vis-à-vis other countries that do not become members to any economic 
groupings. The second problem of interest is the examination of the effects of AFTA on trade of 
member against non member countries. In addition, this study also examines whether the 
establishment of AFTA results in trade creation or diversion, the two concepts expounded by 
Viner (1950). 
1.4  Approach of the Study 
In order to shed some light to the issues and questions highlighted in Section 1.3, a 
specific approach is adopted in undertaking this study. For the purpose of examining issues   11
identified as the first and second parts of the study, an extensive literature survey is undertaken to 
analyse the problems of interest. The main aim and focus of the literature research is to 
synthesize the evolution and changes in the thinking of trade in the past five centuries. In 
addition, the two parts of the study also attempt to unearth relevant ideas and events in the history 
of trade which are, perhaps not very familiar to many people, but of importance (implicitly if not 
explicitly), especially to politicians, policy makers and the general public. In the case of the 
doctrine of free trade as an ideological belief, for example, this study not only discusses the 
virtues of free trade but also examines the questions of how and why a number of countries in 
Europe, especially Britain, adopted unilateral free trade policies in the middle of nineteenth 
century.    
Following a common approach to undertaking empirical research, this study employs 
econometric methodology to answer questions grouped in the third part of the study. In this 
regard, the study makes use of econometric modelling techniques to develop econometric models 
that are thought to be the most appropriate for assessing the effects of regional FTAs on trade. To 
this end, structurally, the first part of the study is presented in three chapters (Chapter 2 through 
Chapter 4), the second part is organised into four chapters (Chapter 5-8), while the following two 
chapters (Chapter 9 and Chapter 10) aim to answer questions grouped as the third part of the 
study.  
1.5  Significance of the Study  
Although the virtues of pursuing free trade policy is crystal clear especially among trade 
economists, this idea is not well accepted by politicians, policy makers as well as the general 
public in many countries. Since one important objective of this study is to examine the historical 
evolution of the free trade idea and how it managed to influence trade policy formulation in the   12
past, it is hopeful that this study can provide a demonstration that free trade is not merely a matter 
of theoretical exposition but it can essentially be incorporated into the commercial policy of all 
countries for the benefit of the whole world. 
The other important objective of this study is to assess the forces that influence the 
thinking of ASEAN leaders in agreeing to the establishment of AFTA and to examine economic 
benefits to be gained by member countries due to its establishment. It is hopeful that this study 
will provide insightful information over the forces at work at the time when AFTA was 
negotiated as well as provide an indication as to whether or not AFTA will benefit its members.  
Past studies investigating the effects of regional FTAs produced inconclusive findings 
over the welfare implications that they have on members as compared to non members. It is 
hoped that this study is able to shed some additional light over this issue with the use of a 
different approach and econometric models. In addition, it is expected that this study would be 
able to provide an answer to the question of whether AFTA creates or diverts trade. The answer 
to this question should be of interest not only to trade economists but also to politicians, policy 
makers and the general public. In short, it is hoped that this study contributes to the enrichment of 
literature on international trade.  
1.6 Outline  of  the  Thesis 
In attempting to answer all issues and questions detailed out in Section 1.3, this thesis 
proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 examines the position of trade during the era of mercantilist 
economics. Mercantilism was a dominant force in commercial policy formulation for about two-
and-half centuries between the 1500s and 1750s. This chapter examines the mercantilists’ view 
that international trade is important because it is a vehicle to achieve multiple objectives 
including the accumulation of treasures, the enrichment of national wealth, attaining a favourable   13
balance of trade and creating employment opportunities. This chapter also describes the reasons 
behind the mercantilists’ argument that exports are good, imports are bad. 
Chapter 3 analyses the position of trade in the era of classical economics (between the 
1770s and 1870s). This chapter emphasizes that this era saw the emergence of the free trade idea 
primarily due to Smith’s (1776) Wealth of Nations. This Chapter also examines Smith’s 
criticisms of the mercantilists’ thinking about international trade. In addition, it also analyses 
various theoretical expositions of free trade doctrine as promulgated by other prominent 
economists such as Benjamin Vaugham, David Ricardo, Robert Torrens, John Stuart Mill and 
Nassau Senior. Additionally, this chapter highlights the debates among economists over the 
protectionist British Corn Law. 
Chapter 4 analyses the theoretical advancements of free trade doctrine in the period of 
neoclassical economics starting from the 1870s up to the present time. This includes the 
examination of theoretical debates among economists on the virtues of free trade as well as their 
debates over the superiority of the two main competing trade theories; comparative cost 
advantage originally expounded by Ricardo (1817) and factor proportion theory expounded 
primarily by Eli Heckscher and Bertil Ohlin (1933). In addition, this chapter also analyses actual 
trade policies and practices across countries during this period. 
Chapter 5 examines the evolution of regionalism and regional trading arrangements that 
have occurred all over the world throughout history. This chapter does not only document the 
historical record of economic regionalism in the twentieth century, but also of such arrangements 
which were initiated in parallel with the formation of nation-states at the beginning of the 
eighteenth century.   14
Chapter 6 analyses the issue of regionalism versus multilateralism. This includes the 
discussion on various GATT provisions in relation to treatments to be given to regional trading 
arrangements. In addition, this chapter also examines literature on theoretical research concerning 
the issue of regionalism versus multilateralism. 
Chapter 7 examines literature on empirical research concerning the economic effects of 
regionalism and regional FTAs. Various methodologies and techniques of analysis used by 
researchers as well as their findings are examined and discussed in detail. This is done in an 
effort to build a foundation for this study to proceed to the last part, that is, the examination of the 
effects that regional FTAs have on trade of member in comparison to non member countries. 
Chapter 8 examines the forces which influenced the thinking of the leaders of ASEAN 
countries in agreeing to the formation of AFTA. In addition, this chapter also analyses the 
political economy of AFTA establishment as well as assessing economic benefits to be gained by 
its member countries.  
Chapter 9 and 10 are designed to provide answers to research questions grouped as the 
third part of the study. Specifically, Chapter 9 discusses the methodology and technique of 
analysis to be used for assessing the effects of regional FTAs on trade. The findings of the this 
part of this the study concerning the effects of regional FTAs on trade and the effects of AFTA 
on member vis-à-vis non member countries are presented in Chapter 10. Finally, the summary 
and conclusions of this study are presented in Chapter 11.   15
CHAPTER TWO 
FREE TRADE IN THE ERA OF MERCANTILIST ECONOMICS  
2.1 Overview 
This chapter examines the mercantilists’ thinking on trade especially during the period 
when mercantilist economics was dominant – during the 1500s until 1750s. It also emphasizes 
that mercantilist economics, which viewed foreign trade as a vehicle to accumulate treasures, 
enhance national wealth, achieve favourable balance of trade, maximize employment 
opportunities and protect domestic industries, was in stark contrast to “orthodox economics”. 
According to mercantilists, these objectives could only be achieved through state interventions in 
trade affairs aimed at promoting exports and restraining imports.  In addition, this chapter also 
analyses actual trade policies and practices adopted by countries across the world during this 
period.    
2.2  Free Trade in Mercantilist Economics  
Mercantilism is a term used to explain economic thinking and practice, which was 
pronounced for the period of about two-and-a half centuries between the 1500s and 1750s 
(Backhouse 2002, 58; Landreth and Colander 1994, 36; Magnusson 2003, 46).
5 According to 
Roger Backhouse (2002, 58), this terminology was invented by Marquis de Mirabeau in 1763. It 
became popular when Smith attacked mercantilist economics in his book, the Wealth of Nation 
(1776). Although mercantilist economics touches also other issues – such as individualism and 
the value of profits – the most striking thought of mercantilism is on international trade. There 
                                                 
5 There exists a variation of definitions of mercantilism provided by historian economists. Generally, this term is 
used to explain the economic system that uses state power for the purpose of accumulating precious metals, 
increasing the surplus of exports over imports and building up certain industries. Charles Wilson (1957, 16) for 
example defined mercantilism as “a complex of ideas and policies designed to achieve national power, and 
ostensibly wealth”. 
   16
existed many writers associated with mercantilist economics during this time, of whose ideas 
were translated into the commercial policies of many countries in Europe. Important among them 
included Thomas Smith, Thomas Mun, William Petyt, John Pollexfen, Gerard Malynes, John 
Cary, Richard Cantillon, John Asgill and Charles King. Actually, these were mercantilists based 
in Britain, the centre of the discussions and debates on the thinking of economic affairs. 
Elsewhere in Europe, mercantilist economics was also dominant during this time.
6 
Fundamentally, mercantilists view international trade as important and indispensable. 
Mercantilists argued that trade is an important means to achieve multiple interrelated objectives: 
(1) accumulating treasure or bullions, (2) enhancing national wealth or economic growth, (3) 
achieving favourable balance of trade, (4) maximizing employment opportunities, (5) protecting 
home industry and (6) enhancing state power (Coats 1992, 46). In order to achieve these 
objectives the conduct of international trade must hinge on one important principle; exports must 
be promoted while imports must be restrained (Backhouse 2002, 58; Roll 1992, 64; Viner [1937] 
1975, 3). 
 
2.2.1  Accumulation of Treasures or Bullions 
The aim to accumulate treasures or bullions (precious metals) was the earliest argument of 
mercantilism, which originated in the 1500s (Viner [1937] 1975, 3). During this time many 
nation-states in Europe experienced a shortage of gold and silver bullions, therefore they found it 
difficult to service the expanding volume of trade (Hunt 2002, 20). However, the “bullionist 
doctrine” of early mercantilist thinking could be distinguished from the later “balance-of-trade 
doctrine”, which started to become prevalent in early seventeenth century. While the former 
stressed “on the importance of a favourable balance in each transaction of each merchant”, the 
                                                 
6 Mercantilist writings in other parts of Europe can be found in the works of Charles W. Cole (1931) for France, Lars 
Magnusson (1987) for Sweden and Marjorie Grice-Hutchinson (1978) for Spain.   17
latter “emphasized on the aggregate or national balance of trade” (Viner [1937] 1975, 3). The 
policy to restrict the export of bullions was then introduced not only to attract the flow of gold 
and silver into a country but also to keep them there by prohibiting their exports. In some places 
these restrictions lasted from the late Middle Ages into the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. In 
England, “foreign gold and silver” accumulated through trade were finally allowed to be exported 
in 1663, but “English coin or bullion” could only be legally exported in 1819 (Viner [1937] 1975, 
4)). Spain, the country into which most gold from the Americas, particularly Mexico and Peru 
flowed (Robertson 1973, 31), imposed a ban on the export of gold over the longest period of time 
with “death penalty” for the persons who disregard this rule (Hunt 2002, 20).  
2.2.2  The Promotion of National Wealth  
The notion that international trade will improve national wellbeing as well as act as a 
vehicle to achieve wealth and richness was found even in the early writings of mercantilists. In 
the middle of sixteenth century Thomas Smith ([1581] 1969, 62) wrote: 
God has ordained that no country should have all commodities, but that one lacks, 
another bring forth, and that one country lacks this year, another has plenty thereof 
commonly that same year, to the intent men may know that they have need one of 
another’s help.  
Although some early mercantilist writers such as Thomas Smith recounted natural endowment of 
a country as given by the “Providence”, but these individuals were only ordinary persons 
interested in economics affairs and commercial policies. They were neither theologians nor 
natural law philosophers, thus their writings on economic issues were “amoral and practical, not 
ethical or legalistic” (Irwin 1996, 27).    
The primary thinking of mercantilists in relation to international trade is that foreign trade 
is indispensable and important because it will improve national prosperity by creating wealth and   18
richness. This can be achieved by encouraging exports to foreign countries while at the same time 
restraining imports. Mercantilists argued that exports improve prosperity and economic wealth 
whereas imports impoverish a nation and its people (Child 1693, 160; Pollexfen 1697, 40). 
Additionally, Mercantilists strongly reject the importation of processed products from other 
countries arguing that it is more beneficial to produce processed goods at home using either local 
or imported raw materials.  
Producing processed products domestically is more preferable than importing them 
because these products, after undergoing some transformation will result in more value added 
content thus fetch higher prices. Another reason advanced by mercantilists was that 
manufacturing activities will be able to provide much higher employment opportunities for the 
public as compared to primary activities. In this regard Thomas Smith ([1581] 1969, 65) argued 
that processed products form other countries will “make our own commodities and send it us 
again, whereby they set their people a work and do exhaust much treasure out of realm”; 
therefore “better for us to pay more to our people for these wares than less to strangers”.   
There was a divergence of views, however, among mercantilists over the question of 
whether individual merchants’ pursuit for wealth through involvement in trading activities is 
beneficial or detrimental to a nation. A few writers complained that while on one hand trade 
yields benefits and welfare to merchants, but on the other it will be hurtful and can impoverish 
the nation at large (Malynes 1601, 4; Petyt 1680, 11). On this Petyt (1680, 11) argued that “a 
private trade may be very beneficial to the private trader, but of hurtful, nay of very ruinous 
consequences to the whole nation … particular men may grow rich by trade, whereby the nation 
is impoverished”. The conflict between the interests of traders and the interests of nation formed 
the primary basis for the mercantilists’ support for state interventions and regulations over trading 
activities. Thus for the purpose of ensuring the benefits of trade are accrued not only to traders   19
but also to the state, state control and intervention over trade are thought to be a necessity (Irwin 
1996, 32). 
2.2.3  Favourable Balance of Trade 
For most part of the seventeenth century, mercantilists held that the main purpose of trade 
should be to achieve a favourable balance of trade. Trade with another country was viewed as 
profitable if the value of exports exceeded the value of imports. Hence, the resulting trade surplus 
would augment the accumulation of precious metals and treasure in the country. A favourable 
balance of trade is considered desirable not only based on economic but also on political grounds. 
It is important from the perspective of mercantilist economics because the inflow of precious 
metal will improve liquidity and availability of credit domestically, whereas from political 
standpoint, the accumulation of specie will be useful as a security in times of national emergency 
such as war (Irwin 1996, 35). Mun (1664, 11), an influential mercantilist noted that: “The 
ordinary means therefore to increase our wealth and treasure is by foreign trade, wherein we must 
ever observe this rule; to sell more to strangers yearly than we consume of theirs in value.”  
Recognising the interdependence of exports and imports, especially of barter trade – 
whereby trade is a two-way process of exchanging exports for imports – few mercantilists were 
cautious in proposing measures to restrict imports as a way to achieve favourable balance of 
trade. With this interdependence in mind, mercantilists found it hard to believe that restricting 
imports will improve the balance of trade (Paxton 1704, 61; Robinson 1641, 8). For example 
Henry Robinson (1641, 8) cautioned that “here is worth remembrance that a great part of foreign 
commodities brought for England are taken into barter of ours, and we should have not vented 
ours in so great quantity without taking them”.    20
In addition to state’s measures and interventions aimed at restricting imports, 
mercantilists also resorted to moral suasion in persuading people to reduce imports, especially of 
expensive luxury items (Mun 1621, 56; Pollexfen 1697, 58). Few mercantilists, however, argued 
that state’s interventions should be used as the last resort, particularly if efforts undertaken to 
discourage the public from importing failed. Pollexfen (1697, 58), for example argued that: 
When the balance of trade is against us, if we cannot alter it by increasing the 
expense of our goods there, or by spending in the room of theirs like goods taken 
from another country, from where we may have them on better terms, then the 
safest way (if we can be without such goods) is to discourage the use and expense 
of them by example: if that be not likely to have any effect, then high customs or 
prohibitions may be used, but prohibitions should always be the last remedy, when 
no other way can be found out. 
2.2.4  Maximizing Employment Opportunities and Protecting Home Industries 
By the end of seventeenth century mercantilists argued that economic activities generating 
high value added products and involving extensive processing should be located in the home 
country because they help creating employment opportunities for the people, therefore economic 
activities should be oriented towards exporting manufactured goods rather than raw materials 
(Cary 1695, 130; Petyt 1680, 24). In this connection Petyt (1680, 24) argued that: 
If any nation hath naturally any materials of manufacture, it is far more 
advantageous to export them in manufacture, rather than the raw materials, 
because the manufacture is much more valuable, and will make a return of five, 
ten or twenty times more treasure to the nation than the raw materials. Besides it is 
most dangerous to export the materials of manufacture, since it may transfer the 
manufacture itself into some neighbouring nations…. But if foreigners will vend 
their raw materials of manufacture, it is necessary, or highly convenient, for a 
nation to import them, and put them into manufacture at home. 
This line of argument exemplified the thinking of mercantilists, which supported the 
imposition of export taxes on (exported) raw materials while at the same time argued in favour of 
liberalising imports of raw materials to be used in manufacturing processes. Fortrey (1663, 28-  21
29) contented that “all foreign commodities that are useful to improve our own manufactures and 
trade abroad, and cannot be raised here, should be brought into us under easy customs” whereas 
imported goods, especially luxury and consumption items “should pay extraordinary customs, but 
should not be forbidden to be brought in”.  
To mercantilists, the virtue of manufacturing activities is not only because they could 
produce more valuable products, but also due to their capability to generate employment. The 
wages of those employed in export-oriented manufacturing activities are argued to be foreign-
paid income (Child 1693, 3; Clayton 1719, 18). At the turn of eighteenth century it became clear 
to mercantilists that commercial policies could be a useful tool to induce the development and 
extension of the manufacturing sector, which was believed to be of paramount important to the 
economy. In addition, John Asgill (1719, 10) argued in favour of using trade policies for the 
“protection and encouragement” of local manufacturing in his writing on how a government 
could use policies to achieve greater level of domestic employment and output.          
The view in favour of using commercial policies to restrict imports which compete 
directly with locally manufactured goods was pronounced among mercantilists at the end of 
seventeenth century as could be found in many writings. This kind of propositions continued to 
be dominant in the first half of eighteenth century. Joshua Gee (1729, 111) contended that “it will 
be a maxim to observe by all prudent governments who are capable of manufactures within 
themselves, to lay such duties on foreign as they may favour their own and discourage the 
importation of any of the like sort from abroad.” David Clayton (1719, 18) was even bolder: 
“Whatever trade, or branch of trade, bring in any manufactured goods that interfere with what is 
being made among ourselves, is in its direct tendency and consequences injurious to the nation.” 
Similarly King (1721, 5) argued that: “trade is eminently bad, which supplied us with the same 
goods as we manufacture ourselves, especially if we can make enough for our consumption.”    22
2.3  Trade Policies and Practices during the Era of Mercantilism 
In Europe, trading activities during the era of mercantilist economics were conducted 
under various restrictions in consonance with the prevailing thinking of that time (Hunt 2002, 
21). Trade restrictions were pervasive both in prosperous nations (such as England and the 
Netherlands) as well as poorer countries in Eastern Europe. The mercantilist economics which 
centred on the competitive struggles between nations, propounded that economic relations with 
another country was a “zero-sum game”, whereby one country’s gain could only be achieved at 
the expense of another (Appleyard and Field 1995, 19). This thinking exerted great influence on 
the setting up of trade policies, of which the primary aim was to acquire sufficient revenue and 
accumulation of treasure and wealth (Backhouse 2002, 58). The struggle between England and 
the Netherlands was not only limited to the conduct of trade between them, but also stretched 
over the control of the “middleman role” of trade in Europe. For most of seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries the Dutch was very much in control of the trade (Daunton 1995, 536; 
Robertson 1973, 30). Daniel Defoe noted in 1728 that the Dutch were “… the Carriers of the 
World, the middle person in trade, the factors and brokers in Europe” (cited in Daunton 1995, 
536).  
The control over trade by the Dutch produced lucrative businesses for their companies as 
many economic activities and related industries such as shipbuilding, freight, marine insurance, 
warehousing and processing were abundantly available. This prompted English to devise policies 
aimed at wresting the control of trade from the Dutch, as evident by first, the enactment of the 
Navigation Law and followed by its subsequent amendments, in 1651, 1660, 1662 and 1663, a 
span of only twelve years. The laws had various provisions aimed at strengthening English’s 
involvements as a “middleman” in trade and to deny other countries from getting access to 
opportunities derived from the growing British Empire in the Atlantic and Asia. Daunton (1995,   23
537) noted that “the coastal trade was limited to English-owned ship; import from Europe of 
enumerated articles such as flax and wine had to be carried in ships owned in England or the 
producing country, which cut out Dutch carriers; there was a ban on the import of goods such as 
timber and tobacco through Holland or Germany; and long distance import trades from Asia, 
Africa, and America were confined to English ships which came directly from the country of 
growth or port of first shipment”. The tussle between English and the Dutch continued for a long 
period of time, and by the late nineteenth century England had displaced the Netherlands as the 
“world carrying and entrepot trade” (Daunton 1995, 533). The French were defeated in the 
competition for worldwide empire and London emerged as the world’s financial centre, 
obviously an expensive win financed by taxpayers and consumers in Britain.       
Trade restrictions were particularly enormous if a country experienced a negative balance 
of trade. In 1692 Great Britain imposed high import duties on wine, brandy, salt and vinegar 
coming in from France, a country of which Britain had negative trade balance. The impact of this 
restriction to France was doubly severe because these goods, if they came into England from 
Portugal would be subject to lower duties. In addition, the English prohibited the importation of 
“bonelace”, a material used to manufacture “flankers” as this material was in direct competition 
with locally produced ones (Smith [1776] 1937, 440). As always, the unfair trade practices 
imposed by one country invited retaliation from another; therefore France in return, prohibited 
the importation of English Woollens in 1697. Coincidently, the architect of French commercial 
policy was Jean Baptiste Colbert, a well-known mercantilist who became the Finance Minister in 
1661. Colbert’s trade policy was a truly mercantilist as it was designed to achieve national self 
sufficiency as well as to accumulate treasures through measures aimed at increasing exports and 
reducing imports (Backhouse 2002, 90).    24
Trade disputes in Europe in the middle of seventeenth century were prevalent. Prior to the 
dispute with the English, the French had been in dispute with the Dutch, when France in 1667 
imposed very high duties on a great number of foreign manufactured items. The Netherlands in 
retaliation imposed a ban in 1671 on the importation of wine, brandy and manufactures from 
France. The dispute resulted in heavy consequences; the war between France and the Netherlands 
in 1672 was claimed to be “partly due to this commercial dispute” (Smith [1776] 1937, 434). 
In Britain the use of export and import duties as a measure of protection only heightened 
toward the middle of eighteenth century. Before this period the use of tariffs for protection was 
considerably selective (Daunton 1995, 537). For example, in 1690 with the exception of woollen 
products, which were protected with a duty of 20 percent on import from India and China, the 
average import and export tariff rate was only 5 percent of the official value. During this time 
both duties were mainly used as a means to maximise revenue to the state; therefore import duties 
were high on income-elastic items as well as on sugar and wine, which could not be grown in 
Britain.  
But in the following years tariffs were gradually increased reflecting a shift toward 
protection in addition to efforts undertaken aimed at raising revenue to finance the wars with 
France and the American colonies. Initially protection was given to woollen industry with the 
imposition of a ban on imports of silk-cloth as well as printed and dyed calicoes in 1701. 
Subsequently, import duties on other items were raised in stages to reach the level of 25 percent 
of official value by 1759. Thereafter import duties continued to increase, initially to finance the 
war against the Americans who fought for their independence which started in 1775, and later the 
war against the French which broke out in 1793.   25
During the era of mercantilism the conduct of trade of colonies – encompassing countries 
in three continents, America, Africa and Far East Asia – under the colonial powers of Britain, 
France, Holland, Spain and Portugal, was enormously influenced by the mercantilist policies of 
the colonials. The colonies, being under the direct control of colonials, found that in most cases, 
the laws enacted to achieve mercantilist trade policy of the “motherlands” were extended to them. 
In the case of British colonies for example, laws and regulations were primarily devised to meet 
the following mercantilist objectives of the motherland: (1) to provide protection and 
encouragement to colonial shipping business and industry, (2) to make sure that as much as 
possible imports of colonies from Europe come through British ports and (3) to ascertain that 
products desired by Britain be send to the motherland (Daunton 1995, 537; Robertson 1973, 88).  
2.4 Conclusion 
Between the 1500s and mid 1750s, mercantilists exerted great influence over trade 
policies in many countries. As a result, the conduct of international trade during this period was 
carried out under enormous restrictions. The main idea behind this is the notion that economic 
relations between countries were essentially a “zero-sum-game”, whereby one country’s gains 
could only be achieved at the expense of others.            26
CHAPTER THREE 
FREE TRADE IN THE ERA OF CLASSICAL ECONOMICS 
3.1 Overview 
This chapter examines thinking about trade during the era of classical economics which 
encompasses a period of about 100 years. Subsequently, it analyses the expositions of the theory 
of trade by prominent classical economists, in which among others include Adam Smith, David 
Ricardo, Benjamin Vaugham, James Mill, Robert Torrens and John Stuart Mill. In addition, this 
chapter also analyses factors that influenced the thinking of British policy makers in adopting a 
unilateral free trade policy in the middle of nineteenth century, which resulted in the repeal of 
protectionist Corn Law in 1946. This chapter also examines what influence that the change in 
Britain’s trade policy orientation has had over the commercial policy formulation in other 
countries in Europe. Finally, this chapter analyses trade policies and trade practices across world 
major trading countries during this period. 
3.2  Free Trade Theory in Classical Economics 
Classical economics was prevalent for a period of slightly more than one hundred years 
arguably starting from the publication of Adam Smith’s book, An Enquiry into the Nature and 
Causes of the Wealth of Nations (1776) until the 1890s (Landreth and Colander 1994, 61; O'Brien 
2003, 112). The publication of this book as well as the teaching of Smith at the University of 
Glasgow in the 1760s created a sharp break in the thinking of international trade, from 
mercantilism to orthodox economics. Additionally, a number of other economists contributed 
their ideas and analyses for the augmentation of the free trade doctrine, thus firmly established 
the doctrine as the orthodoxy in the field of economics.    27
The initial expositions as well as enhancement of the theory of free trade fundamentally 
began during the time of Adam Smith. In the Wealth of Nation Smith expounded a free trade 
theory when he examined and criticised the effects of mercantilists’ commercial policies on the 
real value of society (or output). On the issue of the balance of trade, Smith ([1776] 1937, 464) 
argued that amid mercantilists’ warning of the imminent impoverishment to be faced by a trading 
nation experiencing a negative balance of trade, the actual evidence indicated the opposite:   
“Every town and country, on the contrary, in proportion as they have opened their ports to all 
nations; instead of being ruin by this free trade, as the principle of the commercial system would 
lead us to expect, have been enriched by it”. 
On the protection of domestic industry from foreign competition, he argued that 
prohibitive duties or outright ban on imports will reduce competition in domestic market, 
allowing local producers to have a monopoly power of the home market. Subsequently, this 
induces them to charge higher prices on goods, which finally results in laziness and 
mismanagement. Smith explained the behaviour and outcome of interactions between individuals 
and marketplace, whereby, individuals always direct their labour and capital to get the best 
possible advantage for their own benefits. Coincidently, however, this pursuit leads to a positive 
outcome for the society. Smith ([1776] 1937, 421) accounted that:  “Every individual is 
continually exerting himself to find out the most advantageous employment for whatever capital 
he can command. It is his own advantage, indeed, and not that of the society, which he has in 
view. But the study of his own advantage naturally, or rather necessarily lead him to prefer that 
employment which most advantageous to the society”. 
Smith ([1776] 1937, 421) also explained that the benefits of international trade come from 
the notion of opportunity cost – the trade offs between alternative activities facing resource 
constraints. Since at any particular time, the amount of capital and labour available in an   28
economy is fixed, output in one sector can only be increased at the cost of taking resources from 
other sectors. Thus, Smith argued against government policy interventions in the economy 
arguing that government policies will not increase output beyond what the available capital can 
support. Government interventions can only divert capital to a direction, which otherwise it 
would not go, and this “artificial direction” is not likely to be more beneficial than it would have 
gone naturally. Further, Smith ([1776] 1937, 424) strikingly accounted the benefits of trade, 
basing his analysis on absolute cost advantages: 
If a foreign country can supply us with commodity cheaper than we ourselves can 
make it, better buy it of them with some part of the produce of our own industry, 
employed in a way in which we have some advantages. It is certainly not 
employed to the greatest advantage, when it is thus directed towards an object, 
which it can buy cheaper than it can make. The value of its annual produce is 
certainly more or less diminished, when it is thus turned away from producing 
commodities evidently of more value than the commodity, which it is directed to 
produce. According to supposition, the commodity that could be purchased from 
foreign countries than it can be made at home. It could, therefore, have been 
purchased with a part only of the commodities, or, what is the same thing, with a 
part only of the price of the commodities, which the industry employed by an 
equal capital, would have been produced at home, had it been left to follow its 
natural course. 
Economists emerged during the era of classical economics continued to refine and 
enhance the arguments in favour of free trade for the setting up of commercial policies. Benjamin 
Vaugham (1788, 25) demonstrated a hypothetical example of how a world with two countries and 
two goods, in which one country specialises in producing one good while another country 
specialises in another good, then exchanging the goods between them through trade, will result in 
each country acquiring higher amount of both goods. He expounded that higher amount of goods 
produced under this situation in comparison to another circumstance, whereby, both countries 
engage in the production of both goods is due to international specialisation of labour.   29
In the early nineteenth century classical economists elucidated the benefits of free trade 
from the perspectives of productivity and efficiency enhancement brought about by the 
international division of labour (Mill 1808, 38; Torrens 1808, 53). James Mill (1808, 38) argued 
that the benefits of international division of labour accrued to countries engaging in international 
trade could hypothetically be envisioned by imagining that the world is a big empire with nations 
and kingdoms regarded as its provinces. In this big empire each province specialises in producing 
one product that suits it mostly and another province producing another product. Through trade 
all provinces will benefit because “by their mutual intercourse they are enable to sort and 
distribute their labours as most peculiarly suits the genius of each particular spot. The labour of 
human race thus becomes much more productive, and every species of accommodation is 
afforded in much greater abundance”. 
Up to the early nineteenth century, the arguments of classical economists over the benefits 
of free trade was hinged on the notion that imported good can be acquired more cheaply abroad 
due to the absolute lower cost of production, popularly known as “eighteen-century rule” (Gomes 
2003, 24; Irwin 1996, 89). Under this rule the case for free trade is obvious if one country has an 
absolute cost advantage in one product while another country has an absolute cost advantage in 
another. Specialization and trade then produce a bigger amount of both products to be available 
for the two countries to consume. This rule is, however, unable to demonstrate the benefit of free 
trade for a situation in which only one country has the absolute lower costs of production in both 
products. Fundamentally the “eighteen-century rule” has failed to answer the question of why a 
country should engage in trade if it has absolute cost advantages in all products, in comparison to 
its trading partners.    30
The answer to this question came in 1817 when David Ricardo expounded the theory of 
comparative cost advantage.
7 Ricardo expounded that international trade is still beneficial to two 
trading countries even in such a situation that only one country has absolute cost advantages in 
producing all products. Ricardo ([1817] 1969, 82) demonstrated in his book, The Principles of 
Political Economy and Taxation an example of how comparative cost advantage works. He 
showed a numerical example of the benefit to both Portugal and England, when they involve in 
trading two products, wine and cloth under the situation of Portugal having absolute cost 
advantages in both commodities but enjoying only comparative cost advantage in wine. In 
essence Ricardo’s example can be depicted as in Table 3.1.  
Table 3.1 
Ricardo’s Production Condition in England and Portugal 
 
Labour Requirements in Production 
Countries 
Wine Cloth 
Portugal 80  men/year  90  men/year 
England  120 men/year  100 men/year 
(Source: Ricardo, [1911] 1969, page 82) 
Ricardo expounded that although Portugal has absolute advantages in both wine and 
cloth, but it enjoys a comparative advantage only in wine production, whereas in cloth 
production, it suffers a comparative disadvantage. Therefore, it is more advantageous for Portugal 
to produce only wine while letting England to produce cloth, then exchanging the two goods 
through trade. Portugal has a comparative advantage in wine production because to produce one 
                                                 
7 Few classical economists such as Emanuel Leser and R. A. Seligmen argued that the credit for expounding the 
theory of comparative cost advantage should be assigned to Robert Torrens, since his Essay on the External Corn 
Trade written in 1815 contained few sentences conveying a similar message as expounded by Ricardo in 1817. 
However, according to Jacob Viner ([1937] 1975, 442), Ricardo is entitled to the credit because he was the first to 
give “due emphasis to the doctrine, for first placing it in an appropriate setting, and for obtaining general acceptance 
of it by economists.” Further, Viner insisted that the theory “was never an integral part of Torrens’ thinking.”    31
additional unit of wine it needs to divert only 8/9 men/year from cloth into wine production. This 
is better since to produce one additional unit of cloth it needs to divert 9/8 men/year from wine 
production. Naturally then, England enjoys a comparative advantage in cloth production but 
suffers a comparative disadvantage in wine production. 
Ricardo’s brief exposition of the theory of comparative advantage induced other 
economists to further augment this theory. James Mill (1821. 87) helped providing a greater 
clarity of the arguments in relation to the theory of comparative cost advantage: 
When a country can either import a commodity or produce it at home, it compares 
the cost of producing at home with the cost of procuring from abroad; if the later 
cost is less than the first, it imports. The cost at which a country can import from 
abroad depends, not upon the cost at which foreign country produces the 
commodity, but upon what the commodity costs which it sends in exchange, 
compared with the costs which it must be at to produce the commodity in 
question, if it did not import it. 
In addition James Mill (1821, 89) argued that the benefit enjoyed by a country is due to the 
products received (import) but not from the products it gives away (export) because a country 
“gain nothing in parting with its commodities”. He also stressed that the products exported are 
essentially the cost of acquiring imports.   
In arguing for the case of free trade in policy debates (in this era), however, most 
economists relied not on the abstract theory of comparative advantages, but rather on an 
efficiency argument associated with absolute cost advantages (Gomes 2003, 42; Irwin 1996, 93). 
The theory of comparative advantage, however striking, did not become a leading part of the 
classical cannon until John Stuart Mill gave its prominence in his Principles of Political Economy 
(1848). J. S. Mill’s book contained a concise yet penetrating account of the benefits of trade and 
the costs of protection. He also lucidly illustrated the static argument of how total world output 
and individual country consumption increase with international specialization and trade. In   32
addition, J. S. Mill ([1848] 1920, 581) argued that trade will have an important indirect effect;  it 
helps advancing production techniques and technologies since “the tendency of every extension 
of the market to improve the processes of production” which benefits the world at large because 
“whatever causes a greater quantity of anything to be produced in the same place, tends to the 
general increase of the productive powers of the world”.  
3.3  Trade Policies and Practices during the Era of Classical Economics  
Trade policies and practices in the early period of classical economics were characterised 
by the continuation of commercial policies of the previous period, which leaned toward 
mercantilist thinking. The economic argument in favour of free trade became to be accepted by 
both policy makers and the general public only toward the end of eighteenth century. In Britain, 
William Pitt, an enthusiastic student of Adam Smith became Prime Minister in 1784, and he 
immediately began putting free trade ideas into practice (Armitage-Smith 1898, 9; Hirst 1925, 7; 
Semmel 1970, 9). In particular, he took efforts to address problems of excessive smuggling 
activities on goods, which in parts, due to incredibly high import duties. Originally these goods 
were imposed with high duties to finance the war against the Americans a decade earlier. 
Accordingly Pitt reduced import duty on tea from 119 percent to 12.5 percent. Although the tariff 
rate was reduced, the government revenue collection remained about the same as before, partly 
because the smuggling activities were brought to a halt, and also due to high elasticity of demand 
for imported tea. Pitt also improved trade relations with neighbouring countries including France, 
in which a treaty was signed allowing the exchange of various goods at liberal terms. As a result, 
wines from France could now be brought into England at the same duty as that of wines from 
Portugal. However, the fledgling liberal bilateral trade regimes of the two countries lasted only 
twelve years, as it was halted by the French War in 1793.      33
Wars always pose serious problems for trade, not only that trading activities have to be 
carried out under extremely high risks, but also because it provides a great opportunity for 
elements of protection to flourish. During the French War (1793 – 1815), export and import 
duties as well as other internal taxes in Britain were increased for purposes of collecting 
additional revenue to finance the war. This original intention, however, succumbed to the 
pressure of interest groups seeking protection for their products against competition from foreign 
producers. In Britain Pitt initially believed that the war with France would not be long, and 
resorted to loans for financing the war. Soon after he found this was inadequate, thus import 
duties and other taxes were gradually increased. When the war ended in 1815, Britain found its 
people overburdened with excessive and multiple kinds of taxes, as cogently summarized by 
Sidney Smith (cited in Hirst 1925, 13): 
The schoolboy whips his taxed top; the beardless youth manages his tax horse, 
with a taxed bridle, on a taxed road; and the Englishman pouring his medicine, 
which has paid 7 percent, into a spoon which has paid 15 percent, flings himself 
back upon his chintz bed, which has paid 22 percent, and expires his arms of an 
apothecary, who has paid a licence of 100 pound for the privilege of putting him 
to death. His whole property is then immediately taxed from two to ten percent. 
Beside the probate, large fees are demanded for burying him in the channel.   
3.3.1  The British Corn Law Controversies 
In Britain, during the period of classical economics, a spectacularly controversial debate 
among economists as well as the general public occurred over the commercial policy associated 
with the Corn Law. The law was enacted just after the end of the French War in 1815 with the 
purposes of ensuring adequate supply of corn and stabilizing the price of agriculture produce 
(Grampp 1993, 39), therefore, provided protection to British landlords as well as farmers 
(Daunton 1995, 546; Hirst 1925, 14). Essentially, biased policy toward granting protection to 
agriculture started well before the Corn Law. In 1773, an act was enacted restricting the   34
importation of wheat at zero duty; wheat can only be imported if its domestic price was above 48 
shillings a quarter.
8 This provision was supplanted with another act in 1791, of which an 
incentive was introduced in the form of export bounty (subsidy) to encourage the exportation of 
wheat when the price fell below 44 shillings. 
Under the Corn Law the importation of foreign corn was forbidden when the local price 
of wheat was below 80 shillings per quarter (Gomes 2003, 172; Hirst 1925, 15). Despite 
elaborative efforts aimed at achieving price stability with the enactment of the Corn Law, the 
price of wheat increased incredibly. Francis Hirst (1925, 15) noted that within a two-year period 
the prices of wheat increased by more that 100 percent: “in January, 1816 wheat was 52s, 6d., in 
January 1817, 103s, 1d., in June, 1817, 111s, 6d., per quarter”.         
The Corn Law was particularly controversial from the economic point of view because it 
attracted some kind of support from Thomas Malthus, another prominent classical economist. 
Malthus was a supporter of free trade in general, but on grain trade, he was particularly 
concerned with the security of food supply and the role of agriculture to the state. Malthus (1815, 
10) argued that in any case trade in grain must be “… that a free trade in corn in all ordinary 
cases, not only secure a cheaper, but a more steady, supply of grain”. These requirements would 
be difficult to achieve under unilateral free trade initiatives with the absence of formal trade 
agreement with trading partners. For example at a time when there is a general crop failure, grain 
exporting countries would act to protect their domestic interests and tend to impose export 
restrictions. Malthus further argued that this situation would limit the ability of Britain to import 
                                                 
8 It is possible to trace a commercial policy aimed at ensuring the stability of agriculture prices and fair return to 
farmers and landlords to the period as early as 1670 whereby there existed a provision in the law allowing for the 
imposition of high import duty of 16s on wheat when its price was less than 53s, 3d. However this policy was 
uncontentious until the 1750s because it brought no impact to the general public as up to this time Britain was 
actually a net exporter of grains, thus the provision of the law was never evoked (Daunton 1995, 546).     35
sufficient amount of grain, hence exacerbate price fluctuations and jeopardize food supply in the 
country.  
Malthus contended that landlords are important to the economic development and the 
prosperity of the state. He also argued that the free importation of grain will have far reaching 
consequences. Abundantly available and competition from foreign grains first reduces domestic 
production of grains, and subsequently pushes down rents on land due to a lower land-demand 
for crop cultivation. This in turn reduces the income of landlords, the class of people who 
supports livelihoods of many others, and consequently lowers aggregate demand in the country. 
Malthus (1815, 33) believed that competition from foreign grains poses a serious problem 
because “… here is a reason to fear that it may be accompanied with an actual diminution of 
home demand”. Malthus acknowledged that the contribution of landlords to the state is not only 
in terms of producing goods domestically, but more importantly because of the contribution of 
their capital and opportunities to provide jobs to the public. Malthus also argued that the 
existence of landlords is closely linked with the prosperity of the state because of the availability 
of land to ensure the security of food supply. Malthus (1815, 35) noted that “it may truly be said 
that though they do not so actively contribute to the production of wealth, as either the classes 
just noticed [labour and capital], there is no class in society whose interests are more nearly and 
intimately connected with the prosperity of the state”. Additionally he claimed that landlords 
form the backbone of domestic demand for manufactured goods. If the income of landlords were 
to be severely affected by free trade in grain, the repercussion to the manufacturers would also be 
untenable. This is because the consumption of landlords “afford the most steady home demand 
for the manufactures of the country, the most effective fund for its financial support and the 
largest disposable force for its army and navy”.   36
Malthus’s support of the Corn Law drew torrents of opposing responses from other 
economists. Ricardo contended that the law will increase nominal wages throughout the whole 
economy, and therefore, will adversely affect manufacturers and drove down profits. Ricardo 
([1815] 1951, 25) also argued that the benefits of free trade in grain come from two sources. One 
benefit is through an increase in profits due to availability of cheap food, which is beneficial “to 
those derived revenue from the employment of their capital, either as farmers, manufacturers, 
merchants or capitalists”.  Another benefit is due to abundance of food supply to the people, in 
which “the same revenue becomes efficient in procuring a greater amount of the necessaries and 
luxuries of life”. Ricardo ([1815] 1951, 237) further stressed the importance of lower food prices 
caused by free trade in order to induce capital accumulation and elevate economic growth beyond 
the static efficiency gains: 
Beside the impolicy of devoting a greater portion of our labour to the production 
of food than would otherwise be necessary, thereby diminishing the sum of our 
enjoyments and the power of saving, by lowering profits, we offer an irresistible 
temptation to capitalists to quit this country, that they may take their capitals to 
places where wages are low and profits high. If landlords could be sure of the 
prices of corn remaining steadily high, which happily they cannot be, they would 
have interest opposed to every other class in the community … to give a moderate 
advantage to one class, a most oppressive burthen must be laid on all other classes.        
Robert Torrens also opposed the Corn Law and argued for its repeal. Besides expounding 
similar arguments as Ricardo did on the benefits of free trade in grain for capital accumulation 
and enhancing economic growth, he argued that Britain will arrive at a stationary state of 
economic growth if the law were there to remain for a long period of time. He also claimed that 
return to capital will diminish when a lower quality of land has to be used in quest to increase the 
amount of crop production. Torrens (1827, 214) accounted that: “Under any given degree of skill 
and economy in the application of labour, the return upon capital will be determined by the 
quality of land in cultivation; and as inferior soils are resorted to, the rate of profit will   37
consistently diminish, until the stationary state is attained, in which no additional capital can be 
employed”. 
James Mill also responded to Malthus’ arguments. Mill expounded that efficiency gains 
from free trade will naturally be attained because importable goods could only be procured 
through producing exportable, then exchanging them. When actual trade takes place, the 
economics behind this is that it occurs as if exported labours were employed at home to produce 
the importable. The gain from free trade will be unambiguous “because it will procure more corn 
by going in the shape of commodities to purchase corn abroad, than if it had been employed in 
raising it at home”. Therefore, a law “to prevent the importation of corn, can have only one effect 
– to make a greater portion of the labour of the community necessary for the production of its 
food” (cited in Gomes 2003, 182).    
3.3.2  The Coming of Free Trade to Britain 
Besides stern criticisms over the Corn Law that came from classical economists, the law 
also drew massive protests from other groups in Britain, which finally resulted in the repeal of the 
law in 1846. At least three forces that worked in tandem, which could be associated with the 
demise of the Corn Law. Firstly, the poor economic conditions faced by ordinary people in the 
early nineteenth century, in particular due to (temporary) declining state of manufacturing 
activities and poor harvest of grain, thus created worries about food security. Secondly, the 
emergence of Anti-Corn Law League, a strong lobbying group, which pressured the authority to 
repeal the law. And finally, the adoption of free trade ideology among the majority of legislatures 
and bureaucrats, headed by Robert Peel who became British Prime Minister in 1841. 
In the early nineteenth century Britain faced a serious economic deflation. As of 1841, in 
many manufacturing towns such as Leeds and Nottingham, working hours of mills initially had   38
been cut short, only for the mills to be completely shut down soon later. The majority of the 
people faced difficulties to carry on with their normal lives and terribly distressed as the number 
of unemployment increased. The condition of the working class in 1841 was in horrible state, as 
accounted by Richard Cobden: “The sufferings throughout the country were fearful … there are 
thousands of houses in England at this moment where wives, mothers, children are dying of 
hunger” (cited in Morley 1881, 190). The standard of living which had been on the increase since 
the early eighteenth century started to decline in the early 1800s, and the declining trend reversed 
only after 1850s (Daunton 1995, 435). Many quarters, including the general public, partly blamed 
the protectionist policy embedded in the Corn Law as the main cause.   
Another force, the Anti-Corn Law League led by Cobden, was initiated and formed by 
Manchester textile manufacturers in 1838. The other prominent figures in the league included 
John Bright, a carpet manufacturer based in Rochdale and James Wilson, a Scottish journalist 
who founded the  Economist  magazine. The ultimate aim of the league was to pressure the 
government of Britain to repeal the Corn Law, arguing that besides denying the availability of 
cheaper goods to the public, higher British food prices due to agriculture protection implied lower 
real wages of workers and depressed their standard of living. At the same time British 
manufacturers were furious since they were unable to export their products to many European 
countries because these countries demanded reciprocal excess of grains to British market (Gomes 
2003, 250; Morley 1881). Apparently British manufacturers began to loose their competitiveness 
in other markets due to higher cost of domestic labours (Semmel 1970, 133).   
Ideological belief among the people who have the power to decide over commercial 
policies was paramount in helping the adoption of liberal trade regime. It was possible for Britain 
to change its policy from protectionism to free trade because Robert Peel, the Prime Minister 
himself subscribed to free trade ideology (Bhagwati and Irwin 1987, 109-130; Hirst 1925, 29-31;   39
Irwin 1989, 41-59).
9 However, even under this circumstance, free trade idea was not easily 
accepted by politicians, policy makers and the general public in Britain. Since the time of Adam 
Smith, although free trade doctrine managed to establish itself as the orthodoxy of economics, 
free trade idea was treated with scorn and criticism by the majority of people. Only after the 
enactment of the Corn Law in 1815, the discussions, especially in the hall of Parliament, over the 
nature and validity of economic arguments favouring free trade became pronounced. Semmel 
(1970, 133) noted that by the 1840s “free traders were present in sizeable numbers in the lower 
house”. Therefore, free trade idea started to take hold in the thinking of many people and it was 
successfully translated in many legislations. Notwithstanding this though, the repeal of the Corn 
Law was never a simple case as Peel faced resistance from his own party, and the repeal went 
through in Parliament quite dramatically. Peel contemplated resigning as Prime Minister in 
December 1845 after his recommendation for the repeal had been backed by only three of his 
Cabinet Members (Semmel 1970, 145). However, he was later persuaded to hold on to power 
after his colleagues retracted and compromised, and in February 1846 he announced a complete 
repeal of the Corn Law, which to take effect in 1849 (Gomes 2003, 250; Grampp 1993, 94).  
Although the announcement to repeal the Corn Law was made in 1846, essentially the 
gradual process of trade liberalization on goods other than grains started much earlier, albeit on a 
piecemeal basis. During 1824 and 1825, most import and export duties were brought down to 20 
percent, while over 1000 customs tariff classifications were simplified and repealed. Few years 
earlier (in 1822), a process of revising Navigation Laws had started until they were completely 
repealed in 1849. The process of liberalization became more aggressive after the repeal of the 
                                                 
9 Robert Peel became Prime Minister representing the Conservative Party, which was aligned to agriculture-
protectionist group of landlords. Arguably he subscribed to free trade ideology long before becoming Prime Minister, 
but he, together with other Conservatives, considered agriculture protection was justified as a special case for Britain. 
However by 1845 he found that justifications for agriculture protection were no longer valid and started arguing for 
the repeal of the Corn Law. For detailed accounts of the change of Peel’s view over the Corn Law, see Douglas Irwin 
(1989, 41-59).   40
Corn Law, and by 1860 all the remaining protectionist tariffs on manufactured goods were 
abolished. By this time only a few imported consumption goods were still in the list of taxable 
items of which they “either were not produced at home or were already subject to domestic 
excise taxes” (Gomes 2003, 252). These were such items as tea, sugar, tobacco, wines and spirits, 
imposed for purposes of revenue collection. The amount of duties collected on these items was 
substantial to Britain, contributing about 87 percent of Customs revenue in 1861. 
3.3.4  The Era of Low Tariffs across Countries, 1860s-1870s  
The era of low tariffs (1860s-1870s) across many countries of the world had a strong 
connection with the successful repeal of the British Corn Law. Economic prosperity attained by 
Britain in the years after the repeal of the law influenced other countries in Europe to adopt a 
similar trade policy. Encouraged by the boom years of the 1850s, many British proponents of free 
trade, especially Cobden
10 began to envisage the possibility of achieving free trade all over 
Europe (Armitage-Smith 1898, 145; Bairoch 1993, 23; Marsh 1999, 9), and this idea was shared 
and promoted by the people at the Britain’s Board of Trade, as well as by diplomatic missions in 
the capital of Europe (Gomes 2003, 254; Marsh 1999, 21). 
In an effort to promote trade in general and free trade in particular, the private sector in 
collaboration with Britain government held the Great Exhibition of 1851 in Hyde Park, 
showcasing British supremacy in industrial products and commercial activities. This exhibition 
impressed foreign visitors over the marvels of British technology and industrial prowess, and also 
of the self-confidence of British entrepreneurs. All these were claimed to be the result of British 
                                                 
10 Cobden envisaged a free trade for the whole of Europe even in his speech on the repeal of the Corn Law delivered 
in the House of Commons on January 15
th, 1846: “I believe that if you abolished the Corn Law honestly, and adopt 
free trade in its simplicity, there will not be a tariff in Europe that will not be changed in less than five years to 
follow your example” (cited in Armitage-Smith 1898, 145).   
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adoption of the policy of free trade. Hence, to many people the British’s case proved that “free 
trade brought progress, prosperity and national contentment” (Gomes 2003, 254).  
The economic prosperity enjoyed by Britain in the 1850s induced the French to agree for 
the negotiations of a trade treaty with British in 1859. The architects of this treaty were Cobden, 
on Britain’s side and Maurice Chevalier on the other.
11 Chevalier, a free trader and economics 
professor at the College de France, who headed the negotiations for France, managed to convince 
the French Emperor, Napoleon III to agree for France to sign a trade agreement with Britain, 
named the Anglo-French Commercial Treaty in 1860, after taking just one year of negotiations. 
The swift conclusion of the treaty could be associated with a number of reasons.  
First, the experience of British in attaining prosperity and economic wellbeing under a 
unilateral free trade policy provided them with additional confidence to bring forwards tariff 
reductions on a few items of interest to France, in particular wine and brandy. Duties on these 
items were originally classified as “revenue duties”, which had been contributing significantly to 
the coffer of Treasury (Marsh 1999, 15). The swift of Britain’s action in cutting their tariffs 
provided stimulus to France in adopting the same attitude over commercial policies. 
Second, Napoleon III inclined to believe that lower tariffs would increase the 
competitiveness of French industries and also would improve the standard of living of the 
working-class by lowering consumer prices, a thinking that was in consonance with free traders. 
In addition, the political system of France of that time provided the Emperor with the power to 
make decisions on matters relating to international commerce without the need to refer to 
legislatures. To avoid any complications the treaty was negotiated in secrecy, thus it was 
concluded without the support of parliamentary deputies, business community, and industrialists, 
                                                 
11 This treaty was popularly known later as Cobden-Chavalier Treaty, see for example O’Rourke and Williamson 
(1999, 38) and Peter Gourevitch (1986, 72)   42
in which the majority of whom were the proponents of protection. French industrialists argued 
that the treaty would be bad for the country. Comparing the items traded bilaterally with Britain, 
they argued that France’s industrial exports played a far smaller role than that of Britain, thus 
there was “no synchronisation of business interests between the two countries” (Gomes 2003, 
254). Of course this argument was in sharp contrast with the argument advanced by free traders, 
who argued that the least controversial aspect of trade between these two countries would be the 
trade of goods which occurred due to differences in endowments. In this situation, since the 
imported goods were not in direct competition with locally produced items, everyone will gain 
from trade. However, to the French that had personal interests, the home market was a paramount 
importance; their continued prosperity, together with that of thousand of workers, depended on 
the protection of the local market which was now threatened by the Treaty’s provisions for tariff 
cuts. 
Third, there was an inclination on both sides to ease political tension between the two 
countries. As far as Britain was concerned, a commercial treaty with France was important to 
avoid any intention of Napoleon III in advancing its political power across the English Channel; 
and the victory of France over Austria in northern Italy was a great concern. Therefore many 
people in Britain “believed that the road to peace could be secured only when the people of each 
nation learnt to be dependent by supplying each other material needs” (Marsh 1999, 10). Similar 
intention was also apparent on the part of France, particularly the Emperor himself. Facing 
difficulties with the new developments in northern Italy, in particular with the defeated Austrians 
who refused to mollify, and Italian nationalists, who proceeded to unify themselves, Napoleon 
was in need of peace with other neighbours, especially Britain.  
Under the terms of the agreement, which was to be effective for ten years until 1870, 
France was supposed to abolish all prohibitions imposed on British industrial goods and replaced   43
them with import duties, initially not exceeding 30 percent ad valorem, and further reduction to 
25 percent after four years. Meanwhile, Britain would impose no duties on a large number of 
French products with the exception of wine and brandy. As for these two items, the duty structure 
was based on the strength of alcoholic content. The lowest duty was imposed on wine of the 
lowest strength at 1s. per gallon, followed by medium strength (1s. 9d.), high strength (2s. 5d.) 
and spirit (2s. 11d.). Tariff concessions granted by Britain was significant since the level of duty 
on wines had been nearly 6s. per gallon (Marsh 1999, 15). 
The most remarkable effect brought about by the Anglo-French Commercial Treaty of 
1860 was the chain reaction it produced. Between 1861 and 1868, almost all countries of Western 
and Central Europe embraced trade agreements interlocking each other, known as the “network 
of Cobden treaties” (Bairoch 1993, 23; Gomes 2003, 255), all incorporating the Most-Favoured-
Nation (MFN) clause. At the same time of the negotiations with France, Britain proposed similar 
trade treaties with Spain, Portugal and Austria and later negotiated such treaties with Belgium, 
Italy, and the Zollverein. Meanwhile, France negotiated trade treaties with many European 
countries including Belgium, Prussia, Italy, Switzerland, Sweden and Norway. 
Following the Anglo-French Treaty, France signed similar treaties with Belgium and 
Prussia in 1862 (ratified by the Zollverein in 1865), Italy in 1863, Switzerland in 1864, Sweden, 
Norway, the Hanse Towns, Spain and Holland in 1865, Austria in 1866, and Portugal in 1867. 
Similarly, Britain concluded trade agreements with Belgium in 1862, Italy in 1863, and the 
Zollverein and Austria in 1865. In later years the Zollverein not only signed commercial treaties 
with European countries, but also with Mexico and Japan. In 1868 it concluded trade treaties with 
Austria and Spain and in 1889 with Switzerland, Mexico and Japan (Pollard 1974, 117). Even 
Russia lowered import tariffs during the twenty years following its economic policy reform 
which began in the 1860s, in which the most remarkable component was the tariff reduction of   44
1868. The treaties singed by these countries interlocked each other through the MFN clause that 
entitled a party to the lowest duties granted by another party to any other signatories of any other 
treaties. Thus, although every treaty was bilateral in nature, the resulting network was effectively 
multilateral. More important than their formal shape was the consequence of the treaties; each 
new treaty continued to lower the tariff barriers that had fragmented the European market 
previously.      
Across the Atlantic, however, the United States engaged in a different sort of commercial 
policy during the 1860s as compared to European countries. Previously, particularly in the few 
years after 1845, and following the report of Robert J. Walker, then the Secretary of Treasury, the 
United States had to some extent involved in the liberalization of its trade policy (Letwin 1961, 
40; Taussig 1920, 2). For example, in the Tariff Bill of 1846, some of Walker recommendations 
in relation to tariff reductions were approved by the Congress. Walker incorporated in his report 
arguments and justifications for the Congress to liberalize trade, which at that time leaned 
towards protectionism, as underpinned by Alexander Hamilton’s (1791) “Report on 
Manufactures”. Walker’s report recommended for the abolishment of protective barriers given to 
the manufacturing sector arguing that those barriers were erected at the expense of agriculture 
sector and consumers. 
Walker argued that the negative effect of protection granted to manufactured products 
was that it allowed only a small amount of imports of manufactures, especially from Britain and 
other European countries. Consequently, those countries were unable to receive much money to 
be used as an exchange for the importation of agriculture produce from the US. Since the US was 
naturally well endowed with fertile lands and suitable climate, the country was able to produce 
huge amount of agriculture products for export. Unfortunately though, the ability of foreign 
countries to import agriculture products was constrained by the protectionist policy of the US.   45
Walker acknowledged that: “Foreign nations cannot for a series of years import more that they 
export; and if we closed our markets against their imports by high duties, they must buy less of 
our exports or give a lower price, or both” (cited in Letwin 1961, 42).               
The Bill of 1846 gradually reduced import tariffs in the US, and by 1861 tariffs on 
dutiable items were fairly uniform, averaged around 20 percent, with a maximum tariff recorded 
at 24 percent. However, in 1861 the Congress passed the Morrill Act, the first of a series of laws 
imposing higher duties on imports. This initiative was taken by the North, who controlled the 
Congress as a part of efforts to finance the American Civil War (1861-1865) against the South, 
and later it became the opener of floodgate for protectionist interests to demand for higher tariffs. 
The speed of tariff being increased was spectacular, because as of 1864, just in three years, the 
average level of duties was double to 47 percent. It was apparent then “protection was granted to 
any commodity for which it was requested” (Robertson 1973, 370). Import tariffs continued to be 
raised in the subsequent years to reach an average of 60 percent in 1897, this time due to the 
enactment of the Dingley Act.  
3.4 Conclusion 
The doctrine of free trade managed to establish itself as the orthodoxy of economics 
during the period of classical economics. It is imperative to note that this period not only 
witnessed the acceptance of free trade doctrine amongst economists, but also witnessed the 
adoption of the free trade idea in the setting up of trade policies and practices in many countries 
of the world. While the acceptance of the free trade doctrine among economists is primarily due 
to the work of, among others, prominent classical economists such as Adam Smith, David 
Ricardo and John Stuart Mill, the adoption of free trade into trade policies is arguably due to non 
economists, including influential individuals such as Robert Peel and Richard Cobden.      46
CHAPTER FOUR 
FREE TRADE IN NEOCLASSICAL ECONOMICS 
4.1 Overview 
This chapter examines thinking about trade in the period of neoclassical economics which 
emerged in the 1870s. It begins by analysing the expositions of trade theory both in the early and 
later periods of neoclassical economics, of which this chapter emphasizes that 1930 was the 
watershed. This chapter also analyses the debates over the validity of the theory of trade, 
especially on the criticisms by some economists on the theory of comparative cost analysis, in 
particular by Bertil Ohlin. Besides this, it also examines the debates over the virtues of free trade 
in the 1980s and 1990s particularly about the implications brought about by new trade models, in 
which a few economists incorporate imperfect competition and economies of scales into their 
analysis. In addition, this chapter also examines trade policies and practices across many 
countries of the world during neoclassical economics encompassing three main periods: the 
period between the 1870s and 1910s; the period between the two World Wars; and the period of 
the post Second World War. Finally, this chapter analyses the factors that influence policy 
makers of leading trading nations to agree to engage in multilateral cooperation for trade 
liberalization which resulted in the establishment of the GATT in 1947. 
4.2  Neoclassical School of Economics 
The neoclassical school of economics emerged in the 1870s (Landreth and Colander 
1994, 211). The development of a new set of analytical tools – fundamentally driven by marginal 
analysis – for analysing economic phenomena marked the transformation of classical economics 
into neoclassical economics. The extension of the exposition and analysis of trade was primarily 
due to the works of the early neoclassical economists such as Alfred Marshall, Augustin Cournot,   47
Francis Edgeworth, Vilfredo Pareto and Arthur Pigou.
12 In some aspects the works of these early 
neoclassical economists were somewhat different form that of later generations such as Frank 
Taussig, Gottfried Haberler, Frank Graham, Jacob Viner, Eli Hecksher, Bertil Ohlin, Paul 
Samuelson, Ronald Jones, Jagdish Bhagwati, and Paul Krugman.  
At least two aspects of differences could be identified which divided the early and the 
later periods of neoclassical economics.
13 First, the separation was signalled by the development 
of general equilibrium framework mainly in the 1930s, for analysing economic problems in the 
latter as opposed to partial equilibrium in the former. Gomez (2003, 151) argued that: “The 1930s 
was the watershed between the old and the new (or modern) neoclassical economics”. Second, 
the “formalist” approach to economic analysis began to be accepted as the Marshallian economic 
analysis was inadequate to provide answers to many economic phenomena. In the US for 
example, Marshallian economics retained its dominance until the 1930s, but since then the 
formalists’ method of research and analysis became widely adopted, transforming economic 
theories and expositions into a “highly mathematical structure” (Landreth and Colander 1994, 
421).  
4.3  Free Trade in the Early Period of Neoclassical Economics    
The early contribution of neoclassical economics to the trade theory was attributed to 
Augustin Cournot, whose approach to economic analysis shaped “the basic structure of twentieth 
century economics” (Gomes 2003, 92). Cournot’s early contribution was in relation to the 
analysis of international trade in the form of mathematical expressions demonstrating that the 
removal of tariffs causes a country worse off than under tariff protection, in particular when he 
                                                 
12 Some economists describe this period as economics in the age of Marshall, see for example Gomez (2003, 92). 
 
13 The analysis of this Chapter argues the writings of economists prior to the 1930s as contributions to the early 
neoclassical period. Nonetheless, Pigou’s contribution is distinct from the others because he contributed to both the 
earlier and later periods of neoclassical economics.       48
analysed gains from trade measured in terms of money.
14 In his analysis, Cournot ([1838] 1929, 
157) showed that there is a “nominal reduction” of real income in the importing country after the 
removal of tariffs, because the loss to the producers of import-competing products out weights 
the gain to consumers. He then concluded that imports reduce real income in the importing 
country. Cournot’s result, in contrary to the result derived by the use of comparative cost 
analysis, drew criticisms from other prominent economists including Edgeworth, Viner and 
Samuelson (Gomes 2003, 94).  
The most severe criticism perhaps came from Viner who contended that Cournot’s 
argument of the benefit of import duties is so obscure and falls short of establishing a case, so “it 
scarcely deserves attention on its own account” ([1937] 1975, 586). However, Viner 
acknowledged that Cournot argument could not be ignored because his general authority as an 
economist was so high; therefore, his finding was used by protectionists as a proof which refutes 
the doctrine of comparative cost advantage. Referring to Cournot’s argument, Viner contended 
that the loss to producers is at least offset by a corresponding gain to consumers. On the contrary, 
Viner ([1937] 1975, 588) argued that there will be a possible additional gain to consumers 
“because at its reduced price the additional purchases thereof may yield more satisfaction than 
the commodities they replace”.        
Marshall extended the expositions of classical theory of trade by systematically developed 
and refined analytical methods with the use of geometrical diagrams in addition to descriptive 
reasoning. He incorporated in his “value of representative bales” of trade between two countries 
not only the value of labour, as used by the classical economists, but also the value of capital and 
                                                 
14 Ohlin (1933, 563) noted that Cournot’s works on international trade attracted little attention, except for his early 
treatments of economic problems in mathematical forms. According to Ohlin this was “due partly to the fact that his 
conclusions were erroneous” since in his analysis Cournot gave too much weight to the loss of producers of import-
competing goods in comparison to gains to consumers. 
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investment in the analysis of demand and supply of internationally traded goods (Marshall 1924, 
157). Marshall’s analysis was still based on the doctrine of comparative cost advantage as the 
determinant of trade. Although his analysis was based on a barter trade with the non-existence of 
international borrowing and lending, he argued that demand and supply of international trade is 
different from demand and supply of domestic trade. Borrowing the terms of “reciprocal 
demand” introduced by J. S. Mill, Marshall (1924, 160) expounded that trade between two 
countries occurs because reciprocal demand is effected in such a way that “the demand of each 
[country] has its origin in the desires of her people to obtain certain goods from abroad; and her 
supply has its origin in her facilities for producing things which the people of other countries 
desire. But her demand is, in general, effective in causing trade, only in so far as it is backed by 
her supply of appropriate goods; and her supply is active, only in so far as she has a demand for 
foreign goods”. 
In analysing reciprocal demand between two countries, Marshall (1924, 161) showed 
using a numerical “trading schedule” of how two countries, E and G trade on various terms of 
trade or “rates of interchange”. In the trading schedule, on one side he demonstrated that if G’s 
products are scare or limited in E’s market, they will be purchased by only few people of very 
wealthy at very high a price. But if the supply increases greatly, they have to be sold at a lower 
price in order for less wealthy people with less purchasing power to buy. On the other side, the 
same will occur for the selling of E’s products in country G. Finally trade reaches an equilibrium 
point whereby the two countries trade at a particular rate of interchange.    50
Marshall translated his numerical example into a diagram to show the interaction of this 
reciprocal demand. Two curves (known also as offer curves), one for each country, took a 
quadratic form and intersected at the rate of interchange representing trade in equilibrium. The 
gain from trade or “net benefit” was conceived as the area between the two prices bounded by the 
offer curves. Marshall’s offer curves diagram representing his trading schedules is depicted in 
Figure 4.1.  
Figure 4.1 
Alfred Marshall Offer Curves 
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(Source: Marshall, 1924, page 331) 
Note: OE and OG are the offer curves of country E and G, while Ox and Oy (of 
equal scale) represent the corresponding bale of goods of E and G respectively. In 
this diagram Marshall demonstrated that following E offer curve, at point P, E is 
willing to trade OM bales of E goods for only ON goods of G. Similarly, following 
G offer curve, at point p, G is willing to trade pm bales of G goods for only Om 
goods of E. Finally, trade between the two countries would be in equilibrium at 
point A at the specific term of interchange. 
In other words Marshall’s case of “net benefit” is simply the sum of the imported “bales” at 
corresponding unit prices at which a country would have purchased successively up to the point of   51
equilibrium terms of trade. Viner ([1937] 1975, 571) found fault with Marshall interpretation of 
this net benefit, which led him to argue that the result is “invalid”. Viner claimed that Marshall’s 
procedure overestimates the country’s net benefit from trade because Marshall would have 
assumed the importing country’s offer curve remains the same whether the country pays the 
equilibrium or the maximum price for the extra marginal units of imports. In essence this simply 
implies that Marshall would have assumed that the marginal utility of exportables is constant.     
Marshall’s reciprocal demands or offer curves in fact are based fundamentally on 
Edgeworth’s work documented in Mathematical Psychics (1881). Edgeworth (1881, 113) used 
consumer indifferent curves to develop offer curves under the system of barter trade in a manner 
similar to that later used to explain trade theory. Edgeworth defined an offer curve as “the locus of 
the point where lines from the origin touch curves of indifference”. Since the locus of coordinates 
from the origin being the ratio of prices, the offer curve thus summarises the conditions for 
constrained utility maximization; for at all points on the offer curve, the price ratio equals the ratio 
of marginal utilities of two individuals, who involve in trade. 
Another important contribution of Edgeworth to trade theory was the introduction of 
contract curves. He defined a contract curve as the locus of points at which one country’s 
indifference curve is tangent to the other country’s indifference curve. In essence, this locus of 
points implies that one country cannot increase its welfare without decreasing the welfare of the 
other, since at one point the total world output of any goods is fixed. By bringing together the two 
countries offer curves Edgeworth showed that international equilibrium occurs at the intersection 
of the offer curves. 
Pigou provided theoretical arguments over the impact of protective tariffs on revenue and 
income distribution as published in Protective and Preferential Import Duties (1906). He argued   52
that, theoretically, tariff protection can increase the real income of a factor used intensively in a 
protected industry. In a hypothetical country which has only two industries, A and B, tariff 
protection given to industry A will increase the output of industry A and reduce the output of 
industry B. This will, in turn, increase the proportion of output produced by the factor used more 
intensively in A. Therefore, he argued that it is possible, even if the imposition of a tariff reduces 
the real national income (or dividend) as a whole, the absolute return to the favoured factor may be 
improved by it. Pigou (1906, 59) indicated that: “The increase percent in the share of the dividend 
obtained by the favoured factor might exceed the shrinkage percent of the dividend itself”. Further, 
he asserted that free trade will have implication on the international movement of factors of 
production. A tariff, which raises the share of one factor to the national real income, creates 
incentives for international movement of disadvantaged factors. In any case the factor most likely 
to move will be capital, because immigration policy of many countries restricts the movement of 
labours. Thus, even if the imposition of a tariff is disadvantageous in terms of the share of national 
income accrued to labour, immigration of labour might not occur. But he suggested a different 
implication on capital since it is much easier to move from one to another country.      
Another important contribution to the analysis of international trade came from an Italian 
economist, Vilfredo Pareto. Pareto propounded a system of mathematical expositions for analysing 
trade in equilibrium involving a number of different markets. His treatment, based on the prices of 
goods brought some modifications to the traditional trade theory, which was traditionally based on 
the labour theory of value. In a way, Pareto analysis is an extension to the classical Ricardian 
theory of trade in which other economists use in their analysis. In addition, Pareto also developed 
optimality criteria for assessing welfare implication of trade. He argued that, with appropriate 
compensation, free trade causes an improvement in economic welfare. This is achieved so long as 
the group of people who gains from trade (the gainers) could compensate the losers in such a way   53
that the welfare position of the losers prevails as before the trade, while at the same time the 
welfare of the gainers improves. The theoretical underpinning of the Pareto-optimality criterion is 
a breakthrough in trade theory because it provides a method to ascertain whether free trade in 
equilibrium achieves (Pareto) optimality or not. 
In his analysis of tariffs as the measure of protection, Pareto ([1927] 1971, 374) arrived at a 
conclusion that as a general rule “every protective tariff is the cause of the destruction of wealth 
within the country which levies this duty on a good”. On the contrary, the removal of a tariff which 
induces resources to move from a less efficient import-competing industry to a more efficient 
export sector will augment wealth, since under free trade a greater bundle of goods can be obtained 
at lower prices. The gains are even larger if the contracting import-competing sector faces 
increasing cost of production while the export sector enjoys decreasing costs. 
4.4  Free Trade in Neoclassical Economics after the 1930s 
4.4.1  Taussig, Haberler, Viner 
Until the time of Marshall, economists advanced two forces as the determinants of trade 
between nations. First, trade occurs because of absolute cost advantage as originally propounded 
by Smith. At this early stage, the economic argument for free trade was that it is advantageous for 
a country to import, in exchange for its exports, goods which either could not be produced at home 
or could only be produced at a cost absolutely greater than if they are imported. Under free trade, 
every country will gain when all products (abstracting from transportation costs) are produced in 
countries where their absolute costs are the lowest. Essentially, the case for free trade expounded 
by Smith did not exceed this point.    54
Second, trade occurs because of comparative cost advantage as propounded by Ricardo, 
whose argument started from another state of affairs, apparently less favourable to free trade. The 
doctrine of comparative advantage maintains that under free trade each country will specialize in 
the production, thus export goods that it enjoys a comparative advantage in “real costs”. In 
exchange a country imports goods which could be only produced domestically at a comparative 
disadvantage. Such a specialization will result in mutual benefits to participating countries. In the 
exposition of this theory the “real costs” are expressed in terms of the quantities of labour-time 
embodied in the goods produced.      
By the first quarter of twentieth century, the absolute advantage as a determinant of 
international trade was widely accepted as an explanation for the large part of world trade 
(Haberler [1933] 1956, 128). Meanwhile the theory of comparative cost advantage when used to 
explain the cause of trade faced difficulty to be accepted even by some economists. This theory 
was in general accepted by British, American and Italian economists, but met with resistance in 
France and Germany (Haberler [1933] 1956, 122), fundamentally because of the reluctance of 
some economists to accept the labour theory of value. As a result, up to this time the doctrine of 
comparative cost advantage was on the defensive everywhere (Viner [1937] 1975, 438). Partly 
because of this reason, there was a renewed interest among economists to expand the analysis and 
theoretical expositions of trade theory in order to get a complete understanding of the determinants 
of international trade. On one hand a number of influential economists such as Bertil Ohlin, 
Gottfried Harbeler and Edward Mason (Viner [1937] 1975, 510), made it a point to challenge the 
adequateness and validity of the doctrine of comparative cost advantage in explaining international 
trade. On the other, economists including Frank Taussig and Jacob Viner provided their analyses 
and arguments justifying the relevance of this doctrine.   55
Critics against the doctrine of comparative cost advantage mainly pointed to the 
assumptions underlying Ricardo’s analysis of the example of cloth-and-wine trade between 
England and Portugal. It is universally agreed that for Ricardo’s conclusion to be valid, the 
analysis required a number of important assumptions, although Ricardo himself never expressly 
stated. To economists, it is obvious that among the important assumptions underlying Ricardo’s 
analysis include the following: (1) labours, as the only factor of production, are mobile within a 
country while completely immobile between countries, (2) the economy operates under perfect 
competition, (3) it involves only two countries and two commodities, (4) constant labour cost 
regardless of the level of output, (4) there is full employment in both countries and (5) internal and 
external transport costs are zero (Appleyard and Field 1995, 29; Haberler [1933] 1956, 126; Viner 
[1937] 1975, 444). 
Taussig (1927, 3) provided an extended synthesis to the theory of comparative cost 
advantage by presenting examples of three different concepts which are important in explaining 
international trade: absolute, equal and comparative differences in costs. He expounded that trade 
occurs in two of the three situations: the existence of absolute and comparative differences in the 
costs of production in two trading countries. In this regard he found that trade between tropical and 
temperate countries occur mainly due to absolute differences in costs. Meanwhile, he argued that 
goods with equal differences in the costs of production will not be traded; instead both countries 
will produce them to meet their domestic demand. 
He also analysed money wages as well as the prices of goods in relation to international 
trade. In his analysis he distinguished between international and domestic goods. He contended 
that the prices of goods, which subject to export (or import) are the same throughout international 
markets. On the contrary, domestic goods that are not traded internationally at all, will not   56
necessarily have the same price in one country in comparison to another because the prices of 
domestic goods in one country are determined by the effectiveness of its labour (Taussig 1927, 
35). As such was the case, he maintained that high money wages would not necessarily cause high 
prices of domestic goods. Also, high money wages will not necessarily correlate with the 
prosperity of a nation. He claimed that it is a fallacy of the argument which maintains that 
international trade tends to equalize national money wages since wages are also influenced by the 
effectiveness of labour in producing domestic goods.        
In addition to providing extensions to the theory of trade, Taussig also examined to what 
extent trade theory reflects realities. He did this to throw some light on the question of whether 
economic theory can be used as a tool to understand real world phenomena. He used available data 
in coal, brick, glass, and cotton industries of the United States, Belgium, Germany, Belgium, 
Sweden and Japan to analyse differences in labour costs. In conclusion he maintained that there are 
differences in labour costs in the production of those products in various countries. As regard to 
wages and prices in relation to international and domestic goods, Taussig (1927, 173) found that 
they are in consonance with the general theory of trade.      
Haberler contribution to international trade theory was primarily in terms of providing 
extended modifications as well as syntheses of the theory of comparative advantage in such a way 
that in the end the theory can be demonstrated as an approximation of reality. Basing his analysis 
initially on the “unrealistic” assumptions underlying the theory of comparative advantage, 
Harbeler presented through models and examples that even after the original assumptions are 
discarded the results of the analysis remains the same; the existence of trade is superior compared 
to no trade.    57
Haberler ([1933] 1956, 131-132) introduced the element of money price into the analysis of 
trade based originally on the theory of comparative advantage. He demonstrated using a modified 
example, borrowed from the work of Taussig, how comparative differences in costs can be 
translated into absolute differences in prices. He showed that goods, which a country exports (or 
imports), depend directly on absolute differences in money-price. His framework can be 
considered as an alternative method of analysis since a synthesis using comparative differences in 
labour-cost faces various difficulties. He argued that his synthesis is important because in actual 
fact international trade does not involve an exchange of goods against other goods, but through the 
medium of money. 
Haberler ([1933] 1956, 136) also showed that the theory of comparative advantage can also 
be applied to the case of more than two goods and two countries. Using some mathematical 
expressions he demonstrated that the conclusion drawn from this situation is similar to that of two 
goods and two countries. In both cases a country specializes in the production (and export) of 
goods that it has comparative advantages. Therefore the division of labour between countries 
increases total output for consumption in both countries. 
Haberler ([1933] 1956, 142) analysed the implication of introducing transport cost into his 
model. In this situation he conceded that the division of labour will not attain benefits as great as 
under the assumption of goods can be transported at no cost. He acknowledged that the necessity 
to pay for transportation charges makes the world poorer than if the goods can be transported 
without cost. However, he maintained that in so far as international trade takes place, although 
with the existence of transport costs, “it must be advantageous, since it will be undertaken only if 
the division of labour exceeds the cost of transport”.   58
In order to approximate reality, Haberler also discarded other assumptions underlying the 
theory of comparative cost advantage: homogenous labour and the ability of labour to move freely 
from one branch of production to another.
15 He reckoned that there existed many different qualities 
of labour as well as the existence of many other factors of production besides labour. He also made 
another important observation, that many of these factors are specific. The specificity of factors of 
production is either due to the fact that they can be used only for one particular purpose, or they 
will experience great loss if transferred to another use (machinery, for example, can only be used 
as scrap-iron). The existence of specific factors led to the rise of arguments for tariff protection to 
avoid losses due to specialization and trade. To this argument Haberler ([1933] 1956, 188) 
contended that “… the loss, which seems so obvious and impressive, may indeed be real losses 
from the standpoint of the owners of the idle factors, but they are out weighted by the greater gain 
to other persons. To community as a whole, the net result is a gain and not a loss”.  
In response to criticisms against the assumptions underlying the theory of comparative cost 
advantage, Viner, in defence of the theory, undertook a detailed study to examine the issue. Viner 
meticulously recollected and analysed all criticisms that appeared in literature starting from the 
period of Ricardo up to the time of his study. Viner ([1937] 1975, 444) examined both criticisms 
against Ricardo’s analysis which did not amount to the rejection of the assumptions as well as of 
the more fundamental criticisms which questioned their validity. He argued that the doctrine of 
comparative cost advantage was not only attacked by protectionists for obvious reasons, but also 
by two groups of economists. The first group of economists rejected the doctrine apparently due to 
the fact that this doctrine was an “outstanding product” of English classical school. Meanwhile, the 
                                                 
15 In another writing, Haberler (1961, 19) contended that economists are confronted with a permanent dilemma in 
theoretical research. If an economic analysis is based on realistic assumptions, one has to be content with uncertain, 
ambiguous and only approximate results. In contrast if one looks for unambiguous results, “highly specific” and “not 
generally applicable assumptions” will have to be made.    
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other group believed that they have “a superior technique than it affords” to evaluate commercial 
policy (Viner [1937] 1975, 438), obviously in reference to economists belonging to the Austrian 
and Lausanne schools.            
Viner conceded that one major problem connected with the doctrine of comparative cost is 
the assumptions that only two commodities and two countries involved. On this point Graham 
(1923, 54-55) claimed that because of the adherence to these assumptions “the classical theory of 
international values seems … to open to grave objections, objections which, while they do not 
subvert its foundations, nevertheless call for a substantial modifications of its conclusions”. Viner 
responded to Graham’s critic by pointing out that classical economists had already successfully 
extended the analysis to deal explicitly with this particular issue. He recollected the works of 
Mountifort Longfield, Nassau Senior, Francis Edgeworth and Gottfried Haberler and showed that 
even after the assumptions are dropped, the theory of trade in general is still valid.     
Viner also acknowledged the assumption of no transport costs involved in carrying out 
trade was occasionally used as a basis for criticism. In respond to this criticism he admitted that the 
analysis of trade with the existence of transport costs showed only less gain from trade because the 
amount of goods traded will be reduced. In addition, Viner ([1937] 1975, 468-469) argued that in 
this particular case the terms of trade will be different for the two countries; the difference being 
absorbed in meeting the cost of transportation, thus confirming the result found earlier by Haberler 
([1933] 1956, 142). 
Reluctant to accept the labour theory of value in determining the real cost as propounded 
by English classical economists, economists belonging to the Austrian school presented the 
concept of “opportunity cost” or “alternative cost” as an alternative method in the analysis of trade. 
In fact Haberler ([1933] 1956, 175) was the first to apply the opportunity cost theory to the   60
problem of gains or losses from international trade, using it as a substitute for the doctrine of 
comparative “real cost”. In this regard Viner ([1937] 1975, 469) commented that analysis based on 
opportunity cost faces difficulties in determining real income about a similar manner to those that 
faced by the real cost analysis. Further he commented that the new technique of analysis merely 
avoids the difficulties faced by the real cost analysis through ignoring considerations which the 
real cost analysis takes into account. 
4.4.2  Hecksher, Ohlin, Samuelson 
The sternest and sweeping criticisms against the theory of comparative cost probably came 
from Ohlin. Ohlin’s critics were targeted at both assumptions underlying the theory, as some other 
economists did, and also at the body of the theory itself. Fundamentally, Ohlin’s critics were 
directed at the doctrine of labour theory of value. Ohlin (1933, 571-590) contended that this 
doctrine is defect because it expounds that the relative value of goods – and hence their relative 
prices – is determined by the amount of labours used to produce them. As such, Ohlin argued that 
in order to make comparison about the amount of labours used, or the “real costs” of goods 
produced by different countries, two important assumptions must be made. First, the various 
categories of labours – unskilled, skilled and technical – must be translated into a common base on 
the assumption that there exists a fixed relationship between these categories. Hence if the wage of 
one skilled labour is twice as high as of an unskilled, one working day of the former equals two of 
the latter. Therefore any types of work can be converted into the common base, the unskilled 
labour. Second, capital and labour are employed in the same proportion in the production of all 
commodities. Ohlin argued that these assumptions do not correspond to the facts of reality, and 
even Ricardo would have aware of it.    61
As regard to the assumption of the existence of a fixed relationship between the wages of 
different categories of labours, he argued that this assumption is plagued with a number of 
problems. In particular, the assumption excludes the possibility of analysing cases related to 
changes in the relative positions of social classes, such as why the real wages of office workers 
declined since the previous four decades in Europe, while the wages of manual workers continued 
to rise considerably. Ohlin contended that changes in relative wages of different groups of workers 
affect production cost and consequently influence trade between countries.  
Ohlin also argued that the assumption of a fixed relationship between capital and the cost 
of labour in all industries is in stark contrast with reality. He observed that in some industries wage 
costs were twenty-five times as high as capital expenses, whereas in others, capital expenses were 
considerably higher than the wage costs. Ohlin acknowledged that some economists claimed the 
pure labour theory of value, which is based on artificial assumptions, yields only a rough 
approximation of reality. Further, he acknowledged that these economists argued that it is possible 
to introduce modifications to the theory of value taking into account the fact that different goods 
require different proportions of capital and labours, thus the coefficient of relationship between 
capital and labour changes from one good to another. Ohlin disputed the existence of this 
possibility and stressed that previous attempts were unsuccessful and doomed to fail right from the 
beginning. Ohlin (1933, 573) argued that: 
If one holds – with Ricardo and Mill – that relative prices are primarily determined 
by the quantities of labour employed, and if at the same time the quantity of capital 
employed is considered relevant, one has in fact abandoned the orthodox cost 
theory which was based on the assumption that all cost elements can be expressed 
in terms of one [labour].   
Ohlin also criticized the assumption of the constant cost of production. He reasoned that 
this assumption is a defect; therefore, it causes inadequate treatments on the phenomena of both   62
increasing and decreasing returns. In addition, Ohlin also criticized another assumption, which on 
one hand assumes free movement of labour within a country, while on the other assumes a 
complete immobility of the factor of production from one to another country. He argued that due 
to these assumptions phenomena related to the international movements of factors of production, 
especially labour and capital cannot be properly addressed.   
Ohlin also observed that in analysing specific cases, economists often used the terms of 
comparative advantage very loosely. The term was used even in reference to all kinds of 
advantages including cheap capital, cheap labour as well as of various natural advantages; this is a 
flaw since not in the least those economists thought in terms of “effectiveness of labour”. The 
loosely use of the terms of comparative advantage, according to Ohlin, necessitated an alternative 
theory of international trade, expressed in money costs.  
Ohlin finally claimed that in essence the whole classical theory of value can be replaced by 
a simple argument, that prices of goods are determined by their relative costs measured in terms of 
money instead of real costs. Accordingly, production costs depend on the prices of the factors of 
production, which, in turn depend on the prices of goods. In other words, the prices of goods and 
of the factors of production react upon one another, creating an interdependence, which 
characterises the whole mechanism of price formation. 
Having rejected the validity of the classical labour theory of value, Ohlin expounded a 
different approach to theorizing international trade. Ohlin justified his approach by referring to the 
fact that the interdependence theory of pricing, developed by Leon Walras, Carl Menger, William 
Jevon, Alfred Marshall, Irving Fisher, Vilfredo Pareto and Gustav Cassel already replaced the 
labour theory of value in the analysis of other economic phenomena, therefore, the same should be 
applied for theorizing international trade.    63
In expounding a new trade theory, Ohlin gave full consideration to the importance of the 
element of space in analysing the interdependence system of pricing. He first applied the theory of 
price interdependence for interregional trade. Since the conditions of trade between regions of a 
country are similar to that of trade between countries, he then extended the application of the 
theory of interregional trade to international trade. Moreover, Ohlin (1933, 589) argued that 
international trade should only be considered as a special case of interregional trade, since 
countries signify the most important regional boarders as far as the movements of goods and 
factors of production are concerned. In addition, Ohlin (1933, 34) acknowledged that his theory 
had had antecedents to the work of Eli Hecksher as appeared in The Influence of Foreign Trade on 
the Distribution of Income (1919), albeit disagreeing with Hecksher, who contended that his 
original work was merely a modification and addendum to the classical theory of international 
trade.
16 
Ohlin (1933, 14) agreed with the classical viewpoint that interregional as well as 
international trade occurs because of differences in the relative prices of goods in two difference 
places. While the doctrine of comparative costs expounds that differences in the prices of goods 
are due to differences in the real costs expressed in terms of labours used in their production, Ohlin 
argued that differences in the prices of goods are due to the interdependence system of pricing. In 
the first place the price of a good is determined by its demand and the possibility of its production. 
The demand for the good is, in turn, determined by the desire of consumers. Meanwhile, the 
possibility of producing the good depends on the supply and the condition of productive factors. 
                                                 
16 Hecksher’s original paper published in 1919 was in Swedish language under the title Ekonomisk Tidskrift. Only 
thirty-year later, in 1949 his paper was translated into English by American Economic Association in Reading in the 
Theory of International Trade. Since the original idea of Ohlin’s proposition was accrued to Hecksher, this whole 
theory is popularly known later among economists as Hecksher-Ohlin factor proportion theory.    
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Therefore, this interdependence relationship mediates the translation of demand for good into 
demand for the factors of production.    
Taking into account the mechanism of price formation, Ohlin contended that one important 
condition for trade to occur is that some goods can be produced more cheaply in money costs in 
one region (of a country) compared to others. The goods are cheaper in that region because in them 
are embodied relatively great quantities of factors of production, which are also cheaper in 
comparison to other regions. Therefore those cheaper goods will be exported, while other goods, 
which can be produced more cheaply in other regions, are imported. Although this line of 
reasoning seems somewhat similar to the argument underlying absolute cost advantage as the 
cause of international trade, nevertheless there exists a sharp difference. While the reasoning of 
absolute cost advantage has not clearly indicated why the costs of production are different in 
different countries, Ohlin expounded that the cheapness of goods is due to abundant availability of 
the factors of production. Ohlin (1933, 20) maintained that: “Each region has an advantage in the 
production of commodities into which enter considerable amounts of factors of abundance and 
cheap in that region.”   
Ohlin (1933, 91) argued that inequality in the prices of factors of production in different 
countries will translate into different commodity prices, thus causes trade to occur. He also argued 
that dissimilar endowment of various factors of production in different countries results in 
different prices. Furthermore, even the existence of similar factors of production in different 
countries will still result in different prices because of differences in factors’ qualities and 
attributes. Besides agreeing to the types of factors of production along classical categories – 
labour, land and capital – he argued that other categories of factors such as natural resources, risk 
element and the stability of productive conditions must also be taken into account. Ohlin (1933,   65
76) also contended that even within these broad categories, it might be necessary to divide them 
further into sub-factors for purposes of analysing their pricing formation. For example, natural 
resources can be classified into five categories: (1) agriculture and forest growing, (2) fishing and 
hunting, (3) production of minerals, (4) production of water power and (5) transport activities.         
On the immediate effect of trade, Ohlin argued that in addition to equalising prices of 
goods as expounded by the classical theory, trade will also tend to equalize the prices of factors of 
production. This is because trade influences the interaction of demand and supply of productive 
factors. Ohlin provided an example of two regions and two factors to illustrate his case. In this 
example, one region is abundantly supplied with cheap land but scanty of labour, whereas the 
opposite is the case for another region. The first region will find it advantageous to export goods 
requiring much land and import goods produced with much labour. Thus when industries that use 
greater land expanding the demand for land increases relative to the demand for labours. As a 
result the price of land increases, while the price of labour declines in comparison to the situation 
prior to trade. The opposite is true for the second region. Industries requiring much labour will 
expand and industries using much land will contract, resulting in increased demand for labour and 
pushing up it price while demand for land decline as does it price. In the end the price of land 
which used to be cheaper in the first region prior to trade will now become more expensive. 
Whereas the price of land which was expensive prior to trade in the second region become 
cheaper; therefore, with trade the prices of factors of production will tend to be partially equalised.      
Ohlin’s factor proportion theory of trade quickly gained adherents among economists 
(Husted and Melvin 1995, 89). Subsequently, many economists undertook further research to 
provide additional theoretical insights and extensions to this new trade theory. Primarily due to the 
works of Samuelson, the Heckscher-Ohlin theory become a dominant international trade theory for   66
much of the post World War 2 period (Jones and Kenen 1984, 14). Samuelson provided two 
important extensions to the theory. One extension is with regard to factor-price equalization 
theorem. According to Samuelson (1948, 163-184), free mobility of goods internationally will 
cause equalization in the prices of factors of production. This exposition extended the original 
Heckscher-Ohlin theory which had postulated that unlike the free movement of factors themselves, 
free mobility of goods would only bring partial equalization of prices. Originally, Ohlin (1933, 39) 
had argued that full equalization is highly impossible because of the existence of transport cost and 
other impediments. Samuelson contented that Ohlin’s exposition is a false. Furthermore, he argued 
that Ohlin had failed to formally prove his argument. Samuelson (1948, 169) argued that: “On the 
contrary, not only is factor-price equalization possible and probable, but in a wide variety of 
circumstances it is inevitable.” Samuelson formally proved his theorem using production-
possibility curves of two hypothetical countries, America and Europe when these two trading 
partners involve in trade of two products, food and clothing using two factors of production, land 
and labour. Essentially this proposition suggests that free trade may be a complete and not a partial 
substitute for free international mobility of labours as well as other factors of production. The 
factor-price equalization theorem was later supported by Jan Tinbergen (1949, 39-47), James 
Meade (1950, 129-133), Abba Lerner (1952, 1-16) and Sven Laursen (1952, 540-557). 
Commenting on this theorem, Haberler (1961, 17) found that Samuelson’s conclusion is a 
stark difference with the conclusion of the classical theory of trade. In the Ricardian theory of 
comparative cost advantage, it is implicit that free trade is perfectly compatible with large and 
lasting differences in real wages or per capita real income levels of trading countries. In other 
words, the Ricardian theory of trade expounds that factor prices will not be equalized by free 
movements of goods, except perhaps in special cases. Few economists, particularly Paul Baran 
(1957, 53) and Gunnar Myrdal (1957, 149) criticised this theorem, arguing that it is incompatible   67
with reality since statistical record showed an increasing gap of differences in per capita income 
between rich and poor as well as between developed and underdeveloped countries. Responding to 
this criticism Haberler (1961, 18-19) argued that the critics missed an important point because they 
failed to realise that this theory was developed under very restrictive assumptions and they could 
not be said to be the representation of actual reality.
17 Since this theory is based on unrealistic 
assumptions, Haberler maintained that: “… there is no chance whatsoever that factor prices will 
ever be equalised by free commodity trade.”       
A second important contribution of Samuelson to trade theory was his joint effort with 
Wolfgang Stopler, propounding another theorem, known by later economists as the Stopler-
Samuelson theorem. In this theorem, Stopler and Samuelson (1941, 58-73) postulated that 
international trade will necessarily increase the real wage of the abundant factors of production 
while lower that of scarce factor expressed in terms of goods. They proved their theorem through 
the use of production possibility frontiers and Edgeworth’s contract curves. This theorem 
essentially throws important light to the theoretical uncertainty about the effect of trade on the 
factors of production which was a subject of debates among economists, in particular between 
Charles Bastable, Gottfried Harberler and Jacob Viner.  
Bastable (1903, 109) argued that free trade may force a food exporting country to cultivate 
unsuitable soils which will then push rent to increase, therefore, benefiting landlords while labours 
and capitalists will suffer. Harberler ([1933] 1956, 195), while expressing his doubt that large and 
mobile factors such as labours can be harmed by free trade, recognised a possibility, especially in 
                                                 
17 In order to develop his theory Samuelson (1949, 181-197) employed eight assumptions which can be summarised as 
follows: (1) there are only two countries, (2) there are only two commodities, food and clothing, (3) each commodity 
is produced using two factors of production, land and labour, (4) the law of diminishing marginal productivity will 
hold, (5) the commodities differ in their labour and land intensities; food is land-intensive while clothing is labour-
intensive, (6)land and labour are assumed to be qualitatively identical inputs in the two countries, (7) all commodities 
move perfectly free between the two countries, and (8) there will be no complete specialization in both countries.   
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the short run, that specialised and immobile workers may suffer substantial reduction in the 
amount of income due to intense foreign competition. Viner ([1937] 1975, 533), on the contrary 
criticised Harberler’s argument maintaining that there is no priori or empirical ground of such a 
case. Instead, he contended that: “But even if labour on average had low occupational mobility and 
were employed relatively heavily in the protected industries, its real income might still rise with 
the removal of tariff protection … if it was an important consumer of the hitherto protected 
commodities sufficiently as a result to offset the reduction in money wages in the new situation”.     
Since this theorem provides theoretical support on this issue, protectionists, especially in 
the US, use it extensively to advance the pauper labour argument. Krugman and Obstfeld (2000, 
24) noted that protectionists argued that labours in general and unskilled labours in particular will 
be harmed by free trade, since labours are considered as a scarce factor in the US, and Stopler-
Samuelson theorem seems to land theoretical support to this argument. Haberler (1961, 20) 
criticised the pauper labour argument maintaining that the theorem was developed using a model 
based on unrealistic and highly restrictive assumptions: only two factors of production are 
involved and no complete specialization takes place. In fact Stopler and Samuelson (1941, 73) 
stressed in the conclusion of their study that though this theorem confirms that the scarce factor 
could be harmed by free trade, it provides no political support for protectionist trade policy. They 
contended that: “… the harm which free trade inflicts upon scarce factor is necessarily less than 
the gain to others. Hence it is always possible to bribe the suffering factor by subsidy or other 
redistributive devices so as to leave all factors better off as a result of trade”. 
Another extension to the Hecksher-Ohlin model was provided by T. M. Rybczynski. 
Rybczynski (1955, 336-341) investigated the effects of an increase in the use of productive factors 
on production, consumption and the terms of trade. In this analysis he provided theoretical   69
conclusion that an increase in the quantity of a factor causes more than proportionate increase in 
the production of a good which uses that factor intensively while the output of another good which 
uses that factor less intensively will experience absolute decline. 
Samuelson’s (1939) formal analysis of Hecksher-Ohlin model, which proves that free 
mobility of goods results in full equalization of factor prices, was done under “straightjacket” 
assumptions. More than 30 years later, Samuelson (1971, 365-384) examined an extended model 
of which he named Ricardo-Viner model. In this model he incorporated three factors of 
production; two factors are specific, one each for the production of two goods, while the third 
factor is mobile (labour). The factor is specific in the sense that it cannot move from one industry 
to another. As for this model Samuelson found that with the existence of international trade factor-
prices will only be partially equalised, thus confirming the theoretical possibility of specific cases 
where the original Ohlin proposition would be true. This finding also provides support to a general 
understanding that factor-price equalization theorem holds true to the extent that the number of 
productive factors does not exceed the number of goods. In contrast, if the number of factors 
exceeds the number of goods, free trade in goods will cause only partial equalization in factor 
prices. 
At about the same time of Samuelson, Ronald Jones (1971, 3-21) made another formal 
analysis of the specific factor model by constructing a formal structure of a model, and providing 
theoretical insights concerning its implication to factor returns when there will be variability in 
factor endowment. Jones concluded that when the prices of goods are held constant, an increase in 
the endowment of mobile factors lowers the return to these factors, but in contrast, raises the return 
to specific factors. Similarly, an increase in the endowment of specific factors lowers the return to 
the specific factors while increasing the return to mobile factors.          70
4.4.3  Theoretical Research Based on Ricardian Economics 
Although a great number of economists in the middle of the twentieth century showed 
enormous interests in undertaking theoretical research based on Hecksher-Ohlin factor-proportion 
theory, research based on Ricardian comparative advantage, to a lesser extent, continued to exert 
its influence in the theory of international trade. Lionel McKenzie (1954, 165-180) made use of 
Ricardian comparative advantage to examine the problem of specialization of world production 
under free trade. In this analysis he extended the two-country, two-good model to determine the 
efficient pattern of specialization involving many countries and many goods. For this analysis 
McKenzie borrowed a general equilibrium model of world production constructed by Frank 
Graham. Originally, Graham (1948, 76) used this model to solve the problem of world production 
involving many countries and many commodities by trial and error. McKenzie extended Graham’s 
analysis by creating a model of world specialization using matrix equations. He then showed 
formally that the model based on Ricardian comparative advantage can demonstrate that there are 
gains from trade involving many countries and many commodities, in which an efficient 
multilateral specialization can be determined. 
Jones (1961, 161-175) later extended McKenzie model of world efficient specialization to 
examine the relationship between comparative advantage and the theory of tariffs. He constructed 
the world-efficient-frontier line of production and argued that trade and perfect competition 
ensures the efficient allocation of world resources, whereby the production of world output will be 
on the world efficient frontier. When a tariff is introduced, competitive behaviours are still in 
existence, but it may result in inefficient resource allocation. Furthermore, if the tariff is 
prohibitive, production takes place in the most inefficient manner. Similarly a system of subsidy 
also results in world production to be generated below the efficient line. Additionally, a system of   71
subsidy may depress world output further away from the efficient frontier as compared to the 
system of tariffs because inefficient producers are able to export to the efficient region. Jones 
(1961, 174) finally concluded that: “Some trade is better than no trade – if the impediments to 
trade are in the form of tariffs.”             
4.4.4  Normative Theory of International Trade 
Another important development that emerged during the post WW2 period was an effort to 
define a clear boundary between the positive and normative theories of international trade. As 
opposed to the positive theory of trade, which is concerned with the exposition of facts or actual 
economic phenomena (Samuel 1994, 24), normative theory is concerned with welfare judgments 
of commercial policy (Corden 1984, 65). According to Bhagwati (1964, 4), Ohlin was among the 
earliest trade economists who demanded that the distinction between positive and normative 
aspects of trade theory be clearly drawn, proposing these two areas be written in separate books or 
chapters. Although a demarcation line separating the two is pretty clear nowadays, economists 
initially found it difficult to distinguish them. Commenting on Ohlin’s demand, Harberler (1958, 
3) contended that this aim is easier postulated than accomplished, and pointed his critic at Ohlin, 
he argued that: “… in the midst of ‘objective theory’ he [Ohlin] proves in typical classical manner 
that interregional trade and division of labour results in an increased social product without making 
it clear that this statement implies a value judgement on his part and is not merely ‘objective 
analysis’”.     
A fundamental issue concerning the normative theory of trade revolves around the question 
of gains from trade. There existed a number of economists who explored this issue, prominent 
among them included Paul Samuelson, Robert Baldwin, Murray Kemp and Jagdish Bhagwati. 
Samuelson perhaps was the first modern economist who formalised the modelling of gain from   72
trade. Samuelson (1939, 195-205) developed a model involving small countries –countries which 
could not influence their terms of trade – and showed that there are gains from trade provided 
world prices are different from autarky prices. In addition, he also expounded that the gains are not 
limited to circumstances that the country moves from autarky to free trade; the gains will also exist 
in the cases of countries moving from autarky to restricted trade. Essentially Samuelson made two 
contributions to the theory of trade from this model. First, he proved that there are gains from trade 
in a general model involving many goods and many factors of production. Second, he showed that 
the potential gains do not depend on the redistribution of income, but rather on improved 
consumption opportunities brought about by trade.  
To supplement his earlier analysis of gains from trade, Samuelson (1962, 820-829) 
provided a second model involving two commodities with the use of production possibility 
frontiers. In this second model Samuelson also extended his analysis to cover the case of a large 
country by the use of the “Baldwin envelop” curve. Baldwin (1948, 748-762) originally 
constructed an enveloped curve to examine consumption possibilities facing a large country, in 
which the country is in the position to influence world prices, and thus its terms of trade. 
Samuelson demonstrated that when the enveloped curve is applied to his model the curve fits 
outside the autarky frontier at all but one point; the point at which no trade will occur because 
world prices converge with autarky prices. Hence, Samuelson showed that the existence of an 
opportunity to trade makes a country potentially better off regardless of whether the country is 
small or large. 
Quite similar to Samuelson, Murray Kemp (1972, 803-819), proved using different 
mathematical expositions that free trade is potentially superior to no trade, even for large countries. 
In addition, he also expounded that “compensated” restricted trade is also superior to no trade. He   73
argued that the manner in which trade is restricted is not important, citing tariffs, quotas and 
exchange rate as examples of the restrictions. Kemp also examined a question concerning the 
ranking of trading situations, in particular whether lower tariff rates would be superior to higher 
rates. To this question, he found that a lower tariff is superior to a higher tariff in similar manner as 
no tariffs are superior to lower tariffs. Kemp concluded that this proposition holds true because 
under free trade all necessary conditions to achieve “Paretian optimum” are satisfied. In particular, 
the marginal rate of transformation between goods in production equals both the marginal rate of 
transformation between goods in international trade and the marginal rate of substitution in 
consumption. He argued that the imposition of a tariff will destroy these equalities.   
Jagdish Bhagwati investigated the stability and generality of the theorems expounded by 
Samuelson and Kemp. Based on Samuelson’s proposition that free trade was superior to autarky 
under competitive price system, Bhagwati (1968, 137-148) examined whether or not this 
proposition holds for the case of other economic systems. Bhagwati proved that Samuelson’s 
proposition holds true not only for economies characterized by a competitive price system, but also 
for planned economies. Bhagwati also examined Kemp’s theorem that restricted trade is superior 
to no trade, and he found the theorem lacks ammunition for generalization thus he advanced some 
qualifications. Bhagwati argued that Kemp’s proposition valid only under three classes of policies 
as provided in Kemp’s examples: tariffs, quotas and exchange restrictions. If the theorem is 
extended to cases involving taxes on domestic production or subsidies on consumption, it is no 
longer valid. When a production subsidy (or tax) on exportable (or importable) is granted, it 
reduces social welfare below that of no trade situation. So in the case of restricted trade, it is 
impossible to compensate the losers while keeping the gainers at their original welfare level. 
Bhagwati also advanced qualifications to Kemp’s theorem that low tariffs are superior to high 
tariffs. He argued that Kemp’s theorem holds true only if exportables are of no inferior in   74
comparison to importables. Thus, if the inferiority of exportables in societal consumption could 
not be ruled out, a reduction in the level of tariffs may lead to the deterioration of economic 
welfare.  
4.4.5  Imperfect Competition, Economies of Scale and International Trade 
In the 1970s and 1980s there was a renewed interest among some economists to 
incorporate economies of scale into the theory of international trade, although the effects of 
increasing returns to scale had been the subject of discussion since the 1920s. Helpman (1984, 
326) noted that this matter is recognised as important since it has implications on trade patterns, 
gains from trade as well as commercial policies.   Pioneering works on this were accrued to Frank 
Graham, Frank Knight, Gottfried Haberler and Bertil Ohlin. Graham (1923, 54-86) argued that 
economies of scale causes a country to lose from trade and therefore concluded that the imposition 
of a tariff is beneficial. He constructed a numerical example showing that when a country has two 
sectors, one subject to increasing, while the other subject to decreasing returns to scales, the 
country may lose from free trade. On the assumption that there is only one factor of production 
(labour), free trade will lead a country which has comparative advantage in a decreasing-return 
sector to specialize in that sector. Therefore, labours are shifted from increasing returns to scale 
industry to decreasing returns to scale industry. The output per person will fall in both industries, 
resulting in the reduction of gross domestic product. Finally, this leads to a welfare loss.                
Knight (1924, 582-606) accused Graham of failing to distinguish between internal and 
external economies of scales. He argued that economies of scale external to the firm should bring 
no implication to trade theory since firms take prices as given. If the economies of scale are 
internal to the firm, it means that there is no competition, therefore it is entirely a problem 
associated with monopoly. Graham (1925, 324-330) denied the need to distinguish between   75
internal and external economies of scales. Harberler ([1933] 1956, 204) and Viner ([1937] 1975, 
473) agreed with Knight on this issue. Viner pointed out that Graham would have confused 
between average and marginal costs in his pricing rules and argued that external economies of 
scale may depend on world output rather than national output, in which case Graham’s argument 
will significantly be weakened.  
With regard to economies of scale as a determinant of international trade, Haberler ([1933] 
1956, v) in the preface of his book outlined the need to formally apply the theory of monopolistic 
competition and the theory of imperfect competition developed respectively by Edward 
Chamberlin and Joan Robinson as well as the theory of business cycle into the analysis of 
international trade. Meanwhile, Ohlin (1933, 55-56) propounded that economies of large-scale 
production could also cause international trade. However, he argued that the character of this case 
is entirely exceptional; the choice of location of production is arbitrary and not due to the 
availability of cheap supply of productive factors. The choice of location of one industry in one 
region as well as another industry in another region could simply be due to history or chance. An 
industry, having been located in one place, will overtime gains strength and reach the efficient 
scale of production. As its operation cannot be profitably undertaken in all regions because of the 
lack of demand, the industry tends to remain where it was first established. In the event of trade 
with other countries is opened up, the industry reaps additional benefits due to enlarged market and 
demand for its products. 
The renewed interest in theorizing trade in the present of economies of scale in the 1980s 
was primarily associated with Paul Krugman, Kelvin Lancaster and Elhanan Helpman. Krugman 
(1979, 469-479) developed a formal one-sector model to give treatment that trade is caused by 
economies of scale instead of trade is caused  by differences in factor endowments or technology.   76
The case of increasing returns treated by Krugman was one of internal to firms of which market 
structure is based on Chamberlinian monopolistic competition. In this study Krugman modified 
and extended the work of Dixit and Stiglitz (1977, 297-308) for the specification of international 
trade under monopolistic competition. In his analysis Krugman showed that there are both 
existence and gains from trade due to increasing returns. He demonstrated that there is an increase 
in the scale of production and the range of goods available for consumption. He also showed that 
welfare in both countries will be enhanced due to higher real wages and an increased choice of 
goods. 
From a different angle, Lancaster (1980, 151-175) examined monopolistic competition in 
association with the theory of intra-industry trade. In his study Lancaster showed that monopolistic 
competition is the most competitive market structure within the manufacturing sector, especially of 
high technology industries, because the products of these industries are not homogenous. He 
concluded that such a structure leads to a high degree of intra-industry trade of differentiated 
goods produced under internal economies of scale.  
Helpman (1981, 305-340) integrated the Hecksher-Ohlin theory of trade with the 
Chamberlinian approach to product differentiation, economies of scale and monopolistic 
competition. He used Hecksher-Ohlin theory to examine inter-sectoral trade while Chamberlinian 
approach was used to analyse intra-industry trade. Helpman’s analysis showed interesting as well 
as useful results. He proved that even in the presence of monopolistic competition, the pattern of 
inter-sectoral trade can be predicted from differences in factor endowment. Therefore, a capital 
rich country becomes net exporter of capital-intensive goods, while a labour-intensive country 
becomes net exporter of labour-intensive goods. Differentiated products, however, will be 
exported and imported by both countries. In essence, Helpman’s models showed that if market   77
structure is monopolistically competitive, economies of scale lead to arbitrary specialization of 
goods by different countries. Also, these models established the idea that countries specialize and 
trade, not only because of underlying differences, but due to the existence of increasing returns to 
scale in certain industries.  
4.4.6  The Position of Free Trade Doctrine in the 1980s and 1990s   
The findings of research associated with the incorporation of economies of scale into 
international trade theory triggered another bout of debates over the virtues of free trade and their 
implications on theoretical as well as commercial policies. Writing in 1987 under the title of Is 
Free Trade Passe? Krugman (1987, 131-144) argued that: 
Yet the case for free trade is currently more in doubt than at any time since the 1817 
publication of Ricardo’s Principles of Political Economy. … In the last ten years the 
traditional constant returns, perfect competition models of international trade have 
been supplemented and to some extent supplanted by a new breed of models that 
emphasises increasing returns and imperfect competition. These models call into 
doubt the extent to which actual trade can be explained by comparative advantage; 
they also open the possibility that government intervention in trade via import 
restrictions, export subsidies, and so on may under some circumstances be in the 
national interest after all. … free trade is not passé but it is an idea that has 
irretrievably lost its innocence. Its status has shifted from optimum to reasonable 
rule of thumb. There is still a case for free trade as a good policy, and as a useful 
target in the practical world of politics, but it can never again be asserted as the 
policy that economic theory tells us is always right.                
Commenting on this article, Bhagwati (1989, 1-34) found that the argument provided by 
Krugman was puzzling. This was so not only because, especially research on the theory of 
commercial policy during the 1960s and 1970s, showed plainly that “import restrictions, export 
subsidies, and so on, may under some circumstances be in the national interest”, but it was also 
puzzling because no one, including economists can assert that free trade is “the policy that 
economic theory tells us is always right.” Moreover, Bhagwati argued that the post WW2 theory of 
commercial policy went beyond these propositions to alert analysts and policy makers that, even if   78
a departure from free trade is justifiable, it is necessary to distinguish between policy interventions 
that are “merely beneficial” and those which are “maximally useful”. He also cautioned 
economists who want to influence their countries’ trade policies to take into account two key 
questions in advancing their advices: (1) consistent with theory, what nature of appropriate 
interventions when departure from free trade is justifiable?, and (2) does a country’s reality fits any 
of the numerous theoretical possible cases where such an appropriate intervention is desirable?. 
Bhagwati further argued that the latest models based on imperfect competition are merely 
additional examples to the previous theoretical circumstances whereby free trade will not be the 
optimum policy under the existence of market failures; therefore, a government could act to its 
national advantage by devising appropriate policy interventions. 
The new bout of debates about the virtues of free trade among economists calmed down by 
the end of 1990s. Bhagwati (1998, 4) observed that the academic scenario during this period has 
witnessed the return of economist “defectors” from free trade doctrine to the fold, and there was an 
“harmony” of agreement among prominent economists for the case of pursuing free trade policy. 
A significant reason for the return was due to the acknowledgement by economists of two 
important propositions: (1) if market failures remain unfixed, then pursuing free trade policy can 
harm rather that help and (2) if market failures are fixed through suitable policy interventions, then 
free trade can once again be used to exploit the potential gains from trade. Within the second 
proposition, economists emphasise that if market failures arise in domestic markets, then the most 
appropriate policy interventions would be to devise policies targeting at those domestic market 
failures, while free trade is maintained externally.  
Overall, economists provide three persuasive arguments propounding why free trade 
should be pursued internationally. First, although theoretically a departure from free trade is   79
justified under the situation of imperfect competition, but there is no evidence of “significant 
enough” imperfections existed in the world to abandon free trade (Dixit and Grossman 1986, 249). 
Second, if protectionist intervention is attempted, it will make matters worse because 
governmental interventions will reflect the interests of powerful lobbying groups instead of social 
advantage (Krugman and Obstfeld 2000, 221). Third, if one country devises policy interventions 
resulting in diverting gains from other countries to its advantage, it is most likely that other 
countries will retaliate, causing everyone loses from the breakdown of free trade (Bhagwati 1998, 
7).         
4.5  Trade Policies and Practices during Neoclassical Economics 
4.5.1  Trade Policies across Countries: the 1870s – 1910s  
The emergence of neoclassical economic analysis in the 1870s occurred at a time when 
trade practices experienced the return of a protectionist trade policy in many regions of the world. 
This was a reverse of the previous trend, in which a liberal trade policy had been adopted in many 
countries, especially in Europe following Britain’s adoption of a free trade policy with the repeal 
of the protectionist Corn Law in 1846. The strengthening trend of a protectionist trade policy 
continued from the 1870s up to the time of the First World War, which broke out in 1914 (Capie 
1994, 10).  
In Europe, the sign of shift from the period of a liberal trade policy adopted by many 
countries following Cobden-Chavalier treaty between Britain and France in 1860, to protectionism 
started to appear in the late 1870s. As late as 1875, a relatively liberal trade policy was still 
prevailed in many European countries as depicted in Table 4.1. The first European country to give 
way to protectionist trade policy was Germany. In 1879, Germany then under Otto Von Bismarck 
as the Chancellor, who was known as a staunch proponent of protectionism, introduced a   80
legislation imposing import tariffs on both agriculture and industrial products (Capie 1994, 35; 
O'Rourke and Williamson 1999, 95). This legislation started with low specific duty on agriculture, 
equivalent to 6 percent ad valorem on wheat and 8 percent on other cereals. However, import 
tariffs were raised in 1885 and again in 1887, reaching an equivalent of 35 percent ad valorem on 
wheat and 47 percent on rye. Tariffs were briefly revised downward during Georg Von Caprivi as 
the Chancellor in 1890-1894, only to be revised upward again in 1902. 
Table 4.1 
Average Level of Duties on Manufactured Products in 1875 
Countries Percentage 
Austria-Hungary 
Belgium 
Denmark 
France 
Germany 
Italy 
Norway 
Portugal 
Russia 
Spain 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
The Netherlands  
United Kingdom 
Continental Europe 
Europe 
15-20 
9-10 
15-20 
12-15 
4-8 
8-10 
2-4 
20-25 
15-20 
15-20 
3-5 
4-6 
3-5 
0 
9-12 
6-8 
(Source: Bairoch, 1989, page 42) 
German turn-around to protection was soon followed by France, which began to increase 
import duties on agriculture products in 1885. France’s agriculture duties were again increased in 
1887, at which time import duty on wheat reached 22 percent (Capie 1994, 35). French 
protectionism strengthened further with the adoption of Melane Tariff in 1892. Under Melane 
Tariff, not only import duties on agriculture were increased, but it also reimposed duties on a wide 
range of raw materials. However, important raw materials to the French import-competing   81
industries such as cotton, wool and flax were exempted from duties due to political pressure 
exerted by these industries’ players. Tariffs on both agriculture and industrial products were 
generally specific, but equivalent to 10-15 percent for agriculture and about 25 percent for 
industrial goods. In 1894, France again raised import duty on wheat to 7 francs per 100 kilogram; 
this amounted to an equivalent of 32 percent ad valorem, since domestic price of wheat was 22 
francs (O'Rourke and Williamson 1999, 96). 
Following Germany and France, many other European countries also returned to 
protectionism. Protectionism returned to Sweden with first the reimposition of duties on 
agriculture in 1888, and followed by industrial products in 1892. The return to protectionism 
occurred after the period of a liberal trade policy adopted by Sweden when it had entered the web 
of bilateral treaties signed in the wake of Cobden-Chavalier initiative (Heckscher 1954, 237). 
Similarly, Italy moved toward protectionism starting with the introduction of moderate tariffs in 
1878, followed by the imposition of more severe import tariffs in 1887 in which most duties were 
specific. Duties were increased further in 1895, whereby duty on grain reached 75 lire per ton or 
about 36 percent ad valorem (Bairoch 1989, 77). In Spain a new tariff structure was devised in 
1877, introducing minimum tariffs for products originating from countries with whom it had 
signed trade treaties while maximum tariffs were imposed on other countries.
18 Initially, under this 
new tariff structure the difference between the maximum and minimum tariff was fairly small of 
about 10 percent. The tariff policy reform of 1892 witnessed an increase in duties and marked the 
real return to protectionism in Spain. The gap between maximum and minimum tariffs remained 
small, but the minimum tariff was sharply increased to 80-100 percent for agriculture and 300-400 
percent for manufactured goods (Bairoch 1989, 63). Norway which adopted a fairly liberal trade 
                                                 
18 The minimum and maximum tariff structure imposed on an item is also known as “double tariffs”. 
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policy from the 1860s until 1880s, succumbed to protectionists’ pressure in 1895 with the 
imposition of import duties on machinery and meat. Norway turn-around happened when Sweden 
unilaterally abrogated the Sweden-Norway trade treaty which they signed in 1827. In Norway, a 
more significant move towards protectionism occurred in 1905 when tariffs on agriculture were 
introduced while duties on animal products were further increased. 
Nonetheless, there were few European countries which continued to cling to free trade 
policy throughout the period of 1870s-1910s. Great Britain managed to maintain free trade despite 
enormous domestic pressure to adopt a protectionist trade policy similar to its neighbouring 
countries. One source of demand for protection came from National Fair Trade League, which 
existed from 1881 until 1891. This lobbying group demanded British government to impose 
retaliatory tariffs against foreign countries which impose tariffs on British industrial goods. A 
more challenging demand for protection came from British Colonial Secretary, Joseph 
Chamberlain who proposed for the establishment of preferential trading area among countries 
within the British Empire. His proposal, outlined in a speech he delivered in Birmingham in 1903, 
marked the beginning of intense debates over trade policy. The demand for protection caused 
enormous policy debates in 1904 and 1905. But the debate subdued when the Liberals, who were 
generally proponents of free trade won the 1906 election with a landslide majority. The issue, 
however, remain unresolved as protectionist pressure groups continued to argue for the case of 
protection right up to the outbreak of WW1 in 1914 (Gomes 2003, 226).          
Few smaller countries in Europe also managed to maintained liberal trade policy 
throughout this period. Denmark continued to adhere to a free trade policy in agriculture, made 
possible due to the change of country’s economic orientation from a net exporter to a net importer 
of grains. Nevertheless it imposed tariffs on manufactured goods, in particular manufactured   83
textiles, which attracted duties between 20 to 30 percent (Bairoch 1989, 81). The Netherlands 
followed a similar path, maintaining a free trade policy throughout the period. Belgium and 
Switzerland also managed to cling to free trade, with nearly all agriculture products were free from 
duties, although they imposed some duties on animal products, and moderate duties on industrial 
goods (O'Rourke and Williamson 1999, 96).  
The returns of protectionism in many countries in Europe during this period can be 
associated with few reasons, which intertwined upon one another in affecting a change in trade 
policy. Early distress in Europe was evident in 1873 when economic downturn engulfed many 
countries. There were some improvements in economic conditions in the years that followed, but 
they were too far from the earlier strength; prices continued a downward trend while profits were 
squeezed. For the next two decades (from 1870), enormous tensions were experienced in almost all 
countries in Europe because of economic downturn. Although there had been several drops in 
business cycles previously, but the ones happened between 1870 and 1890, was not a “normal” 
business cycle downturn, leading some people to consider it a period of deflation (Gourevitch 
1986, 73). As general prices dropped further, many quarters contended that cheap import of grains 
was the main cause of the deflation and argued that protection was necessary to insulate the 
economy from outside pressure.       
The liberal trade policy adopted by many European countries after 1860 as they followed 
the example of the British free trade policy caused an influx of cheap imports of agriculture 
products from the New World especially from the US. Thus the “grain invasion” into Europe 
threatened to reduce the income of the people that involved in agriculture sector. To the European 
countries which considered agriculture products as important, because of their contribution both to 
domestic economic activities and as a source of export earnings, the grain invasion brought   84
massive distress. In Germany, agriculture producers and estate owners of Prussia east of Elba 
(Junkers) found this period of time was particularly hard, not only because their sales of grain in 
Britain slowed down due to competition from the New World (Gomes 2003, 258), but also 
because of domestic grain prices continued to drop, therefore, threatening the livelihood of many 
people. Meanwhile, the producers of textiles, iron and steel also sought protection for their 
products. As latecomers to these industries in comparison to Britain, they advanced infant industry 
arguments as justification for their demand for protection (Gourevitch 1986, 88). They needed a 
tariff wall because this industry entailed high start-up costs; thus early competition from foreign 
established producers endangered their survival. These two groups constituted a powerful lobby to 
influence political decision in Germany towards granting protection to both agriculture and 
industrial goods.  
Different domestic circumstances experienced by Britain as compared to other major 
European countries allowed it to maintain a free trade policy throughout this period. Grain 
invasion from the New World had less significant impact on domestic politics in Britain. In one 
aspect grain invasion which caused declining grains prices was good for Britain because it 
translated into higher real income for the general public. From another aspect grain invasion did 
not bring enormous distress, since from the early nineteenth century the contribution of agriculture 
sector to the British economy was on the decline, thus transforming Britain from a net exporter to a 
net importer of agriculture products. Although grain invasion brought bad impact to agriculture 
sector, by this time British’s economic structure had transformed significantly to become a well-
established industrial economy. As a result, much agriculture land was converted into producing 
higher value added goods for urban industrial markets. By this time, many British aristocrats 
already derived their income from a variety of sources and also developed “strong psychological 
linkages to the industrial order” (Thompson 1963, 55). Another important reason why Britain   85
managed to maintain the free trade policy was the existence of fairly strong interest groups 
lobbying against protectionism. These groups included consumers, traders, manufactures of iron, 
steel and other industrial products who wanted to keep the cost of inputs low for the production of 
specialty products, therefore they could continue to dominate trade in the world market 
(Gourevitch 1986, 78).  
In Denmark and the Netherlands, different forces were at work that helped these countries 
to cling to free trade policy. The liberal trade policy of the previous two decades pushed down the 
prices of agriculture products, resulting in the contraction of domestic production of grains in these 
countries. Notwithstanding this, however, industrial sector continued to expand, albeit in different 
dimension. Industries expanded into the production of specialised and high quality foodstuffs such 
as diary, meat and vegetable. Cheap foreign grain was welcomed as the grain being used as input, 
especially as feed for the animals that produced milk, meat and other products. In addition, cheap 
grain prices brought another benefit, especially in terms of cheaper bread for consumers, who then 
spent their surplus income on high quality goods produced domestically (Tracy 1989. 23).  
Trade policies adopted by countries in the North and Latin American continent during this 
period were similar to that of the majority of European countries. In the US, the deepening of 
protectionism occurred well before the 1870s. After experiencing two decades of liberal trade 
environment (1840-1860), the US returned to protectionism with a tariff revision made in 1861. 
Protectionism strengthened further by the tariff reform of 1866, in which it remained in force until 
1883, imposing import duties averaging 45 percent for manufactured goods. Another major 
revision of trade policy was undertaken in 1890, through the introduction of the McKinley tariffs. 
This new tariffs not only increased both specific and ad valorem duties, but also enlarged the 
number of items subject to tariffs. From 1890 to 1913 series of tariff modifications were made,   86
which alternately reduced and increased import duties, although by only small amounts. There 
were two important modifications undertaken in this period; the Dingley Act of 1896, which 
annulled certain small reduction in duties and the Payne-Aldrich tariff of 1909, which introduced 
the system of double tariffs. The double tariffs system remained in force until 1913, when a slight 
departure of trade policy occurred. In 1913 a more liberal trade policy was adopted under the 
Underwood tariff, providing a fairly big increase in the number of goods allowed to be imported at 
zero duty into the US, and a substantial decrease in the level of import duties. By this time overall 
import duties fell from 33 to 16 percent, with the decrease of duties on manufactured goods was a 
slightly higher, dropping from 44 to 25 percent. Nevertheless, at this time the average import duty 
of the US, comparatively, was still the highest in the world (Bairoch 1989, 144).  
In the US, the whole period of 1870s-1910s was characterised by protectionist trade policy, 
especially on industrial products, although trade policy on agriculture was far more liberal. This 
happened because the US was always a major producer of agriculture products, thanked to the 
abundant availability of land in the country. But the case was different for industrial products; the 
US was a latecomer in comparison to European countries, Britain in particular. Therefore, 
arguments in favour of industrial protection were all the while strong the United States. The most 
prominent argument was that protecting infant industries was necessary to avert competition from 
established foreign competitors. In addition, import duties had been a very important source of 
revenue to the Federal Government in this period, since only in 1913 the country managed to 
introduce corporate income tax. The previous attempts to introduce corporate tax were 
unsuccessful because the initiative was blocked by powerful and politically influential 
industrialists. This indicates that free trade ideology never had a strong foothold in the US in 
comparison to the situation in Britain (Gourevitch 1986, 110).   87
Canada was on the path of a liberal trade soon after Britain adopted free trade policy in 
1846, and at that time about 65 percent of Canada exports went to Britain. However, the year 1878 
marked a major turning point for Canada when the National Policy was adopted by the 
Conservative government. It was followed by the new tariff legislation of 1879 which provided 
protection for both agriculture and industry. By this time import duties on agriculture were 
between 20-50 percent, and 20-30 percent on manufactured goods. This caused an increase in the 
intensity of protection; in 1878 the collection of import duties had amounted to 14.4 percent of the 
value of imports, whereas in 1880 it increased to 26.3 percent (Urquhart and Buckley 1965, 173). 
By the second half of the nineteenth century, Argentina’s trade policy was already leaned 
towards protectionism. A new tariff structure which was adopted in 1854 contained some 
protectionist elements. This tariff structure was simple, containing only 60 items, but it was fairly 
progressive. Import duty was low at 5 percent for raw materials and semi manufactured goods, but 
higher at 15-20 percent for manufactured items. Protectionism strengthened in the 1870s with the 
revision of duties aimed at promoting industrialization. For the period 1873-1875 bounties were 
offered to the first few companies that involved in certain targeted industries. The elements of 
protection were further strengthened by the tariff reform of 1876, imposing 40 percent duty on 
manufactured goods, 10-20 percent on semi-manufactured, and 20 percent on raw materials. Again 
the tariff revision of 1891 resulted in a further increase of duties for varieties of goods. Import duty 
for wholly manufactured goods was 60 percent, slightly lower at 40 percent for semi finished, and 
low duty at 5-15 percent for semi-manufactured items, while machinery was exempted (Alejandro 
1967, 75-98).   
In Australia, increased pressure for the introduction of tariffs was evident among the 
colonies of independent states in the 1860s. In Victoria, the 1867 legislation allowed the   88
introduction of import duties aimed at protecting domestic industries (Carmody 1952, 51-65). By 
this time, although the tariff levels were moderate, if one took into account the distance of 
Australia from other major exporting countries, the distance alone would constitute a natural 
protection of about 10 to 20 percent (Blainey 1975, 35). Import duties in Victoria were revised 
upward by the subsequent tariff reforms, the first in 1871, and again in 1877, to provide additional 
protection for local industries. The Federal tariffs of 1902 marked the deepening of protectionism, 
with import duties ranged from 5 to 25 percent. In 1906, the Industries Preservation Act was 
passed, of which the major provision was the introduction of anti-dumping measures. The tariff of 
1908 introduced double tariffs in Australia aiming at protecting domestic industries, while 
retaining preferences for goods coming from Britain. Nonetheless, in 1913 the Australia level of 
protection was lower in comparison to that of Canada and other countries in continental Europe, if 
one put aside the remoteness of Australia as a barrier to trade (Bairoch 1989, 147).    
Japan’s seclusion from the world economy officially came to an end in 1858 when it signed 
a formal trade agreement with the US. A similar treaty was then signed with nearly all trading 
powers in the subsequent years, which forced Japan to impose low import duties, at an average of 
5 percent. While the elements of protection started to emerge after the restoration of Meiji in 1868, 
but effective protection was introduced only in 1899 (Bairoch 1989, 157). Between 1894 and 1897 
the treaties that Japan signed earlier were renegotiated with all signatories. This resulted in the 
signing of new treaties, which came into force in 1899, allowing an increase in import duties and 
providing for Japan’s complete tariff autonomy in 1911. The first autonomous tariff of 1911 
marked a significant increase in protection, whereby, import duties on manufactured goods were 
varied between 15 and 50 percent. In 1913, import tariffs for the majority of semi-manufactured 
goods were between 20-30 percent, while that of wholly manufactured items were at 30-40 
percent. Import duties on machinery and equipment were lower at around 20-25 percent.       89
China’s closed imperial economy ended in 1842 following the victory of Britain in the 
Opium Wars (1839-1842). This forced China to sign the Treaty of Nanking in the same year. One 
of the important elements of this treaty was to provide fair and consistent tariffs for British goods 
and to open up four new ports – Amoy, Foochow, Ning Pong, and Shanghai – in addition to 
Canton and Macau, which were already operating. In the next few years, China signed similar 
treaties with the US (1844), France (1844), Belgium (1845) Sweden (1847) and Russia (1851). 
Another treaty, signed in 1858 between China and Britain provisioned for the opening up of more 
ports for foreign trade and explicitly authorised the import of opium into China. In addition, this 
new agreement had a provision restricting the imposition of import tariffs of only up to 5 percent 
ad valorem. This new treaty technically allowed Britain to take control the administration of 
China’s import tariffs. The low import duty imposed by China made it one of the most liberal trade 
regimes in this period, although the liberal policy was, in essence, forced upon by Britain, in which 
at that time was considered a superpower, both in terms of trade and military.   
4.5.2  Trade Practices between the two World Wars 
The First World War (WW1) which broke out in 1914 marked another sharp break in the 
history of commercial policies of many countries. The exigencies of the War not only strengthened 
the protectionist trade policy inherited from the previous period (the 1870s-1910s), but they also 
exacerbated problems associated with the conduct of international trade. In almost every country, 
new barriers to trade were erected in response to changes in economic and political conditions 
brought about by WW1. 
Britain, the most significant country which had clung to free trade since 1846, signalled a 
departure from the past with the imposition of 33.3 percent import duty on a few luxury items such 
as motor cars and parts, musical instruments, clocks, watches and cinematographic films through   90
the enactment of McKenna legislation in 1915. The protective flavour of this new import duty was 
apparent, because unlike the previous luxury duties, it was not matched by domestic taxes to 
eliminate the protective effects (Kindleberger 1989, 161-196). In addition, the new law allowed 
Britain to give preferential treatments to countries in the British Empire, which was not possible 
under the free trade regime previously. 
During the WW1, Britain’s trade policy was primarily characterised by efforts to 
strengthen trade cooperation with other countries within the British Empire. In 1919 two 
legislations were enacted with provisions favouring trade within the Empire. First, the Finance 
Act, which extended provisions favouring Empire’s trade, originally introduced under McKenna 
legislation. This new law reduced import duties on tea, cocoa, coffee, chicory, currents, and certain 
dried fruits by one-sixth, and on wine by one-third if they came from the Empire. The other 
legislation, Key Industries Act, designed primarily to strengthen defence industries, equally 
contained preferences for products within the Empire. Protection was further strengthened in 1921 
when the Safeguarding Industries Act was passed, imposing 33.3 percent duty on goods of 
“strategic importance” to Britain such as scientific instruments, glassware, wireless valves, ignition 
magnetos and hosiery latch needles. This Act was originally intended to give temporary protection 
to British industries of only five years, but when the five-years period ended in 1926 the Act was 
not only extended (for another five years), it also enlarged items liable for duties (Capie 1983, 41).        
In the few years after the end of WW1, political ideology played an important role in 
determining trade policy in Britain. For example, a liberal trade ideology subscribed to by the 
Labour Government during a brief period between 1924 and 1925 resulted in the repeal of the 
McKenna legislation and allowed some safeguarding duties to lapse. However, the administration 
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duties on wrapping paper, pottery, button and enamel hollow-ware. Similarly, when Labour Party 
came back into power in 1929 some safeguarding duties were not renewed and anti-dumping 
provisions under the Safeguarding Act were repealed. Protectionism strengthened once again 
during the Coalition Government which came into power in 1931. 
Although by the beginning of the 1930s Britain’s moved towards protectionism could be 
considered complete, yet the elements of protection continued to strengthen (Capie 1983, 63). In 
1931 the Abnormal Importation Act was enacted, allowing for the imposition of import duties of 
up to 100 percent on certain goods, although in practice the highest applied rate was about 50 
percent. The list of items subject to duties, however, was not very long covering mainly pottery, 
sanitary ware, tiles, metal furniture, textiles, camera and electric lamps. A marked increase in 
protection occurred in February 1932 when the Import Duties Act was introduced imposing 10 
percent duty on all other goods not yet attracting any duties. Exceptions were only given to a 
handful of items, primarily food products and raw material originating from Empire countries. The 
speed of tariff increases was tremendously fast; in April 1932 the rate was revised upwards, 
doubling the nominal rate to 20 percent. And by the end of that year iron and steel products 
including pig iron, girders and sheet were imposed with 33.3 percent duty. Again in 1935, the duty 
on iron and steel was raised to 50 percent in an effort to ward off competition from other European 
steel producers. In short, the extent of protection in Britain increased sharply at the beginning of 
the 1930s. Prior to this, almost 85 percent of British imports were free of duty, but the number was 
reduced to only 30 percent at the end of 1932.       
As if the use of import tariffs was not adequate to provide protection to domestic 
producers, Britain then started to resort to import quota, fundamentally in the middle of 1930s. The 
first quota system was introduced for the importation of iron and steel from other European   92
countries in 1935 as British steel companies found it difficult to compete against cartels of iron and 
steel from continental Europe. The import quota system was then extended to imports of 
agriculture products, notably meat, from all countries including those from the British Empire.   
A number of forces were at work which forced Britain to make a turn-around to 
protectionism in the early 1930s after it had clung to free trade for almost a century. A prolonged 
business cycle downturn and bad economic condition contributed greatly to Britain’s departure 
from a free trade policy. Initial stress due to bad economic condition was evident during the WW1 
(1914-1918). Majority of the people faced difficulties in carrying out their normal lives because 
many aspects of economic policy setting were geared towards the War. Trade flows and economic 
activities suffered quickly and severely during the War – consumer goods production was replaced 
by military production, shipping was requisitioned for the war, and transporting goods around the 
world encountered enormous hazards (Capie 1983, 69). Economic conditions improved slightly in 
the early years following the end of WW1, especially in terms of the growth of Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP), although unemployment and the loss of potential outputs were still high. 
Throughout the 1920s the general public in Britain experienced enormous distress as the economy 
fell into a long period of stagnation; a period of very low growth, due to lack of demand, both 
internal and external for British products, thus the economy was unable to elevate national output 
to a satisfactory level.
19 Consequently, the depression pushed up unemployment to reach one 
million people or 7 percent in the middle of 1920s, and continued to soar to the peak of three 
million in 1931 (Gomes 2003, 277).    
                                                 
19 For the twelve years period from 1913-1925, the annual income growth of Britain was at 0.2 percent. This indicated 
a very low growth since it recorded the growth of annual income of 1.7 percent for the previous 14-years period from 
1890-1913 (Kenwood and Lougheed 1999, 177).    
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At the end of 1920s Britain’s economic malaise became chronic problems. Internally, 
rigidities in wage and cost structures did not allow the costs of labour, thus final products to fall 
despite the existence of huge supply of labours in the country. Externally, Britain incurred huge 
trade deficits, recorded with almost all other countries.
20 In addition to the rigidity of the cost 
structure, British currency was overvalue due primarily to the fact that the sterling was peg to the 
gold standard; therefore, it was impossible for a natural adjustment in the balance of payment 
account occur.    
Because of these chronic economic problems, it was widely acknowledged that John 
Maynard Keynes decided in 1930 to break away from free trade ideology that he had subscribed 
for a long time.
21 This happened after a series of conventional remedies and initiatives to increase 
domestic demand were found to be of “not responding, impractical and inexpedient” due to 
constraints under which the British economy operated (Gomes 2003, 279). Keynes then contended 
that imposing import tariffs to generate revenue would be a pragmatic remedy to address the 
unemployment problem; although he stressed that this measure should only be temporary. Keynes 
also argued that the economics of free trade would not work under the situation of large scale 
unemployment. Furthermore, chronic weaknesses in the balance of trade were made worse by the 
slump in world demand. This condition warranted the imposition of tariffs to switch demand from 
foreign to home goods, thus resulting in increased employment in domestic industries.    
                                                 
20 In fact Britain experienced trade deficits for most of the years starting from the middle of nineteenth century. In 
1870 the trade deficit was in the amount 58.7 million pound, recorded after goods imported were valued at 302. 8 
million against the export value of 244.1 million. In 1914 its trade deficit increased to 170.4 million pound, with total 
import and export stood at 696.6 and 526.2 million respectively (Capie 1983, 13). 
    
21 Keynes previous record as a free trader was unquestionable. In 1923 he wrote that: “We must hold to Free Trade, in 
its widest interpretation, as inflexible dogma, to which no exception is admitted, wherever the decision wrest with us 
… we should hold to Free Trade as a principle of international morals, and not merely as a doctrine of economic 
advantage”(Keynes CW 1977). 
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Concerns over “unfair trade practices” allegedly pursued by a number of countries, in 
particular Germany and the US, and the worry over the influx of foreign goods at the expense of 
domestic industries contributed to the British switch to protectionism. Since the early 1920s there 
were growing resentments among producers as well as policy makers over the practice of 
dumping, accused of being done by foreign companies especially of iron and steel, tyres, and glass 
bottles aimed at penetrating British market. Consequently at the end of 1920s, allegations of 
dumping became common.
22 The National Federation of Iron and Steel Manufacturers, for 
example, claimed that it was impossible for British steel companies to compete against companies 
from continental Europe. This federation accused German steel companies of being involved in 
dumping their products by selling them in Britain at prices below of those sold in Germany, so the 
federation pressed for appropriate actions to be taken, especially through the introduction of anti-
dumping law. Besides the pressure for protection to protect industries from dumping, there were 
increasing sentiments particularly by those influenced by mercantilist arguments to protect 
domestic industries against the flood of foreign imports. They were primarily worried over the 
continued increase of imports and the prolong Britain trade deficits experienced for over a decade.   
The continuing existence of pressure groups, existed in different forms at different times, 
lobbying for protection was another significant force in influencing British trade policy. In fact 
strong lobbying groups demanded for protection emerged soon after the Britain’s adoption of a 
free trade policy. The Fiscal Reform League founded in 1870 was the earliest, before the formation 
of a more famous lobbying group, the National Fair Trade League in 1881. However, these groups 
were unsuccessful in their demand for protection due to various societal factors existed at that 
                                                 
22 At this time, although the allegations of dumping were common, but the evidence of dumping was scanty; only nine 
applications for the imposition of anti-dumping duty were received by the Board of Trade, and only two were granted, 
duties on glass bottles and vulcanised tyres (Capie 1983, 49). 
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time. Britain witnessed a growing number of pressure groups starting from the early twentieth 
century when domestic economic conditions deteriorated.  
In 1903, the Tariff Reform League was formed with two main objectives and immediately 
became a formidable pressure group under the leadership of Joseph Chamberlain, a former 
Colonial Secretary. The first objective of the group was to protect the existence of British 
industries from the onslaught of foreign competitors. This group argued that the conduct of 
international trade was unfair to British producers because, while goods from foreign countries 
could enter British market duty free, goods from Britain were imposed with import duties when 
entering their markets. The other objective of the group was to forge closer economic relations 
among countries within the British Empire through reciprocal provisions of preferential tariffs. By 
the 1920s, the Tariff Reform League gained momentum and attracted wide support from various 
quarters of societies including politicians and businessmen with special interests. At the same time 
numerous trade and industry associations were complaining with increasing voice about 
difficulties faced by their members to compete with foreign competitors. Prominent among these 
associations were National Federation of Iron and Steel (NFIS), Federation of British 
Manufacturers (FBM) and National Union of Manufactures (NUM).   
The Netherlands, another significant country which had managed to maintain liberal trade 
policy since the sixteenth century turned to protectionism in the early 1930s. Kindleberger (1989, 
178) noted that because of increasing domestic resentments over declining wheat prices, the 
Netherlands decided to regulate farm prices in 1931. This was done with the introduction of the 
Wheat Act in 1931, setting the domestic price of wheat at 12 florins per kilogram. In 1932, as a 
response to the depreciation of pound sterling, the country declared fiscal emergency by imposing 
a general duty of 25 percent on agriculture products under the Dairy Crisis Act and the Hog Crisis   96
Act. These two acts were then combined into the Agricultural Crisis Act in 1933 with a broadening 
coverage (Gordon 1941, 307). In addition, the Netherlands also imposed licensing requirements 
not only on imports, but also in some cases on exports. In 1931 an export quota was established for 
cases where foreign countries imposed import quotas for its products. The quotas were distributed 
among exporters based on their historical record of exports. An export licence attracted some fees, 
in the amount of 70-100 percent of the difference between world price and the market price in the 
importing country, with the proceeds then distributed back to Dutch producers of particular goods 
(Gordon 1941, 356).     
Major continental European countries such as Germany and France witnessed the 
strengthening of protectionist elements in trade policy during the inter Wars period. Germany, 
already protectionist in outlook at the eve of the WW1, underwent a minor change in trade policy 
during the WW1. After the outbreak of the War, Germany trade policy was geared towards the 
fight against the blockade imposed by its enemies in an effort to secure its military and essential 
supplies. During this time it was not only that Germany did not collect any duties for the 
importation of agriculture and raw materials, but it also imposed a ban on the export of these 
items. Immediately after WW1 ended, in which Germany was the losing side, its trade policy was 
devised at the behest of the victorious powers; the countries in the Allied Forces. More 
specifically, Germany was required by the Treaty of Versailles signed in 1920 to grant the Allied 
countries unilateral and unconditional most-favoured-nation treatments for five years. When the 
five years period ended in 1925, especially after the problem of heavy fluctuations in its currency 
stabilised, Germany decided to return to pre-war protectionist policy with the enactment of “little 
customs duty law” (Hentschel 1989, 792). Under this law, duties on iron and steel and agriculture 
were reintroduced, although not to the level requested by the agrarian pressure group east of Elbe 
(Junkers).    97
Beginning in the 1930s Germany overall economic policy was devised to deepen 
industrialization, therefore, its trade policy was used as a supplement to ensure a continuous access 
to the import of foods and raw materials (Kindleberger 1989, 181). The new economic plan, 
especially the Four Year Plan devised in 1936, aimed at producing synthetic materials and gasoline 
from coal, because these items were argued to be important especially during wartime. Up to this 
time, the sentiment of German general public was primarily of unhappiness over the loss of its 
African colonies in the Versailles Treaty, particularly Cameroon, since it was an important source 
of raw materials for energy generation. The strategy of securing foods and raw materials supply 
was, however, changed towards the end of 1930s, when Adolf Hitler, then the Chancellor, 
focussed its attention at securing them from countries adjoining Germany. At one meeting held in 
May 1939, he explained the need for enhancing relations with countries in the east of Germany in 
order to guarantee an uninterrupted supply of food. He argued that colonial territories would not 
solve the scarcity of food, which Germany had experienced during WW1, because other countries 
could block the supply. Also, his directive to the Economic Staff Group in May 1941, just before 
the attack on the Soviet Union, specifically asserted that this new strategy was designed to secure 
continuous food supplies from neighbouring countries east of Germany. 
The WW1 strengthened protectionist agitation in France. By 1918 the minimum tariff rate 
was raised from 5 to 20 percent, while maximum rate was also increased from 10 to 40 percent. 
France was argued to be the first country to introduce import quota to provide additional protection 
to domestic producers of both agriculture and industries (Kindleberger 1989, 162). Protectionism 
enhanced further between 1919 and 1931 when laws were enacted to extend the list of agriculture 
products, of which the French government could change the rate of import duty during 
emergencies. Originally this provision was provided by an old law of 1897, the so-called loide 
cadenas, in which the original list contained only 46 items.                98
The WW1 caused a fresh request for higher duties in the US; this time it came from a new 
group of “infant industries”, which had started to produce certain products, such as chemicals and 
dyes, originally pioneered by industrialists in Germany (Robertson 1973, 663). The US authority 
responded to this request with the passing of the Emergency Tariff Act of 1921, and in 1922 a 
permanent legislation, the Fordney-Mc Cumber tariff, was enacted allowing for the increase of 
average duty to about 33 percent. Throughout the 1920s, people aligned to the Republican argued 
that high tariffs contributed significantly to the attainment of prosperity in the US, especially since 
the country recorded high trade surpluses with other countries, forgetting that the high level of 
exports was only a result of the readiness of Americans to lend abroad in quest for higher rate of 
returns for their investments. When the country started to experience economic downturn in 1929, 
these people thought that serious depression could be avoided by again increasing the level of 
tariffs. In 1930, after a year of debate, the Congress passed the Hawley-Smoot tariff, which raised 
average duty to over 60 percent and imposed tariffs on more than 12,000 items (Husted and 
Melvin 1995, 166). Although 34 foreign countries collectively lodged a protest note over the bill 
and a huge number of American leading economists urged President Herbert Hoover to veto the 
bill, the President was unremoved and signed the bill into a law.
23 
Many competent observers argued that the Hawley-Smoot tariff was the main cause for the 
deepening of the 1930s Depression. The passing of this legislation resulted in massive retaliations 
by other countries; some immediately increased their tariffs while others responded with the 
imposition of import quotas. Also, this legislation signalled an important massage to the world; the 
US would act to fulfil its selfish nationalism whenever the country considered it justified. 
Furthermore, in the campaign of 1932, Republicans, who was the incumbent government, claimed 
                                                 
23 According to the New York Times of 5
th May 1930, 1028 economists in the United States singed the protest note, 
prominent among them were Irvin Fisher, Frank Graham, Paul Douglas, Frank Taussig, Ernest Patterson, Henry 
Seager and Clair Wilcox. 
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that protection had brought prosperity in the past, therefore, promised even higher duties and 
proposed to broaden the list of dutiable goods. The Democrats, sharing the thinking with 
Republicans this time, joined them for tariff-making efforts in the Congress, only to notice that 
their acts contributed greatly to the massive deterioration of world trade.  In the next two years, 
many people started to realize that the collapse of world trade hurt everyone and a plan for trade 
liberalization needed to be initiated.
24   
New thinking in the US favouring trade liberalization resulted in the enactment of the 
Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act in 1934, which was passed by a large majority in both the House 
of Representative and Senate. The Act permitted the President a negotiating period of three years 
to come to an agreement with any countries willing to engage in reciprocal tariff concessions. 
Although the Act specified that the Congressional approval of the reciprocal agreement was not 
required, but the president’s tariff reducing power was limited to 50 percent of the prevailing rates. 
This legislation was renewed thrice (in 1937, 1940 and 1943) by Congress without major 
amendments, and for the period of 1934-1945 reciprocal trade agreements were negotiated with 29 
countries. As the signing of the reciprocal trade agreements proved to be beneficial, it was 
renewed again in 1945, and this time the tariff making power of the President was broadened. 
Under the new provisions, the President could reduce tariffs up to 50 percent of the rates 
prevailing at January 1, 1945. Also, duties which had already been lowered to 50 percent from the 
1934 levels could be further reduced to another 50 percent. 
Between 1934 and 1947, after series of tariff reductions provided in the reciprocal trade 
agreements, the average tariff duty of the US was reduced to about 25 percent. But reciprocal trade 
agreements have limitations, primarily due to the fact that they could only be used for the 
                                                 
24 During the Great Depression between 1929 and 1933 world trade contracted nearly 70 percent. The value of world 
trade declined from US$2,998 million in 1929 to US$992 million in 1933 (Kindleberger 1973, 132). 
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negotiations to reduce import tariffs. These agreements were unable to address the issue of 
quantitative restriction on imports such as quotas because no country felt that it could give up its 
quota system unless all other countries did the same, and a bilateral trade agreement with the US 
did not fall into a framework which provided such a guaranty.   
4.5.3  Post WW2 Trade Policies and Multilateral Cooperation for Trade Liberalization       
Three important developments which occurred during the inter Wars period signalled the 
need for multilateral cooperation for the setting up of a new international economic order in efforts 
to ensure continuous prosperity for the world.
25 And much of efforts to realise this desire was 
taken under the stewardship and influence of the US, which emerged from WW2 as a major 
economic and military superpower. The first of the three developments was the collapse of world 
trade, due primarily to increased protectionism in every trading nation. During this time the 
general public had to endure high cost of living because goods could only be purchased at higher 
prices, as supposedly cheaper goods from abroad were impaired by various measures introduced to 
protect domestic producers.  
Second, it became evidently clear that a unilateral free trade policy adopted by some 
countries in Europe starting from the middle of nineteenth century, as exemplified by Britain and 
the Netherlands, was not sustainable in the long run, since this policy completely broke down 
during the hard times of the inter Wars period. Apparently it was very difficult for those countries 
to continue maintaining a unilateral free trade since other countries resorted to “beggar my 
neighbour” trade policy (Kjeldsen-Kragh 2001, 122); a policy devised to augment economic 
wellbeing of one country at the expense of others. Third, the instability of arrangements for 
international payments, caused by excessive exchange controls undertaken by many countries, 
                                                 
25 By the end of WW2, the economy of most countries was in ruin with the exception of only the US, which at that 
time accounted for more than 50 percent of world industrial output (Woolcock 2003, 107).    101
created enormous risk and uncertainty for trading nations. This problem was further exacerbated 
by the collapse of gold standard, forcing many countries to resort to a competitive devaluation of 
their currencies in the quest for increasing exports.    
As WW2 drew to an end, major trading countries at both sides of the Atlantic came to an 
agreement for the setting up of an international economic order to deal with two broad issues: 
international monetary arrangements and international trade relations (Gomes 2003, 298). 
Preliminary discussions over these issues were held following the signing of Mutual Aid 
Agreement between the US and Britain in 1941. This agreement, although primarily concerned 
with lend-lease issues, also contained provisions committing both countries to cooperate in 
international economic affairs after the war (Kenwood and Lougheed 1999, 237). As regard to 
addressing the issue of international monetary arrangements, after many discussions and meetings, 
specific rules were finalised by delegates representing 44 countries at an international conference 
held at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, in July 1944. This led to the creation of International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (commonly 
known as the World Bank). 
Originally the IMF was established to achieve three main objectives, reflecting lessons 
learnt during the interwar years. The first objective was to ensure a stable multilateral system of 
payments based on the worldwide convertibility of currencies; therefore, the system of exchange 
controls could be eliminated. Another objective was to maintain the stability of exchange rate, thus 
the competitive devaluation of currencies would be avoided. The final objective for the 
establishment of the IMF was to grant member countries with flexibilities over the control of 
domestic monetary and fiscal measures allowing them to pursue policies targeting at full   102
employment, while at the same time retaining the worldwide stability of exchange rates.
26 
Meanwhile, the original objective of the World Bank was to provide financing for the post WW2 
reconstruction of the affected countries. The roles of the bank were later widened to include 
providing aid to developing countries as well as to assist member countries evaluating their 
economic potential and designing development programmes.    
Parallel to efforts undertaken on international monetary arrangements, the intention of war 
time planning was also to establish a set of rules for the conduct of international trade. Initial 
discussions to address this issue started in early 1943 when the US and British governments 
initiated a proposal for the creation of a commercial union. The main elements of this proposal 
which came from both sides were twofold; a sweeping cut in tariffs, of which all tariffs to be 
reduced by a targeted percentage and to end export subsidies provided to agriculture sector, which 
were prevalent in the US. While negotiations on monetary issues continued smoothly and led to 
the signing of the Bretton Woods Agreement in 1944, the talks on trade, however, faced various 
hiccups started right from the beginning. This was mainly due to differences between the US and 
Britain, the two important trading countries. The US wanted thorough sector-by-sector and 
country-by-country tariff reductions and these approaches be applied based on non-discriminatory 
or Most-Favoured-Nation (MFN) principle extended to all other countries. The US also demanded 
Britain to end its imperial-preference trade policy, the demand of which the British resisted.  
Discussions on international trade relations continued in 1945 when the US came up with 
another proposal aimed at ensuring the expansion of world trade and employment. Many elements 
                                                 
26 While the IMF is still functioning today, but the original objectives underlying its establishment were abandoned 
when the Fund legalised the floating of currencies under Jamaica Agreement in January 1976. According to Robert 
Leeson (2003, 7-15), the collapse of Bretton Woods system was due predominantly to the defeat of the ideology that 
favoured fixed exchange rate (as subscribed to by the IMF) by the “floaters” (under the influence of Milton Friedman). 
In addition, such other factors as the oil price shocks of the 1970s and the win of market forces or “invisible hand” in 
determining the price of foreign exchange over the “fixers” were also at work.   103
in this new proposal were in essence formed the first draft of a Charter for the establishment of 
International Trade Organization (ITO). The proposal also contained measures to tackle a wide 
range of issues including tariff reductions, the elimination of preferences, the non-discrimination 
of domestic taxes and regulation, and common principles for custom valuation. At the end of 1945 
the US and British officials found a compromise; British could initially continue with its imperial 
tariff preferences, but they would have to be reduced progressively through product-by-product 
negotiations. In the following year, the US organised an international conference on trade and 
development where it formally proposed for the establishment of ITO (Woolcock 2003, 110). It 
invited 15 other countries to participate in the conference held in London in 1946. Countries which 
participated in the conference included Britain and its colonies and dominions – Australia, Canada, 
New Zealand, South Africa and India. Other countries which took part in the conference were 
France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxemburg, Russia, Cuba, Brazil and China. 
Subsequent important negotiations were undertaken from May to September 1947 in 
Geneva. In these negotiations, in which 23 countries took part, the focus was on the negotiations 
for tariff reductions based on “request” and “offer” between the countries of major exporters of 
goods’ concerned. The agreed level of tariff cuts would then be extended to all other participants 
based on MFN principle. At the end of the negotiations tariff concessions for 45,000 tariff lines, 
covering two-thirds of world trade were concluded and tariff reductions of about 35 percent were 
achieved. The negotiations in Geneva also reached an agreement on some core principles over the 
conduct of international trade such as non-discrimination, national treatment, and common rules 
governing anti-dumping and custom valuation. All important elements agreed to during the 
negotiations were incorporated into the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which 
was signed at the end of the meeting. Since the ratification of any international agreements was 
always difficult in the US, President Harry Truman signed an Executive Order legalising the   104
implementation of the GATT Agreement using the trade negotiating authority granted by Congress 
under the Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act before the expiry of the authorised power in 1948. 
During the negotiations in Geneva the draft Charter for the establishment of ITO was also 
discussed. Britain and few other countries, due to their chronic balance of payment problems, 
requested specific provisions allowing member countries to impose trade barriers in efforts to 
address these problems. In this meeting, it was generally agreed that such provisions could be 
permitted, but the US insisted that the IMF should have a veto over this issue; therefore, in essence 
allowing the Americans to use their influence and huge voting rights in the IMF to ensure the 
original intentions of these provisions are always observed. 
In 1948, negotiations for the establishment of ITO were held in Havana, Cuba following 
the positive impetus gained at the Geneva discussions. At the end of the Havana meeting an 
agreement was reached among the negotiators representing 53 countries including the main 
players, the US and Britain, over the need to officially establish ITO as a world governing body 
overseeing international trade affairs, thus the Havana Charter was signed. 
The establishment of the ITO, however, did not materialise, mainly due to the failure of the 
US Congress to ratify the Havana Charter. Few forces were at work making the ratification of the 
Charter impossible in the US Congress. Contrasting political climates were existed in the US 
during the period of ITO negotiations as compared to the period of the negotiations for the 
establishments of the IMF and the World Bank. During the negotiations of the IMF and the World 
Bank, the US Congress was controlled by Democrats, who were relatively in favour of liberal 
trade regime. However, in the election of 1948, Republicans gained control of the Congress, and 
since they had been critical of the ITO, arguing that many of the ITO provisions amounted to the   105
surrendering of the control of American domestic policies to a supranational body (Gomes 2003, 
298), the ratification of the Charter would surely face problems.  
With the Congress already leaning towards opposing the ITO establishment, a group 
representing international business, previously one of main lobbies in favour of liberal trade, 
shifted position and came out against the ratification of the Havana Charter (Woolcock 2003, 112). 
This group believed that two provisions, one allowing member countries unrestricted 
implementation of domestic policies targeting at full employment, and the other which permitted 
expropriation, although it could only be done in exceptional cases, provided too much scope for 
state interventions, therefore, these provisions were argued to work against the interest of the US 
businesses (Diebold 1952, 18). As the GATT already ratified, there was in fact an alternative 
avenue for the US businesses to fall back on to resolve issues in relation to the conduct of 
international trade. During the Congressional hearings on the Havana Charter, major US 
companies which had campaigned for a new trade regime kept a distance from the debate. Since 
protectionist interests, particularly the US agricultural lobbying group, opposed ITO all along, the 
possibility of the ratification of the Havana Charter in the US quickly became out of question. 
In Europe, by the early 1947 the East-West ideological conflicts of the Cold War became a 
pressing issue. This problem attracted considerable attentions in the US, and it was widely 
acknowledged that the US government must act promptly to help European countries recovering 
from their economic weaknesses, so as to avoid potential social unrest, which could lead to gains 
for the communist ideology. Such was the situation that, in June 1947 General Marshall proposed 
a plan for the US to assist European countries by extending aid, which later known as the Marshall 
Plan. The Truman Administration put significant efforts into pushing the Marshall Aid legislation 
through the Congress and felt that the ITO issue was a lower priority. Without support from   106
businesses and the administration, there was simply no prospect that the US Congress would ratify 
the Havana Charter. 
Since the establishment of ITO was never materialised, the GATT Agreement was the only 
concrete result of the many rounds of negotiations on matters associated with international trade. 
Originally, the GATT was meant only as an interim agreement involving governments (and 
custom authorities) for the conduct of international trade and this agreement would need to be 
incorporated into ITO.   Even though GATT possessed many of the specific provisions intended 
for the ITO, having been conceived as a temporary trade agreement, it lacked institutional 
structures (Hoekman and Kostecki 1995, 13). In the initial years of its operation, GATT did not 
exist as an independent body, although it organised formal Sessions of Contracting Parties once or 
twice a year.
27 Its organization structure emerged only gradually. While major decisions were 
made at the Sessions of the Contracting Parties, it rapidly became obvious that a permanent body 
was needed especially to coordinate and implement decisions arrived at each Session. 
Subsequently, an Inter-Sessional Committee was formed in 1951 to organised voting by air mail or 
telegraphic ballot over certain issues such as matters relating to import restrictions justified for 
balance of payment problems. This committee was replaced in 1960 by the Council of 
Representatives which assumed broader powers and responsibilities including day-to-day 
management of the GATT Secretariat. 
At the early 1990s a complete structure of the GATT as an organization emerged. This 
allowed Contracting Parties to further enhance rules for international trading system, including a 
strengthening capacity for the surveillance of Contracting Parties’ trade policies and assisting 
conflict resolution through consultations, negotiations, mediations, and dispute settlement. 
                                                 
27 Since signatories of the GATT comprised also the custom authorities of certain territories such as Hong Kong, the 
members of the GATT are called Contracting Parties instead of Member Countries.   107
Trade liberalization initiatives under the GATT were undertaken through a mechanism 
called Multilateral Trade Negotiations (MTNs). During the life of the GATT, and before the 
creation of World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995 as its replacement, eight rounds of MTN 
were held. The eight rounds of MTN negotiations were the Geneva round (1947), the Annecy 
round (1949), the Torquay round (1951), another Geneva round (1956), the Dillon round (1960-1), 
the Kennedy round (1964-67), the Tokyo round (1973-79) and the Uruguay round (1986-94). In 
the Uruguay round negotiations, Contracting Parties decided to establish WTO as the world 
governing body, entrusting the new body with a bigger role in managing world trading system. 
The early rounds of MTNs dealt primarily with tariff negotiations. In addition to 
negotiations on tariff issues, attention began to shift towards non-tariff restrictions and starting 
from the Kennedy round the problem of trade in agriculture products was discussed. The Tokyo 
round took Contracting Parties a step forward by addressing policies which were not previously 
subject to GATT disciplines, particularly product standards and government procurement. This 
trend continued in the Uruguay round, in which negotiations were also conducted on trade in 
services, intellectual property, and rules of origin, all of matters which the GATT had very little 
rules (Hoekman and Kostecki 1995, 17).                   
As far as negotiations on tariffs were concerned, a significant achievement of tariff 
reductions were recorded in the Geneva round, which resulted in the signing of the GATT, with an 
average tariff cut of 35 percent. The next four rounds of MTNs achieved only moderate tariff cuts, 
predominantly because the negotiations for tariff reductions were based on item-by-item and 
request and offer basis. But the negotiations at the last three rounds – Kennedy, Tokyo and 
Uruguay – resulted in another significant tariff cuts; 35 percent, 34 percent and 40 percent   108
respectively, since during these negotiations, a formula-based approach to tariff cuts was 
introduced and agreed upon by the Contracting Parties.  
Since the conclusion of WW2, the existence of the GATT (and from 1995, WTO) has 
helped strengthening rules for the conduct of international trade, particularly when more and more 
trading nations decided to become members.
28 Unfortunately, however, the purist economics of 
free trade idea, which dominated the argument for the Repeal of the Corn Law in Britain in the 
middle of nineteenth century, was never regained its dominance during trade negotiations in the 
twentieth and twenty-first centuries.  
Nowadays the economists’ case for free trade has not had much weight among the people 
who really matters when it comes to international trade relations. According to Paul Krugman 
(1997, 113-120), trade negotiations conducted in the many rounds of MTN are essentially “a game 
scored according to Mercantilist rules”. In contrast to economists’ case for free trade, which is 
simply a unilateral case, whereby it is of its own benefits that a country pursues unilateral free 
trade regardless of what others might do; the current rule in trade negotiations is that an increase in 
exports – no matters how expensive to produce them in terms of other opportunities forgone, is a 
victory. Likewise, an increase in imports – no matter how many resources they release for other 
uses, is a defeat. 
In fact the 23 countries which signed the GATT Agreement in 1947 did not indicate that 
achieving free trade for the world was one of the underlying objectives of the Agreement. Instead 
the desire then was only to achieve substantial reduction of tariffs and non tariff barriers (GATT 
1994, 486) reflecting the thinking that all countries should now move towards adopting a “freer” 
trade policy regime in comparison to the policy adopted between the two World Wars. Similarly, 
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when 124 countries agreed at the conclusion of the Uruguay round negotiations to establish WTO, 
achieving free trade for the world was again not a goal. At this time, the prime goal for the 
establishment of the WTO and thus trade negotiations to be conducted under its auspices was 
merely to have “more open world trading environment” (GATT 1994, iv).  
4.6 Conclusion 
There have been significant changes to thinking about trade during the period of 
neoclassical economics. Besides a new approach being used in expounding the theory of trade, 
which is essentially based on formal analysis, this period also observes significant changes to trade 
policies adopted by individual countries. Unilateral free trade policies, adopted by many countries 
following Britain’s footstep in the middle of nineteenth century, came to an end at the breakout of 
the First World War in 1914. Thereafter, protectionist trade policies in virtually all countries 
continued to strengthen their grip, especially during the period between the two World Wars. Free 
trade failed to emerge as a dominant thinking in trade policy formulation for the post WW2 period. 
Instead, this period witnessed the emergence of the “freer” trade idea, whereby policymakers of 
one country agreed to embrace a liberal trade policy provided other countries do so. Although 
proponents of freer trade agree that liberal trade policies in all trading countries are good and 
achievable, they never envisage that setting free trade for the whole world is possible and 
achievable.    110
CHAPTER FIVE 
HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF REGIONALISM AND REGIONAL TRADING 
ARRANGEMENTS 
5.1 Overview 
This chapter examines the historical evolution of regionalism and regional trading 
arrangements that have occurred all over the world.  Besides examining regionalism of the 
twentieth century, which has been pursued aggressively by many countries after the conclusion of 
WW2, this chapter also examines regionalism of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries which 
occurred in parallel with the formation of nation-states. Specifically, this chapter examines 
regionalism that has occurred in various parts of the world including Europe, North and South 
America, Africa and Asia. 
5.2  Concepts and Definitions 
Four concepts are widely used in reference to special and policy-induced arrangements of 
trade affairs, which have been initiated in many parts of the world. These are Regional Preferential 
Trading Arrangements (RPTA), Regional Free Trade Areas (RFTA), Customs Unions (CU) and 
Bilateral Free Trade Areas (BFTA).
29 While the first three are generally advanced along regional 
lines, the fourth is pursued bilaterally by only two countries. RPTA is an arrangement involving 
few member countries in which goods that come from members are subject to lower trade barriers 
than goods coming from non members. RFTA is an arrangement in which member countries agree 
to allow free flow of trade between them without imposing any trade barriers while retaining 
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Frieder Roessler (1993), Alan Winters(1999) and Dilip K. Das (2004) group them as Regional Integration 
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independent authority over trade policy with other countries. CU is essentially an arrangement 
which incorporates two important elements: a free trade area among member countries, and the 
application of common external tariffs with non members. The common external tariffs can differ 
across goods but not across union partners. Meanwhile, BFTA is an arrangement involving only 
two partner countries in which traded goods are free from any trade barriers.  
One of the main reasons countries engage in certain types of trading arrangements along 
regional lines is because they want to reap benefits created by the economics of regionalism. 
However, regionalism is a loose and elusive concept; scholars have yet to agree on a standardized 
and widely accepted definition. The problem of defining regionalism perhaps first appeared more 
than a half century ago, when Jacob Viner (1950, 123)  commented that “economists have claimed 
to find use in the concept of ‘economic region’, but it cannot be said that they have succeeded in 
finding a definition of which it would be of much aid … in deciding whether two or more 
territories were in the same economic region”. Thus far, neither economists nor political scientists 
have had much success in settling this issue (Mansfield and Milner 1999, 589-628).  
Dispute over the definition of regionalism arises because of disagreements on the 
importance of the geographical proximity of constituent countries on one hand, and the importance 
of the relationship between economic activities as well as communal similarities on the other. 
Generally, a region is defined as a group of countries located in the same geographically specified 
area. Exactly which areas constitute a region, however, remain controversial. For example, while 
some writers consider Asia-Pacific as a combination of two regions, Asia and America, others 
consider it a single region. Moreover, a region implies more than just close physical proximity 
among the constituent states. The US and Russia, for instance, are rarely considered inhabitants of 
the same region, even though Russia’s eastern coast is very close to Alaska. Besides proximity,   112
many scholars insist that members of a common region should also share cultural, economic, 
linguistic, or political ties (Nye 1971, 45; Thompson 1973, 89-117). 
A number of authors define regions largely in terms of these non geographic criteria and 
place relatively little emphasis on the physical location. For example, France and the French 
speaking countries of Northwest Africa are sometimes referred to as a regional grouping because 
of their linguistic similarities. Also, social constructivists argue that countries sharing a communal 
identity imply a region, regardless of their location (Kupchan 1997, 212). In this regard Peter 
Katzenstein (1997, 8) argued that regional “geographic designations are not ‘real’, ‘natural’, or 
‘essential’. They are socially constructed and politically contested and thus open to change”. 
Therefore, there are researchers who loosely consider arrangements such as the US-Israel Free 
Trade Area and the Lome Convention as regional arrangements in their studies. 
This study, however, aims at analysing formal regional economic groupings which are 
created along geographical proximity. The study focuses on regional arrangements established by 
contractual-obligation agreements with specific intentions to enhance extensive economic relations 
among participating countries. This approach is imperative in order to distinguish formal and 
informal economic groupings. In addition, this approach is also in line with a definition provided 
by Sheila Page (2000, 7), who defines regionalism as a group of countries that have “created a 
legal framework of cooperation covering extensive economic relationship, with the intention that it 
will be of indefinite duration, and with the possibility foreseen that the region will economically 
evolve in future”. To this end, loose and non-binding regional groupings such as Asia Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC) as well as arrangements pursued at bilateral level will be given 
attention only in special circumstances.        113
5.3  The Genesis and Proliferation of Regional Trading Arrangements   
Economic regionalism has a long historical record, although it has existed in slightly 
different forms at different times. During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, it occurred in 
parallel with the move towards the formation of nation-states, which was pervasively pursued in 
many parts of the world. This effort brought along the establishment of a kind of “customs-union”, 
in which uniform tariffs were set for imports from other politically independent states. Again in 
modern history, especially after WW2, regionalism has been pursued with increasing intensity all 
over the world.  
5.3.1  Regionalism in Europe 
The earliest regionalism in Europe probably occurred between England and Scotland, 
which was established through the Act of Union in 1703, although the idea for the formation of an 
economic and political union between them was first floated in 1547 (Das 2004, 9). In France, the 
conclusion of the French Revolution in 1789 brought all its provinces into a kind of customs 
union.  In Germany, the German Custom Union or the Zollverein was formed in 1834 among 18 
small states and territories. It grew bigger with the unification of the whole of Germany in 1871, 
which brought all tariffs into uniformity externally. The confederation of Switzerland in 1848 as 
well as the unification of Italian states in 1860 resulted in a similar form of customs unions. Also, a 
customs union was established with the creation of Romania through the unification of Wallachia 
and Moldova in 1881 (Schiff 2000, 9). 
Economic regionalism established in Europe during this period had significant impact, 
especially from the perspective of economics, to the countries concerned. But the most significant 
of all was arguably Germany. Partly due to this, Germany emerged from thirty-nine disconnected 
and backward independent states and territories at the end of eighteenth century (Barraclough   114
1972, 414), into one of the most powerful and advanced countries in Europe towards the end of 
nineteenth century. The production of coal in Germany in 1871, one of the indicators used to 
measure economic “greatness” during this time, surpassed the combined production of France and 
Belgium. By 1913 the production of coal in Germany was almost as much as in Britain, then the 
world’s largest producer. This was a dramatic reversal; as late as the early nineteenth century, 
German’s states and territories were economically backward in comparison to other European 
countries, with each German territory retaining independent tariffs not only with other countries 
but also among themselves. Prussia, the largest and most influential German state, alone had sixty 
different tariffs and 2800 classes of taxable goods in 1815. As a result, German producers faced 
enormous difficulty to compete especially with their English and French rivals (Leeson 2005, 403-
406).  
The move toward the establishment of uniform external tariffs started in Prussia with the 
Tariff Law of 1818, aimed at creating uniform internal tariffs and to extend them to other small 
and medium-sized states in North Germany that formed enclaves between the disconnected 
Prussian territories. Thereafter, the unification of tariffs was soon pursued in other areas of 
Germany. By 1828 three customs unions were established: the Prussian-Hessian Customs Union; 
the South German Customs Union, which united Bavaria and Wurttemberg; and the Central 
German Customs Union, although originally this was largely formed to balance Prussian 
dominance (Bramsted 1972, 118). In 1829, Prussia and South Germany were united and opened 
the way for a much wider German Customs Union. In 1834 the Zollverein was officially 
established covering an area of 8,253 square miles and a population of 25 million, comparable in 
size with other leading European powers.      115
The Zollverein was not the only successful story of customs unions which helped countries 
emerge stronger economically. Another important successful story about the creation of customs 
unions out of non-viable small territories in Europe was the unification of Italy. Previously, the 
existence of many Italian city states – with their own currencies, banks and customs – had 
hampered trade even between themselves. Before 1848, freight for the 125 mile journey from 
Bologna to Lucca had to stop at seven customs stations. Similarly, freight between Florence and 
Milan had to stop at eight stations in 150 miles. The unification of Italy in 1860, primarily due to 
the influence of the Prime Minister of Sardinian state, Camillo Benso Cavour, abolished these 
obstructions and laid the foundation for swift economic progress, and in the early twentieth 
century Italy emerged as one of the great industrial nations in Europe (Pollard 1974, 118). 
During the nineteenth century, there was no lack of initiatives to establish customs unions 
among politically independent countries. Unofficial attempts were made for such a union 
involving France and Germany in 1888 while the Hungarians attempted a central European union 
during 1885-86. But the most persistent attempt, in particular from the 1880s to 1914, was to link 
Germany with its neighbours in a variously named “Central European Economic Association” 
(Pollard 1974, 120). This initiative was not only to include Germany’s close neighbours of 
Austria-Hungary, Belgium, Holland, Switzerland and Denmark, but at times it went even as far as 
Italy, Romania, and Sweden. None of this seriously took shape, except in the distorted form of 
expansionist Germany during the Great War (which was rename the First World War) of 1914-
1918. To the Germans, economically this War was aimed at incorporating the Balkans, Turkey and 
Ukraine into a German-dominated economic empire. Since this distorted economic grouping did 
not last long when the Germans lost the War to the Allied Forces, only two minor customs unions 
between politically independent countries were successfully established. These were the customs 
union involving Norway and Sweden in 1874 and the customs union of Austria-Hungary, which   116
was formed by the establishment of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1867. The latter customs 
union remained effective until the collapse of the Empire in 1918.  
The proliferation of customs unions and other regional trading initiatives in Europe was 
disrupted by the outbreak of the WW1 in 1914. But such initiatives re-emerged soon after the war 
ended. Nevertheless, trade arrangements initiated during the period between WW1 and WW2 
tended to be highly preferential. Some were created to consolidate the empires of major powers, 
including the customs union of France, which was formed in 1928 with countries under its empire, 
as well as the Commonwealth system of preferences established in 1932 by Great Britain (Pollard 
1974, 145).  
In contrast to the eighteenth and nineteenth century experiences, however, many 
regionalism initiatives during the inter Wars period occurred among sovereign countries. Shortly 
after the WW1 ended, Hungary, Romania, the Balkan States and Bulgaria negotiated tariff 
preferences especially on the trade of agricultural products between them as well as with other 
European countries. In 1934, the Rome Agreement was signed for the establishment of a regional 
PTA involving Italy, Austria and Hungary. Similarly, throughout the 1930s, Belgium, Denmark, 
Finland, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden concluded a series of economic 
agreements (Kenwood and Lougheed 1971, 211-219; Pollard 1974, 49).   
In the modern history of the post-WW2, the regionalism of economies through the signing 
of regional trading agreements arguably occurred in two waves. The first wave of regionalism 
began in the 1950s and lasted until the 1970s, while the second started in the mid-1980s (Bhagwati 
1993, 22-51). The first wave emerged in Europe with the signing of the Treaty of Rome in 1957 
involving Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of West Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the 
Netherlands to establish the European Economic Community (EEC). Other European countries   117
comprising Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland and United Kingdom 
organized a convention in Stockholm in 1959 and agreed to form the European Free Trade Area 
(EFTA). 
Throughout history, the EEC has probably been the most successful example of economic 
regionalism among politically independent countries that was formed along regional lines, 
especially in terms of its ability to integrate member economies. By 1967, the EEC successfully 
established a Commission, a Parliament and a Court. The roles of these institutions of integration 
have since been strengthened and expanded. Progress towards integrating its members, 
nevertheless has never been a smooth path all the time. The integration of the EEC member 
economies was oscillated between confidence and enthusiasm at one period, and doubt and 
retrenchment at the other. The former seemed to coincide with economic booms and the latter with 
recessions. 
The economic difficulties experienced in the early 1980s caused the EEC falling into a 
moribund state. While severe anti-inflationary policies adopted worldwide at the beginning of the 
decade helped the US and Japan to stop their economy from deteriorating, the EEC countries were 
firmly stuck in the mire. The matter was made worse since the growth of intra-EEC trade was 
uneven among its members, making some members feel uneasy. The rapid integration of economic 
activities that had characterized the early stages of its establishment lost steam in the mid-1980s. 
This sign of weakness forced the EEC members to draw up new programs to ensure integration 
processes remained on track.  In 1986 members of the EEC came up with their Single Market 
Program (SMP) with the aim of creating a single market for goods, services, capital and labour. 
This program was later known as EC-92, a reflection of the target date for the completion of the 
plan by the end of 1992. Subsequently a new agreement, the Treaty on European Union was   118
agreed in December 1991, laying the foundation for the signing of the Maastricht Treaty in 
February 1992, with the prime aim being the establishment of the Economic and Monetary Union 
(EMU). This new agreement marked a further integration of the EEC member countries. With the 
Maastricht Treaty coming into force in November 1993, the EEC was renamed the European 
Union (EU).  
Throughout the twentieth century, the EU expanded its membership four times – in 1973, 
1981, 1986 and 1995.
30 This enlarged the membership of the grouping from the original six to 15 
after the 1995 expansion. The beginning of the twenty-first century saw the EU enlarge its 
membership still further. In April 2003 the Treaty of Accession was signed in Athens, Greece 
between the 15 existing member-countries and 10 would be new members. These 10 new members 
included the Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, 
Slovenia and Slovakia. Except for Cyprus and Malta, these new members were all central and east 
European countries, formerly belonging to the Eastern Bloc under the stewardship of Russia 
during the Cold War until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1990. Officially, these 10 new 
members were accepted into the EU in May 2004.  
Still four more candidates for future membership, Bulgaria, Romania, Turkey and Croatia 
are at various stages of negotiations for accession into the EU. Bulgaria and Romania have been 
involved in negotiations with the EU over their accession since 2002. It is expected that both 
countries would officially become new members of the EU by January 2007. The accession 
negotiations for Turkey commenced in the early 2005, paving the way for Turkey to become a 
member of the EU in 2008. Meanwhile, Turkey has to continue undertaking economic and 
political reforms, in particular concerning elements to uphold the principles of liberty, democracy, 
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joined in 1973; Greece joined in 1981; Spain and Portugal joined in 1986; and Austria, Finland and Sweden joined in 
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respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, in which all these 
elements need to be brought into compatibility with the EU standards. Also, in June 2004, the 
European Council decided to accept Croatia as the latest candidate for the EU membership. With 
this, Croatia would be eligible to get help, including financial assistance in preparing its pre-
accession programs required by the EU.       
5.3.2  Regionalism in North and South America 
Economic integration through the formation of nation-states was not only pervasive in 
Western Europe but also occurred in other parts of the world, especially in North America. The 
American colonies maintained independent external tariffs until the constitution adopted in 1789 
imposed uniform external tariffs with other countries and barred individual states from setting up 
independent import duties (Bairoch 1989, 147).      
Regionalism in the American continents during the first wave (of the twentieth century) 
followed closely the events happening in Europe. In Latin America, frequent public debate on the 
need to create regional blocs was heard throughout the 1950s, at the time when European countries 
negotiated the establishment of the EEC. Finally after a decade of deliberation and negotiations, 
the Latin America Free Trade Area (LAFTA) was launched in 1960 involving Mexico, Argentina, 
Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela. In the same 
year four Central American countries, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua 
established the Central American Common Market (CACM), while Costa Rica joined the grouping 
in 1962. In 1969, four members of the LAFTA – Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru – decided 
to form a customs union under the name of the Andean Pact with Venezuela becoming the fifth 
member in 1973.             120
In contrast to the first wave of regionalism which started in Europe, the second (and 
current) wave of regionalism, which emerged in the mid-1980s, started in the American continents 
following a change in the attitude of the US in relation to international trade affairs. Beginning 
from this period the US made a conversion from pursuing a multilateral-only trade policy it 
adopted since the formation of the GATT into an increasing involvement in all facets of trade 
relations with other countries – multilateral, regional and bilateral. This was indeed a major change 
since during the first wave of regionalism two specific proposals were advanced for the formation 
of free trade areas on a regional basis involving the US. These two proposals were the 
establishment of the North Atlantic Free Trade Area and the Pacific Free Trade Area. But none of 
these materialized because the US opposed the proposals. The change then came in 1985, when the 
US signed a free trade agreement with Israel, and followed by the signing of a similar agreement 
with Canada in 1988.     
The shift in Americans attitude took place primarily because of growing perception in the 
Congress that the GATT is inadequate and the “regional card should be played” as a form of threat 
to those reluctant to liberalize fast enough through the GATT process to suit America’s desires and 
interests (Bhagwati 1991, 70). Since trade liberalization processes at the GATT have been slower 
than the American impatience, the regional cards have been played again and again, reinforcing 
the American shift in external economic policy.
31 
The proliferation of regionalism in the Americas during the second wave continued with a 
stronger momentum during the 1990s. During the period 1990-1992 a new sub regional customs 
union, the Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR), was negotiated and agreed upon in South 
                                                 
31 The US frustration over the slow GATT process for trade liberalization ran high at the GATT Ministerial Meeting in 
November 1982 when it failed to secure an agreement from European and developing countries for the launching of a 
new round of MTN (Bhagwati 1996, 46; Panagariya 1999, 7).     
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America between Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay. In 1994, the US-Canada FTA was 
extended to include Mexico with the establishment of the North America Free Trade Area 
(NAFTA). Meanwhile, in other parts of Latin America, the old and inactive preferential trading 
arrangements began to be revived and in the early 1990s the Andean Pact and the CACM were 
rejuvenated.  
During the Summit of the Americas (December 1994), a proposal was made to establish 
the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). The FTAA is obviously the most ambitious regional 
free trade area ever proposed to date, and if this is materialised, it would become the largest FTA 
in the world with a combined GDP of US$13 trillion representing a total population of 800 million 
(Das 2004, 193). Negotiating parties include all countries in the two American continents with 
Cuba being the only exception.
32 Thirty-four participating countries have been involved in 
negotiations for a formal agreement aimed at progressively eliminating all barriers to trade and 
investment.
33 The originally target date for completing the negotiations was January 2005. 
However, efforts undertaken to formally establish the FTAA came to a complete halt at the 
following Summit of the Americas (November 2005) because their leaders could not even agree 
whether or not to continue the negotiations on the proposed economic grouping. 
5.3.3  Regionalism in Africa 
The first wave of regionalism after WW2 was argued to end with events that occurred in 
the African continent. Due to the influence of the earlier regionalism initiatives pursued in Europe 
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as compared to other participating countries. This is understandable because it would be impossible to reconcile 
Cuba’s communism and centrally planned economy with democracy and market economy subscribed by the others, 
upon which the specific provisions of the FTAA Agreement being currently negotiated are based upon.   
 
33 Thirty-four participating countries of the FTAA are Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bahamas, Belize, Bolivia, 
Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, 
Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Monstserrat, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, St. Lucia, 
St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Vincent and Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, The US and Venezuela.   122
and Latin America, respectively in the late 1950s and 1960s, African countries aggressively 
pursued their economic groupings starting in the 1970s. The first of the economic groupings 
established in Africa was the Communaute Economique de l’Afrique Occidentale (CEAO) when 
the Abidjan Treaty was signed in 1973 by Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, Mali, Mauritania, Niger 
and Senegal, while Benin joined the grouping in 1984.  In 1975 a much bigger grouping, the 
Economic Community of Western Africa States (ECOWAS) was formed with the participation of 
fifteen countries. These fifteen countries comprised the seven members of the CEAO plus Guinea, 
Liberia and Sierra Leon, Cape Verde, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea Bissau, Nigeria and Togo. In 
addition, a small economic grouping was also formed in 1976 involving Burundi, Rwanda and 
Zaire (Foroutan 1998, 305-336). In the same year the Union Douaniere at Economique de 
l’Afrique Centrale (UDEAC) was founded by former French colonies of Cameroon, Central 
African Republic, Chad, Congo and Gabon. Equatorial Guinea, a former Spanish colony joined the 
union in 1985. The economic groupings in Africa were probably the least successful of all; by the 
middle of the 1980s the groupings became feeble and unable to move forward as they faced 
various problems.  
The second wave of regionalism gave a new lease of life to many economic groupings in 
Africa; this time new PTAs were formed based on old foundations. The Union Economique et 
Monetaire Ouest Africaine (UEMOA) was established out of the CEAO, and the Common Market 
of Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) was resurrected. The PTA for Eastern and Southern 
African states was expanded and the UDEAC was revamped with the aim to replace complex and 
distorted external and internal tariffs with a simplified and transparent system, similar to the one 
adopted by CEAO members.      123
5.3.4  Regionalism in other Parts of the World 
In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, regionalism in other parts of the world was 
scanty, perhaps because during these two periods many third world countries were under the 
empires of colonial powers of Europe. Efforts to create uniform external tariffs among colonies 
and dominions only occurred when these powers started to decolonize their colonies. In Australia 
for example, a form of customs union, setting uniform external tariffs was established when the 
Commonwealth of Australia was created by its six states in January 1901. In Asia, no effort was 
made to form any kind of economic groupings until long after the conclusion of WW2 (Das 2004, 
10).  
The first economic grouping in Asia was formed during the late period of the first wave of 
regionalism. It occurred in 1975 with the signing of the Bangkok Agreement (BA) by six countries 
– Bangladesh, India, Laos, the Philippines, South Korea, Sri Lanka, and Thailand – with the aim of 
liberalizing trade among members based on preferential tariff arrangements. This grouping is 
probably one of the least known, and because member countries failed to come up with a specific 
name for the grouping, it is only known as BA, the acronym of the agreement. Notwithstanding the 
ambitious target drawn during the formation of the grouping, which aimed to include all Asian 
countries as its members, the grouping has been plagued with problems right from the beginning in 
which two of its original members, Thailand and the Philippines, failed to ratify the agreement. 
Additionally, the scope of trade liberalization is trivially limited, even the removal of non tariff 
barriers is excluded from the agreement. In the end, albeit in existence for almost 30 years, it has 
achieved very little (Kelegama 2001, 105-222).         
Only few significant economic groupings were initiated during the benign period between 
the first and second waves of regionalism. In the Middle East, the Gulf Cooperation Council   124
(GCC) was founded in 1981 with the participation of six countries – Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, 
Qatar, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates. This economic grouping was formed with the aim 
of eliminating tariffs between members by 1982, and to be followed by the liberalization of trade 
in services in the following year (Soloaga and Winters 2001, 1-29).  
Another important regionalism occurred during this time was the establishment of the 
Australia New Zealand Closer Economic Relations (CER) in 1983. Although this was essentially 
an enhanced version of the earlier free trade agreement signed in 1965, the implementation of the 
CER agreement resulted in an unprecedented deepening of economic integration. Thus, the CER is 
considered as another example of successful economic integration between politically independent 
countries besides the EU. Since the CER agreement involves only two partner countries, 
integration processes follow a relatively smooth path in comparison to that of the EU. The path is 
smooth because both countries have many comparable features, including the systems of 
government, laws, customs regulations as well as sharing a common language. Prior to the 
formation of the CER, in particular before the 1970s, both Australia and New Zealand had the 
highest average level of protection for their import-competing products among OECD countries 
(Das 2004, 143).  
The CER agreement widened and deepened substantially the scope of trade liberalization 
and other economic integration programs. The CER sets specific target dates for phasing out trade 
barriers and other trade-distortion measures: 1987 for performance-based export incentives, 1988 
for tariffs, and 1995 for tariff quotas and other import restrictions. Also, anti-dumping practices 
between the two countries were to be ceased by 1990. All those targets were achieved within the 
stipulated time frames reflecting a smooth implementation of the agreement. It is imperative to 
note that the successful implementation of the CER agreement has been based on two distinct   125
features. First, the agreement is implemented without the need for the creation of a supervisory 
body or secretariat. And second, the actual implementation of trade liberalization programs is not 
only restricted to the two partner countries, but in most cases it is also extended unilaterally to 
others. According to Peter Lloyd (1997, 267-280), the CER can be considered as one of the “most 
clean and most outwardly open” regional integration arrangements notified to the GATT, second 
only to the EU, particularly in bringing down trade barriers. 
During the second wave of regionalism only one important economic grouping that was 
established in Asia. In 1992, countries of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
agreed to establish the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA). This proposal was initiated by Thailand 
in January 1991, and all ASEAN member countries accepted the proposal during the fourth 
meeting of ASEAN leaders (the ASEAN Summit) held in Singapore a year later (January 2002). 
The original goal of the AFTA was to progressively reduce tariffs on goods traded among 
members to between zero and 5 percent within 15 years starting from January 1993. Under the 
AFTA, trade liberalization activities are implemented through a mechanism called Common 
Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT). 
The CEPT divides goods into two categories: (1) fast-track goods for which tariffs would 
be reduced to 0 to 5 percent within 7 or 10-years period, depending on whether the prevailing tariff 
was below or above 20 percent, and (2) normal-track goods for which tariffs would be reduced 
more slowly within a 15-years period. Subsequently, during the 1993 and 1994 ASEAN Summit 
meetings, tariff liberalization programs were accelerated. Member countries agreed that the 
liberalization of tariffs on goods in the fast-track would be completed by 2000 and goods in the 
normal-track by 2003 instead of 2008. These trade liberalization schedules would be applied 
equally to the original six ASEAN members – Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines,   126
Thailand and Singapore. Four newer member countries of ASEAN, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar 
and Vietnam are allowed longer time frames for their tariff liberalization programs. 
Originally ASEAN was established in 1967 as a political grouping to address security and 
ideological issues in the region, particularly in trying to balance the influence of communism 
which gained credence in the 1960s and the early 1970s especially in neighbouring Indo-China 
countries. Economic cooperation began to be incorporated into ASEAN starting in 1977 when the 
ASEAN Preferential Trading Arrangement (ASEAN PTA) was drawn up. This PTA granted a 10 
to 15 percent margin of preferences on 71 commodities and industrial products traded among 
member countries. However, this new scheme was weak and insignificant because important 
sectors were exempted. Additionally, the scheme was ineffective due to multiple problems: 
negotiations were conducted on a product-by-product basis; domestic content requirements were 
high; and tariff preferences were limited. Although during the 1985-1987 Summit Meetings 
ASEAN leaders had agreed to expand the list of sectors covered by the PTA as well as to increase 
the margin of preferences, it still did not achieve much. At the end of the 1980s, the fraction of 
goods eligible for regional preferences was only about 3 percent of the total number of traded 
goods. When the AFTA was established in 1992, the PTA arrangements were absorbed into the 
AFTA.         
5.3.5  Regionalism after WW2: A Comparison between the First and the Second Waves 
The two waves of regionalism which occurred after the conclusion of WW2 arose in 
sharply different context and rationality. The first wave of regionalism arose and initiated against 
the backdrop of the Cold War and the rash of decolonization, all of which coloured their economic 
and political effects. Many least-developed and developing economies signed preferential trading 
arrangements to reduce their economic and political dependence on former colonial powers.   127
Meanwhile, the second (and current) wave of regionalism arose in a different context than the 
earlier episode. Although it began in the mid-1980s, the current wave gained a stronger momentum 
in the wake of the Cold War’s conclusion, which marked a significant change in the pendulum of 
interstate power and security relations.  
The first wave of regionalism was weak, short-lived and achieved very little except for the 
EEC. One of the important reasons which contributed to this failure was the fact that the US, the 
most influential country as regard to world economic affairs, was only committed to 
multilateralism and largely opposed regionalism. The US had a historical bias toward MFN-only 
trade liberalization and considered regionalism as a force which worked against multilateral 
liberalization. The US took a polemical stance and relentlessly championed the cause of trade 
liberalization through the GATT. 
Another reason for the first wave’s failure was attributable to one of underlying objectives 
behind the formation of regional economic groupings, especially among developing countries. 
This was essentially in relation to the belief subscribed by many developing countries that 
regionalism would help them in economic development and industrialization. Since the period of 
the 1960s until the early 1970s was economically characterized by the adoption of an import-
substitution strategy in many developing countries, they found regionalism was an appealing 
concept to help achieving these aims. Policy makers argued that start-up companies could first 
learn to export within a less competitive regional market and use it as a stepping stone to face 
stronger competition in the global markets. However, import-substitution as a strategy for 
economic development and industrialization was largely a failure; cases of infant industries created 
under the wall of protection, but later managed to become stronger internationally were very rare.     128
In contrast, the second wave of regionalism has been characterized by the increasing 
regularity of its use to promote and consolidate economic and political reforms in prospective 
members, a rarity during the prior wave. Additionally, the second wave of regionalism has also 
been accompanied by a high level of economic interdependence as well as the adoption of “export-
and-foreign-investment-led policies” rather than the promotion of import substitution policies 
(Lawrence 1996, 6). 
5.4 Conclusion 
Regionalism may be argued to occur in two main periods of time. First, it occurred during 
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in parallel with the formation of nation-states in many parts 
of the world, in which uniform external tariffs were set for imports from other independent 
countries. Regionalism has also been aggressively pursued by many countries after the conclusion 
of WW2. During the latter period, regionalism has been established primarily through the signing 
of regional trading arrangements between politically independent countries, leading to the 
formation of either one of the following regionally based economic arrangements: Preferential 
Trading Arrangements, Free Trade Areas or Customs Unions. Regionalism in the twentieth 
century has occurred in two waves. The first wave began in the 1950s with the formation of the 
EEC and lasted until the 1970s. Meanwhile, the second wave emerged in the middle of 1980s 
marked by the signing of the US-Israel Free Trade Agreement.     129
CHAPTER SIX 
REGIONALISM VERSUS MULTILATERALISM 
6.1 Overview 
This chapter examines the issue of regionalism versus multilateralism. It is imperative to 
examine this issue because there exists an opposing view on whether or not regionalism is 
compatible with multilateralism. In this context, the specific question of interest is whether 
regionalism is “building blocs” or “stumbling blocs” to multilateralism. In addition, this chapter 
also examines the GATT position on regional trading arrangements (RTAs), in which the analysis 
is not only on those RTAs that were in existence prior to the formation of the GATT, but also for 
RTAs to be established in future. Subsequently, this chapter examines the economics and politics 
of the GATT Article XXIV, which deals specifically with the issue relating to the formation of 
customs unions and free trade areas. Finally, this chapter analyses theoretical research on 
regionalism versus multilateralism. This part begins with the examination of Viner’s (1950) 
exposition of “trade creation” and “trade diversion”. It then examines various theoretical models 
that try to shed light on this issue, which can be grouped into the following categories: symmetric 
models; asymmetric models; negotiated-tariff models; and political economy models.         
6.2 Concepts  and  Definitions 
The issue concerning regionalism versus multilateralism has been the subject of debate 
since the 1940s, primarily during the negotiations for the formation of the GATT and the 
establishment of ITO. According to Alan Winters (1999, 8) “multilateralism is a characteristic of 
the world economy or world economic system”.
34 However, multilateralism “must ultimately 
                                                 
34 This Chapter only attempts to define multilateralism as the definition of regionalism is already presented in Chapter 
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reside in the behaviour of individual countries” to the extent that individual countries behave 
multilaterally. So for any one country, multilateralism is a positive function of: “(1) the degree to 
which discrimination is absent” – the degree to which all trading partners receive identical 
treatments; and “(2) the extent to which the country’s trading regime approximates free trade”. 
Winters further noted that on the face of it criterion (1) alone would be a sufficient definition of 
multilateralism, but in the context of regionalism versus multilateralism, whereby any preferential 
trading arrangements involving a few member countries will worsen multilateralism, criterion (2) 
will “add back the missing dimension”.    
6.3  The GATT Position on Regional Trading Arrangements  
Under the GATT (and from 1995 WTO) the position of regional trading agreements 
(RTAs) is spelled out specifically in three Articles: Articles I, XXIV and XXXIII.
35 The position 
of RTAs under the GATT is mainly governed by the provisions of Articles I and XXIV. It is a well 
known fact that the idea for the establishment of a multilateral trade order had its origin from the 
dispute between the US and the UK over trade policy during the inter Wars period, in which the 
US strenuously complained about the UK imperial preferences. This dispute continued to 
pronounce significantly during the negotiations for the formation of the GATT. During these 
negotiations, the main tussle was still between the US, which was determined to have 
multilateralism approach to international trade liberalization and the UK, which was reluctant to 
give away totally its imperial-preference trade policy (Bhagwati 1991, 63). Also, at the time when 
these negotiations started many other countries such as Belgium, France, Luxemburg and the 
                                                                                                                                                                
 
35 The establishment of the WTO in January 1995 was one of the outcomes of the Marrakesh Agreement (also referred 
to as WTO Agreement) of which the Contracting Parties signed on 15 April 1994. The WTO Agreement includes the 
original text of the GATT as well a set of additional agreements covering other areas than trade in goods. Since the 
primary discussion of this Chapter focuses on specific articles of the GATT, in many circumstances a direct reference 
to the GATT is made rather than the WTO.  
       131
Netherlands had signed certain forms of RTAs, and it was against their interest to abandon these 
arrangements.  
The agreed GATT and the ITO Havana Charter (nevertheless, the establishment of ITO did 
not materialize because many participating countries which signed the Havana Charter fail to ratify 
it) contain provisions reflecting a compromise between these two contrasting views. Article I, 
Paragraph 1 of the GATT contains provisions adopting an unconditional MFN principle.
36 
Paragraph 2 of the same Article, however, grants exemption to certain types of RTAs which had 
been in force prior to the signing of the GATT. This latter provision specifically gives exemption 
to preferences granted by Great Britain and France to their imperial countries; preferences under 
the customs union of Belgium, Luxemburg and the Netherlands; preferential trade arrangements 
between Chile and its neighbouring countries; and preferential arrangements between Lebanon and 
Syria and their neighbouring countries. During the GATT negotiations not only treatments to be 
accorded to the existing RTAs were debated, but also treatments for RTAs to be established in 
future. At the end of the negotiations, it was agreed that both the existing and future RTAs are 
exempted from the MFN principle: paragraph 2 of Article I for RTAs formed prior to the GATT 
and Article XXIV for RTAs to be established in future.  
At the GATT negotiations, customs unions were proposed to be exempted from the 
unconditional MFN principle right from the beginning, but free trade areas and other forms of 
RTAs were not included until the last moment (Snape 1993, 281). Even the US was relatively soft 
on the issue of customs unions so long as their formation encompasses a complete-100 percent 
                                                 
36 Conditional and unconditional MFN principles perhaps could best be explained by illustrating an example provided 
by John Jackson (1989, 137): “Under conditional MFN, when country A grants a privilege to country C while owing 
MFN to country B, then country A must grant the equivalent privilege to B – but only after B has given A some 
reciprocal privilege to pay for it”. As regard to unconditional MFN, following through this example, country A “must 
grant the equivalent privilege to country B, without receiving anything in return from B.”   
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tariffs reduction. According to Wilcox (1949, 70) although the US opposed trade preferences but it 
tolerated customs unions; the US proposal for the ITO Charter had provisions exempting 
prevailing customs unions from the MFN principle. As for the free trade area, it was only at the 
Havana Meeting that Article XXIV of the GATT was incorporated at the insistence of Lebanon 
and Syria.
37  
The language in which the exception of customs unions from MFN principle is expressed 
as well as the exception given to free trade areas indicated that the original thinking and the basis 
for the exemptions from unconditional MFN were significantly bent by the time the GATT was 
agreed. As a result, the formation of a complete customs union was no longer the only criterion for 
exemptions since other forms of RTAs were also tolerated under Article XXIV. Essentially, 
Article XXIV would not exist but for MFN being unconditional in Article I; conditional MFN 
would not have led to the demand for such exemptions, as preferences would have been allowed 
(Snape 1993, 281). Although these provisions are viewed as loopholes by proponents of 
multilateralism, according to Dilip K. Das (2004, 97) without them many countries “would not 
have joined the GATT.” 
Another GATT provision which has a direct bearing on RTAs is Article XXXIII. This 
Article rules out that other GATT provisions may be invoked for the treatment of preferential 
trading arrangements involving customs territories of contracting parties, in which they can be a 
sovereign state or “a separate customs territory possessing full autonomy in the conduct of its 
external commercial relations and of the other matters provided for in this Agreement”. According 
to Frieder Roessler (1993, 312) this means that a complete customs union such as the EEC, which 
                                                 
37 According to Frank Haight (1972, 391-404), the original GATT proposal envisaged that a free trade area should be 
only between countries of the same region, but this restriction was removed by relevant subcommittees formed during 
the GATT negotiations.   133
possessed customs autonomy, could itself theoretically accede to the GATT/WTO, in which case 
its existence no longer require justification under Article XXIV.   
6.4  The MFN Provision in Commercial Treaties and its Controversies 
The use of a MFN provision or clause has a long history and its phrase was first appeared 
in the seventeenth century (Jackson 1989, 133). The use of the MFN provision, either conditional 
or unconditional seemed to be driven primarily by the importance of trading activities in the eyes 
of European countries as they competed against each other to develop networks of trading 
relationships among themselves and with other countries outside Europe. In the later centuries, it 
was a norm to include a MFN clause in a variety of trade arrangements, especially in various 
friendship, commerce and navigation treaties. 
The incorporation of a MFN provision in a commercial agreement assures each party that, 
if other parties of the agreement enter into any other treaties with third parties which provide more 
favourable treatments in relation to trade with those third parties, these more favourable treatments 
will be automatically extended to all the parties of the first agreement. This essentially means that 
no other countries will be treated more favourably (Snape 1993, 274).    
Nevertheless, the existence of a MFN clause in commercial treaties has always been 
subject to controversies. In the nineteenth century, controversies over the MFN clause occurred 
occasionally because some countries which had signed a treaty that included in it a MFN provision 
tried to derogate their MFN commitment. This especially happened in cases when these countries 
signed a new agreement with third parties and did not want to extend newly negotiated favorable 
treatments in the new agreement to the signatories of a previous treaty. In Europe, numerous 
examples of this kind of controversies existed during this period.   134
Frankfurt, one of the many German territories, in 1832 signed a commercial treaty with the 
UK providing for MFN treatment. As surrounding states joined the Prussian Zollverein, Frankfurt 
found itself increasingly isolated economically and became willing to accede to the Prussian 
Zollverein. In 1835, therefore, Frankfurt asked the UK for leave to abandon its promise of MFN 
treatment, but it was not explicitly granted by the UK. All parties concerned seemed to have taken 
it that in the absence of express consent from the UK Frankfurt was bound by the treaty of 1832 
not to enter the Zollverein (Viner 1950, 7). 
A controversy also occurred in 1867 when the Prussian Zollverein adopted a new 
constitution and took into its membership some additional German states. Napoleon III of France 
insisted, on the strength of the MFN clause in the Franco-Prussian commercial treaty of 1865, an 
extension to France a similar favourable treatment granted by Prussia to new Zollverein members; 
free entry of France’s goods to Prussia. The France claim was, however, energetically denied by 
Prussia. 
Another controversy occurred in 1857, in connection with the “customs union treaty” 
between Austria and Modena. Originally, Austria had in 1852 signed with Modena a “complete” 
customs union treaty. But in 1857 Austria negotiated a revised arrangement provisioning for less 
complete tariff unification than the 1852 treaty. Meanwhile in 1851, Austria had also signed a 
commercial treaty with Sardinia which provided for a reciprocal MFN treatment. Under this treaty 
a separate article, however, exempted both countries from MFN obligations of the concessions 
made to the third countries if any of them form a complete customs union. 
Cavour, on behalf of Sardinia, made a claim to benefit from the 1857 Austrian-Modenan 
treaty on the ground that the new tariff arrangements between Austria and Modena did not 
constitute a complete customs union and therefore was not eligible to claim exemptions from the   135
MFN obligations provided under the Austro-Sardinian treaty of 1851. Cavour maintained that a 
customs union involved a fusion of the tariff interests of two or more states. If certain conditions 
were not met, the resulting agreement was only a commercial treaty and not a complete customs 
union. He argued that four conditions must be met to constitute a complete customs union: 
uniformity of export and transit tariffs; free exchange of products of the unified countries; 
uniformity of external import tariffs and suppression of an internal tariff line; and, pooling of 
customs revenue and a specific formula for the allocation of customs revenue between the 
participating states must be established in advance. He claimed that the Austrian-Modenan 
arrangement failed to meet these conditions mainly because it allowed Modena to add “internal” 
duties to the external ones. In addition, this new agreement had three other defective points: it 
created separate and distinct Austrian and Modenan tariffs; it installed a tariff wall between 
Austria and Modena; and it failed to provide a specific method of customs revenue allocation. He 
therefore demanded the extension to Sardinia of all concessions granted by Austria to Modena. 
De Buol, replying on the part of Austria, argued that the arrangement with Modena 
adequately met the conditions of a complete customs union. Foreign goods crossing the territories 
of either Austria or Modena to reach the other member required only one and the same customs 
declaration. They were subject to the same customs regulations and pay only once the rates fixed 
by a tariff common to both countries. As for the internal duties, which were different in the two 
countries, he maintained that internal arrangements between the parties had no bearing on the 
international character of the arrangement. Also, the special internal duties had no international 
bearing, nor did the method for reimbursement of the tariff revenues. He also pointed out that 
international law did not establish any definition of a complete customs union and history 
furnished too few precedents to fall back on. Therefore, to determine whether an arrangement was 
a complete customs union or not, it was necessary to observe the actual operation of the agreement   136
and whether the two countries form, in their relations with the outside world, a single customs 
territory. While refusing to concede the validity of the legal arguments raised by Cavour, De Buol 
however stated that Austria, moved by other considerations, had asked Modena to accede to the 
nullification of the treaty.      
Since the formation of the GATT, controversies in relation to the principle of MFN 
emerged in a different context than the nineteenth century experiences. Throughout the post-WW2 
period there have been controversies over the usefulness of conditional in comparison to 
unconditional MFN principles in ensuring gradual but continuous liberalization of trade among the 
GATT members. As opposed to unconditional MFN, which is based on non-discriminatory 
principle of trade policy and to be applied equally to all members, conditional MFN in essence 
allows GATT members to preferentially discriminate one against another.  
There are basically two opposing views over the usefulness of the principle of preferential 
discrimination brought about by conditional MFN in the context of multilateral liberalization. Both 
are set in the context of domestic protectionist pressure on governments. On one hand it is argued 
that preferential discrimination permits countries to liberalize further (and faster) than otherwise by 
engaging in reciprocal reductions of barriers in agreements with like minded countries. The 
opposing view in contrast maintains that discrimination permits governments to raise, selectively, 
barriers against “troublesome” exporting countries – and thus to bow to domestic protectionist 
pressures – in a manner in which they could not if the barriers had to be raised against all 
exporters, friends as well as foes (Snape 1993, 238). 
A leading advocate of the latter view was Jan Tumlir. Tumlir (1985) argued strongly that 
non-discrimination, unconditional MFN provides a firm constraint on protection. He maintained 
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weaken a government’s ability to resist protectionist pressures. He pointed out that some forms of 
protection which emerged in the 1970s as well as in the 1980s, even as tariffs had been falling 
since the GATT came into force – for example, country-specific import quotas and voluntary 
export restrains – could not be imposed in a system that was really non-discriminatory. Strong 
implementation of unconditional MFN would have prevented them.  
In contrast, it is often argued against Tumlir’s position that unconditional MFN does not 
guarantee the development of a liberal, multilateral trading system. The liberal system in Europe 
started to be eroded from the early 1870s, despite unconditional MFN. French protectionists were 
able to claim that the Cobden-Chavalier Treaty, with its unconditional MFN provisions, was 
initially imposed undemocratically (by Napoleon III). Moreover if governments wish to 
circumvent the constraint of unconditional MFN they can do so by multiplying tariff 
classifications, by not renewing bilateral treaties as they expires, or by providing notice of 
withdrawal under the terms of the treaties (Pomfret 1988, 18). 
Another position opposed to that of Tumlir is presented by those who argue that 
unconditional MFN is a drag on trade liberalization because it could encourage free-riding and 
foot-dragging. The possibility of free-riding would discourage negotiation and curb the selection 
of products to be covered. Foot-dragging which comes from those who already benefit from 
unconditional MFN provisions as well as from those who want to secure benefits without paying a 
price would cause some countries to refuse to negotiate at all, but conditionality could have 
brought them to the negotiating table. Conditional MFN and preferential discrimination brought by 
it then could facilitate more rapid liberalization.   
Commenting on this last point, Richard Snape (1993, 279) argued that the arguments 
favouring conditional MFN because it could avoid the problem of free-riding and foot-dragging   138
frequently tend to focus on approximation and ignore the whole. He asserted that “it is difficult to 
envisage a world of criss-crossing, bilaterally negotiated, conditional MFN agreements, each 
designed to discourage free riding and foot-dragging and each therefore with limited coverage, 
leading to a stable and harmonious trading system, or even one with the degree of harmony and 
stability produced by that which we have.”      
6.5  The Economics and Politics of GATT’s Article XXIV 
Article XXIV of the GATT permits the formation of customs unions and free trade areas 
provided that “the duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce are eliminated on 
substantially all trade between the constituent territories in products originating in such territories”. 
Some economists have questioned the requirement of the GATT that an agreement establishing an 
RTA to cover substantially all trade, suggesting instead that the relevant criterion should be 
whether or not the preferences provisioned in an RTA creates trade. Others have argued that the 
current spread of RTAs undermines the principle of MFN. The GATT/WTO has also been 
criticized for not effectively enforcing its requirements for RTAs, in particular because it 
frequently failed to reach decisions in interpreting the provisions of various regional agreements 
notified to the GATT/WTO (Roessler 1993, 311).  
Following Viner’s (1950) theory of customs unions, economists have analysed preferential 
trading arrangements by comparing the relative efficiency of an RTA in comparison to multilateral 
trade liberalization, and their standard conclusion being that an RTA may increase or decrease 
world welfare depending on whether it creates or diverts trade. From that perspective the 
substantially-all-trade criterion make little sense, because it seems to oblige contracting parties to 
include in their RTAs preferences that divert trade from more efficient producers in the third 
countries to less efficient producers in the preference-receiving countries, thereby reducing world   139
welfare. Kenneth Dam (1970, 289) argued that “certainly it is strange to state, as Article XXIV 
effectively does, that discrimination is forbidden unless it is 100 percent effective”. Rather than 
requiring that the discrimination in favour of regional partners be complete, so he and others argue, 
the GATT should insist that RTAs do not divert trade or at least do not divert more trade than they 
create.  
Commenting on such a proposal political scientists argued that the proposal does not take 
into account that most RTAs have their origin mainly in political considerations. Over and above 
the aim to create closer economic ties, partners to these agreements generally wish to create greater 
political cohesion between them. The examples of these are abundant; the Treaty of Rome which 
created the EEC is the most obvious. According to its preamble the purpose of the treaty is to 
establish “the foundation of an ever-closer union among the European people” and “to strengthen 
the safeguards of peace and liberty”. Similarly, one of the purposes of the ASEAN PTA was to 
“contribute to political and economic stability in the region”. The Australia-New Zealand CER 
emphasizes in its preamble that the close historic, political, economic and geographic relations 
between Australia and New Zealand would be further strengthened by the expansion of trade 
between them. From this perspective, Roessler (1993, 312-313) argued that to propose that 
regional agreements be examined in the GATT solely in the light of economic efficiency 
considerations is thus to ignore the fact that most RTAs are not concluded solely for those reasons. 
He further argued that the main function of the GATT rules governing such agreements is to 
permit contracting parties to pursue regional trade liberalization for non-economic purposes.  
In addition to analysing the economics of customs unions and free trade areas in terms of 
the resource allocation implications of specific arrangements, some economists examine the 
economics of the GATT trade liberalization process. On this issue they argue that the main   140
economic consequences of GATT trade liberalization are to be found in the economics of the 
multilateral liberalization process as a whole rather than in the resource allocation effects of any 
particular RTAs. But of course if each agreement has beneficial resource allocation effects as well 
as contributing to a beneficial process, so much the better. 
The economics of the influence of the GATT’s Article XXIV on multilateral trade 
liberalization is perhaps best seen through the framework of analysis of the formation of a club 
(Johnson 1976, 30; Snape 1993, 283-284). According to Snape, clubs are formed between those 
who wish to share the benefits of impure or excludable public goods, recognizing that a voluntary 
cooperative arrangement in the same area of interest will be superior to unilateral action. View in 
this way the GATT “club” comprises members who recognize that by making commitments to 
each other they constrain the actions of others against them and also constrain their own actions, 
and create a system that itself yields benefits – a public good.  
In clubs, a number of questions arise and need to be answered collectively by members in 
order for the club to remain in existence. These include questions in relation to how broad the 
coverage of the rules should be, whether there should be special provisions for certain classes of 
members, whether higher fees can purchase higher benefits, whether the membership is open or 
closed, whether new members will be admitted on the same conditions as the old, how much the 
basic rules should be bent in order to retain members (particularly important ones), how to enforce 
the rules, and whether there might be a networks of clubs with similar but differentiated purposes 
with partially overlapping membership. All these questions also arise with respect to the GATT 
“club”.  
As regard to the formation of the GATT “club”, one of the basic principles in which its 
establishment is based upon is the equality of treatments among all members. This principle is   141
argued to be important in order to achieve the GATT’s objectives as outlined in the preamble of 
the agreement: raising members’ income; ensuring full employment; developing full use of 
resources; and increasing the production and exchange of goods. The vehicles for achieving all 
these are the liberalization of trade and elimination of discrimination.  
Since the GATT membership is defined in terms of customs territories rather than 
countries, so complete customs unions could not be considered “exception” from the equality of 
treatment. The main relevant exceptions to the basic non-discrimination rule of the GATT then are 
for the treatments given to other types of RTAs: incomplete customs unions, free trade areas, as 
well as interim arrangements leading to customs unions and free trade areas. In order to analyse 
the economics of the GATT “club”, two additional pertinent questions need also to be answered. 
Are the exceptions given to those RTAs necessary to create memberships large or important 
enough to generate the public goods associated with the establishment of the GATT? Do they 
damage the real purposes of the GATT and reduce the production of the public good significantly? 
According to Snape (1993, 284-285), the answer to the first question is probably yes. As it 
was mentioned previously, the GATT is not just an economic agreement. It is essentially 
“international legal document whose primary purpose is to promote or protect certain political 
goals of nation-states” (Baldwin, 1980, 138). Snape further argued that if there had been an 
effective enforcement mechanism in the GATT so that Article XXIV had been applied strictly, the 
six original members of the EEC almost certainly would have left the GATT. Thus the exception 
and slack enforcement of this Article have helped protecting the GATT “club”. 
The second question – whether exceptions damage the real purpose of the GATT and 
reduce the production of the public good significantly – actually addresses the issue of how 
important non-discrimination really is for the achievement of GATT trade liberalization. Snape   142
(1993, 285) argued that what Article XXIV manages to do is to constrain the granting of 
preferences to “purport” free trade areas or customs unions. By and large Article XXIV does 
appear to have a restraining influence. In many instances participating countries appear generally 
to adhere to the provisions restricting the increase in trade barriers upon the formation of 
preferential arrangements, although the methods by which average trade barriers are to be 
calculated for conformity with GATT’s Article XXIV provision “have been much in dispute”. 
Would Tumlir’s argument maintaining that discrimination is the enemy of progressive 
liberalization still apply when the raising of barriers against third parties is proscribed and that 
proscription is generally adhered to? Obviously it seems difficult to sustain his argument when it is 
interpreted narrowly, though Tumlir does make a telling point that discriminatory non-tariff 
barriers have flourished even as non-discriminatory tariffs have been reduced. But his argument 
gains more substance when it is considered in the context of the development of a systemic 
system. The main worry is that the less demanding are the constraints on preferences the more 
preferential arrangements will develop. Each agreement on its own may satisfy Vinerian trade 
creating criteria for improved resource allocation. But preferential discrimination could result in 
many other downside effects: it can lead to resistance by governments to further liberalization as 
existing preferences are defended; it tends to make further negotiations with other parties more 
difficult; it tends to promulgate new rules of origin and dispute settlement procedures; and it is 
likely to lessen the system’s resistance to further implicit discrimination against some countries – a 
development that can easily lead to explicit discrimination. To this point Krugman (1991c, 56) 
argued sharply that: “the great political advantage [to European and North Americans] of regional 
pacts is that they can exclude Japan.”   143
View from this perspective, the economics of Article XXIV really concern with the public 
good produced by the GATT “club” and the damage that discrimination can do to its production. 
The rules provided by Article XXIV essentially aimed at limiting discrimination by imposing a 
high political cost on it. Strictly interpreted, the GATT would only allow an RTA if its signatories 
are really serious about favouring each other (free trade among partners for most products) while 
at the same time external barriers cannot be raised. The high political cost attached to establishing 
such preferential arrangements could act as a deterrent to their formations. Increasingly, however, 
loose interpretation of Article XXIV has lowered this cost for all countries, while the Enabling 
Clause has reduced the cost for developing countries even further.
38 The plethora of pseudo-free 
trade agreements that are now being implemented or proposed, and the threat in which they 
provide to a liberal and efficient multilateral system, suggest that currently the cost may be too 
low. 
6.6  Theoretical Research on Regionalism versus Multilateralism 
Theoretical research on regionalism versus multilateralism grows rapidly as economists 
grapple with the question of whether RTAs are good or bad for the multilateral system. Borrowing 
Bhagwati’s (1991, 77) phrase, are RTAs “building blocs” or “stumbling blocs” towards 
multilateralism? This question becomes more pressing as the worry about the ability of the WTO 
                                                 
38 The Enabling Clause was incorporated into the GATT as a result of the Tokyo Round of MTN negotiations (1973-
1979). Under this clause developing countries are allowed a much easier path to establish preferential trade 
arrangements among them without the need to conform to the provisions of Article XXIV. This clause also legalizes 
the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) in which developed countries offer non reciprocal trade preferences to 
developing countries.    
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to maintain the GATT’s unsteady yet distinct momentum towards multilateral trade liberalization 
heightened, and also as the world faces the proliferation of RTAs everywhere.
39  
At present, regionalism versus multilateralism changes the focus of research from the 
immediate consequences of regionalism on the economic welfare of the integrating countries to the 
question of whether it sets up forces which encourage or discourage evolution towards global freer 
trade. Findings from theoretical research point to either direction, and according to Winters (1999, 
7), the conclusion is “we don’t know yet”. This is so because one can build models that suggest 
either conclusion, and the models constructed are highly abstract that they could only be viewed as 
“parables rather than sources of testable predictions.”        
6.6.1  Early Theoretical Research on Regionalism 
Theoretical research on regionalism may be argued to begin with Viner (1950, 45) seminal 
contribution in theorizing the possibilities of “trade-creating” and “trade-diverting” due to the 
formation of customs unions, although his work did not directly address the debate over 
regionalism versus multilateralism in the present context. Viner’s classic work was mainly 
concerned with analysing the welfare effect of customs unions to members as well as to the rest of 
the world. Under his framework trade-creating is associated with a welfare gain, and trade-
diverting with a welfare loss. Viner expounded that the net welfare effect depends on the 
magnitude of trade creation and trade diversion, and all these in turn depend on specific features of 
a customs union – its economic size, the level of external tariffs imposed on non members, the 
degree of complementarities of member countries and the level of difference in the unit cost of 
                                                 
39 A full survey of theoretical research on regionalism as well as multilateralism is beyond the scope of this study. 
Instead, this chapter only examines the most relevant research that directly addresses the issue of regionalism versus 
multilateralism.   145
protected industries. This is so because any customs unions could result in both trade-creating and 
trade-diverting at the same time.  
Notwithstanding this, however, Meade (1955, chapter 2) argued that the relative 
magnitudes of trade creation and trade diversion alone would not be sufficient to determine the 
welfare effect of a customs union for two reasons. First, the benefits of preferential liberalization 
depend not only on the extent of trade creation, but also the magnitude by which the cost is 
reduced on each unit of newly created trade. Similarly, losses are determined not just by the 
amount of trade diversion but also by the magnitude of the increase in cost due to trade diversion. 
Second, and as formalized subsequently by Frenz Gehrels (1956, 61-64) and Richard Lipsey 
(1957, 40-46) using a one-factor, general-equilibrium model, which indicates that once the 
unrealistic assumption of zero elasticity of demand in the importing country is dropped, even a 
wholly trade-diverting union may lead to a net increase in welfare. Bhagwati (1971, 580-587) 
made a further point that even with zero demand elasticity, a trade-diverting union can lead to an 
improvement in welfare provided the supply elasticity of the good in question is positive but finite. 
He then concluded that in order to eliminate the possibility of a trade-diverting union leading to 
welfare gains, one must assume the elasticity of demand for imports in the importing country to be 
zero and the elasticity of supply in the exporting countries to be infinity.   
6.6.2 Symmetric  Models 
In the present context and debate, theoretical research on regionalism versus 
multilateralism, according to Winters (1999, 11), “took off” with a 1991 seminal article by 
Krugman, Is Bilateralism Bad? To make the analysis of the problem of regionalism tractable, 
Krugman (1991a, 9-23) employed a simple model in which there exists N identical countries and B 
identical blocs in the world. Each country produces one differentiated good and he assumed that   146
there is no transport cost to bring the good from one to another place. If B = N each country is a 
bloc, but when B falls as regional integration occurs, each country within the bloc gives one 
another free market access as well as imposes a common external tariffs on non-members. The 
external tariff rate is chosen so as to maximize the bloc’s welfare, taking the policies of other 
trading blocs as given – a traditional “Nash” optimum tariff game.  
Krugman showed that as the number of blocs in the world decreases, each bloc’s share in 
the other blocs’ consumption rises, so the rate of optimum external tariff increases because the 
bloc commands more market power. Integration not only creates trade diversion but also in his 
model it is exacerbated by increasing external tariffs. In essence he showed that the world welfare 
is lower with a few trading blocs than the cases of only one or many blocs, and for specific 
parameter values, the world welfare is worst when the number of blocs is three.
40   
Krugman’s work stimulated a storm of criticism and extension. The most pressing 
theoretical criticism was that his production structure contained no element of comparative 
advantage, and that this led him to over emphasis trade diversion. Srinivasan (1993, 84-89) offer 
one counter example when he considered a two-good-one-factor Ricardian model as an analogy to 
the two-province-one-factor model with continuum of goods. He demonstrated in this model that 
even with complete trade diversion, each province enjoys the same level of welfare as in global 
free trade, and concluded that once the symmetric assumption of trading blocs is dropped the 
Krugman’s result is no longer valid.  
                                                 
40 This finding raised the eyebrows of many economists and policy makers because at about the time of Krugman’s 
writing the world seemed to be moving towards the formation of three major trading blocs: Europe, North America 
and Asia. Specifically at this time the EC started an aggressive program for its enlargement; in North America the US 
was proposing for the establishment of NAFTA; and, in Asia the expectation was for Japan to lead the East Asia 
Economic Grouping, the formation of which was proposed by Malaysia (nevertheless, the original concept of this 
grouping never takes off due to lukewarm response from Japan and outright opposition from the US).     147
Alan Deardorff and Robert Stern (1994, 18) provided another counter example in which the 
finding is inconsistent with Krugman. They used different assumptions: trade in homogenous 
products occurs between countries which own the same technology but have different factor 
endowments as in Hecksher-Ohlin model. Deardorff and Stern imagined two types of countries, 
with a pair of countries of each type. When two blocs are formed, each combining a country of 
each type, all the benefits of a move to free trade are achieved at the two-bloc level. In a more 
general setting, with equal-probability drawing to form trading blocs, Deardorff and Stern showed 
that the world welfare increases monotonically as the number of blocs diminishes (with each bloc 
becoming larger). This finding is in contrast with Krugman’s U-shaped welfare contour depicting 
the relationship between the number of blocs and world welfare, in which the world welfare is 
minimized when the number of trading blocs is three.  
Eric Bond and Constantinos Syropoulos (1996a, 411-437) introduced an elegant model to 
examine the relationship between the size of trading blocs and their market power under the 
existence of comparative advantage. They demonstrated that the effect of an increase in the size of 
trading blocs over Nash optimum tariffs is highly sensitive to the assumptions made regarding the 
pattern of endowment. When the share of importables in the bloc endowment is zero (as in 
Krugman) equilibrium tariffs must increase with an increase in absolute bloc size. In contrast, if 
the share of importables in the endowment is positive, this result only holds if the elasticity of 
substitution is sufficiently low. Otherwise, the equilibrium tariffs must decrease with increasing 
bloc size. They also showed that the world welfare is at minimum when the world has four or more 
blocs if the elasticity of substitution is low and the share of importables in the endowment bundle 
is small. If the share of importables in the endowment bundle is sufficiently high, world welfare 
will be minimized when there are only two trading blocs.         148
A significant extension to the Krugman’s original model is the incorporation of the role of 
transport costs. Krugman (1991b, 5-25) was the first to do this, although the issue was later 
thoroughly taken up by Jeffrey Frankel, Ernesto Stein and Shang-jin Wei in a series of papers. 
Krugman subdivided the world into continents and observed that if inter-continental trading cost 
was prohibitively high – thus precluding inter-continental trade – a series of regional blocs, each 
covering one continent, would produce a first-best outcome equivalent to global free trade. This 
finding is in contrast with Krugman’s earlier work; that now trading blocs are good. Krugman 
inferred that even without the formation of regional free trade areas or preferential trading 
arrangements of any sort, countries trade more with their neighbours than with countries from 
which they are far apart, in part because of transport costs. Krugman’s conclusion is that, to the 
extent that trade follows the “natural” lines dictated by proximity, the formation of regional trading 
blocs is good. Such natural blocs are contrasted with “unnatural blocs”, in which free trade 
agreements are formed between individual countries on different continents, which are less likely 
to be welfare-improving.   
Frankel, Stein and Wei (1995, 61-95; 1996, chapter 4) and Frankel (1997) undertook 
research analysing the cases in between the two Krugman’s assumptions by allowing transport 
costs to be finite but non-zero. They found that, as inter-continental transportation and business 
costs increase relative to intra-continental ones, regionalism becomes a better policy in welfare 
terms. For a set of parameters – three continents each with two countries, import tariffs of 30 
percent; and zero intra-continental trading cost – they found that if inter-continental cost was 
above 15 percent of the gross value of export, intra-continental regionalism is welfare-improving. 
However this result is not very robust. Volker Nitsch (1996b, 26) showed that if intra-continental 
cost is fixed at just 5 percent in the above case, it produces a different result: regional blocs are 
welfare-decreasing for all the chosen values of inter-continental costs. Inter-continental   149
regionalism is always harmful to the world welfare for the models employed by Frankel, Stein and 
Wei. This result was also challenged by Nitsch (1996a, 355-363) who provided examples of 
relatively low inter-continental transport costs in which cases “unnatural” integration could be 
better than “natural” integration. 
Frankel, Stein and Wei (1995, 61-95; 1996, chapter 4) also considered PTAs which merely 
reduce rather than abolish tariffs between partners. In this study the model showed improvement in 
welfare, essentially because (the formation of) PTAs ensure that the optimal import-sourcing 
condition is not too badly violated. In this sense Frankel, Stein and Wei argued that a bloc 
formation is a stepping stone towards multilateral free trade. This argument was disputed by 
Winters (1999, 14) who claimed that since they did not provide specific mechanism through which 
the benign path could be followed or even encouraged, their argument does not seem to be a 
particularly powerful characterization. Winters further argued that merely referring to the partial 
welfare benefits resulted from a PTA is not sufficient, for one could “equally refer to the (greater) 
benefits of jumping straight to free trade”.   
6.6.3 Asymmetric  Models 
Bond and Syropolous (1996a, 411-437) examined a situation in which one bloc expands 
asymmetrically from other blocs of the world, although, this bloc expansion occurs by drawing 
members symmetrically from each of the other blocs. They showed that the optimal tariff of the 
expanding bloc becomes arbitrarily large and its internal prices approach the free trade level as the 
number of countries included in the bloc increases. This happen because the terms of trade benefits 
(due to increased demand) for the bloc’s comparative advantage goods outweigh the trade 
diversionary effects, and this result holds even if the enlarged bloc does not increase its tariffs on 
other countries. They also showed that the expanding bloc can assure itself a welfare level that is   150
above a free trade by excluding some countries. The welfare level of the expanding bloc would 
decrease, however, when the size of its membership reach the point where it includes all countries. 
Frankel (1997) also shed some light on this issue. He demonstrated that in a world with 
four continents in which all countries initially practice MFN trade policies, a sequential Nash tariff 
game leads to regionalism and lower welfare for all. By playing this game, one continent can 
improve its welfare by creating a FTA, if the other three maintains their MFN tariffs. The other 
three would lose because their terms of trade decline, even if the first continent does not increase 
its tariffs. From here a second continent would benefit itself by integrating with neighbouring 
countries, assuming unchanged policies elsewhere, and then this game would be played by the 
third and the fourth continents. In the end all countries in the four continents are worse off than 
under MFN policy. 
Junichi Goto and Koichi Hamada (1994, 18; 1997, chapter 4) obtained a similar result to 
that of Frankel’s (1997). They found a situation in which one regional trading bloc begat another. 
They also showed that once countries A and B combines to form a bloc it pays them to pre-empt C 
and D from combining in the same manner by bringing one of the latter into their own bloc. This 
game imposes high cost on the left-out country, but the left-out country could do nothing to join 
the bloc, thus creating free trade for the world, unless the other three agree. 
Hakan Nordstrom (1995, chapter 3) analysed this issue in a more general framework. He 
introduced a model quite similar to that of Frankel (1997) – involving differentiated products and 
finite transport costs. He started by considering just one bloc in the form of a customs union. The 
creation and expansion of the customs union harm excluded countries even at constant external 
tariffs; but in mitigation, the excluded countries can always raise their welfare above the level of 
free trade by joining the bloc and exploiting further the remaining outsiders. As suggested by Goto   151
and Hamada as well as Bond and Syropolous, however, this process would not lead to a global 
coalition, in which all countries joining the customs union, because existing members will 
eventually lose from further expansion as the number of outsiders available to be exploited 
declines. Nordstrom suggested that after about a half of all countries are inside the customs union, 
further expansion will be vetoed from the inside.  
Nordstrom also observed that if the customs union chooses an optimum rather than a 
constant tariff, it will increase its external tariff as it grows, hitting outsiders harder than in the 
previous case. In the absent of retaliation, the optimum size of the union is about 60 percent of the 
world economies. But, of course, the excluded countries might retaliate against such an aggression. 
If these countries alter their MFN tariffs they will punish the union as well as each other. However, 
if they maintain existing tariffs on each other and coordinate their punishment tariffs against the 
union, they can exercise significant market power. Such a retaliation could reduce the union 
welfare below what it could achieve at a constant external tariff and no retaliation, provided the 
members of the union is smaller than 75 percent of all countries. A union of more than 75 percent 
of all countries would win the tariff war even in the face of coordinated opposition. 
Nordstrom also explored inter-bloc issues by introducing a model in which the world is 
divided into two continents, A and B, and allowing only one bloc to be formed along a “natural” 
line, similar to the approach taken by Frankel, Stein and Wei (1995). Nordstrom found that a 
customs union on continent A hurts all excluded countries, and benefits much more heavily 
countries in A, because they are a union of natural trading partners, than of countries in B since the 
latter are not. The incentives are, therefore, for both sets of countries to seek integration. However, 
as in the previous case, the union in A may close its doors, although nothing can stop another 
customs union to be formed in B. If there is a prospect, then after the formation of the blocs on   152
both continents, an inter-bloc negotiation will take place, each bloc seems likely to include all the 
countries on their continents in efforts to maximize their power for the second round of 
negotiations. Provided the continents are not very different in size, the subsequent negotiation of 
inter-bloc free trade would be mutually advantageous. 
6.6.4 Negotiated-Tariff  Models 
An early effort to incorporate trade agreements into the analysis of regionalism was 
undertaken by Bond and Syropoulos (1996b, 118-141). Using the same basic model as Bond and 
Syropolous (1996a), they examined trigger strategies in which initially there exists an inter-bloc 
free trade agreement supported by the threat of trade wars if any party violate the agreement. They 
then examined the critical rate of discount perceived to be needed to make the blocs indifferent 
between defecting and continuing to cooperate – the critical discount rate is important because it 
balances current benefits of defection against future costs of trade wars. If the current discount rate 
is above this perceived-critical value, blocs defect from free trade. Similarly, if integration 
(moving from smaller to larger blocs) reduces the critical discount rate, it will make cooperation 
less likely to be maintained. 
Bond and Syropoulos argued that for the larger blocs, two countervailing forces are at 
work: on the one hand the incentive to deviate is greater the larger are the blocs, but on the other, 
the welfare loss from the resulting trade wars is also high. However, they found that the former 
effect always dominates, making it more difficult to maintain free trade in blocs-ridden world. 
They also found that for any given discount rate the minimum supportable cooperative tariff rises 
as bloc size increases, indicating that integration increases the pressures for protectionism. 
Based on similar principles, Kyle Bagwell and Robert Staiger analysed multilateral tariff 
cooperation during the formation of customs unions and free trade areas in two separate papers. In   153
the first paper, they (1997b, 291-319) argued that the trade diverting effect of free trade 
agreements leads to higher multilateral tariffs during the transition period over which such 
agreements are negotiated and implemented. During the period of transition, trade volume between 
member and non-member countries is still large as internal tariffs between member countries have 
not yet been eliminated. Yet members and non-members recognize that they will trade less with 
one another in the future, once the FTA agreement is fully implemented. Thus, during the 
transition period the incentive to deviate unilaterally from MFN tariffs among members is large 
because the actual discount rate is higher than the discounted future value of maintaining 
cooperative relationship. In order to ensure some measure of cooperation between member and 
non-member countries, it is then necessary to raise the transition-period tariffs between the two 
sets of countries, reducing the volume of their trade and the associated incentive to defect. 
In the second paper Bagwell and Staiger (1997a, 91-123) considered tariff cooperation 
during the formation of customs unions. They argued that while the formation of both customs 
unions and free trade areas bring about a similar trade diversion effect, the former has another 
distinct by product: the market power effect. In their model they demonstrated that the emergence 
of customs unions will be associated with temporarily reduced multilateral trade tensions between 
member and non-members, and resulted in a temporary “honeymoon” for liberal multilateral trade 
policies. During this “honeymoon” period, non-members are less apt to take a confrontational 
stance over trade disputes with member countries of the emerging customs union as the risk of a 
possible trade war is high. Subsequently their results suggest, however, that the harmony between 
customs unions and multilateral liberalization is temporary; eventually, as the market power effect 
of the emerging customs union being felt, a less favourable balance between current and expected 
future conditions emerges, therefore liberal multilateral trade policies cannot be sustained.       154
Bond, Syropoulos and Winters (1996) used the Bond and Syropoulos (1996b) framework 
to examine explicitly the relationship of deepening EU integration in relation to trade with other 
trading partners. They considered a model involving N countries, split initially into one large 
country (the US) and two smaller ones (France and Germany). While the latter have already 
combined into the EU bloc with common external tariffs, there also exists a self-sustaining trade 
agreement between the EU and the US. They then allowed France and Germany to integrate more 
deeply by reducing trade frictions between them and asked whether tariff cuts within the union 
affect the incentive-compatibility agreement with the outside country (the US). They found that the 
“Kemp-Wan” tariff reduction – the reduction in the union’s external tariffs that just leave the 
outside country indifferent to the union’s internal tariff reduction – becomes a useful benchmark. 
For the outside country, the reduction in the union’s internal tariffs reduces the attractiveness of 
the original trade agreement because its trade within the union is now reduced. The Kemp-Wan 
reduction in the union’s external tariff, however, restores incentive-compatibility for the outside 
country because the tariff reduction brings its welfare back to the initial level. For the union, 
however, a Kemp-Wan adjustment generates two conflicting forces.  
First, the customs union becomes more attractive to the union members because the 
expanded volume of intra-union trade raises the welfare of member countries. This suggests that 
the union could “live with” a lower tariff imposed on the outside country. On the other hand, 
deviating from the trade agreement with the outside country also becomes more attractive because 
the payoff rises. This indicates that from the perspective of the union members, the external tariffs 
need to rise in order to ensure the union maintains the agreement with outside country because a 
higher external tariff makes sticking to the agreement more attractive. They found that the first 
effect almost always dominates the second, therefore, a fall in the union’s external tariffs help 
maintaining incentive-compatibility of the original agreement. Essentially, the two conflicting   155
forces exerting on the union offset each other if the share of the union expenditure on the union 
goods is not influenced by the level of external tariffs. In such a case, and since the Kemp-Wan 
tariff reduction is incentive-compatibility for both the union and the outside country, internal 
liberalization plus a Kemp-Wan reduction will maintain the sustainability of the agreement. 
6.6.5 Political  Economy  Models 
In contrast to the models discussed previously which assume that the decisions to form a 
trade bloc as well as the choice of external tariffs are exogenous, political economy models assume 
that those decisions are endogenously determined (Panagariya 2000, 312). And according to 
Winters (1999, 23) many of political economy models are essentially derived from the initial 
works of Gene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman. Grossman and Helpman (1995, 667-690) 
examined the conditions under which a free trade agreement might emerge as an equilibrium 
outcome of negotiations between politically like-minded governments. They imagined those 
governments to make decisions in response to political pressures from industry’s interests and at 
the same time pay some attention to the plight of average voters. In analysing the rivalry between 
competing interests in a single country, they used an analytical framework which was originally 
developed in Grossman and Helpman (1994, 833-850). This framework emphasizes the interaction 
between lobby groups representing industry special interests and (an incumbent) government. In 
the model, lobby groups offer policy-contingent campaign contributions to politicians, who make 
decisions that serve their own political objectives. In this setting, the country’s policy stance 
reflects the relative political power of its organized special interests and also the extent of the 
government’s concern for the plight of average voters. 
They argued that if a FTA must completely liberalize trade among member countries, a 
particular government might endorse such an agreement under two types of situations. The first   156
arises when the FTA will generate substantial welfare gains for the average voters while the 
affected interest groups fail to coordinate their efforts to defeat the accord. The second arises when 
the agreement will create profit gains for actual or potential exporters in excess of the losses to be 
suffered by import-competing industries plus the political cost of any welfare loss that might be 
inflicted on the average voters. 
They found that an agreement to form a FTA is most likely to occur when there is a 
balance in the potential trade between member countries and when the FTA affords enhanced 
protection (due to trade diversion) rather than reduced protection (due to trade creation) to most 
sectors. With enhanced protection, an exporting industry captures the benefits of the high domestic 
prices in the partner-importing country. With reduced protection, an import-competing industry 
sees its domestic prices fall as a result of the duty-free imports from partners. Whereas reduced 
protection may involve some trade creation, enhanced protection gives rise only to trade diversion. 
Thus, the conditions that improve the viability of a potential FTA also raise the likelihood that the 
agreement will reduce aggregate social welfare. 
Grossman and Helpman (1994, 833-850) also showed that the allowance for the exclusion 
of certain sectors from a FTA agreement can make a previously infeasible FTA feasible. More 
recently, Rupa Duttagupta (2000) incorporated trade of intermediate inputs into the Grossman-
Helpman model and addressed the role of the rules of origin in a general equilibrium model. She 
assumed that one partner-country exports an input to a partner country and imports from that 
country a final good using the input. She showed that the introduction of the rules of origin in this 
setting can make acceptable a FTA that is otherwise rejected, though, under some circumstances, 
the reverse may also happen. The former possibility arises because the country that exports the 
input and votes against the FTA in the absence of the rules of origin switches its vote in the   157
presence of such rules. As regards to the welfare of the bloc, the rules of origin can create 
distortion effects in which the FTA becomes welfare inferior relative to the status quo.   
Pravin Krishna (1998, 227-251) employed a one-sector, partial-equilibrium, imperfect 
competition model to analyse a decision to form a FTA. She used a Cournot oligopoly model in 
which firms belonging to three countries compete in one another’s market. She assumed that the 
number of firms and market size are asymmetric across countries. Also, producers are given a 
decisive role in determining policy outcomes via an assumption that governments based their 
policy decisions on the home firms’ profits. Initially each country imposes non discriminatory 
tariffs on imports from each other and the tariffs are the same across all countries. Two countries, 
A and B, must decide whether or not to form a FTA which, given equal initial tariffs, is equivalent 
to a customs union. She found that for the FTA to be accepted by both governments, profits of 
home firms must rise in each potential member. She also found that the greater the degree of trade 
diversion, the more likely that the FTA will be accepted. 
A number of researchers explored the question of how a decision to join a PTA by a 
country impacts its choice on preferred external tariffs. In raising this question, Bhagwati (1993, 
22-51) expressed a concern that such a decision may result in a rise in the extra-bloc trade barriers 
either via an increase in tariffs or more vigorous implementation of anti-dumping measures against 
outside countries. This may turn even an initially trade-creating bloc into a trade-diverting bloc. He 
argued that within a traditional three-country framework, increased imports from a PTA partner 
that threaten the survival of another member country’s firms will lead the latter to seek higher 
tariffs on imports from non-member countries.  
Following up this issue, Panagariya and Ronald Findlay (1996, 265-287) used a model in 
which industry-specific lobbies play a decisive role in the determination of tariffs. Specifically,   158
they considered three-goods, Meade-Lipsey model in which a country imports two goods and 
exports the remaining one. Each good is produced using one specific-factor and labour. One of its 
imports comes from a partner and the other from an outside country. They found that tariffs in 
each sector are determined by the amount of labours employed by that sector. 
Olivier Cadot, Jaime De Melo and Marcelo Olarreaga (1999, 635-657) also used the 
Meade-Lipsey, three-goods model in which tariffs are determined endogenously via the Grossman-
Helpman (1995) political-economy process. They found that in FTA arrangements that exclude the 
rules of origin, whereby goods destined to a high-tariff member market can be imported through a 
low-tariff member, competition for tariff revenue may lead to competitive reductions in external 
tariffs until they are removed completely. In a CU setting, by contrast, lobbies may cooperate on a 
union-wide basis and win in their quest for increased protection against outside countries.        
6.7 Conclusion 
The issue of whether regionalism is good or bad for the multilateral trading system was 
extensively debated during the negotiations for the formation of the GATT. During these 
negotiations, the main tussle was between the US, which argued that the world should only 
embrace multilateralism and the UK, which at that time already had arrangements giving 
preferential treatments to its imperial countries. At the end of the negotiations a compromise was 
achieved, not only recognizing the prevailing preferential arrangements but also allowing for the 
formation of future preferential trading arrangements, albeit subject to a number of conditions.  
Findings from theoretical research addressing the issue of regionalism versus 
multilateralism, especially on the question of whether regionalism is good or bad for 
multilateralism, are still inconclusive. This is so because researchers can build models supporting   159
either conclusion. According to Winters (1999, 7), these models are highly abstract that they can 
only be considered as “parables rather than the sources of testable predictions”.                  160
CHAPTER SEVEN 
EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ON THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF REGIONALISM 
7.1 Overview 
This chapter examines empirical research on the economic effects of regionalism. It begins 
by analysing the origin of the theory on regionalism, which is essentially due to Jacob Viner 
(1950) seminal contribution in expounding the possibilities of trade creation and trade diversion 
brought about through the formation of customs unions. For clarity and simplicity, this chapter 
divides empirical studies on regionalism into four categories: counterfactual studies based on 
partial equilibrium analysis; counterfactual studies based general equilibrium analysis; studies 
based on gravity models; and ex-post studies of regionalism. Besides analysing the results of 
previous empirical studies, this chapter also examines the methodological underpinnings of these 
four categories of studies, emphasizing the strengths and shortcomings of each of them. 
7.2  The Origin of the Theory on Regionalism 
Many empirical studies have been conducted over the years to examine the economic 
effects of regional trading arrangements (RTAs). These studies started soon after Viner’s (1950) 
seminal contribution in theorizing the implications of trade creation and trade diversion due to the 
formation of customs unions. According to Bela Balassa (1967, 1) the earliest empirical analyses 
examining the economic effects of customs unions were undertaken by P. J. Verdoorn (1954), L. 
H. Janssen (1961) and L. B. Krause (1963).
41 Originally under Viner’s framework, trade creation 
                                                 
41 A full survey of empirical research on the economic effects of regionalism is beyond the scope of this chapter. 
Instead, this chapter analyses only the findings of prominent empirical studies as well as examines their 
methodological underpinnings.    
   161
is associated with the expansion of trade between partner countries in accordance with 
comparative advantage. He (1950, 43) expounded the case of trade creation as follows: 
There will be commodities, however, which one of the members of the customs 
union will now newly import from the other but which it formerly did not import at 
all because the price of the protected domestic product was lower than the price at 
any foreign source plus the duty. This shift in the locus of production as between 
the two countries is a shift from a high-cost to a lower cost point … 
Whereas he argued that trade diversion is associated with the expansion of trade between member 
countries as a result of preferential treatments given to imports that come from customs union 
members: 
There will be other commodities which one of the members of the customs union 
will now newly import from the other whereas before the customs union it imported 
them from a third country, because that was the cheapest possible source of supply 
even after the payment of duty. The shift in the locus of production is now as 
between a low-cost third country and the other, high-cost, member country. 
Although the interest of research on regionalism is argued to be triggered by these two Viner’s 
expositions, actual empirical studies have not limited only to the analyses of trade creation and 
trade diversion as they have gone far beyond validating these propositions. Many studies have 
been undertaken to examine other economic effects of regionalism such as the effects of 
regionalism on prices and competition among firms, trade, growth, resource allocation as well as 
gains of member vis-à-vis non member countries. Even in assessing trade creation and trade 
diversion, the original Viner concept of “the shift in the locus of production” is not directly 
examined due to various difficulties. Instead, economists in their empirical examination measure 
the shift in the “pattern”, “direction” and “volume” of trade flows between members and non 
members, and these variables are taken as indicators of trade creation and trade diversion.    162
From a broad perspective, empirical studies on the economic effects of a RTA can be 
grouped into two main categories: ex ante or ex post, depending on the character of a study 
whether one attempts to evaluate possible repercussions in advance or after a particular RTA was 
established. For clarity and simplicity, however, this study divides empirical studies of RTAs into 
four categories, taking methodological approaches as the defining factor, since generally the use of 
different methodologies produces different results. Furthermore, these studies employed different 
key assumptions, model structures, representations of economies and approaches to data analysis, 
which in part influence their results.
42  
The first and second groups of studies (of the four categories) are both model-based 
counterfactual analyses. The first group is counterfactual studies based on partial equilibrium 
analysis while the second group based on general equilibrium framework. Both groups of studies 
involve either perfectly or imperfectly competitive markets and also incorporate various possible 
scale economies and market structures into the analyses through a number of ways. The third 
group is the studies of RTAs which use gravity model, originally developed by Jan Tinbergen 
(1962) with the purpose of analysing determinants of bilateral trade flows between trading 
partners. Finally, and following Augusto de la Torre and Margaret Kelly (1992), the fourth group 
is called ex post studies of RTAs. 
                                                 
42 Categorizing empirical studies on the economic effects of regionalism into these four groups is entirely the view of 
the author. Nonetheless, many other writers have come up with different types of categorization; see for example T.N. 
Srinivasan, John Whalley and Ian Wooton (1993). 
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7.3  Partial Equilibrium Counterfactual Analyses  
7.3.1  Methodological Underpinnings  
Partial equilibrium counterfactual analysis (PECA) was the earliest technique employed by 
researchers to evaluate the economic effects of RTAs. In general, studies of this group involve 
simulation exercises based on specific models, undertaken before the official formation or 
extension of a particular RTA and they are designed based on characteristics of prominent trade 
theories (Srinivasan, Whalley, and Wooton 1993, 52-79). Parameter values for production, 
preferences and trade barriers are introduced into the models in an effort to perform ex ante 
counterfactual analyses assessing potential effects of a trading bloc. The application of this 
technique of analysis is not only limited to the examination of RTAs, since it can also be used to 
perform simulation exercises of policy experiments of other trading arrangements such as bilateral 
free trade agreements.  
The use of partial equilibrium analysis is, however, subject to limitations. According to 
Micheal Gasiorek, Alasdair Smith and Anthony Venables (1992, 35) a partial equilibrium 
approach to study the economic effects of an economic integration is incomplete for two reasons. 
First, partial equilibrium analysis assumes that resources used by an industry under investigation 
are available at prices equal to social opportunity cost. If one imperfectly competitive industry’s 
expansion is only possible at the expense of another’s contraction (due to overall resource 
constraint), then this assumption is no longer valid, therefore the result of a study may 
overestimate the welfare gains associated with any policy experiments. Second, partial equilibrium 
studies assume that inputs supply curves are horizontal, so that resources are available to an 
industry at constant prices. If inputs supply curves to each industry are in fact upward sloping, 
partial equilibrium studies again overestimate the effects of the policy experiments.    164
7.3.2  Empirical Research Based on PECA    
Verdoorn (1954) study was an early example of partial equilibrium counterfactual analysis 
examining the effects of an intra-OECD trade arrangement on members as well as on the rest of 
the world (ROW). In this study he used a static partial equilibrium analysis under a perfectly 
competitive market structure. Key assumptions he employed were that –0.5 consumption elasticity 
of substitution between imports and domestic production and –2 between different countries’ 
exports. Under his framework, import tariffs on manufactures are eliminated among 10 OECD 
countries. A common external tariff is then imposed on non members after the formation of the 
grouping.  Under the situation of unchanged exchange rates, his simulation showed that total world 
export increased by US$400 million (2.6 percent of 1952 total world export), meanwhile intra-bloc 
export increased much larger at US$1 billion (19 percent of 1952 intra-bloc exports). He also 
showed substantial trade diversion; of the US$1 billion increase in intra-OECD export, US$600 
million (6 percent of 1952 total world export) is diverted (into the group) from the rest of the 
world. 
Another partial equilibrium study was performed by Harry Johnson (1958), assessing the 
potential benefits associated with the UK’s entry into the EEC. He calculated potential welfare 
gains to the UK due to lower tariffs facing UK exporters as well as lower prices received by its 
importers. Like Verdoorn, this study also examined the impact on manufactured products, whereby 
tariffs between the UK and EEC are eliminated. A common external tariff is also imposed on 
outside countries after the bloc formation. Johnson found that trade gains accrued to the UK were 
between £62-£192 million for exports and £31 million for imports. At the minimum, welfare gain 
to the UK was roughly 1 percent of its Gross National Products (GNP), which would occur in 
1970.       165
Employing data used previously by Verdoorn (1954), Tibor Scitovsky (1958) undertook a 
partial equilibrium study examining gains from the formation of the EEC under the situation of 
changing exchange rates. In his model, different marginal costs between countries in a particular 
industry are taken to be due to a difference in import tariffs in an importing country. The gain from 
integration is thus in terms of resource gains due to the equalization of marginal costs. Using 
Verdoorn data, he assumed that when trade imbalances occur because of the formation of the EEC, 
exchange rates will appreciate to bring the trade back into a balance as before its formation. 
Scitovsky found that the EEC gained US$74 million, the same amount that the ROW loss. This is 
a gain from increased specialization and represented only 0.05 percent of European GNP. In 
addition, the EEC countries also gained US$465 million from a favourable terms-of-trade 
improvement.    
Smith and Venables (1988) used a static partial equilibrium model to simulate various 
possible scenarios of the effects of the EC-1992 single market program.
43 These include the range 
of products available to consumers, the level of prices, and welfare gains. In order to capture these 
effects they employed a model of trade under imperfect competition, originally developed by 
Krugman (1979). This means that firms operate under increasing return to scale (IRS) and produce 
differentiated goods, while market in equilibrium involves intra-industry trade. This study 
considered ten industry sectors, each of which has firms that use IRS technology. The rest of the 
economy is, however, modelled as perfectly competitive industries with constant return to scale 
technology in each industry. Trading countries (and regions) included in the study were France, 
Germany, Italy, the UK, the rest of the EC and ROW.  
                                                 
43 As a result of further integration of EEC members, originally formed in 1957, the name of this economic grouping 
was changed twice; first to European Community (EC) in 1988 and later to European Union (EU) in 1993.     166
Following a method employed by past studies, they chose sector-by-sector trade barrier 
reductions in the order of 2.5 percent of the base value of intra-EC trade. They analysed segmented 
and integrated markets when barriers are removed under Cournot and Bertrand markets, in which 
the number of firms is either fixed (Cournot) or varied (Bertrand). Under Cournot market, the 
equilibrium of demand and supply is determined only by changes in outputs as prices are held 
constant. In contrast, under Bertrand outputs are held constant but prices are allowed to change. 
They found that under Cournot market, the welfare effects caused by the removal of barriers for 
segmented markets range from – 0.01 percent of consumption for cement, lime and plaster to 1.3 
percent for office machinery. The effects were higher for integrated markets, ranging from 0.2 
percent for cement, lime and plaster to 5.6 percent for artificial and synthetic fibres. Under 
Bertrand market, welfare effects for segmented markets were insignificantly low, whereas for 
integrated markets the results were higher in the range of 0.04 to 1.2 percent for the 10 industry 
sectors.  
7.4  General Equilibrium Counterfactual Analyses (GECA) 
7.4.1  Methodological Underpinnings  
Starting from the middle of the 1980s, economists, based on the general equilibrium theory 
of international trade, have incorporated general equilibrium conditions into the analysis of RTAs 
by introducing a variety of Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) models. In addition to 
evaluating ex ante, these models, to a certain degree, can also evaluate ex post effects of any 
trading arrangements. This technique of analysis has also a wider scope of applications in 
comparison to partial equilibrium, since it can examine any economic variables such as output, 
employment, consumption, trade, price and welfare.        167
Over the years CGE models have extensively evolved and may be grouped into three main 
generational structures (Lloyd and MacLaren 2004, 445-468). The first generation CGE models 
incorporate perfect competition and constant returns to scale. However, this group of models 
differs from the general equilibrium models of trade theory in one important aspect, although they 
are based on the same assumptions. While the general equilibrium trade-theory models assume 
perfect competition and homogenous goods, CGE models assume that goods, including 
intermediate inputs, are differentiated by their origin, therefore, for any goods, imports from 
different sources are imperfect substitutes.
44  
With goods differentiated by sources, the existence of two-way bilateral trade flows (of 
intra-industry goods) is possible because the goods are imperfect substitution. This departs 
markedly from that of general equilibrium trade-theory models, in which their assumptions impose 
a condition that trade flows can only be one way. And because two-way intra-industry trade 
constitutes an important component in international trade data, it is necessary that models used to 
evaluate RTAs can take account of this reality.  
The second generation CGE models incorporate imperfect competition and economies of 
scale. Imperfect competition is often introduced through monopolistic competition using Dixit and 
Stiglitz (1977) utility function, while economies of scale is incorporated by assuming that total 
cost function contains a fixed and a constant marginal costs. Meanwhile the latest, third generation 
CGE models attempt to capture inter-temporal effects of investment and productivity growth. 
In general, a CGE model constructed to examine a particular RTA contains multilevel 
specification structures, thus requiring a huge amount of information, which could only be 
analyzed through the use of a specialized computer software program (e.g. G-Cubed Model). A 
                                                 
44 This condition is often referred to as the Armington assumption as it was first expounded by P. S. Armington in his 
(1969) article, A Theory of Demand for Products Distinguished by Place of Production.   168
typical CGE model used to evaluate a RTA generally requires the following components: (1) a 
database of bilateral trade flows of commodities between countries; (2) a database containing 
transportation costs and information on protection (e.g. tariffs or tariff equivalents); (3) an input-
output table for each country, which link sectors within industries and across countries; and (4) a 
set of behavioral equations based on a specific economic theory containing specific assumptions 
about the behaviors of individual firms and consumers (Lloyd and MacLaren 2004, 450-451).  
In addition, a CGE model also requires a set of accounting identities. These identities track 
various flows of income and expenditure in an economy. These include: (1) the flow of household 
expenditures to private consumption, to governments, to imports and to savings; (2) the flow of 
income to households from wages and rents; (3) the flow of income to government from taxes on 
domestic transactions and on traded goods (and inputs); (4) the flow of income to firms from 
selling goods and services to consumers, governments, domestic firms as well as exports; and (5) 
the flow of expenditure made by firms to households as the providers of primary factors, domestic 
firms as the suppliers of intermediate inputs and to the importation of goods. 
As regard to the behavioral equations of firms, they are normally based on the following 
economic underpinnings. Each firm is assumed to choose its profit-maximizing level of outputs for 
purposes of determining the least-combination of domestic factors of production and intermediate 
inputs from both domestic and import sources (to produce a good). From this optimization 
problem, a demand function for the factors of production and intermediate inputs can be derived, 
as also the supply function of the good. It is usual to represent these functions through constant 
elasticity. The demand side of the economy is represented by households maximizing utility across 
private consumption, government expenditure and savings. From these assumptions, demand 
equations can be derived for domestically produced and imported (final) goods.   169
The policy simulation results generated by a CGE model are derived from calibrating the 
elasticities in the model to the data in the base period (i.e. quantities, prices and trade policy 
settings) and from imposing a policy shock – for example, a change in tariff rates. The differences 
in the values of the variables (between simulated and based period) can then be taken as the effects 
due to the policy shock.               
7.4.2  Caveats on Using CGE Models 
Schiff and Winters (2003) argued that although CGE models are one of the most popular 
techniques employed to evaluate the economic effects of RTAs, they have a number limitations 
that need to be recognized when interpreting their results. First, the results obtained from simulated 
policy shocks are just simulations and not unconditional predictions. Second, although CGE 
models measure any chosen variables quantitatively, they are not empirically estimated; therefore, 
according to Lloyd and MacLaren (2004, 453) the results obtained from CGE models are 
essentially “theory with numbers”. Third, simulation results may be sensitive to the assumed 
values of elasticities and to the way in which changes in a particular trade policy are incorporated. 
Fourth, although it is easy to simulate changes in tariff rates, it is often difficult to measure tariff 
equivalents of non tariff barriers. It is not only that measuring barriers to trade in services difficult, 
but in many situations none of this information is available. Moreover, the rules of origin, which 
are the necessary component of RTAs, are neither incorporated in the design of the policy 
simulations, nor are the costs of the rules of origin included in the welfare calculations. Hence, not 
all aspects of trade liberalization in goods and services brought about by the formation of an RTA 
can be simulated and, therefore, the results can only be treated as a guide. 
The fifth caveat concerns the Armington assumption. This assumption is necessary in order 
to capture intra-industry trade, therefore it is useful, because it reduces the number of parameters   170
to be estimated. However, its usage comes at a cost. This assumption takes it that the elasticity of 
substitution is constant for a particular good (or intermediate input) and it is the same across all 
sources of imports. Moreover, the use of the Armington assumption together with constant 
elasticity of substitution (CES) introduces a bias result of CGE models. The bias occurs because no 
matter how high the price of an import from a non member country rises, the quantity imported, 
while approaching zero, never reaches it. This problem does not exist in a partial equilibrium 
model because an import from non member country will become zero if its tariff-inclusive price 
exceeds the member country’s price. CGE models, therefore, produce a bias result against finding 
trade diversion and understate a possible welfare loss to non member countries. The second 
consequence over the use of the Armington assumption together with CES functions is that the 
terms of trade effects resulting from the change of a trade policy can be implausibly large. 
Therefore, a welfare loss due to deteriorating terms of trade (when tariffs are lowered) is bias 
upwards. Taking these two partially offsetting effects together, it is uncertain what would be the 
sign of the net effect to members as well as to non member countries. 
The sixth caveat is that in ex ante evaluation, it is assumed that there is a total removal of 
preferential tariffs. In practice, some politically sensitive sectors may be excluded from an 
agreement altogether, hence causing a bias in the evaluation. However, even if this bias is avoided 
through correctly specifying the detail of the agreement with respect to trade liberalization in 
goods, there remain the omission of items involving beyond-the-boarder deregulation, such as 
intellectual property right and domestic content in mass media, which means that the results of 
CGE models provide only a partial picture of the effects of a RTA.         171
7.4.3  Empirical Investigation Based on GECA 
A study by Marcus Miller and John Spencer (1977, 71-93) was one of the earliest attempts 
to incorporate numerical, general equilibrium analysis (a generation one CGE model) of a RTA. 
They examined the effects of UK entry into the EEC which involves not only lowering trade 
barriers with the EEC-6 but also the elimination of preferences given by the UK to Commonwealth 
countries (primarily Australia and New Zealand) as well as its resulting effects on the rest of the 
world. They used Armington assumption with two goods per country, constant return to scale and 
perfect competition. They examined two scenarios for the UK joining the EEC, both involving the 
elimination of mutual tariffs and an adoption by the UK of the EEC common external tariffs. The 
first scenario requires the UK to transfer 90 percent of its tariff revenue to the EEC, while the 
second does not. They found that the UK obtained a small terms-of-trade gain on its entry. The 
price of the UK agriculture rose by 22 percent as compared to manufactures. Under the no-transfer 
scenario, the UK increased both exports and imports of manufactured goods with the EEC in the 
amount of 50 percent (in both scenarios). In addition, the UK increased its agricultural imports 
from the EEC by 72 percent and decreased its imports from the Commonwealth countries by 0.8 
percent.       
R. G. Harris and David Cox (1984, 45-47) used a second generation CGE model to 
examine the effects of the US–Canada FTA. They incorporated a non competitive market structure 
and economies of scale in their study and examined various possible scenarios of trade 
liberalization arrangements: (1) Unilateral free trade (UFT) where Canada set all its tariffs to zero; 
(2) Multilateral free trade (MFT) where Canada and the rest of the world set their tariffs to zero; 
(3) Bilateral free trade (BFT) with the US where tariffs of both countries are set to zero; and (4) 
Sectoral free trade (SFT) between Canada and the US in selective industries: textiles, steel,   172
agriculture machinery, urban transport equipment and chemical. They chose nine industries 
characterized by constant return to scale (CRS) while 20 others characterized by increasing return 
to scale (IRS) and used the Armington assumption. The IRS firms face fixed and variable costs per 
unit of output. While Canada is allowed to affect its export prices, it takes import prices as given. 
They found that Canada enjoyed welfare gains of 4.0, 9.0, 9.0 and 1.5 percent of its Gross 
Domestic Products (GDP), respectively for scenarios 1, 2, 3 and 4.
45 In addition, Canadian trade 
volumes with the world respectively increased by 55, 90, 88 and 15 percent. As regard to trade 
with the US, Canadian trade volume increased by 99 percent and 14 percent under BFT and SFT. 
Finally, real wages in Canada rose by 10, 25, 28 and 6 percent under UFT, MFT, BFT and SFT. 
Bob Hamilton and John Whalley (1985, 446-455) used a multi-countries global general 
equilibrium model, somewhat similar to Miller and Spencer but with larger dimensionality, to 
analyse a variety of potential RTAs. They examined the following potential FTAs:  US–EEC, US–
Japan, US–Canada, US–Other Developed Countries, US–NICs, and US–LDCs. In addition, they 
also considered (hypothetical) regional free trade areas involving EEC–Japan, Northern FTA 
(involving the US, EEC, Japan, Canada and other developed countries) and Southern FTA 
(involving NIC and LDC countries). They employed Armington assumption in addition to the 
assumptions of constant returns to scale and perfect competition (i.e. a generation one CGE 
model). They found that in all cases that involve the US (in FTAs), the country always gained. 
Almost all the left-out countries lost, with the greatest welfare loss experienced by LDC and NIC 
countries. As for the three regional FTAs, they obtained results showing that EEC–Japan FTA 
produced small welfare effects; the EEC countries and Japan recorded only small gains (0.8 billion 
and 1.0 billion in 1977 price respectively), while the left-out countries also recorded small losses. 
                                                 
45 Harris and Cox (1984) and latter economists used GDP as a variable in the place of GNP which was popular 
previously. Apparently, this is due to difficulties in finding information about net factor payments accrued to a country 
which need to be added to the GDP figure in order to derive GNP.    173
The result for Northern FTA showed greater welfare effects with huge gained for members and 
substantial losses for non members. The results for Southern FTA were less clear cut; even among 
members, only LDC countries gained while NIC countries lost and non members recorded small 
loss.        
Harrison, Rutherford and Wooton (1989, 288-294) used a somewhat similar model as of 
Hamilton and Whalley (1985) to examine the effects that might occur if member countries left the 
EC. The model incorporated six tradable goods and eleven countries. They employed a static 
general equilibrium model, used the Armington assumption and firms are characterized by 
constant returns to scale and perfect competition (i.e. a generation one CGE model). They assumed 
that trade barriers (tariffs and non tariffs) are equivalent to 40 percent between non members and 
20 percent between members. The examined two possible scenarios: (1) eight cases of various 
countries leaving the EC (with Common Agriculture Policy (CAP) remaining in place); and (2) 
eight cases of each country leaving the EC (with CAP being eliminated). They found that in both 
scenarios, all the EC countries recorded welfare reductions on leaving the EC. The US (a non EC 
member), however, recorded a small welfare gain in all cases. The highest loss was for Ireland (8 
percent of GDP) and the smallest losses were for France and Italy (both at 0.9 percent of GDP). 
Gasiorek, Smith and Venables (1992, 35-61) employed a generation two CGE model to 
estimate gains from lowering non-tariff barriers and the integration of the EC. They examined 
eight countries (and regions), of which seven are France, Germany, Italy, the UK, other EC North 
(Benelux and Denmark), Greek and Ireland, and Iberia (Spain and Portugal), and the eighth 
country represents the rest of the world (ROW). They identified 14 IRS and 1 CRS sectors. The 
factors of production comprise of labour (with four types of skills), capital and intermediate goods. 
There is a single representative consumer and firms are symmetric in each country and industry.   174
They examined four situations: segmented and integrated markets, each in the short and long run. 
Market behaviour follows Cornout conditions. The number of firms is fixed in the short run but 
vary in the long run. They found that under segmented market welfare gains were small for all 
countries, but increase slightly from short to long run. Greek/ Ireland recorded the highest welfare 
gains, an increase of 1.1 percent of GDP in the short run, but increased further in the long run to 
1.4 percent. Welfare gains for members were higher in the integrated market for both short and 
long run as compared to segmented markets. 
Jan Haaland and Victor Norman (1992, 67-88) used a generation two CGE model to 
investigate the effects of the EC integration on the EC and EFTA countries, as well as on Japan 
and the US. They used a model similar to Gasiorek, Smith and Venables (1992). They considered 
11 IRS and 1 CRS tradable goods and 1 CRS non tradable good for each regions or countries. The 
factors of production are skilled and unskilled labours, capital and intermediate goods. They 
assumed that only one representative agent in each region. The EC and EFTA each consists of 6 
separate, but identical, countries and submarkets. Firms are assumed to be symmetric in each 
industry within a region. They performed four experiments: (1) trade costs in segmented EC 
markets were reduced by 2.5 percent of the initial value of the EC trade, with initial trade costs 
assumed to be 10 percent within the EC and EFTA and 20 percent between Europe, Japan and the 
US; (2) trade costs were reduced and the EC markets were integrated; (3) trade costs in Europe 
(including EFTA) were reduced, as in the first scenario; and (4) Same as scenario 2, except that 
now it encompassed all Western Europe. They found that for scenario (1), the EC gained a 1 
percent increase in welfare, while EFTA, the US and Japan recorded declining welfares of 0.3, 
0.02 and 0.02 percent respectively. For scenario (2), EC experienced welfare gains of 1.9 percent 
but welfare fell in EFTA, US and Japan by 0.4, 0.4 and 0.6 percent respectively. For scenario (3)   175
and (4), EFTA experienced positive welfare gains while the EC gains in welfare were smaller than 
in scenario (1) and (2).     
Robert Scollay and John Gilbert (2001) used a CGE model (version 4 of the Global Trade 
Analysis Project (GTAP) database) to run a comprehensive set of trade liberalization experiments 
for the Asia-Pacific region. These experiments included cases of various liberalization 
arrangements: bilateral, plurilateral, hub-and-spokes and global (multilateral). For each experiment 
they calculated changes in welfare (as percentage of based-period GDP) for individual APEC 
countries, the EU and for all non member countries of these possible RTAs as an aggregate. 
In the case of (potential) Japan–South Korea–China plurilateral RTA, all three countries 
gained: 0.25 percent, 0.8 percent and 2.09 percent respectively. However, most APEC countries in 
South East Asia countries lost (for example Singapore lost - 0.87 percent) due to this plurilateral 
arrangement. The members of this plurilateral RTA gained 0.5 percent in aggregate, whereas the 
aggregate of non member countries’ loss was – 0.03 percent. They considered ASEAN + 3 (China, 
Japan and South Korea) as a hub-and-spokes arrangement. For this specific case, all +3 countries 
gained individually (Japan by 0.34 percent, South Korea by 1.18 percent and China by 1.96 
percent), and collectively they gained 0.64 percent, whereas the aggregate of non members loss 
was - 0.06 percent. 
Using the Michigan model of world trade (a generation two CGE model) with version 4 of 
the GTAP database, Brown, Deardorff and Stern (2003, 803-828) also simulated the ASEAN + 3 
RTA. In this study they used (a future) 2005 as the base year, the year in which all post-Uruguay 
Round liberalization is supposed to be completed. They found that if all members were to 
eliminate all tariffs on agriculture and manufacturing products and remove barriers to trade in 
services, then there would be the following welfare gains: Japan would gain 2.62 percent of its   176
base period GDP, Singapore 10.66 percent, South Korea 4.21 percent and China 1.95 percent. The 
magnitudes of these gains and the rankings of these countries by the size of the gains are quite 
different from those obtained by Scollay and Gilbert (2001) because both studies used different 
underlying economic theories for the design of simulation experiments. 
This study also found that if APEC countries were to liberalize on an MFN basis, most (but 
not all) member countries would gain with the group experiencing aggregate welfare gains of 0.56 
percent, while non member countries would also gain (0.05 percent). However, if APEC were to 
liberalize on a preferential basis, again, most members would gain, with APEC countries as a 
group gaining a slightly higher (0.58 percent), whereas the aggregate welfare loss of non APEC 
countries would also be higher (- 0.12 percent).  
The findings of this study showed a couple of interesting features. First, global multilateral 
trade liberalization generates the greatest gains to the whole world (0.56 percent). Second, if the 
members of APEC liberalize based on an “open regionalism” MFN basis, then the gains to the 
world economy are greater (0.34 percent) than if the liberalization is on preferential basis (0.27 
percent).
46 Since the gains to APEC members are slightly higher for preferential than MFN 
liberalization (0.58 percent as against 0.56 percent), therefore, there would be a possible tension 
between “open regionalism” and a preferential trading arrangement because the latter leads to 
greater gains for members, and this occurs at the expense of non member countries.   
                                                 
46 The terms “open regionalism” used here follows the definition of Shang-Jin Wei and Jeffrey Frankel (1995). They 
relate this terms to a situation in which members of a RTA collectively lower their external barriers on goods from non 
members in addition to the reduction of barriers among member countries, although the degree of liberalization against 
non members need not be as high as that between members.   
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7.5  Regionalism Studies Based on Gravity Models 
7.5.1  Methodological and Theoretical Underpinnings 
The use of gravity models in empirical analysis of bilateral trade flows was first employed 
by Tinbergen (1962) and then by Pentti Poyhonen (1963).
47 In its most basic form, a gravity model 
of bilateral trade expounds that trade between country i and country j is proportional to the product 
of GDPi  and GDPj and inversely related to the distance between them.
48 As shown by Hans 
Linnemann (1966), other explanatory variables such as “psychic costs” could justifiably be added 
to the model. In recent years economists have developed a full gravity equation by adding other 
explanatory variables including the size of the partner countries (proxied by GDP per capita or 
land area) as well as dummy variables representing qualitative factors which are claimed to have a 
direct influence on the flow of trade such as geographical proximity and cultural similarity. 
To analyse the effects of regionalism, researchers typically add dummy variables for 
participation in regional arrangements. A positive coefficient on the dummy variable indicates that 
two countries, both of which participate in the same preferential arrangement, trade more with one 
another then predicted by incomes, population, and distance. This positive sign is interpreted as 
suggesting that the arrangement is trade-creating for its members. A negative coefficient on a 
second dummy variable, in which only one member of the pair-countries participates in a 
particular preferential arrangement, is taken as evidence of trade diversion vis-à-vis ROW.  
                                                 
47 Gravity models were applied much earlier in other areas of economics than international trade. According to Walter 
Isard ([1960] 1990, 5), gravity models were used to examine empirical evidence in regional economics as far back as 
1946.  
 
48 The use of the term gravity model is a reflection of Isaac Newton’s gravity theory of physic which says that the 
attraction between two heavenly bodies is proportional to the product of their masses and inversely related to the 
distance between them.    
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Regression results of studies that use gravity models have a strong explanatory power with 
R
2 values ranging from 65 to 95 percent depending upon the sample (Bergstrand 1998, 23-28). 
However for a long period of time, gravity models received a poor recognition from reputable 
economists.
49 The poor reputation attached to gravity models was due to the lack of theoretical 
trade-theory-foundation of which gravity models are based upon, especially from the perspective 
of factor proportion, Heckscher-Ohlin framework (Deardorff 1998, 7-22). The earliest theoretical 
support for the use of gravity models in the analysis of trade flows was provided by Edward 
Leamer and Robert Stern (1970). The authors argued that bilateral trade is indeterminate in the 
absent of transport costs – for example there is nothing to determine whether Japan imports 
apparel from China or from Morocco. They then derived a gravity model from the probability 
distribution of traded good transactions. Another early theoretical foundation was provided by 
James Anderson (1979). Under his framework, Anderson employed two preferences, Cobb-
Douglas and constant-elasticity of substitution (CES), to examine the economic properties of a 
resulting model. In both situations he made used of Armington assumption in which products are 
differentiated by the country of origin.  
 Jeffrey Bergstrand explored the theoretical determination of bilateral trade in a series of 
papers. In one paper, Bergstrand (1985, 474-481) used CES preferences to derive a reduced-form 
equation of bilateral trade involving price indexes. Using GDP deflators to approximate these price 
indexes, he derived an equation for the purpose of testing his assumption that trade occurs because 
of product differentiation. His CES preferences were also nested, with a different elasticity of 
substitutions between (various) imports as well as between imports and domestic goods. His 
empirical estimates supported the assumption that goods are not perfect substitutes and that 
                                                 
49 According to Jeffrey Bergstrand (1998, 23), gravity models experienced low respectability among leading trade 
economists for more than thirty years since it was first employed in empirical analysis of international trade. This has 
only changed when Alan Deardorff (1998) managed to derive gravity equations based on Heckscher-Ohlin framework, 
in which he formally showed a link between this respectable trade theory and gravity models.     179
imports are closer substitutes for each other than for domestic goods. He called his equation a 
generalized gravity model because it also includes price terms.   
In other papers, Bergstrand (1989; 1990) used Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) monopolistic 
competition, and therefore products are differentiated between firms rather than between countries. 
He employed a two-sector economy in which each monopolistically competitive sector has 
different factor proportion, thus his model is a hybrid of a perfectly competitive Heckscher-Ohlin 
and a one-sector monopolistically competitive model of Krugman (1979). Bergstrand used this 
framework to derive a gravity model as well as used it to empirically examine bilateral intra-
industry trade. Bergstrand’s work therefore served to bring together the earlier Armington-based 
approaches to derive a gravity equation with a second framework in which a gravity equation was 
derived from a simple monopolistic competition model.  
Another best known theoretical rationale for the idea that bilateral trade depends on 
product of GDP of trading partners emerged from the work of Helpman (1987, 62-81) and 
Helpman and Krugman (1985, section 1.5). Under this approach, consumers are assumed to seek a 
variety of products for their consumption. They also assumed that firms are monopolistically 
competitive and products are differentiated by firms as well as by the countries of origin.   
Helpman (1987) used the correlation between a gravity equation and a monopolistic competition 
model as a basis to empirically test his (monopolistic competition) model. That is, he interpreted 
the close fit of the gravity equation with bilateral trade data as supportive evidence for the 
superiority of the monopolistic competition model in explaining international trade flows. 
Obviously, up to this time Helpman (1987, 63) did not see any possibility of integrating a gravity 
model with the Heckscher-Ohlin factor proportions theory, as he remarked that “the factor   180
proportion theory contributes very little to our understanding of the determination of the volume of 
trade in the world economy, or the volume of trade within groups of countries”. 
Deardorff (1998) provided another theoretical support for the use of gravity model in the 
empirical analysis of international trade flows. Deardorff showed that Hecksher-Ohlin framework 
can be used to derive a gravity equation as easily as from the theory of imperfect competition. 
Contrary to Helpman, his main purpose was to show that the empirical success of gravity models 
does not necessarily support the imperfect-competition model relative to the Heckscher-Ohlin 
theory. He started by positing an international price vector, in which the production of goods takes 
place in the absent of transport costs. Demands from each country (at the same international price 
vector) are then randomly matched by supplies. Since there is no transport cost, home country’s 
buyers of a good may nonetheless satisfy their demands from a foreign source while the country’s 
exports are the residual of domestic production and domestic demand. Deardorff then introduced 
transport costs, which ensure that the equalization of factor prices would not occur, and in a world 
with more commodities than countries, he argued that it is likely that most goods will be supplied 
by only one country. In that circumstance a gravity model for bilateral trade flows would be 
justified even in a Heckscher-Ohlin framework. Thus gravity models appear to be consistent with 
virtually any trade models in which specialization occurs.  
The use of gravity models in examining the economic effects of a RTA is, however, subject 
to few limitations. First, as Kimberly Clausing (2001, 680) argued, the dummy variable used to 
examine the effects of a RTA is unable to indicate the amount of trade creation relative to trade 
diversion. This is because even if the coefficient of the dummy variable representing intra-bloc 
trade is positive and statistically significant, it does not specifically tell whether the expansion of 
trade among members is a result of trade creation or trade diversion.    181
Second, studies employing gravity equations generally use trade flows data at a very 
aggregate level. So these studies are therefore unable to examine the variations of trade 
liberalization across goods or industries. Additionally, it is also unable to separate the effect of 
trade liberalization from other influences that are acting on trade flows. On this, Frankel (1997, 93) 
conceded in his study (employing a gravity equation) to analyse the effects of a RTA on trade by 
noting that “some effects of regional trading agreements are lost in tests like ours on highly 
aggregated data”.  
Third, the gravity equation estimates of the effects of a RTA are also sensitive to the 
sample of countries included in a study. Haveman and David Hummels (1998, 47-72) showed that 
changing the sample of countries resulted in a different prediction of trade between countries in the 
absence of a particular RTA and also can significantly alter the coefficient of the dummy variable. 
They (1998, 52) argued that the gravity equation estimates of the effects of the EC on trade “vary 
dramatically” according to countries in the sample. Richard Pomfret (1997, 254) also commented 
about a number of different studies (using gravity models) that produce contradictory conclusions 
over the same regional agreement. Citing a number of “implausible results”, Pomfret concluded 
that “there are clearly shortcomings” in this approach.        
7.5.2  Empirical Research Based on Gravity Models 
The use of gravity models in the analysis of regional trading areas, according to Soloaga 
and Winters (2001, 3) was first employed by Norman Aitken (1973, 881-892) who examined the 
effects of the formation of the EEC and EFTA on European trade. In addition to normal gravity 
variables which have a direct influence trade flows between countries such as national income, the 
size of population and geographical distance, he also incorporated two dummy variables 
representing the membership of the EEC and EFTA into the gravity equation. Following Balassa’s   182
(1967, 5) definition, he examined gross trade creation (GTC) which refers to the total increase in 
trade among members of the EEC and EFTA. For the purpose of examining trade diversion (TD) 
he estimated the amount of trade between countries if there was no preferential trade arrangement. 
To do this he first examined to ascertain an appropriate base year in which it is free from 
integration effects. This based year is then used to make projections about what would be the 
amount of trade in the event of no preferential arrangement. TD was then calculated by abstracting 
the projected amount of trade (from the actual trade) of the respective years of the study. In 
addition, they also estimated “external trade” creation which refers to integration-caused increases 
in trade between members and outside countries. 
The results of the study showed that both the EEC and EFTA experienced a cumulative 
growth in GTC over their respective RTA periods with GTC of the EEC being substantially 
greater than the GTC of EFTA. The estimates for 1967 (the last year of the sample data) indicated 
that the size of the GTC for the EEC and EFTA were approximately US$9.2 billion and US$1.2 
billion respectively. The EEC was found to have a net GTC effect on EFTA through 1964, but this 
was replaced by a growing net TD effect from 1965 through 1967. The regression results of the 
study suggested that 1958 being the last year for which it could safely be assumed that European 
trade was unaffected by the formation of the EEC, and therefore it could be used as the base year 
for making the extrapolation of trade.  
A similar study was undertaken by Aitken and Robert Obutelewicz (1976, 425-433) to 
examine the effects of the trade agreement between the EEC and the Association of African 
Countries (AAC), concluded during the Yaounde Convention (1963). In this study, they 
incorporated four dummy variables to capture the effects of preferential trading arrangements. 
These variables are British preference for the exports of African Commonwealth countries, the   183
preference of the EEC countries other than France for the exports of the AAC, French preference 
for Tunisian-Moroccan exports, and French preference for the exports of the AAC (former French 
colonies). They found that this trade arrangement had a statistically significant effect on both the 
EEC and AAC exports, with the size of the effect, in both cases, increasing progressively 
throughout the period of study (1959-1971). Also, the effect of British preference was the 
strongest, estimated at US$683.1 million in 1971, while the combined preference of all the EEC 
countries was more than 80 percent of the total AAC’s exports to the EEC. 
Frankel, individually as well as with other researchers, undertook a series of empirical 
studies on the effects of trading blocs on trade in various parts of the world, and the results of these 
studies were comprehensively compiled in Regional Trading Blocs in the World Economic System 
(1997, chapter 5). In addition to formal RTAs – such as the EU, EFTA, NAFTA, MERCUSOR 
and ASEAN – Frankel also analysed informal trade blocs grouped as Western Europe, Free Trade 
Area of the America (FTAA) and APEC in these studies. For some formal RTAs, the beginning 
period of the study started many years before their actual formation as his studies encompassed a 
period of 1965-1992. Frankel argued that this was done in order to examine the effects of informal 
blocs in those (pre-formation) years as well as to have comparability of results among the trading 
blocs being investigated.  
7.5.2.1 European Union, European Free Trade Area and Western Europe  
Frankel’s study of the fifteen member countries of the EU revealed that trade among 
members was insignificant for the early periods but turns into significant thereafter. The 
coefficient values of a dummy variable – which represents the case when the pair of countries 
being members of the EU – were insignificant for various years of 1965-1980. Only in 1985 the 
coefficient became significant with the parameter value of 0.2 and the coefficient value increased   184
to 0.3 in 1990. This suggests that in 1990 (after holding constant the influence of GNP, proximity, 
and the other gravity variables), two members of the EU-15 trade 35 percent more with each other 
than two otherwise similar countries [e 
0.3  = 1.35]. Frankel argued that the somewhat weak EU 
effect could either be due to the fact that the EU only has officially in  existence from 1993 onward 
as well as because some of the 15 countries were not in the precursor EEC.         
In many studies that he involves – see for example Frankel, Stein and Wei (1995), and 
Frankel and Wei (1993) – Frankel seldom found that trade among EFTA members to be 
statistically significant. The only exception was, however, found in Frankel and Wei (1997) which 
showed positive and significant coefficient of 0.2. This occurred when data of 1970, 1980, 1990 
and 1992 was pooled together. The coefficient of the dummy variable for Western Europe as a 
whole was not significant prior to 1990. But in that year (1990) the coefficient turned significant 
with the parameter value being 0.4, indicating that two Western European countries trade 49 
percent more than two otherwise-similar countries. This suggests that even without a formal 
arrangement, Western Europe is still naturally a potential trading bloc.  
7.5.2.2 NAFTA, MERCOSUR, the Andean Pact and the Free Trade Area of the America   
Frankel and Wei’s (1997, table 1) study showed that the coefficient values of NAFTA bloc 
were almost never significant, not even in 1992, when NAFTA was officially negotiated. They 
argued that the lack of significance could be due in part to the small number of observations (that 
could be included in their study) since NAFTA has only three member countries. An exceptional 
result was obtained, however, when data was pooled over the 1970-1992 period. Of this they found 
that the estimated coefficient of NAFTA bloc being significant with the parameter value of 0.36, 
implying a 43 percent effect on intra-NAFTA trade [e 
0.36  = 1.43].    185
Frankel and Wei (1997) found a clear upward trend of intra-bloc effects for MERCOSUR 
with the coefficient values of the dummy variable not significant during 1965-1975, but thereafter 
the variable became significant (the coefficient value was 1.9 in 1990). This implies that in 1990 
the MERCOSUR member countries – Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay – trade among 
themselves almost seven times as much as otherwise-similar countries. This demonstrated an 
example of how a gravity model can give a very different answer in comparison to the calculation 
of intra-regional trade share.
50 The Intra-regional trade share of the MERCOSUR countries has 
been low and slow-growing. But when one takes into account the fact that MERCUSOR member 
countries constitute only a small fraction of gross world product and trade then its intra-regional 
trade share looks far more impressive.  
 Frankel (1997) showed the most dramatic turnaround for the member countries of the 
Andean Pact. Despite the fact that the Andean Pact was only established in the 1960s, the dummy 
coefficient for 1965 was negative and highly significant (– 1.3), meaning that in 1965 these 
countries traded with each other only one-quarter as much as they should have been [e 
-1.3  = 0.27]. 
The coefficient became small and insignificant in 1970 through 1990, but in 1992, after the 
reinvigoration of the Andean Pact, it suddenly became positive and highly significant with the 
parameter value of 1.0. This implies that in 1992 the Andean Pact countries traded 2.7 times as 
much as otherwise-similar countries. In this study Frankel also found an upward trend for the 
parameter values of the dummy coefficient representing intra-FTAA bloc trade. The coefficient 
was negative and significant (- 0.3) in 1965, which reflects a general lack of openness on the part 
of Latin American countries during the heyday of import substitution. But the coefficient turned 
positive (although not significant) for period 1975-1980. By 1990 the coefficient became positive 
                                                 
50 The share of intraregional trade of MERCOSUR as computed by Frankel (1997, table 2.1) was small at 6 percent in 
1962 and only increased to 19 percent in 1994. As a comparison, the intraregional trade share of the EU-15 and 
NAFTA were 56 percent and 36 percent respectively in 1962 and each increased to 64 percent and 43 percent in 1994.      186
and highly significant with the parameter value being 0.8, indicating a boost to intra-regional trade 
by a factor of 2.2.  
7.5.2.3 ASEAN and Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation  
Frankel’s (1997, table 4.2) study showed that ASEAN recorded a significant intra-regional 
trade bias in every year from 1965 to 1992. The coefficient value for 1992 was 1.8, which also 
happen to be close to the mean, median, and mode of the yearly estimates. This means that two 
ASEAN countries trade six times more than two otherwise-similar countries. Frankel argued that 
an apparent intra-ASEAN bias could be due to the extreme openness of Singapore.
51 To analyse 
this, Frankel and Wei (1995) tried adding a Singapore dummy to the regression, examining 
bilateral trade involving the city-state. The Singapore dummy did indeed have a positive and very 
significant coefficient (1.51). The coefficient on ASEAN dummy was then reduced to 1.4 but 
remained quantitatively large and statistically significant. This suggests that Singapore’s extreme 
openness does not explain all of the apparent inward trade bias of ASEAN countries. 
Frankel’s (1997) study found a rather surprising result for APEC as a regional grouping. 
Although APEC was only established as informal grouping in 1992, the magnitudes of the APEC 
dummy coefficients were highly significant for 1965 through 1992. There was a slight upward 
trend in the parameter values of the APEC dummy coefficient, reaching 1.2 in 1992. This indicates 
that two APEC countries trade 3.3 times as much as two otherwise-similar countries.  
In a close connection with the finding of Frankel, which indicates significant concentration 
of intra-regional trade (of certain economic groupings) even without a formal trading arrangement, 
Barry Eichengreen and Irwin (1998, 33-57) examined the role of history in influencing regional 
                                                 
51 Singapore is a well known city-state which assumes the role of imports and exports hub for the whole ASEAN 
region. This is indicated by its exports and imports ratios to GDP which stand at above 100 percent.    187
trade flows. They argued that the reason why intra-regional trade flows are higher than predicted 
by gravity models even before the formation of a RTA is primarily because of history. They 
argued that “history should matter” due to a triple of reasons. First, once exporters have developed 
distribution networks in another country, they are likely to continue utilizing them unless profit 
decreases significantly. Second, fixed costs facing those exporters could be “sunk costs”, therefore 
only variable costs need to be covered by exporters for export transactions. Finally, over a period 
of time exporters may be just acquaintance with the market.  
Eichengreen and Irwin used historical trade data – involving 34 countries for 1928 and 
1938; and 38 countries for 1949, 1954 and 1964 – to examine the important of history to trade 
flows. They analysed the deviations of trade patterns with the use of a gravity model. They found 
that trade patterns in one period are explained, at least in part, by deviations in the preceding 
periods. The results showed that gravity variables included in the model were significant and 
surprising stable for the various years under investigation. When they added a lagged-trade as an 
additional variable, then the magnitudes of the coefficients of income and distance were reduced. 
They also found that trade in 1949 (after the end of the WW2) was significantly influenced by 
trade patterns in 1928 and 1938, with trade in 1938 being twice of 1928. By 1964, however, the 
impact of pre war trade patterns disappeared. 
The results of this study imply few implications. First, GATT members traded more with 
one another than predicted in 1949 after the conclusion of the first round of multilateral trade 
negotiations, although this effect disappeared by the 1950s. Second, countries belonging to 
(former) British Empire traded more with Britain and less with ROW in 1949 than predicted. In 
contrast, however, by the 1950s these countries traded more with ROW but less with Britain than   188
predicted by the gravity model. In a way, Eichengreen and Irwin demonstrated that history does 
indeed matter in influencing trade flows, particularly along regional lines.           
Anne Krueger (1999) employed a gravity model in her study of trade creation and trade 
diversion of NAFTA. Besides analysing the effects of regionalism on trade for NAFTA members, 
she also estimated the effects of regionalism on members of other trading blocs: the EU, 
MERCOSUR, ASEAN, Andean Pact and CER. In addition, she also examined the effects of 
NAFTA on outside exporters. For this study Krueger used trade data involving 61 countries for the 
period of 1987-1997. As for NAFTA, she found that the dummy coefficient for the pair of 
countries, both are members, was positive (0.11) but insignificant. This means that trade among 
members is only 12 percent [e 
0.11  = 1.12] higher than predicted by the gravity equation. If an 
importer was in NAFTA while the exporter was in ROW, imports into NAFTA are on average 46 
percent less than predicted.  
Consistent with other studies, she found the effect of the EU on members’ trade is small (7 
percent) and insignificant. However, she found a different finding from Frankel (1997) for 
MERCOSUR, whereby trade between members is less than predicted with the coefficient value 
being – 0.19. Similar to Frankel, she found that ASEAN dummy variable was the most significant 
of all coefficients and it was surprisingly large (1.0), indicating that members’ trade 2.7 times more 
than otherwise-similar countries. She also found members of CER (Australia and New Zealand) 
traded with each other 65 percent more than predicted by the gravity equation. Interestingly 
though, imports from non members into CER also positive, 12 percent higher than predicted.  
Soloaga and Winters (2001) incorporated three dummy variables to capture the “full” 
effects of RTAs on trade. The first variable is to capture the extent to which trade is higher than 
expected if both pair of countries are members of a trading bloc. The second variable is to measure   189
the extent to which members’ imports are higher than expected from all countries. Finally, the 
third variable is to measure the extent to which members’ exports are higher than expected to all 
countries. As for the result of this study, they largely found different results as compared to the 
previous studies of Frankel (1997) and Krueger (1999).  
Soloaga and Winters found that in all cases involving Latin American countries – CACM, 
LAIA, ANDEAN, MERCOSUR – the coefficient of the dummy variable representing intra-bloc 
trade was positive and statistically significant for the whole period of 1980-1996. That is, in every 
dimension tested, Latin American countries traded disproportionately large with each other. As for 
NAFTA, the intra-bloc trade effect was positive but not significant. The coefficients capturing 
intra-bloc trade effects for the EU, EFTA and ASEAN were all negative. Thus they concluded that 
after controlling for normal gravity variables and general trade behaviour, only members of Latin 
American trading-blocs trade significantly more with themselves than expected.                      
7.6  Ex Post Studies of Regionalism 
7.6.1 Methodological  Underpinnings 
This group of studies generally concerns with investigating the effects of regionalism on 
members as well as on the rest of the world by analysing trade data after a trading bloc was 
formed. These studies use various kinds of econometric methods and other data analysis to identify 
the economic effects of a particular trading arrangement. By employing extended definitions of the 
original Viner’s concept of trade creation and trade diversion, researchers are able to indicate 
whether a regional trading arrangement creates or diverts trade. However, according to Srinivasan, 
Whalley and Wooton (1993, 66) this type of studies has limited applications since no welfare 
analysis can be made because underlying theoretical structures are not specified, especially in   190
terms of microeconomic underpinnings. In addition, these studies are plagued with a number of 
econometric problems such as specification bias, parameter value instability and simultaneity bias.      
7.6.2  Ex Post Empirical Research 
Balassa’s (1967) study examining trade creation and trade diversion due to the formation of 
the EEC common market was probably the earliest research that falls into this category. He 
employed a partial equilibrium study focusing on the income elasticities of import demand before 
and after the formation of the EEC. In this study Balassa assumed that income elasticity of import 
demand to be constant in the absent of integration. Therefore a rise in the income elasticity of 
demand for intra-area imports indicates gross trade creation (GTC), while an increase in the 
income elasticity of demand for imports from all sources of supply indicates the actual trade 
creation.
52 In turn, a fall in the income elasticity of demand for extra-area import provides 
evidence of trade diverting effects of the customs union.    
Balassa’s study encompassed two periods: the pre-formation of the EEC (1953-1959) and 
the post-formation (1959-1965). Trade data was broken down into seven major commodity groups: 
non tropical food, beverages and tobacco, raw materials, fuels, chemicals, machinery, transport 
equipment, and other manufactured goods. The results of the study showed an increase in income 
elasticity of demand for imports of all commodities, suggesting that the EEC creates trade. But the 
results vary considerably between commodity groups, indicating trade creation for fuels, 
machinery, and transport equipment while trade diversion is evident for food, raw material, 
                                                 
52 Gross trade creation is a term created by Balassa referring to an increase in intra-area trade, irrespective of whether 
this is due to substitution of the source of supply of goods for domestic or foreign. This is an extension of the original 
Vinerian concepts which relates trade creation as a newly created trade due to a shift of production from higher cost 
domestic to partner countries, while trade diversion entails a shift from lower cost foreign to higher cost partner 
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chemicals and transport equipment. He also suggested that the gain to the EEC is in terms of an 
increase in the real GNP growth rate of 0.1 percent per year.  
Edwin Truman (1975) employed a partial equilibrium econometric study of trade shares for 
the EEC-6 before and after the formation of this customs union. He calculated hypothetical import 
shares after its formation and compared these with the actual import shares. Two methods were 
used: the first attempted to adjust for country-specific cyclical effects, whereas the second did not. 
The pre-formation period was from 1953 to 1960. The year of comparison between the 
hypothetical and actual import shares was 1968 whereby eleven manufacturing industries were 
examined. The study revealed the following results for non member countries under the first 
method: 43 percent of the industries recorded an increase in trade shares while 37 percent showed 
a decrease. He also found that 20 percent of the industries experienced a falling trade shares for 
both member and non member countries. Additionally, the first method showed a US$11 billion 
increase in trade, of which US$2 billion came from extra-regional trade. The second method 
showed a US$1 billion increase in total trade, but this came at the expense of extra-regional trade. 
Kym Anderson and Hege Norheim (1993) calculated numerous indexes to analyse the 
regionalization of international trade. Specifically these indexes were: (1) An intra-regional trade 
share of its total trade, (2) Regional trade share of world trade, (3) Intensity of intra-regional trade 
index, (4) Intensity of extra-regional trade index, (5) Share of GDP traded; (6) Index of propensity 
to trade intra-regionally; and (7) Index of propensity to trade extra-regionally. Utilizing data 
provided by Bairoch (1974) they calculated these indexes for European region from 1830 through 
1990 with a ten-years interval. Due to data limitation, the study of the other regions covered only 
the period starting of 1928-1990, although with the same interval.   192
The results of this study showed that intra-regional trade share (of total trade) increased 
steadily for all regions: Western Europe (from 51 percent in 1928 to 72 percent in 1990), North 
America (from 25 percent to 31 percent) and developing Asia (from 47 percent to 56 percent). The 
intra-regional trade share was somewhat stable for Asia as a whole, while African region recorded 
declining trade share. Merely looking at this index, one might be tempted to conclude that the 
regionalism in Europe and North America cause the concentration of intra-regional trade. However 
Anderson and Norheim argued that this conclusion is totally misleading because the share of intra-
regional trade is a very inadequate indicator of intra-regional trade bias. This is simply because 
trade share is affected by the number of countries in a region, in which the larger the number of 
countries in a region, the larger is the region’s intra-regional trade share. In fact if one considers 
the whole world constitutes one region, then intra-regional trade share of its total trade will be 100 
percent. 
According to Anderson and Norheim a better way of addressing the issue of intra-regional 
trade concentration is by examining four pertinent indexes (out of seven) at once. These indexes 
are intensity of intra-regional trade, intensity of extra-regional trade, propensity to trade intra-
regionally, and propensity to trade extra-regionally. Since the results of the study showed that the 
index of propensity to trade extra-regionally is generally stable throughout the period (in 
comparison to other indexes) – for example 0.3 in 1928, 0.31 in 1958, 0.28 in 1979 and 0.23 in 
1990 for Western Europe, while somewhat fluctuates but increasing, 0.09, 0.07, 0.15 and 0.14 for 
these respective years for North America – it indicates that regionalism has not badly affected 
trade with non member countries.  
Krueger (1999) undertook an ex post study to examine NAFTA effects on trade of 
members vis-à-vis non members. Taking Mexico as a major beneficiary of NAFTA, she analysed   193
Mexico exports into the US as well as to ROW before and after the formation of NAFTA. She 
analysed the “shift and share” of trade to assess the extent to which increases in intra-NAFTA 
trade occur at the expense of the shares of trade of countries outside NAFTA. She started by 
examining the shifts in the shares imports from Mexico into the US market. This analysis 
attempted to provide a rough assessment of the extent to which an increase in Mexican export 
share (into the US) occurred at expense of outside countries. 
Using the average of 1987-1988 trade as a base, the share of Mexican exports into the US 
and the ROW total imports (from Mexico) was calculated. The calculated shares then applied to 
the US and ROW imports for 1990, 1993, 1997, and 1998 to estimate what Mexico’s exports 
would have been if her share of the two markets was not unaltered. The difference between this 
estimate and the actual Mexican exports to each market was then taken as the “shift” in Mexican 
exports in the two markets. 
The results of this study showed few interesting patterns. For the late 1980s and early 
1990s, Mexican exports appeared to have been gaining share (although relatively slowly) in the 
US market but losing share in ROW. After the early 1990s, and especially after 1994, however, 
Mexico gained share both in the US and in ROW markets. The gain in shares was most 
pronounced in manufactured products classified as materials, machinery and transport equipment, 
and miscellaneous manufactures. In each of these categories, the increased Mexican export share 
in trade with ROW was almost as large as the proportionate increase in share of trade with the US. 
Thus the fact that Mexico’s increased export share in ROW’s trade suggested that Mexican 
products were generally a more attractive source for ROW imports, especially after the 1994-1995 
devaluation.   194
Clausing (2001) examined the Canada-US FTA (CUSFTA) to ascertain the evidence of 
trade creation and trade diversion. She employed an econometric study on Canada and the US 
tariff liberalization vis-à-vis the ROW. Clausing specified three models and then regressed these 
models on the data of US imports from 1989 through 1994. As for the first model, she argued that 
as tariffs are reduced between Canada and the US, prices would change to bring to a new 
equilibrium in import demand and export supply. Thus the change in imports is determined by the 
change in the level of tariffs and various shocks in macroeconomic variables such as exchange 
rates, cyclical factors and so on. These shocks are captured in her model by incorporating a 
dummy variable.  
To derive the second model, she added Canada pre-CUSFTA export share into the first 
model arguing that this variable will have a direct influence on the US imports. For example, if 
Canada is already the most competitive source of imports into the US market prior to CUSTA, 
tariff reductions on Canadian goods will likely lead to trade creation. The third model was 
specified specifically to examine trade diversion. In order to examine this effect a series of 
regressions were performed between a dependent variable, which is the percentage change in the 
US imports of a particular commodity from ROW against the US change in tariffs imposed on 
Canada goods. If trade diversion is present, one would expect the percentage change in imports 
from ROW to be negatively related to the extent of tariff liberalization with Canada. 
The results of this study showed that the US tariff liberalization on Canadian goods caused 
trade creation between the two countries since a one percentage point reduction in tariffs was 
associated with a 10 percent increase in imports from Canada. Contrary to her hypothesis for the 
second specification, however, the Canadian pre-CUSFTA export share did not show positive 
relationship with Canadian exports into the US. The result showed that a one percent increase in   195
the Canadian pre-CUSFTA export share was associated with a 0.69 percent reduction in the US 
imports from Canada. As regard to the question of trade diversion, the coefficient explaining the 
relationship between reductions in tariffs on Canadian goods with the US imports from ROW was 
statistically insignificant from zero. Therefore the result of this study suggests no evidence of trade 
diversion created by CUSFTA.    
7.7 Conclusion 
All four categories of empirical studies examining the economic effects of regionalism are 
equally popular among researchers, albeit each of them has its strengths and shortcomings from 
the methodological as well as theoretical points of view. The findings of many of these empirical 
studies differed, especially with regard to the welfare effects that a particular regional trading 
arrangement (RTA) has on member vis-à-vis non member countries. This is true even if these 
studies fall into the same methodological category. Studies based gravity models for example, 
show that the findings of Soloaga and Winters (2001) about the effects of various RTAs on 
members vis-à-vis non members are different from that of Frankel (1997) and Krueger (1999). 
These inconclusive findings, therefore, justify further research to examine economic effects 
brought about by regionalism.         196
CHAPTER EIGHT 
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY AND ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF THE ASEAN FREE 
TRADE AREA  
8.1 Overview 
This chapter examines the factors that influenced the thinking of ASEAN leaders in 
agreeing to the establishment of AFTA in 1992. It is imperative to analyse and identify factors 
which caused a change in the minds of ASEAN leaders, since competent observers claimed that 
even in a few years before the formation of AFTA, discussions about the possibility of establishing 
a free trade area in the region were discouraged and avoided. Besides analysing this issue, this 
chapter also examines the economics of AFTA establishment, in particular, investigating whether 
or not AFTA benefits its member countries.   
8.2  The Precursor of AFTA 
For a long while the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) remained 
primarily a political and diplomatic organization to address issues related to securities, and to 
much lesser extent economics, that affect member countries as well as the Southeast Asian region. 
Since the early days of its formation (August 1967), ASEAN countries have been confronted with 
security issues facing the region particularly the threat of communism. Despite many problems that 
ASEAN has faced, scholars have noted that ASEAN could be considered as one of the most 
successful organizations of its kind in developing countries. ASEAN success has been linked to its 
ability to stabilize a region that might otherwise have experienced a great turmoil. At the centre of 
this argument is the role of ASEAN in moderating intra-regional conflicts and significantly 
reducing the likelihood of wars (Acharya 2001, 5). This is very significant since at the time of its   197
establishment ASEAN was divided by a host of conceivable political differences (Funston 1999, 
205-219).
53 Tension over security issues, however, began to decrease significantly from the 
beginning of the 1990s especially after the end of the Cold War and the breakdown of Soviet 
Union.  
Although another important goal of ASEAN establishment as stated in the Bangkok 
Declaration – which gave birth to ASEAN – and also as appeared in many of succeeding ASEAN 
pronouncements, has been to strengthen economic cooperation in the areas of trade and industrial 
development, little efforts were taken to achieve this aim.
54 In fact in the first 10 years of its 
establishment the Association’s Economic Ministers failed to meet on a regular basis and ASEAN 
continued to be rotated around the annual meetings of its Foreign Ministers (Akrasanee and Stifel 
1992, 27).   
A significant change however occurred in January 1992 when ASEAN member countries 
signed an agreement to form ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) with the aim to have it fully 
implemented within 15 years starting from January 1993.
55 Subsequently, in September 1994 
ASEAN member countries agreed to speed up the process of AFTA implementation by bringing 
                                                 
53 The turbulent political scenarios in the region around the time of ASEAN establishment could be depicted by the 
following cases. Indonesia’s armed confrontation to “crush Malaysia” was only wound up in 1965 as power 
transferred from Sukarno to Suharto. In the same year Singapore left the Federation of Malaysia to become an 
independent state. The Philippines laid claim to the Malaysia’s state of Sabah when the latter became independent 
from Great Britain through Malaysia in 1963 – and in fact the Philippines has never officially retracted this claim. 
Claims on small territories, including islands, occurred times and again between some of the founding members of 
ASEAN, and these claims continue to this day. 
 
54 From the late 1960s to the mid-1980s ASEAN countries signed four separate agreements on a piecemeal basis to 
implement economic cooperation projects: ASEAN Preferential Trading Arrangement (APTA), ASEAN Industrial 
Project (AIP), ASEAN Industrial Complementation (AIC) and ASEAN Industrial Joint Venture (AIJV). All these 
initiatives however achieved little success economically due to the lack of interest among members at various stages of 
implementation. 
 
55 The six original signatories of AFTA were Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand and Singapore. 
The four newer members of ASEAN became signatories to AFTA at the time when they joined ASEAN: Vietnam 
(1995), Laos (1997), Myanmar (1997) and Cambodia (1999). As regard to the detailed account of mechanisms and 
schedules of AFTA implementation, see for example Suthiphand Chirathivat (1996) and AFTA Reader series: Volume 
I (1993), Volume II and III (1995), Volume IV(1996) and Volume V (1998) published by ASEAN Secretariat.   
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forward the target date for its full implementation to 10 years, from 2008 to 2003.
56 This reflected 
a major change in the thinking of ASEAN leaders because even in few years before the formation 
of AFTA discussion about the possibility of the establishment of a free trade area was still 
discouraged and avoided (Imada and Naya 1992, xi). From the perspective of economics, a 
number of economic benefits are to be gained by members of ASEAN as they gradually liberalize 
their trade in the course of fulfilling their commitments for the implementation of AFTA. This 
proposition however, holds only in the context of the “second-best policy option” that ASEAN 
member countries have chosen to follow.
57 In retrospect ASEAN member countries would stand to 
enjoy greater economic benefits had they choose trade policies along the “first-best option” by 
adopting unilateral and non discriminatory trade liberalization (Bhagwati 1993, 23).
58 
8.3  The Political Economy of AFTA Establishment 
The fact that ASEAN member countries adopted the second-best policy instead of the fist-
best option for their trade liberalization warrants investigation. At least three factors could be 
advanced to explain circumstances that influence the decision of ASEAN countries in choosing the 
second-best policy for their path to trade liberalization through the formation of a discriminatory-
                                                 
56 Again during the Sixth ASEAN Summit (December 1998) held in Hanoi, Vietnam, leaders of ASEAN decided to 
further bring forward the completion date of AFTA implementation by one year from January 2003 to January 2002. 
This was taken as a response to Asian financial crisis which swept through many Asian countries in 1997 and 1998. 
 
57 The proposition that there are economic benefits to be gained by member countries that participate in a regional free 
trade area (FTA) holds only in the context of analysis within the theory of the second best. When the analysis is 
broadened to take into account the effects of a regional FTA on members as well to the world at large, the benefits 
then become ambiguous.  In this regard abundance of literature is in existence debating about whether a regional FTA 
is good or bad for the world economy. Examples of such literature, both theoretical and empirical analyses include 
Jagdish Bhagwati (1993), Takatoshi Ito and Anne Krueger (1997), Arvind Panagariya (1999), Alan Winters (1999) 
who argued against regional FTAs. For views in favour of regional FTAs, see Robert Z. Lawrence (1991), Lawrence 
Summers (1991)  and Asian Development Bank (2002, part 3).  
      
58 The theory of the first-best option for international trade policy was enshrined in Adam Smith ([1776] 1937) and 
David Ricardo ([1817] 1969), and rigorously proved later by Paul Samuelson (1939), Murray Kemp (1972), Jean-
Michel Grandmont and Daniel McFadden (1972). 
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and-reciprocal free trade area.
59 All these three factors are particularly relevant in explaining the 
policy option adopted by Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand (ASEAN 4) as Brunei 
and Singapore had been pursuing unilateral trade liberalization even before the creation of AFTA.  
Arguably the most important factor which influenced the option chosen by ASEAN 
members was that it reflected a compromise between rival economic ideologies which 
underpinned policy formulation in the ASEAN 4 countries. Secondly, ASEAN countries were 
increasingly affected by the second wave of regionalism, which proliferated in other parts of the 
world especially in Europe, North and South America as well as in Africa, around the time of 
AFTA establishment. And thirdly, by the end of the 1980s it became clear to ASEAN countries 
that establishing a regional free trade area (FTA) would be a good strategy to induce and sustain 
foreign direct investment (FDI) to member countries by offering investors a much bigger market 
than individual members could provide. Each of the factors, will, in turn be considered in greater 
details. However, before discussing these factors in details it is imperative to track down the origin 
of economic ideological rivalry that emerged in developing countries in general as it inherently has 
significant influence over economic thinking in this part of the world. 
8.3.1  The Origin of Economic Ideological Rivalry in Developing Countries 
In the modern history of the twentieth century, the rivalry of economic ideologies had its 
origin from the debate which occurred in the 1940s through 1960s between development 
economists vis-à-vis neoclassical economists, arguing to influence economic policy formulation. 
Although neoclassical economic ideas have become the orthodoxy of economics since the 1870s, 
this orthodoxy was seriously challenged by the ideas of development economics during a period 
                                                 
59AFTA is a discriminatory free trade area because it discriminates member countries against non members, 
particularly with regard to the imposition of import tariffs. Also, AFTA is a reciprocal free trade area because 
exporters from one member country could only enjoy tariff concession provided for a good by another member if only 
the import tariff for the good in question in both countries does not higher than a threshold of 20 percent.      200
between the 1940s and 1960s, particularly in least developed countries (LDCs) and developing 
countries (DCs).
60 Nevertheless, the prominence of development economic ideas lasted only about 
three decades as its influence started to decline significantly by the beginning of the 1960s. By this 
time “economic planning” which attracted maximum enthusiasm in the 1940s and 1950s in LDCs 
and DCs failed miserably, and the 1960s witnessed a resurgence of neoclassical economic ideas in 
economic policy settings all over the world (Little 1982, chapter 9).   
An initial idea associated with development economics was arguably emerged from Paul 
Rosenstein-Rodan’s (1943) study of the economic problems of underdeveloped countries 
(Krugman 1994, 39-58). The influence of Rosenstein-Rodan study, together with other prominent 
development economists such as Arthur Lewis, Gunnar Myrdal, Albert Hirschman, Raul Prebisch, 
Hans W. Singer, Thomas Balogh and Ragnar Nurkse, caused many developing countries to adopt 
an inward-looking economic policy during the 1950s and 1960s (Lal 1983, 17).   
As regard to international trade, three contentious theoretical issues were heatedly debated 
between development and neoclassical economists in their quest to influence economic policy 
formulation.
61 The first of these issues was the income elasticity of demand for goods from 
developing countries. Development economists argued that income elasticity of demand for 
tropical goods in developed countries is low and it could not be expected to grow sufficiently high 
to enable LDCs and DCs to raise their national income (through exporting). A leading source of 
this argument was documented in Nurkse’s (1961) book, in which he maintained that the role of 
                                                 
60 Although neoclassical economics emerged as orthodoxy of economic thinking in the 1870s, it did not necessarily 
dominate economic policy settings in many countries. Even in the US for example, Institutionalists played a 
significant role in economic policy formulation at the turn of the twentieth century until the 1930s (Landreth and 
Colander 1989, 392).  
 
61 The debate between development and neoclassical economists encompassed a wide range of areas including 
international trade, industrialization strategy, economic planning, exchange rate, the flow of capital and labor and the 
balance of payment management. For the purpose of this study, however, discussion is restricted to debates about 
international trade issues.      201
international trade in nineteenth century as the engine of growth for the new countries of white 
settlement – the USA, Canada, Argentina and Australia – is no longer applicable to LDCs and 
DCs. Unlike some other development economists, Nurkse did not object the idea that these 
countries should seize any trading opportunities available, but he was pessimistic about their future 
availability.  
Nukse argued that in contrast to grains, which according to him is the basis of the white-
settler’s countries prosperity, the demand for tropical products in developed countries has not risen 
in line with growth in their incomes because the income elasticity of demand for these goods is 
low. In addition, there is also a serious danger that synthetic substitutes would be developed for 
many tropical products. He was also pessimistic about the possibility of LDCs and DCs to be able 
to export manufactured goods, partly due to these countries’ lack of technological capability to 
produce them, and also because of the protectionism he thought such exports would provoke in 
developed countries. He therefore advocated what he called a “balanced growth” which is in effect 
the policy of import substitution to meet home demand for imports. 
Nurkse argument was challenged by Irving Kravis (1970), who provided empirical 
evidence that the economic growth of those white settler countries is mainly caused by internal 
rather than external factors. He argued that international trade provides only an extension of 
opportunities in converting domestic resources into goods and services required for investment or 
consumption in other countries. The enlargement of market made it possible for a good to be 
produced efficiently on large scale production characterized by decreasing costs. Furthermore he 
argued that exposure to international competition is the best anti-monopoly policy to prevent the 
establishment of high cost industries. Finally, Kravis (1970, 869) maintained that finding from his 
research showed that international trade could not indicate a differential diagnosis to explain the   202
varying growth records of countries in the nineteenth century. The US, the country which recorded 
the greatest economic success of the nineteenth century owed the pattern and speed of its 
development and prosperity mainly to internal factors, while its external trade expanded just as 
rapidly as some less successful countries; comparable only to the growth of trade of India and 
Ceylon, which did not at all experience fast growth.  
The second issue of debate was the terms of trade effect of developing countries’ exports. 
As expounded by Prebisch (1950) and Singer (1950), development economists argued that both 
theory and historical fact demonstrate an inexorable tendency, over a long period of time, of the 
declining term of trade of primary commodities of developing countries. This occurs due to the 
existence of unlimited supply of labours in developing countries, available for employment in 
plantation or other sectors of export potential at constant real wage.  
The declining terms of trade argument provided those that opposed neoclassical ideas with 
further basis for turning their backs on the orthodox case for freedom of international trade and 
payments. Since, as it was asserted, the prevailing trade system led to a pattern of specialization in 
which the gains from productivity increases in LDCs and DCs primary production are transferred 
to advanced countries, whereas productivity gains in the latter’s manufacturing activities accrued 
only to their own inhabitants, the LDCs and DCs must shun trade with developed countries. Again 
the policy of import substitution is the panacea offered. The most extreme form associated with the 
declining terms of trade argument was the assertion of Myrdal (1957) and Balogh (1963), and 
contrary to the neoclassical view in which a liberal international trade and payments regime yield 
mutual benefits to all trading nations, they argued that trade relations are really a zero sum game, 
enabling the rich advanced countries to prosper at the expense of the poor, backward ones. Myrdal   203
(1957, 46) suggested that the liberal international system would inevitably make the rich richer and 
the poor poorer.  
Neoclassical economists responded to this theoretical argument by claiming that economic 
history in the 1940s through 1970s did not born out as predicted by development economists. Lal’s 
(1983, table 2) examination of the performance of developed versus developing countries as well 
as performance comparison of different developing countries (because developing countries were 
far from being a homogenous group) showed that all of them differ considerably in living 
standards for the period of his studies. This study indicated that Latin America, the richest region 
of developing world in 1950 grew more slowly, in terms of per capita income, than the second 
poorest region in the sample (East Asia, excluding Communist China). Interestingly though, East 
Asia region also grew faster that the world’s richest region (developed countries) in 1950. 
The third issue was the argument about foreign exchange bottleneck experienced by 
developing countries. Development economists claimed that the export earnings of LDCs and DCs 
could not be increased even in the long run. This export pessimism was soon formalized into a so 
called “two-gap” model by Ronald McKinnon (1964). This argument essentially came about on 
the assumption that goods for export could only be produced using imported capital inputs and 
intermediate products in a fixed set of proportion. Output for export could not, therefore, be 
increased above the level determined by the quantity of imports with which a fixed export 
proceeds could finance. Even if a country is willing to save and invest a lager proportion of its 
income to finance growth, it will not be able to transform the saving into higher income and output 
because of an inexorable limit set by ‘fixed’ export earnings. Since an incremental saving could 
not be transformed into foreign exchange to finance the import requirement of additional 
investment, the country then now stuck in a foreign exchange bottleneck.    204
Furthermore, development economists argued that this chronic balance of payments 
constraint experienced by LDCs and DCs could not be cured by the orthodox prescription of 
raising the price of foreign exchange through devaluation of domestic currency – to both increase 
the supply of and reduce the demand for foreign exchange – because these effects are ruled out by 
assumptions. Their assumptions are either that exports would be constrained by world demand, or 
in the case of export volume does increase, it could only be sold at reduced prices, thus render 
impossibility for foreign exchange earnings to increase. Therefore, while raising the price of 
foreign exchange would not increase its supply, technologically fixed import requirements for the 
production of output (for export) means that, for any quantity of output, raising the price of foreign 
exchange would not reduce the demand for it. The only available options for LDCs and DCs are 
that governments to manage their fixed foreign exchange earnings for use in “essential” industries 
and seek to augment them through foreign loans and grants, preferably at low interest rates. During 
the 1940s through 1960s many developing countries were very much influenced by development 
economic ideas, therefore they were pessimistic about their trade prospects. These countries 
therefore tried to solve the problem of foreign exchange bottleneck through direct control of 
imports regardless of the real costs to the economy (Lal 1983, 25). 
Neoclassical economists responded to this issue by arguing that trade policies adopted by 
LDCs and DCs made the availability of foreign exchange even scarcer. Import control which they 
had set up to manage the presumed fixed quantity of foreign exchange induced a bias against 
export sectors and thus retarded the growth of industries with export potential, causing a relative 
decline of profitability of export industries. As import control also rendered protection to domestic 
producers, it caused an increase in domestic prices of importable goods; therefore, consumers 
switched some of their expenditure to the now relatively cheaper exportable products. The relative 
decline of profitability of exporting industries resulted in further reduction in the volume of   205
exports, thus export earnings. This continued until imports were limited to a bare minimum. The 
foreign exchange shortage, which could be cured by a normal means of devaluation then became 
chronic and rolled on its self fulfilling prophecy.  
8.3.2 Economic  Ideological  Rivalry in ASEAN Countries 
The economic ideological rivalry in ASEAN countries especially during the build up years 
to the creation of AFTA emerged in a slightly different form. At this time the apparent rival 
economic ideologies were between those subscribed by neo-mercantilist-nationalists and 
proponents of neoclassical economics. Neo-mercantilist-nationalists generally emphasize the 
importance of state building through interventionist policies to build a strong economy in order to 
enhance and sustain the state’s position in the global economy (Jones 1986, 145-166). In a world 
which they view as highly competitive with conflicting interests, economic activities particularly 
industrialization needs to be pursued through economic policies which help to protect domestic 
industries from foreign imports, while at the same time provide assistance to emerging export 
industries (Giplin 1987, 31-34).  
In contrast, proponents of neoclassical economics view the market, not the state, as the 
most effective and productive way of organizing economic relations. They sought to open up their 
economies to market forces through deregulation and liberalization, and to encourage free flow of 
trade and capital, to exploit the perceived mutual gains from participating in an expanding global 
economy (Giplin 1987, 26-31). Recognizing that in certain circumstances the market could not 
function as good as it should be due to the existence of price distortions and other impediments in 
the market, then it is the role of a state to intervene to alleviate those distortions and impediments 
to pave the way for the smooth functioning of the market. Around the time of AFTA establishment   206
these two approaches dominated the debate over economic policy in Indonesia, Malaysia, the 
Philippines and Thailand (Stubbs 2000, 299). 
In analysing the factors that influence the decision of ASEAN countries to choose the 
second-best policy option, it is imperative to note that in many ASEAN countries the decision 
making process of the states is highly centralized. As a consequence, any decisions on economic 
and trade policies are made by a very small group of people, which includes the prime minister or 
president, responsible ministers, senior government officials of key ministries, technocrats and 
selected economic advisers.
62 Although each country has elected members of parliament, of which 
majority of their votes are required to pass any policies into laws, since all governments of these 
countries are very strong with overwhelming majority in their parliaments, usually all those elected 
members representing the party which forms the government simply endorse the wish of the 
government.
63 The business community is fairly small, and while the number of business 
representations that could lobby their governments is increasing, but only those that have a close 
link with senior politicians and officials manage to represent their business interests effectively in 
any policy formulation (Stubbs 2000, 299).     
                                                 
62 The use of these terms and the roles they assume in economic policy setting warrant explanation especially of senior 
officials, technocrats and economic advisers as the role of president, prime minister and responsible ministers are 
obvious to most people. The prime role of senior officials is to advise their respective ministers, as Michael Pusey 
(1991, 67)  put it “… to what he/she [minister] should or should not do in this or that situation” and also to manage 
and implement programs adopted by the governments (Pusey is a sociologist who studied circumstances that 
influenced the change of economic thinking from the left to the right among Australian policy makers in the mid 
1980s). Technocrats are heads of specialized government departments or agencies having highly skilled scientific 
knowledge whose work mainly involve the application of value-free judgment to a particular problem (Pusey 1991, 
70). Meanwhile, economic advisers refer to a group of people co opted by the government to give advice on matters of 
economic importance, although many of them are neither professional nor academic economists, but leaders of 
successful businesses with little economic knowledge (Krugman 1996, 40-48). According to Krugman, these great 
business leaders often provide misguided economic policy advice to their governments due to the lack of economic 
understanding. 
   
63 This has been the case for Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand. It was the case for Indonesia up to Suharto era before 
Indonesia’s political structure was changed due to public revolt in 1999 when the country experienced its worst 
economic crisis. As for the Philippines, it was true especially during the era of Ferdinand Marcos before its political 
landscape was changed in 1986 because of “people powers” who overthrew the Marcos government after the public 
claimed the occurrence of massive cheating during the 1986 presidential election.      207
8.3.2.1 Indonesia 
In Indonesia, neo-mercantilist-nationalist ideology began to gain prominence among 
decision making elites since the 1950s, soon after the country gained its independence in 1947. 
Collectivist spirit as enshrined in the country’s Constitution played a central role in augmenting the 
role of this group over economic policy settings. Connected with collectivist sentiments was the 
notion that it was necessary for the state to assume a dominant role in the economy to protect the 
nation’s hard-won independence and to guard against the recurrence of foreign domination in 
economic activities (MacIntyre 1992, 140). Although already achieving a prominent status, the 
intertwined values of economic nationalism and state intervention came to permeate all aspect of 
economic policies during the period of Sukarno’s “guided democracy”, beginning from the late 
1950s until his fall in 1966 (Glassburner 1971).  
The influence of neo-mercantilist-nationalists was even stronger in the 1970s, largely 
because of successive oil price booms. As the net exporter of petroleum, the oil price booms of the 
1970s strengthened nationalists’ influence on economic policy as the state revenue from oil 
exports was channelled to fan economic activities aimed at furthering industrialization. Among the 
notable cases were the activities of the giant state oil company, Pertamina and its counterpart, 
Krakatau Steel. Pertamina was of particular importance due to the fact that it was also the sole 
agent for the collection of oil taxes. As oil revenues continued to grow, so did the state’s capacity 
though Pertamina and Krakatau Steel to involve directly in economic activities (MacIntyre 1992, 
142; Robison 1986, 182).  
Only occasionally proponents of neo-classical economics managed to exert some influence 
over economic policy formulation in Indonesia, and this occurred especially during the times when 
the country faced severe economic crises. The first example of such crises was the balance of   208
payment problems of the 1970s which stemmed from over expansion of Pertamina. This over 
expansion was not only through the use of oil revenues, but also by heavy dependence on 
borrowings from international credit markets, many of which short-term loans. Another example 
was the economic crisis of the mid 1980s, occurred due to declining oil price, from US$30 to 
US$10 per barrel from 1983 to 1986. Given that 60 to 70 percent of the Indonesian government 
revenues were generated from the oil sector, the collapse of oil price dramatically affected its 
economy. Upon the adoption of neoclassical economic ideas, stabilization and structural 
adjustment programs were introduced as reflected in the policy of a balanced budget, implemented 
through such austerity measures as budget cuts and the postponement of major industrial projects. 
On the revenue side, efforts were taken to augment non oil revenues through a major tax reform. 
Various deregulation measures were also undertaken with the aim of improving national efficiency 
through greater reliance on market forces (Aziz 1994, 387-391).   
The rivalry of ideologies between neo-mercantilist-nationalists and neoclassical proponents 
in Indonesia heightened towards the end of 1980s as they struggled to influence the thinking of 
President Suharto who held a final say over economic policies. The neo-mercantilist-nationalists 
group, whom Iwan Aziz (1994, 398-415)  referred to as the “engineers” and led by B.J. Habibie, 
then the minister of science and technology, was always in favour of protectionist approach to 
trade policy. On the contrary the neoclassical proponents, led by Widjojo Nitisastro – former 
economic and planning minister and at that time a senior government adviser – and included in this 
group high-level technocrats and American university graduates of Indonesian-based economists, 
pressed for further economic reform and trade liberalization. As a result of that tussle, a deal was 
clinched for embracing less sweeping trade liberalization through AFTA. If the proponents of 
neoclassical economics had their way, Indonesia would have adopted unilateral and non   209
discriminatory tariff cuts. On the contrary, if neo-mercantilist-nationalists had their way, the 
country would not have agreed to the establishment of AFTA.  
It is worth noting that a discriminatory-and-reciprocal trade liberalization under AFTA 
could still, to a lesser extent, pacify the emotion of neo-mercantilist-nationalists. At least it could 
be argued from their point of view that AFTA would provide a training ground for domestic 
industries to learn to compete with firms from other member countries. In addition, the 15-years 
(later reduced to 10-years) implementation period could be used by domestic companies for their 
necessary adjustments to face greater competition under AFTA. Also, a form of trade off could 
easily be envisaged; while some local industries could suffer a contraction of domestic sales due to 
greater competition, but competitive exporting firms could enjoy a much bigger export market in 
other member countries. 
8.3.2.2 Malaysia 
In Malaysia, neo-mercantilist-nationalists ideology started to become prominent since the 
country gained its independence from Great Britain in 1957. Under British rule, especially before 
1955, Malaya was essentially under an imposed free trade regime (Lim 1992, 94). The country 
exported rubber and tin mainly to United Kingdom (UK), and other western industrialized 
countries, in return for imports of manufactured goods also primarily from UK. During the 
colonial era, free trade was a logical policy choice for the British because it worked to their 
benefits, and the few customs and excise taxes in existence were imposed primarily for revenue 
collection and for controlling the consumption of such products as alcohol and opium, which were 
considered harmful to the society. In the 1960s Malaysian government took bold measures to 
encourage the setting up of import substitution industries by offering various tax incentives, in 
addition to providing protection against competing imports in the forms of high tariffs and quota   210
(Jomo and Edwards 1993, 19). Besides aiming at broadening the country’s economic base through 
industrial development activities, this effort reflected the thinking that it is better and desirable for 
the public to consume domestically-produced than imported goods under the disguise of nationalist 
spirit and loyalty to the country. 
Neo-mercantilist-nationalist ideas continued to intensify in the early 1980s when the state 
enhanced its involvement in economic activities particularly by the launching of the heavy 
industrialization policy. Under this initiative the state undertook four big projects; the setting up of 
iron and steel, cement, national car and ammonia-urea plants. To make sure the viability of these 
projects, the country not only made available the fund for these investments – the bulk of which 
came form foreign borrowings – but also provided credit facilities, subsidies and tariff protection 
(Jomo and Edwards 1993, 29; Teik 2001, 191). Explicitly the immediate objectives of these 
projects were to further broaden the country’s industrial base, upgrade domestic technological 
capability and create extensive linkages in the economy. Implicitly, however, this initiative 
reflected the idea that the increased affluence of the general public, due to rising disposable 
income as the country experienced uninterrupted economic growth since the time of independence, 
should be directed towards enhancing the state economic prowess by plugging import leakages 
with domestic goods.   
During the 1980s the rivalry of ideologies between neo-mercantilist-nationalists and 
proponents of neoclassical economics was less evident in Malaysia especially during the era of Dr. 
Mahathir Mohamad, himself a nationalist, as the Prime Minister. While the existence of a few 
people in the policy setting circle that inclined towards the ideology of neoclassical economics 
could not be denied, they were reluctant to express their idea strongly. This was primarily because 
the idea of neo-mercantilist-nationalists was so dominant among the policy making elites.   211
Additionally, this minority group did not want to be seen as having different ideas and “visions” 
from the powerful and influential Prime Minister.  
The grip of neo-mercantilist-nationalist ideology over Malaysian trade policy loosened 
somewhat when Malaysia faced its first recession, that is, when the country recorded its first 
negative economic growth of 1 percent in 1985; the first time during the post colonial era. 
Particularly hard hit was the heavy industrialization projects. Faced with a possible failure of the 
projects, Malaysian Prime Minister was pressed by neoclassical economic proponents to open up 
the economy and sought out more foreign direct investment (FDI) to bring the economy back onto 
the growth path (Bowie 1994). It was clear that Dr. Mahathir and his policy setting elites were 
increasingly convinced about the virtues of the opening up of Malaysian economy to a wider 
global economy, at least during hard times (Bowie and Unger 1997, 82-94). Since Malaysian 
economy immediately got back onto a growth path by achieving 1.2 percent GDP growth in 1986, 
and continued even stronger to achieve 7.2 percent in 1989, mainly due to the influx of FDI, the 
proposal for the formation of a reciprocal regional FTA was much easier to get accepted by the 
policy setting elites.  
8.3.2.3 The Philippines 
In the Philippines, neo-mercantilist-nationalists began to dominate economic policy 
formulation in the 1950s. The enactment of Import Control Act of 1950 marked the beginning of 
measures to control imports into the country, although a part of this effort was aimed to curtail the 
pervasiveness of Chinese community in retail, distribution and other economic activities. This was 
followed by the imposition of import tariffs on varieties of goods. The Philippine government then 
gradually made greater efforts to promote import substitution industries by providing loans to well 
connected oligarchies (Bowie and Unger 1997, 104). In an effort to further control imports and   212
address the balance of payments problem the government also imposed exchange controls. As a 
result, the Philippine manufacturers increasingly received additional protection for their 
businesses.  
In the early 1960s the Philippine government strengthened measures to encourage import 
substitution industrialization (ISI), although this was argued as not an integral part of its 
development strategy. President Ferdinand Marcos continued with this initiative when he assumed 
power in 1966. During his twenty-years in power, the country witnessed enormous expansion of 
state’s activities in agriculture and financial sectors. The state role in the finance sector expanded 
dramatically in the 1980s when the government took over loan defaults to the Development Bank 
of the Philippines and the Philippine National Bank. In the agriculture sector, the state 
monopolized the distribution of sugar through the setting up of the Philippines Sugar Commission. 
In cooperation with Coconut Producers Federation, the government establish United Coconut Oil 
Mills which took over the control of most of country’s coconut processing mills (Yoshihara 1988, 
110).  
After a brief period of outward orientation in 1972 the economy reversed back to inward 
looking in the middle of 1970s. Import tariffs were revised upwards to accord protection to local 
producers. The government also continued to provide funds for investment in sectors related ISI 
industries. As a result, the number of state owned enterprises expanded from 70 in 1972 to about 
300 in the 1980s. In addition, President Marcos deliberately introduced measures to further protect 
domestic producers, created monopolies and provided tax exemptions especially to well connected 
businesses. In late 1979, the Philippine government announced an additional plan for the setting up 
of eleven large industrial projects including cooper and aluminium smelters, fertilizer and 
petrochemical plants, a pulp and paper mill, the manufacture of diesel engines and an integrated   213
steel project, as part of efforts to strengthen industrial deepening. The bulk of the funds for these 
investments were raised internationally in the form of borrowing.  
Only on several occasions proponents of neoclassical economics managed to influence the 
decisions of the Philippine government over economic policies. In the early 1960s, under President 
Diosdado Macapagal, the country faced a major balance of payments problem. In an effort to solve 
external imbalance the Philippine government embraced new policies aimed at promoting export, 
loosening foreign exchange control, devaluing the peso, restructuring import tariffs, and providing 
incentives for foreign investment (Stauffer 1985, 247-248). Similarly under the martial law 
declared in 1972 by President Marcos, proponents of neoclassical economic ideas were given a 
dominant role in policymaking which resulted in policies geared towards improving revenue 
collection, rationalizing the bureaucracy, upgrading infrastructure, attracting foreign capital and 
weakening rural oligarchs (Bowie and Unger 1997, 98). 
Beginning in the 1980s many of the firms, both public and private, which were established 
to undertake ISI projects started to face insolvency problems primarily due to mismanagement. 
This caused severe fiscal burden to the government since these firms were unable to pay back 
government-guaranteed loans. Many of public owned companies were subsidiaries of the National 
Development Company, established under the auspices of the Ministry of Trade and Industry. The 
mismanagement of these public companies was stemmed by the fact that these public owned 
companies were not subject to regularized central government supervision, and the holding 
companies could relatively easy to establish new subsidiaries and incur new debts (Haggard 1990, 
215-255). 
The advice of neoclassical economic proponents was sought again in the middle of 1980s 
when the economic problem became acute. Pushed from within by this group, such as those at the   214
National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) and also forced externally because of 
dependency on the IMF and the World Bank for loans, the Philippine government agreed to 
liberalize the economy in efforts to get the country out of its insolvency problem. Under the 1984 
agreement with the IMF, Marcos government promised to remove quota and licenses for the 
importation of 1,200 types of goods. Building on to this, the NEDA released in May 1986 its 
Yellow Book, a relatively coherent economic policy, promising a market orientation and calling 
for institutional reforms, export orientation, ending monopolies, tax reform, trade liberalization 
and privatization of public enterprises. The market based economic reforms continued when 
President Corazon Aquino assumed power in 1986. In the same year, President Aquino decided to 
remove import controls on two-third of the items, while leaving out intermediate goods thereby 
hurting producer of finished goods. In 1988 the government removed the remaining import license 
requirements and shifted import quota into tariffs, ranging between 10 to 50 percent (Timberman 
1991, 338-339), thus setting the foundation for the Philippines’ deeper economic integration into 
ASEAN.  
8.3.2.4 Thailand 
In Thailand the nationalist spirit has been less prevalent as compared to other Southeast 
Asian countries. This is mainly linked to the fact that Thailand has never been colonized by any 
other powers. For a long time since the signing of 1855 Bowring Treaty, its trade policy followed 
the terms set by western countries which involved some degree of “free trade” (Hewison 2001, 
78). In the 1940s and 1950s, Thailand then under the monarchy system of government, 
experimented with state involvement in economic activities through various kinds of investments 
only to notice that these investments were plagued with insolvency problems a few years later.    215
The coups of 1957-1958 which brought General Sarit Thanarat to power ushered in an era 
of political, social, and economic change. The new government devised policies aimed at 
promoting private rather than state investment. The new approach was taken upon realizing that a 
number of shaky state enterprises could not be saved. This was coincided with a range of reports 
by international organizations, recommending increased support for the private sector as well as 
encouraging import-substituting industrialization to broaden Thailand’s economic base. These 
reports argued that the state should restrict itself to provisioning funds only for investment in 
infrastructure development (World Bank 1959). 
When Thailand shifted toward an import-substituting industrialization strategy in the late 
1950s, authorities provided funds to both Thais and foreign companies, and gave assurances 
against nationalization or the establishment of competing public enterprises. The government also 
offered a variety of tax and other investment inducements, largely through a newly created Board 
of Investment, including protection against imports. By 1964, the effective rates of protection in 
Thailand were fairly high, ranging from 22 to 65 percent for a variety of consumer goods (Muscat 
1994, 106). In addition, tariff escalation was designed to encourage the establishment of finished 
consumer good industries. Tariffs were raised further in 1970, initially for purposes of increasing 
revenue for the state, but subsequently resulted in furthering protection to local firms.   
At the end of the 1950s, the World Bank (1959, 94-106) urged Thailand to adopt ISI 
strategy to deepen its industrial base with generous promotional incentives. Sarit and his advisers 
accepted this recommendation and moved quickly to expand investments in manufacturing 
activities by offering various incentives to the private sector. The first National Development Plan 
(1961-1966) reinforced this policy, and at the same time the government sought the assistance of 
the World Bank and the US government to implement this Plan. Immediately, the Thais   216
government revised the Promotion of Investment Act (1960) to incorporate provisions supporting 
private businesses and to channel state revenues only to investments in projects related to 
infrastructure development.   
For local business people, this approach meant more room for their involvement in 
economic activities that were free from state competition. For budding industrialists, the new 
policy meant increasing protection which acted as added incentives for them to involve in 
manufacturing activities aimed at local market. Meanwhile foreign investments producing goods 
for domestic market also increased steadily since their businesses were shed behind protective 
barriers. The government argued that it emphasis on promoting foreign investment was important 
to overcome the shortages of capital, technology and entrepreneurial skills (Hewison 1985, 280-
281). 
Calls for the promotion of manufacturing goods for export were occasionally made in the 
late 1960s by neoclassical economic proponents as well as by technocrats. However at this time 
there was no great pressure for a change in policy since economic growth continued and profits 
were maintained. In fact, due to pressure from domestic capitalist groups, protection for import-
substituting manufacturing actually increased between the 1970s and the early 1980s 
(Phongpaichit and Baker 1995, 144-145). It was not until the mid 1980s that export oriented 
industrialization (EOI) policy was established. This was even achieved after Thailand experiencing 
severe economic downturn in the mid 1980s. 
Signs of economic downturn were evidenced by the early 1980s. Agriculture exports were 
stagnant, the area under crop cultivation stopped growing, and it was widely believed that the 
expansion of the agriculture sector had come to an end. The decline in agricultural exports had 
substantial impact on domestic demands. Domestic traders and manufacturers of import-  217
substituting industries producing goods for domestic market concluded that the market was 
saturated and began looking for other opportunities especially exports. This heightened the 
pressure for a change in policy emphasizing the promotion of industries with export orientation, 
and it came both from within the government and from influential business community. The 
proponents of neoclassical economics and technocrats – led by Snoh Unakul, who was the 
Secretary General of the National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB) – who had 
been arguing for such a reorientation for over a decade at last found a receptive audience 
(Phongpaichit 1992, 18-21).   
The downturn had substantially bad impact on Thailand’s economy. Although Thailand 
continued to record economic growth in 1984 and 1985, the growth was the lowest for years. 
Bankruptcies mushroomed, investment dropped precipitously, unemployment increased, and even 
the biggest and strongest companies reported flat profits or recorded loses. The downturn also 
indicated significant problem for the state. The policy setting elites were split on the appropriate 
response to the downturn (Phongpaichit and Baker 1996, 65-66). It was recognition however, that 
agriculture sector would not be able to save the economy. Consultations and meetings among 
senior government officials, technocrats, powerful sectors such as banking and textiles as well as 
advisers form the World Bank finally achieved a compromise. This resulted in a major devaluation 
of bath and a move to embrace EOI strategy. The devaluation opened new opportunities as 
Thailand’s cheap labour meant that its manufactures would be more competitive in the world 
market.  
The dominance of neo-mercantilist-nationalists re emerged in July 1988 when Chatichai 
Choonhavan became the first elected Prime Minister since 1976. Chatichai’s alliance of 
businessmen-politicians forced technocrats at NESDB, as well as many of proponents of   218
neoclassical economic approach, who had reached influential positions previously, onto the 
sidelines. This group had to wait until the coup of February 1991 to regain their hold on the 
government’s economic and trade policies. Against this backdrop, the new Prime Minister of 
Thailand, Anand Panyarachun proposed for the establishment of AFTA during the ASEAN 
Leaders Summit in January 1992 and this proposal was unanimously accepted by other leaders of 
ASEAN. 
8.3.3  The Influence of the Second Wave of Regionalism  
The second wave of interest for the formation of regional free trade areas which started in 
the mid 1980s (Bhagwati 1993, 22-51) had significant influence over the establishment of AFTA. 
In contrast to the first wave of regionalism which was triggered by events happening in Europe – 
with the formation of the EEC through the signing of the Treaty of Rome in 1957 and the 
formation of EFTA in 1959 – the second wave of regionalism was sparked by the change of 
attitude of the US on the issue of regionalism in the mid 1980s. Departing from its previous 
attitude which had favoured multilateral-only-trade policy, the US started to involve in regionalism 
seriously by first signing a free trade area with Israel in 1985 and Canada in 1988. And in June 
1991 the US (after securing fast-track negotiating authority from the Congress in May), Canada 
and Mexico began formal negotiations for the establishment of NAFTA. After taking a relatively 
long period of time, the negotiations were finally concluded, and the NAFTA agreement was 
signed by all countries in 1994 (Whalley 1993, 352-382).  
Meanwhile in Europe, the EEC original member countries comprising Belgium, France, 
Germany, Italy, Luxemburg and the Netherlands plus newer members of United Kingdom, 
Denmark, Ireland, Greek, Portugal and Spain embraced greater economic integration by drawing 
up their single market program (SMP) in 1986. The SMP was one of the most significant   219
initiatives for the EEC integration since it provisioned for the free movements of goods, capital, 
services and labours between member countries. In South America, the period of 1990-1992 
witnessed the establishment of a number of regional FTAs; prominent among these was the 
Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR). In Africa, the second wave of regionalism gave a 
new lease of life to the various regional economic arrangements that had been established during 
the first wave but ineffective. For example UEMOA was formed out of CEAO and COMESA was 
resurrected. 
The proliferation of regionalism, especially the formation of NAFTA and the deepening of 
EEC integration, brought significant impact to the thinking of policy making elites in ASEAN 
countries. These two regional trading arrangements were thought to bring enormous downside 
impact on ASEAN countries, both individually and as a group. While ASEAN countries have been 
engaged in outward orientation of economic policy to reap benefits from a world-wide open 
international economic environment, which started in the mid 1980s, these countries felt that they 
would be vulnerable to a segmentation of global market place (Plummer and Imada-Iboshi 1996, 
121). 
The formation of NAFTA and further deepening of the EEC integration posed not only the 
possibility of shrinking market share for ASEAN products, but also an increase in protection in 
these markets. Towards the end of 1980s, North America and Europe represented two important 
markets for ASEAN countries both in terms of export destinations as well as the source of imports. 
In 1988 these two regions absorbed 35 percent of ASEAN exports and provided 39 percent of its 
imports (Akrasanee and Stifel 1992, 37). The preference nature of NAFTA and EEC arrangements 
meant that imports from ASEAN into these two regions could faced stiffer competition or even 
displaced by imports from members. Influenced by these events ASEAN countries viewed that the   220
time has come to strengthen their own economic integration by establishing a regional free trade 
area.  
8.3.4  Inducing and Sustaining Foreign Direct Investment  
By the early 1990s it became clear to many ASEAN countries that FDI contributed 
enormously to their countries’ economic prosperity, particularly in generating employment 
opportunity and contributing to GDP growth. In 1990 FDI inflows into ASEAN countries was 
US$11.66 billion, an increase of almost 100 percent within a span of only two years (Athukorala 
and Menon 1996, table 6.1). This FDI influx primarily occurred after ASEAN countries embarked 
on specific programs to attract FDI inflows particularly by provisioning numerous incentives, 
developing physical infrastructure and maintaining political stability.   
Economically FDI can be divided into two major categories: market-seeking and 
efficiency-seeking investments (Athukorala and Menon 1996, 85). Market-seeking investment is 
an investment in which the prime aim is to produce goods for the host-country and also other 
markets in a region. Efficiency-seeking investment, in contrast, is an investment driven by the 
desire to acquire competitive advantage over competitors in the host country. Market-seeking 
investment itself can take two major forms: First, tariff-jumping investment which is influenced 
purely by tariff preferences and second, investment induced by the enlargement of a market 
because of a regional FTA. Therefore, the attractiveness of a region for tariff-jumping investment 
depends on the magnitude of the margin of preference, which is the difference between tariffs 
applicable to members as compared to non members.  
In addition to the influence of the margin of preference, specific characteristics of a 
regional FTA can have a significant impact on the decision of investors of tariff-jumping 
investments, especially if its formation could create a (real or perceived) threat of increased   221
protection for trade with countries outside the grouping. The main worry for outside investors is 
that the creation of a regional FTA may foster a more protectionist approach towards extra 
regional trade. In this regard, it has been argued that the increase of FDI from East Asian investors, 
particularly Japanese, in the EEC in the late 1980s was due to the concern that EEC single market 
program would increase protection against outsiders (Balasubramanyam and Greenaway 1993, 
86). 
Although prior to AFTA establishment the bulk of FDI that had come into the ASEAN 
region was market-efficiency and export oriented investments, the formation of AFTA provides a 
great potential for AFTA members to attract FDI that falls under the category of market-seeking 
investment influenced by the enlargement of the regional market. Since each ASEAN member has 
a distinct comparative advantage in a particular stage of manufacturing activities (Heinrich and 
Konan 2001, 156), foreign investors could reap enormous benefits by locating different types of 
investments in different countries. Less developed ASEAN members would be suitable as a 
location for producing low value added goods such as product assembly, while relatively more 
advanced countries possessing highly-skilled labours (such as Singapore and Malaysia) would be 
suitable for higher value added activities, such as high technology and capital intensive 
manufacturing industries.  
At the time of its establishment, AFTA represented a single enlarged market with over 335 
million people and a combined income of US$305 billion (Athukorala and Menon 1996, 88). This 
undoubtedly would be attractive to foreign investors who have been looking to gains from 
economies of scale by producing goods for the ASEAN market as well as for export to other 
regions. According to Narongchai Akrasanee and David Stifel (1992, 36) ASEAN officials 
involved in the negotiations leading up to the Leader Summit in Singapore (January 1992)   222
admitted that the opportunity and capability to attract FDI were the most compelling arguments for 
the establishment of AFTA.  
8.4  The Economic Benefits of AFTA  
Trade liberalization undertaken by ASEAN member countries in efforts to fulfil their 
commitments under AFTA brings certain economic benefits to the participating countries. These 
benefits are unambiguous especially if one looks from the perspective of the theory of the second 
best. The theory of the second best, expounded by Richard Lipsey and Kevin Lancaster (1956) 
says that although the first best Paretian optimum could not be achieved because of certain 
necessary conditions are not attainable, welfare gains to an economy are still possible under the 
second best situation.
64 In this regard at least three economic benefits can be envisaged for 
members of a regional FTA, and these benefits are possible because trade liberalization would 
bring a variety of long term dynamic effects (Frankel 2000, 1-12; Lawrence 1991, 23-35). First, 
member countries will enjoy economic gains because many industries are able to operate on a 
large scale basis thus enjoying economies of scale. Second, both consumers and producers will 
gain since they are able to access to consumption goods and intermediate inputs within the region 
at lower costs. And finally, member countries are able to increase their economic efficiency due to 
greater competition for many sectors of their economy.      
8.4.1  Economics of Large Scale Production 
The formation of AFTA brings economic gains as each firm in ASEAN will have better 
opportunity to operate on a large scale basis to serve enlarged market comprising all member 
                                                 
64 The Paretian optimum national welfare could not be achieved under economic equilibria characterised by an 
imperfect market. As regard to international trade, Bhagwati ([1971] 1983, 73-94) demonstrated that trade policies can 
improve national welfare if the policies are devised in the presence of market distortions and if they act to correct the 
detrimental effects caused by the distortions. He also showed that in almost all circumstances a trade policy is a second 
best rather than a first best policy choice.  
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countries. In fact AFTA constitutes a big combined market as the total population of the ten 
member countries in 2004 was more than 500 million. With large scale production, companies will 
be able to enjoy both internal and external economies of scale. Internal economies-of-scale comes 
in the form of decreasing unit cost of production as output increases. The decrease in unit cost of 
production could occur from various sources when economic integration among ASEAN countries 
accelerates, particularly through better specialization of labours as well as lower costs of inputs 
since companies could buy their inputs in bulk to serve their bigger production capacity. In 
addition, external economies-of-scale is also at works. When more companies in an industry 
operate on large scale production they bring positive external effects, first to the industry and 
second to the whole economy. These positive external effects mainly come from decreasing costs 
of communication, transportation and other delivery mechanisms as companies interact with each 
other in undertaking their business activities.        
8.4.2  Gains to Consumers and Producers  
Lowering and eliminating tariffs and non tariff barriers under AFTA bring economic 
benefits to both consumers and producers in ASEAN countries. As the liberalization of trade 
occurs, consumers will not only be able to access bigger varieties of alternative products, but also 
those products will be available at lower prices. This is novel because it translates into an increase 
in real income for consumers since they can acquire more goods with the same amount of money. 
Similarly, producers in ASEAN will also gain from trade liberalization as they now able to get 
access to inputs for their production at lower costs. The lower cost of inputs will, in turn, have 
positive dynamic effects especially in the long run for two reasons. First, the lower cost of inputs 
will lead to lower production costs, which then result in lower prices of final goods to consumers   224
(provided there exist many companies in an industry).
65 Second, final goods of one company 
sometime are used as intermediate inputs in the production of goods by other companies regardless 
of whether they are in the same of different industries. This chain of effects finally translates into 
greater economic gains for the entire economy.        
8.4.3  Increase Efficiency through Greater Competition  
The liberalization of trade policy among ASEAN member countries means that domestic 
companies will be exposed to greater competition from rival companies of other members as tariffs 
and no tariff barriers are lowered and finally eliminated.
66 The need to compete will prevent 
companies from setting their prices excessively above their cost of production. The greater the 
competition, the closer is the price for a product to equal its marginal cost of which producers 
could charge consumers, a level at which the economy is at its most efficient. Competition will 
also drive a country towards achieving allocative-efficiency. A country is said to reach this point 
of efficiency when companies produce a combination of goods that maximizes the overall level of 
satisfaction (or welfare) of the population. In addition, increased competition will also cause an 
increase in economic efficiency as companies have to be more competitive and innovative to 
remain in business. Companies will have to be competitive especially in pricing their products as 
well as innovative in producing goods that appeal to a wide range of consumers. In the long run all 
these will finally result in an increase in real income for the entire economy. 
                                                 
65 However, there is a problem for these dynamic forces to operate efficiently in ASEAN countries. This is due to the 
fact that policies aimed at preventing monopoly as well as anti-competitive behaviours of firms are either not well 
established or poorly enforced. 
    
66 AFTA agreement only requires member countries to lower import tariffs into the range of 0 to 5 percent. However, 
individually ASEAN member countries agreed to eliminate tariffs on most goods traded between them (Severino 
2001, 218-301).    225
8.5 Conclusion 
At least three factors and circumstances could be identified to be in existence around the 
time of AFTA establishment which had great influence over the thinking of ASEAN leaders in 
agreeing to the formation of AFTA in 1992. First, the unanimous decision of ASEAN leaders to 
establish AFTA reflects a compromise of economic and ideological rivalry between neo-
nationalist-mercantilists and neoclassical economics. Second, ASEAN leaders were increasingly 
influenced by the proliferation of regional FTAs which at that time engulfed three major 
continents: Europe, North and South America and Africa. Third, the establishment of AFTA was 
taken in an effort to continue attracting FDI into the ASEAN region. 
From the perspective of economics, there are specific economic benefits to be gained by 
member countries of AFTA as they engage in trade liberalization in efforts to fulfil commitments 
agreed to under the AFTA agreement. This is because trade liberalization will bring long term 
dynamic effects, thus improving economic welfare of the participating countries. In this regard at 
least three economic benefits can be identified, although these gains are only unambiguous in the 
context of the theory of the second best. First, member countries will gain because many industries 
are now able to operate on a large scale basis, therefore, enjoying economies of scale. Second, both 
consumers and producers will gain because they are able to gain access to goods and intermediate 
inputs within the region at lower costs. Finally, member countries are able to increase their 
economic efficiency due to greater competition in their economies.      
       226
CHAPTER NINE 
METHODOLOGY FOR ASSESSING THE EFFECTS OF REGIONAL FREE TRADE 
AREAS ON TRADE  
9.1 Overview 
This chapter explains the methodology to be employed in the third part of this study, that 
is, the examination of the effects of regional FTAs on trade. This chapter begins by providing 
justification over the use of gravity models in the study, and also explains the approaches adopted 
in specifying the appropriate gravity models. Next, this chapter examines the sources of data and 
explains the coverage of this study, which runs over a period of 24 years, from 1980 until 2003. 
Finally, this chapter clarifies the techniques, procedures and steps taken to assess the effects of 
regional FTAs on trade, as well as to examine if the establishment of AFTA led to creating or 
diverting trade.  
9.2  Justification for Further Examination of the Effects of Regional FTAs on Trade 
The broad objective of the third part of this study is to examine the economic effects 
brought about by the formation of regional FTAs on trade of member vis-à-vis non member 
countries. As highlighted in Chapter 7, there have been studies employing various methods of 
analysis to assess the economic effects of regional FTAs with the methods used by these studies 
are as diverse as the studies’ findings. For example, studies which employed a variety of gravity 
models as the method of analysis showed contrasting findings.
67 As regard to studies involving 
ASEAN regionalism, some researchers found this economic grouping positively and significantly 
boosted its intra-bloc trade, while others indicated an opposite outcome.  
                                                 
67 The use of different specification of gravity models in empirical investigation of various economic issues associated 
with regionalism is a common practice among researchers. The main reason behind this is due to the fact that 
objectives and research questions are different from one to another study.      227
A well known study on ASEAN regionalism (as well as other economic groupings) using a 
gravity model was Frankel’s (1997), which examined the effect of ASEAN regionalism on trade 
using data covering the period of 1965-1992. In this study he found that ASEAN regionalism has a 
positive and significant effect on intra-bloc trade for all the years under examination. A similar 
conclusion was advanced by Kruger (1999), when she examined ASEAN regionalism using more 
recent data (1987-1997). However, a study by Soloaga and Winters (2001) employing a different 
specification of a gravity model, showed an opposite result. Testing yearly data for the period 
1980-1996 they showed that ASEAN regionalism has a significantly negative effect on intra-bloc 
trade, especially after 1987. These inconclusive findings justify further examination of the issue, 
with the use of a different approach and methodology. In addition, this study also assesses the 
effect of AFTA based on more recent data, from 1980 through 2003.     
This research takes a different approach to past studies in an effort to examine the 
economic effects brought about by the formation of regional FTAs in general and AFTA in 
particular. In essence, this study analyses relevant data in 3 different parts. At the first part, a 
different specification of gravity model is used to examine the effects of a number of regional 
FTAs on trade of member vis-à-vis non members. The second part involves the examination of 
trade patterns of six original members of AFTA. And finally, the third part assesses “trade 
creation” and “trade diversion” due to the formation of AFTA. 
9.3  Examining the Effects of Regional Free Trade Areas on Trade      
The first part of this study uses a specific gravity model to examine the effects of a number 
of regional FTAs (AFTA, CER, EU, MERCUSOR and NAFTA) on trade. A gravity model is 
chosen over other methods of analysis examined in Chapter 7 because of three main reasons. First, 
the robustness of gravity models in explaining determinants of trade flows between countries in   228
past studies have been well documented (Bergstrand 1998, 23-28). Second, although gravity 
models suffer poor reputation among trade economists early on due to the lack of theoretical 
underpinnings, this problem is considered “settled” by many people after Deardorf’s (1998, 7-22) 
paper which proved formally that a gravity equation can be derived from Hecksher-Ohlin factor 
proportion framework, a prominent theory of international trade. Additionally the recent works of 
Anderson and Wincoop (2003, 170-192) and Andew K. Rose (2004, 98-114) provided a further 
theoretical foundation for the use of gravity model in analysing international trade. Third, since 
this study is an ex post study examining the effects of regional FTAs on trade after their formation, 
it has been argued that gravity models are one of the best methods to undertake this type of study.    
The original gravity model, introduced into international trade by Tinbergen (1962) was a 
model explaining determinants of bilateral trade flows between trading partners. Tinbergen used 
bilateral trade value as an endogenous variable while only two explanatory variables were 
identified. These explanatory variables were the gross domestic products (GDP) of the two 
countries and the distance between them. Subsequent researchers identified and used additional 
explanatory variables which were argued to have an influence on bilateral trade flows. These 
included the wealth of people in the two countries (proxied by per capita income) and cultural 
similarity (proxied by the use of common language in business dealings), which contributed to 
lowering the cost of doing business. To test the effect of any particular free trade areas on trade, a 
dummy variable was included into the gravity equation.  
Frankel’s numerous studies, determining the effect of regionalism on trade, used the value 
of total trade flow as an endogenous variable (see for example Frankel (1997)). As for explanatory 
variables, he used the product of GDP for the first, and the product of per capita GDP of the two 
trading partners for the second explanatory variable. Krueger (1999) used a different specification   229
of the gravity model in her study. She used the value of export of one country to its trading 
partners as an endogenous variable. Unlike Frankel (1997), she used GDP and per capita GDP of 
individual countries as explanatory variables. Soloaga and Winters (2001) used yet another 
different specification. In their study, the value of import was used as an endogenous variable, 
while individual countries’ GDP and per capita GDP were used as explanatory variables. In all 
three studies, distance and language were used as other explanatory variables. Meanwhile, Soloaga 
and Winters added population and total land area as additional explanatory variables in their study.  
9.3.1   Model Specification  
This study uses a different approach in specifying a gravity model to be employed. 
Fundamentally, the model is derived from the basic functional form of Tinbergen (1962) and 
Frankel (1997). Econometric studies are then employed to assist the author in selecting the most 
appropriate specification of gravity model which is supported by the data. The basic functional 
form of the model can be depicted as follows: 
Tij = f (GDPij, PGDPij, Distanceij)          (9.1)      
Whereby: 
Tij is the value of total trade of country i and country j  
GDPij is gross domestic products of country i and country j 
PGDPij is per capita GDP of country i and country j 
Distanceij is the physical distance between country i and country j   230
What this basic gravity model says is that bilateral trade flow between two countries is primarily 
determined by a combination of the two countries’ income (GDPs), the wealthiness of their 
combined population (per capita GDPs) and the physical distance between them. 
Econometric analyses are performed in an effort to come up with the most appropriate 
functional form as well as to help the author choosing the types of interaction terms for the 
explanatory variables. This is an important process since the interaction terms of explanatory 
variables (GDPij and PGDPij) can either be multiplicative or additive. This study uses specific 
econometric methods to ascertain the most appropriate interaction term which is supported by the 
data in explaining bilateral trade flows.
68 Schematically, the two basic competing models are either 
Tij = α + β1 (GDPi x GDPj) + β2 (PGDPi x PGDPj) + β3 (Distanceij) + μij, of which explanatory 
variables take the multiplicative form of interaction, or Tij = α + β1 (GDPi + GDPj) + β2 (PGDPi + 
PGDPj) + β3 (Distanceij) + μij, of where they take the additive form.
69  
Econometric analyses also help resolving the problem of uncertainty over the best 
functional form to be used, as they provide test statistics to guide a researcher in selecting either a 
linear or a log linear model. It is to be noted that the functional form of gravity models mostly used 
in past studies was log linear, while the use of gravity models of a linear form was rare.
70 In 
addition, econometric analyses are also performed to detect and address problems and 
requirements associated with the use ordinary least square (OLS) technique of regression. These 
                                                 
68 There are many alternative econometric methods developed by econometricians that can be used to determine the 
best model based on data at one’s disposal. For purposes of testing competing models, this part of study used 
econometric methods proposed by Sargan (1976), MacKinnon, White and Davidson (1983), Bera and McAleer (1989), 
Vuong (1989) and Pesaran and Pesaran (1995). 
  
69 Econometrically, as will be detailed out in Chapter 10, and in conformity with its popularity for empirical 
investigation, the former model (culminating multiplicative interaction form) turns out to be the better model of the 
two.    
 
70 Again test statistics (will be discussed in Chapter 10) show that log linear is a better alternative than linear form.    231
include problems associated with multicollinearity, autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity as well 
as the requirement that residuals (or error terms) of the regression must be normally distributed.  
To examine the effects of regional free trade area on trade, then dummy variables are added 
into the gravity equation. The use of dummy variables aims to answer two of the research 
questions highlighted in Chapter 1. The first question is whether the formation of regional FTAs in 
general boosts trade among participating members as compared to trade of countries that do not 
become members of any regional free trade areas. The second question is whether the formation of 
AFTA results in boosting trade among members in comparison to trade with non member 
countries. To answer these questions, two separate regressions are performed and two different set 
of dummy variables are used. To answer the first question a regression analysis of the following 
gravity model is performed: 
Log Tij = α + β1 Log (GDPi × GDPj) + β2 Log (PGDPi × PGDPj) + β3 Log (Distanceij) + ρ1 (AFTA) 
+ ρ2 (CER) + ρ3 (EU) + ρ4 (NAFTA) + ρ5 (MERCUSOR) + μij
71
        (9.2) 
Whereby (in addition to variables already defined): 
AFTA is a dummy variable representing AFTA bloc and takes the value of 1 if both trading 
partners are members of AFTA and 0 if otherwise. 
CER is a dummy variable representing CER bloc and takes the value of 1 if both trading partners 
are members of CER and 0 if otherwise. 
                                                 
71 Only five dummy variables, AFTA, CER, EU, NAFTA and MERCUSOR, are included into the model representing 
five respective regional FTAs because countries belonging to other formal regional FTAs do not report their trade 
statistics with other members consistently that allows the author to analyze. This means that except for member 
countries of these five regional FTAs, no other pairs of countries in the sample that belong to other formal regional 
FTAs. 
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 EU is a dummy variable representing EU bloc and takes the value of 1 if both trading partners are 
members of EU and 0 if otherwise. 
NAFTA is a dummy variable representing NAFTA bloc and takes the value of 1 if both trading 
partners are members of NAFTA and 0 if otherwise. 
MERCUSOR is a dummy variable representing MERCUSOR bloc and takes the value of 1 if both 
trading partners are members of MERCUSOR and 0 if otherwise. 
To answer the second question concerning whether or not the formation of AFTA boosts 
trade between members vis-à-vis non members, another regression analysis is performed as 
follows:  
Log Tij = α + β1 Log (GDPi × GDPj) + β2 Log (PGDPi × PGDPj) + β3 Log (Distanceij) + φ (AFTA) 
+ μij
72               (9.3) 
Whereby (in addition to variables already defined): 
AFTA is a dummy variable representing AFTA bloc and takes the value of 1 if both trading 
partners are members of AFTA and 0 if otherwise. 
Regressing 9.2 and 9.3 will give different results and interpretations. The magnitude of the 
coefficients of dummy variables produced by econometric model 9.2 will indicate the different of 
trade of members of a regional free trade area (say AFTA) in comparison to trade of countries that 
do not become members to any regional free trade areas that exist around the globe (as captured by 
the value of the intercept term). In contrast, the magnitude of the coefficient of AFTA in 9.3 will 
                                                 
72 Terminologically this type of econometric model (as also with model 9.2) which incorporates both quantitative 
explanatory variables (GDP and PGDP) and qualitative variable (AFTA dummy) is called analysis of covariance 
(ANCOVA) model. This is useful since ANCOVA models provide a method of statistically controlling the effects of 
quantitative explanatory variables, called covariates or control variables on exogenous variable when dummy variables 
are added into the model (Gujarati 2003, 304).      233
imply the difference of trade of AFTA members in comparison to countries that do not become 
members of AFTA.  
9.3.2 Data 
Data used in this part of study covers a period of 24 years (1980-2003). The 24-years 
coverage encompasses pre-AFTA formation period (1980-1991) as well as post-AFTA period 
(1992-2003).  This part of study involves regression analyses of cross sectional data of pairs of 
sample countries, performed for every alternate year, thus producing a total of 13 regression 
results. Regressing total trade (exogenous variable) on explanatory variables for every two years of 
pairs of countries should give a good indication of how the coefficients of all variables in the 
model change overtime both for pre-AFTA and post-AFTA formation periods.  
In order to increase the statistical reliability of the regression results and to minimise 
econometric problems associated with multicolinearity, autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity, as 
well as the requirement that error terms are normally distributed, this study analyses trade data of 
all countries that report their trade statistics regularly (for the period of 1992-2003) to the United 
Nations which compiles this data into its Commodity Trade Statistics Database 
(UNCOMTRADE). Of all the countries available in this database, a total of 45 pairs of countries 
meet the requirements to be included in the sample countries.
73 This should constitute a good 
representation of international trade flows, as trade among these countries covers approximately 50 
percent of world trade. The use of the 45 pairs of countries produces a total of 990 (45 × 44/2) data 
                                                 
73 The selection of countries to be included into the analysis began with the list of countries used previously by Frankel 
(1997), of which 63 countries were identified. However because some of these countries did not report their trade 
statistics regularly, they were deleted from the list. In the end only 45 of them meet the sampling requirements and are 
included in the analysis. 
   234
points for the analysis of each alternate year.
74 Data on GDP and per capita GDP is drawn from 
another United Nations database, called National Accounts Main Aggregates Database, while data 
on distances between capital cities of sample countries are drawn from Great Circle Distances 
between Cities Database.
75 
9.3.3  Expected Signs of Explanatory Variables   
As pointed out by previous researchers and already discussed in Chapter 7, as well as in 
line with the expectation of economic theory, two explanatory variables used in this part of the 
study, national income (GDPij) and the wealthiness of population (PGDPij) are expected to have 
positive influence on bilateral trade flows. The economic logic behind this is straight forward: the 
higher is the income and the wealthier is the people in two countries that trade with each other, the 
higher is the value of trade between them. In contrast, it is expected that physical distance between 
the two trading countries will have negative influence on their bilateral trade flows as this poses a 
kind of barrier, particularly in terms of higher transportation cost.  
9.4  Examining Trade Patterns of AFTA Countries 
The second part of this research involves the examination of trade patterns of the original 
six member countries of AFTA – Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and 
Thailand. Although the membership of AFTA has increased to 10 countries, only original member 
countries are chosen to be included in this study because of two reasons. First, since this study is 
an ex-post study examining the effects of AFTA before and after its establishment, the availability 
                                                 
74 A list containing all 45 countries that meet the sampling requirements is provided as Appendix 1. 
 
75 These three databases are accessed online by the author between July 2005 and February 2006 at the following 
addresses: 
1) Trade statistics (UNCOMTRADE) at www.unstats.un.org/unsd/comtrade  
2) GDPs and per capita GDPs at www.unstats.un.org/unsd/snama/dnlist.asp  
3) Distances between cities at www.wcrl.ars.usda.gov/cec/java/lat.long.htm 
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of data for the two periods, pre and post AFTA formation, is extremely important. Of the currently 
10 AFTA members, only the original six countries have adequate data for analysis. The pre-
formation period covering 12 years is from 1980 to 1991, while the post-formation period also 
covering 12 years, is from 1992 until 2003. Second, the dates that the other four countries became 
members of AFTA were different, making comparison of the pre and post AFTA period 
impossible, if all 10 AFTA member countries were to be included into the analysis. Therefore, the 
inclusion of all 10 AFTA members would not only make the comparison impossible, but the 
analysis would also be plagued with the problem of data inconsistency.
76 The analysis of the six 
original AFTA members should give a good indication how trade patterns of each of these 
countries change over the two time periods.  In addition, the ratios of trade of those six countries 
with member vis-à-vis non members are calculated over the two time periods to examine how 
trade ratios have changed overtime.  
9.5  Assessing Trade Creation and Trade Diversion of AFTA 
A specific method is employed to assess trade creation and trade diversion of AFTA. This 
is done by calculating and comparing actual against counterfactual trades of both intra and extra 
AFTA bloc after the formation of AFTA. Intra-AFTA trade value is established by summing up 
each other bilateral trade of all six original AFTA members. In contrast, extra-AFTA trade is 
calculated by summing up each of these countries’ trade with the rest of the world. 
Mathematically, the calculation of intra and extra AFTA trades can be depicted as follows: 
Xa = ∑Tij  
Xb = ∑T ik 
                                                 
76 As already pointed out in Chapter 8, the other four members of AFTA joined the grouping at different dates: 
Vietnam (1995), Laos (1997), Myanmar (1997) and Cambodia (1999).    236
Whereby: 
Xa = intra AFTA trade 
Xb = extra AFTA trade 
Tij = Total trade between one AFTA member with another member 
T ik = Total trade between one AFTA member with non member 
Xb = ∑Tiw - ∑Tij 
Whereby: 
Tiw = Total trade between one AFTA member country with the whole world 
Trade creation is observed if trade between AFTA member countries increases, while at the same 
time trade with non members (the rest of the world) also increases. In contrast, trade diversion is 
evident if intra bloc trade increases while extra bloc trade decreases.
77  
It is important to recognize that an increase in either intra or extra bloc trades of AFTA 
countries after the establishment of AFTA could be due to other factors than the “policy shock” of 
AFTA formation – such as due to an increase in the level of investment as well as due to sustained 
economic growth. In order to capture only the effect of “AFTA shock” on trade, then 
counterfactual trades of member countries in the absence of AFTA need to be established. 
                                                 
77 It should be made clear that the defining concept of trade creation and trade diversion used in this study are slightly 
different from their original meaning. The original concept of trade creation expounded by Viner (1950) referred to a 
shift in the location of production from a high cost member country to a low cost member country, while trade 
diversion referred to a shift in the locus of production from low cost non member to high cost member country. The 
adjustment in the defining concepts of trade creation and trade diversion is necessary, because, as repeatedly noted by 
other researchers, trying to examine empirically trade creation and trade diversion under Viner’s original concepts is 
impossible because of problems faced in establishing whether an increase (or decrease) in trade is due to a shift in the 
location of production of traded goods.   237
Estimating counterfactual trade is important because it indicates what would be the value of intra 
and extra bloc trade if AFTA did not come into existence (in 1992). One way of assessing whether 
AFTA causes trade creation or trade diversion is by comparing the value of trade of AFTA 
member countries in existence of AFTA with the value of trade if AFTA was never established 
(counterfactual trade). For purposes of estimating counterfactual trades, this part of study proceeds 
in two stages.  
At the first stage, overall trends of both intra and extra AFTA trades are examined to 
establish a forecasting-model that appropriately represents the type of trade-trend for data covering 
22 years, from 1970 to 1991, a period before AFTA was established. To come up with the most 
appropriate trend-model, a forecasting technique called “trend analysis” (Carver and Nash 2005, 
229) is employed, in which this forecasting technique will show statistical results comparing all 
competing models fitting the (best) data at hand. Once the best model is found, then it is used to 
estimate intra and extra AFTA counterfactual trades (i.e. after its formation). In order to come up 
with the best model, six possible trend-models are examined: linear, quadratic, growth, logarithm, 
S and exponential.
78 The functional forms of these six models are as in Table 9.1  
At the second stage, intra and extra AFTA counterfactual trades (for the post-AFTA 
formation period of 1992-2003), derived based on the chosen model of forecasting, are used to 
ascertain whether AFTA creates or diverts trade. This is done by deducting the estimated 
counterfactual trades of intra and extra AFTA bloc (of period 1992-2003) from their respective 
actual trades. A positive difference between the actual and counterfactual trades of “intra” AFTA 
bloc indicates a “gross” trade creation. The term gross trade creation is used to indicate an increase 
                                                 
78 As will be further explained in Chapter 10, of all six forecasting models examined, quadratic model comes out to be 
the best model for forecasting both intra and extra trades of AFTA countries. 
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in intra bloc trade which is attributable to AFTA effect.
79 This also means that there is an increase 
in trade among member countries after the establishment of AFTA. Meanwhile, a positive 
difference between the actual and counterfactual trades of “extra” AFTA bloc shows a “net” trade 
creation. This indicates that trade between members of AFTA and the rest of the world countries 
for the same period of time also increase despite the existence of preferential and discriminatory 
AFTA agreement. 
Table 9.1 
Trend Models and Respective Functional Forms 
 
Trend Models  Functional Forms 
 
Linear 
 
Quadratic 
 
Growth 
 
Logarithm 
 
S 
 
Exponential 
 
 
Y = β0 + β1 X1 + β2 X2 
 
Y = β0 + β1 X1
2 + β2 X2 
2 
 
Y = e (β0 + β1X) 
 
Y = β0 + β1 ln (X) 
 
Y = e [β0 + (β1/ X)] 
 
Y = (β0) e (β1X)   
 
(Source: Carver and Nash (2005, 223)) 
To assess whether AFTA “actually” creates or diverts trade, then the test of difference (t-
test) is applied to statistically ascertain whether or not the difference between actual and 
counterfactual trades is significant. In order to establish whether AFTA creates or diverts trade, the 
following decision rules are applied:  
                                                 
79 The term gross trade creation was originally introduced by Bela Balassa (1967), in which he defines it as the total 
increase in trade among members of a trading community brought about by an economic integration, regardless of 
whether the increase in trade replaces domestic production (trade creation) or whether it replaces non member exports 
(trade diversion).   239
1) “Actual” trade creation is observed if the existence of “gross” trade creation is significant while 
at the same time the existence of “net” trade creation is also significant – in other words both are 
significantly different from zero – for the post-AFTA period of 1992-2003. 
2) “Actual” trade diversion is observed if the existence of “gross” trade creation is significant 
while “net” trade creation is inexistence, or if its existence is not significantly different from zero 
for the post-AFTA (1992-2003) period. 
9.6 Conclusion 
Specifically, two gravity models are used in this part of this study, one to assess the effects 
of regional FTAs on trade and the other to examine the effects of AFTA on trade of member vis-à-
vis non member countries. This study chooses gravity models as the method of analysis for three 
reasons. First, the robustness of gravity models in explaining determinants of trade flows between 
countries in past studies has been proven and well documented. Second, although gravity models 
have suffered from a poor reputation amongst trade economists due to a lack of theoretical 
underpinnings, this problem is considered “settled” by many people after Deardorf’s (1998, 7-22) 
paper, which proved formally that a gravity equation can be derived from the Hecksher-Ohlin 
factor proportion framework. Third, it is a well known fact that the use of gravity models is one of 
the best methods to undertake this type of ex post study. In addition, this study employs a specific 
forecasting technique to examine whether AFTA creates or diverts trade.        240
CHAPTER TEN 
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 
10.1 Overview 
This chapter provides the analysis and findings of the third part of this study. It begins by 
explaining the procedures adopted to come up with an econometric model for the purpose of 
examining research questions identified in this part of the study. Subsequently, it discusses other 
important econometric issues associated with the selection of an econometric model. These include 
the discussion of the statistical tests employed to analyse auxiliary assumptions and other 
requirements in order to use the ordinary least square (OLS) technique of estimation. In addition, 
this chapter also discusses the adequateness of the model selected for empirical assessment. 
Finally, this chapter proceeds to discuss the results and findings obtained in this part of the study, 
particularly in efforts to answer the following research questions: (1) Does the formation of 
regional FTAs boost member countries’ trade in comparison to trade of countries that do not 
belong to any regional FTAs? (2) To what extent the trade patterns of the original six member 
countries of AFTA change after its establishment? (3) Does the formation of AFTA result in 
boosting trade among members at the expense of non members? And (4) Does AFTA create or 
divert trade?         
10.2  The Effects of Regional Free Trade Areas on Trade  
10.2.1  Model Selection Procedures 
As already highlighted in Chapter 9, relevant data gathered for the purpose of this study’s 
empirical investigation are the value of bilateral trade of the 45 sample countries, their income 
(GDP), per capita income (PGDP) and physical distance between two trading partners. Following   241
standard economic theory as well as evidence from past studies, establishing a relationship 
between these variables is straightforward: 
 Tij = f (GDPij, PGDPij, Distanceij)          (10.1) 
Whereby: 
Tij is the value of total trade of country i and country j  
GDPij is gross domestic products of country i and country j 
PGDPij is per capita GDP of country i and country j 
Distanceij is the physical distance between country i and country j 
The measurement of endogenous variable Tij and explanatory variable Distanceij is 
uncomplicated and follows the same measurement used by Frankel and Wei (1997). Endogenous 
variable Tij represents the value of total trade (exports plus imports) of a pair of trading countries, 
while Distanceij is the physical distance (in kilometres) of the capital cities of the two countries. 
However, the measurement of explanatory variables GDPij and PGDPij is a bit problematic 
because the combination of their income can take either multiplicative or additive interaction 
terms, each of which has different implications on the extent of bilateral trade to be reflected in the 
regression results. To determine which interaction terms is the most appropriate, econometric 
analysis and testing are performed. Test statistics employed for this purpose are N-Test proposed 
by Cox (1961), NT-Test and W-Test both by Godfrey and Pesaran (1983), J-Test by Davidson and 
MacKinnon (1981) and JA-Test by Fisher and McAleer (1981). In addition, Alkaike Information 
Criterion (AIC) and Schwarz Bayesian Criterion (SBC) are also used. As for the results of the 13 
regression analyses performed every alternate year from 1980 through 2003, multiplicative form of   242
interaction appears to outperform additive form (an example of the test results i.e. of year 2003 is 
presented as Appendix 2).
80  
It remains an issue, however, whether linear or log linear model (as a functional form) is 
superior over the other for purposes of performing regression analysis. To investigate this issue 
another Non-Nested Test comparing linear against log linear model is employed. The Non-Nested 
tests used are S-Test proposed by Pesaran and Pesaran (1995), PE-Test by MacKinnon, White and 
Davidson (1983), BM-Test by Bera and McAleer (1989), and DL-Test by Davidson and 
MacKinnon (1981). In addition, Sargan’s (1976) Likelihood Criterion and Vuong’s (1989) 
Likelihood Criterion are also used. For all regression analyses performed over the period 1980-
2003, the log linear model appears to be superior over the linear model (Appendix 3).
81  Therefore, 
the chosen model is:  
Log (Tij) = α + β1 log (GDPi x GDPj) + β2 log (PGDPi x PGDPj) + β3 log (DIST12ij) + μij   (10.2) 
10.2.1.1  Diagnostic Tests of Auxiliary Assumptions 
In order to use results produced by the regression analysis using ordinary least square 
(OLS) technique, certain auxiliary conditions need to be satisfied. These conditions include the 
requirements that (1) there is no multicollinearity problem between some or all explanatory 
variables included in the regression model, (2) there is no heteroscedasticity which means that 
error terms must be of equal variance, (3) there is no autocorrelation between error terms, (4) error 
terms follow normal distribution and (5) the functional form is correctly specified. To ascertain to 
                                                 
80 Specifically regression analyses are performed over cross sectional data of 1980, 1982, 1984, 1986, 1988, 1990, 
1992, 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002 and 2003. 
 
81 Another minor test comparing multiplicative against additive terms of interaction of explanatory variables income 
and per capita income in linear versus log linear function is also performed. The result of this test confirms earlier test 
in Section 10.1.1 in which, econometrically, the multiplicative form of interaction is superior over the additive form. 
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what extent these problems are in existence in the data used in this study, specific diagnostic tests 
are performed. An example of diagnostic test results of the original econometric model (of year 
2003) is presented in Table 10.1.
82  
Table 10.1 
Ordinary Least Squares Estimation – Total Trade as Endogenous Variable 
******************************************************************************* 
 Dependent variable is LTTRADE03                                                
 990 observations used for estimation from    1 to  990                         
******************************************************************************* 
 Regressor              Coefficient       Standard Error         T-Ratio[Prob]  
 INPT                     -26.3260             1.4574           -18.0638[.000]  
 LGDP03                     1.0448            .026944            38.7763[.000]  
 LPGDP03                  -.018209            .028170            -.64640[.518]  
 LDIST12                   -.92164            .057469           -16.0373[.000]  
******************************************************************************* 
 R-Squared                     .69709   R-Bar-Squared                   .69617  
 S.E. of Regression            1.5887   F-stat.    F(  3, 986)  756.3585[.000]  
 Mean of Dependent Variable   20.0193   S.D. of Dependent Variable      2.8821  
 Residual Sum of Squares       2488.5   Equation Log-likelihood        -1861.0  
 Akaike Info. Criterion       -1865.0   Schwarz Bayesian Criterion     -1874.8  
 DW-statistic                  1.7908                                           
******************************************************************************* 
                                                                                
                                                                                
                               Diagnostic Tests                                 
******************************************************************************* 
*    Test Statistics  *        LM Version        *         F Version          * 
******************************************************************************* 
*                     *                          *                            * 
* A:Serial Correlation*CHSQ(   1)=  10.8139[.001]*F(   1, 985)=  10.8781[.001]* 
*                     *                          *                            * 
* B:Functional Form   *CHSQ(   1)=  91.1998[.000]*F(   1, 985)=  99.9464[.000]* 
*                     *                          *                            * 
* C:Normality         *CHSQ(   2)=  77143.6[.000]*       Not applicable       * 
*                     *                          *                            * 
* D:Heteroscedasticity*CHSQ(   1)=  13.6649[.000]*F(   1, 988)=  13.8282[.000]* 
******************************************************************************* 
   A:Lagrange multiplier test of residual serial correlation                    
   B:Ramsey's RESET test using the square of the fitted values                  
   C:Based on a test of skewness and kurtosis of residuals                      
   D:Based on the regression of squared residuals on squared fitted values      
 (Source: Output of microfit computer program) 
 
                                                 
82 Table 10.1 represents an example of regression results (of year 2003) obtained through OLS method. The 12 other 
regression results performed on alternate years from 1980 through 2003 exhibit about the same statistical results.   
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10.2.1.2 Model  Adequacy 
Based on economic theory as well as prior empirical works, researchers develop 
econometric models with the belief that they can capture the essence of the phenomena under 
investigation. However, a researcher is never sure in advance that an econometric model 
specified for empirical examination will be able to satisfactorily approximate the real world 
phenomenon as predicted by relevant economic theory. Only when results are obtained then a 
post-mortem analysis begins, assessing whether the results make sense or not, keeping in mind 
the criteria of a good model provided by econometric methods. It is at this stage that the 
researcher comes to know if the chosen model is adequate or otherwise. In determining model 
adequacy, a look at some broad features of the results, such as the R
2 (or R
2) values, the 
estimated t-ratios, the sign of the coefficients in relation to their expectation, and the diagnostic 
statistics is essential. If these diagnostics are reasonably good, it can be proclaimed that the 
chosen model is a fair representation of reality. By the same token, if the results do not look 
encouraging because many auxiliary assumptions are not met, very few coefficients are 
statistically significant, very few coefficients have the expected signs then the researcher should 
begin to worry about model adequacy and look for remedies. 
As shown in Table 10.1 the regression results (of year 2003) of the original econometric 
model show that the value of R
2 is reasonably high (0.61644), the expected signs of explanatory 
variables are present and the value of t-scores of the estimated coefficients are reasonably high, 
resulting in all explanatory variables highly significant except for one (i.e. LPGDP03).
83 
                                                 
83 A number of econometricians argue that R
2 (or R
2) is not a good measure to determine whether the selected 
model is good or bad. This is due to the fact that at times regressing unrelated variables could also result in high R
2 
as in the case of spurious regression. As far as this study is concerned, it is the view of the author that it presents no 
harm to report the value of R
2 so long as judgements or conclusion are not made based solely on their values. A 
paper by David F. Hendry (1980, 387-406) presents a good discussion about a misleading nature that high R
2 could 
have in implying a relationship between exogenous and explanatory variables.   245
Unfortunately though, data available for the use in this regression analysis are plagued with 
problems associated with heteroscedasticity and functional form. This is indicated by the 
diagnostic tests which reject null hypotheses concerning heteroscedasticity and functional form, 
two of the most important criteria which need to be satisfied in order to use the OLS technique of 
estimation. Essentially, the existence of the problems of heteroscedasticity and incorrect 
functional form inflate the values of t-scores and R
2 resulting in the statistical results invalid, 
therefore conclusion could not be drawn whether the coefficients of variables under investigation 
are significant or not.  
In order to address these problems an adjusted econometric model is constructed by 
transforming the original data. This is done by constructing a new variable, trade intensity, as a 
proxy to total trade and use it as the new endogenous variable. Trade intensity basically measures 
the proportion of trade to income (GDP) of the sample countries, indicating the openness of a 
country to international trade. Schematically the adjusted econometric model is as follows: 
Log (TRINij) = α + β1 log (GDPi x GDPj) + β2 log (PGDPi x PGDPj) + β3 log (DIST12ij) 
 + μij               (10.3 
Regressing endogenous variable trade intensity (TRIN) on explanatory variables GPD, per capita 
GDP and Distance between two trading partners (in log form) produces regression results as 
appear in Table 10.2 (also for year 2003).    246
 
Table 10.2 
Ordinary Least Squares Estimation – Trade Intensity as Endogenous Variable 
****************************************************************************** 
 Dependent variable is LTRIN03                                                 
 990 observations used for estimation from    1 to  990                        
****************************************************************************** 
 Regressor              Coefficient       Standard Error         T-Ratio[Prob] 
 INPT                     -26.3260             1.4574           -18.0638[.000] 
 LGDP03                    .044797            .026944             1.6626[.097] 
 LPGDP03                  -.018209            .028170            -.64640[.518] 
 LDIST12                   -.92164            .057469           -16.0373[.000] 
****************************************************************************** 
 R-Squared                     .22439   R-Bar-Squared                   .22203 
 S.E. of Regression            1.5887   F-stat.    F(  3, 986)   95.0839[.000] 
 Mean of Dependent Variable  -32.3259   S.D. of Dependent Variable      1.8011 
 Residual Sum of Squares       2488.5   Equation Log-likelihood        -1861.0 
 Akaike Info. Criterion       -1865.0   Schwarz Bayesian Criterion     -1874.8 
 DW-statistic                  1.7908                                          
****************************************************************************** 
                                                                               
                                                                               
                               Diagnostic Tests                                
****************************************************************************** 
*    Test Statistics  *        LM Version        *         F Version           
****************************************************************************** 
*                     *                          *                             
* A:Serial Correlation*CHSQ(   1)=  10.8139[.001]*F(   1, 985)=  10.8781[.001] 
*                     *                          *                             
* B:Functional Form   *CHSQ(   1)=   .81957[.365]*F(   1, 985)=   .81611[.367] 
*                     *                          *                             
* C:Normality         *CHSQ(   2)=  77143.6[.000]*       Not applicable        
*                     *                          *                             
* D:Heteroscedasticity*CHSQ(   1)=   1.1272[.288]*F(   1, 988)=   1.1262[.289] 
****************************************************************************** 
   A:Lagrange multiplier test of residual serial correlation                   
   B:Ramsey's RESET test using the square of the fitted values                 
   C:Based on a test of skewness and kurtosis of residuals                     
   D:Based on the regression of squared residuals on squared fitted values     
The regression results produced by the adjusted model are much better than that of the 
original model in terms of meeting the requirements of the OLS. The statistical results of new 
model do not show the existence of heteroscedasticity and incorrect functional form as diagnostic 
tests of these auxiliary assumptions suggest do not reject their null hypotheses. Also the 
regression results indicate that the data do not have multicollinearity problem. Multicollinearity is 
a problem if the coefficients of explanatory variables are significant when jointly tested, but 
neither one of the coefficients is significant when tested individually (Pesaran and Pesaran 1997,   247
188). As for the 13 regression results obtained from the OLS estimation, it is statistically evident 
that multicollinearity is not a problem. As can be seen from Table 10.2, F-statistics used to test 
joint hypothesis (β0 = β1  =  β2  =  β3  = 0) suggests the rejection of null hypothesis that all 
coefficients are zero. Similarly, the test of difference of individual explanatory variables when 
tested separately (β0 = 0, β1 = 0, β2 = 0, and β3 = 0) also suggests the rejection of the null with the 
exception of only β2 = 0. This implies that multicollinearity is not a problem.
84  
In contrast diagnostic tests suggest the rejection of null hypothesis that the data has no 
serial correlation. However, since the regression analysis in this part of the study is performed on 
cross sectional data, the statistical results are not in significant way influenced by this problem. 
Serial correlation becomes a problem for regression analysis involving time series data. 
Similarly, diagnostic tests reveal that the normality requirement is not satisfactorily met since the 
normality test statistics suggests the rejection of the null hypothesis. However, because the 
sample size of this study is very large with 990 observations, the normality requirement of the 
error terms can be relaxed. This is due to the fact that the normal distribution of error terms is 
only critical for small sample size but it is not so for regression analysis involving large sample 
size as a departure from normality will not affect any statistical tests (Pesaran and Pesaran 1997, 
72).  
10.2.2 Determinants  of  Trade  Intensity 
It is useful to highlight the performance of the adjusted gravity model specified in this 
part of the study. Generally the regression results obtained through OLS method show that the 
model is reasonably good since it is able to shed some light over determinants of trade intensity. 
The regression results (for year 2003) presented in Table 10.2 show that the R
2 value is 0.22203 
                                                 
84 As for regression model appearing in Table 10.1, β0, β1, β2 and β3 are respectively the estimated coefficients of 
INPT (intercept), LGDP00, LPGDP00 and LDIST12. 
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which means that the three explanatory variables included in the model (income, per capita 
income and distance) are able, collectively, to represent about 22 percent of the variation in trade 
intensity.
85 The sign of all coefficients of explanatory variables included in the model is as 
expected by the theory as already explained in Chapter 9 except for per capita income 
(LPGDP03). This means that trade intensity is positively influenced by income but it is 
negatively influenced by distance between two trading countries. The result also show that the 
coefficients of LGDP (0.044797) is significant at 9.7% level while LDIST12 (-0.92164) is very 
significant (at confidence level of almost 100 percent). Since the regression model is in log linear 
form, the result implies that if income (GDP) increases by 1%, then trade intensity increases by 
0.044% provided that the effects of the other explanatory variables on trade intensity remain 
constant.  The coefficient of per capita income (-0.018209) is not significant (since it is not 
significantly different from zero). This also means that explanatory variable per capita income 
(PGDP) has no significant influence over trade intensity, especially for year 2003. The other 12 
regression analyses generally show similar results except for per capital income whereby in the 
initial years of the study its coefficients are positive and significant. 
10.2.3  The Effects of Regional FTAs on Trade of Members versus Non Members 
One of the objectives of this study is to examine the effect of formal regional FTAs on 
trade of member vis-a-vis non member countries. In particular, the specific question of interest is 
whether the formation of regional FTAs results in boosting trade among members in comparison 
to trade with non members. To examine this effect dummy variables are added into the model 
specified previously as equation 10.3 resulting in a new regression model:  
                                                 
85 The R
2 score is taken as the measure of “goodness-of-fit” for this model since it is superior to R
2 for a model 
consisting more than one explanatory variables. In this case R
2 is a better measurement because it takes into 
account the number of the degree of freedom associated with the number of explanatory variables included into the 
model.    249
Log (TRINij) = α + β1 log (GDPi x GDPj) + β2 log (PGDPi x PGDPj) + β3 log (DIST12ij) + φ1 
AFTA + φ2 CER + φ3 EU + φ4 NAFTA + φ5 MERCUSOR + μij       (10.4) 
It is important to note that of the total 990 pairs of countries that meet the sampling 
requirements, 111 pairs represent the cases in which two countries that trade with each other 
belonging to at least one of the five regional FTAs included as dummy variables (AFTA, CER, 
EU, NAFTA and MERCUSOR). The rest of the pairs (879) are either both countries are not 
members to either one of the five regional FTAs or only one of the pairs is a member. Adding 
five dummy variables, each representing a formal regional FTA allows regression analysis to 
make comparison of the effect that a particular regional FTA has on members in comparison to a 
pair of countries in which both are not members to any regional FTAs.
86 The effect can be 
examined by analysing the coefficients of the dummy variables of the regression analysis. The 
summary of the 13 regression results analysing the effect of formal regional FTAs on trade for 
period 1980-2003 are presented in Table 10.3.
87   
Table 10.3 shows that throughout the study period income (LGDP) appears to have a 
significant influence on bilateral trade. Explanatory variable physical distance (LDIS12) between 
two trading countries also has a significant (but negative) influence on bilateral trade throughout 
the study period with its coefficients fairly close to one. The explanatory variable per capita 
income (LPGDP), however, shows a different characteristic. This variable has significant and 
positive influence on bilateral trade in the early period of study until 2000, after which the 
variable becomes marginally small and insignificant. This implies that the wealthiness of the 
people in two trading countries has no longer influence the variability in trade in recent years. 
                                                 
86 As discussed in Chapter 5, there are many other formal regional FTAs such as LAFTA, CACM, CEAO and 
ECOWAS that are in existence currently. However, dummy variables are not assigned to these other regional FTAs 
because none of the pairs of trading countries included in this study belong to these other groupings. 
 
87 Full statistical results (of year 2003) of the econometric model 10.4 are provided in Appendix 4.   250
This is probably due to the fact that trade barriers have come down significantly as a result of 
successful conclusion of many multilateral trade negotiations conducted under the ambit of the 
WTO as discussed in Chapter 4.  
Table 10.3 
The Effect of Regional Free Trade Areas on Trade  
 
 
Estimated Coefficients and 
Probability Values of 
Controlled Variables 
 
Estimated Coefficients and Probability 
Values of Dummy Variables 
 
 
Year 
 
 
INPT 
 
LGDP 
 
LPGDP 
 
LDIST12 
 
AFTA 
 
CER 
 
EU 
 
NAFTA 
 
MERCUSOR 
1980 
 
-35.52 
(.00) 
0.172 
(.00) 
0.188 
(.00) 
-0.949 
(.00) 
2.952 
(.00) 
2.494 
(.36) 
-.262 
(.48) 
-.798 
(.62) 
-.173 
(.95) 
1982 -36.71 
(.00) 
0.215 
(.00) 
0.204 
(.00) 
-1.082 
(.00) 
2.52 
(.00) 
1.993 
(.42) 
-.503 
(.15) 
-1.24 
(.39) 
0.339 
(.89) 
1984 
 
-33.79 
(.00) 
0.136 
(.00) 
0.211 
(.00) 
-0.962 
(.00) 
2.511 
(.00) 
2.193 
(.37) 
-.103 
(.76) 
-.897 
(.53) 
0.618 
(.80) 
1986 
 
-35.38 
(.00) 
0.133 
(.00) 
0.218 
(.00) 
-0.812 
(.00) 
3.191 
(.00) 
2.252 
(.39) 
-.146 
(.68) 
-.436 
(.77) 
0.831 
(.75) 
1988 
 
-33.63 
(.00) 
0.129 
(.00) 
0.141 
(.00) 
-0.871 
(.00) 
3.047 
(.00) 
2.068 
(.36) 
-.269 
(.39) 
-.557 
(.67) 
0.617 
(.78) 
1990 
 
-31.57 
(.00) 
0.082 
(.02) 
0.126 
(.00) 
-0.825 
(.00) 
2.964 
(.00) 
2.381 
(.26) 
-.168 
(.57) 
-.362 
(.77) 
0.567 
(.79) 
1992 
 
-32.94 
(.00) 
0.128 
(.00) 
0.079 
(.04) 
-0.864 
(.00) 
2.822 
(.00) 
2.805 
(.19) 
-.203 
(.50) 
-.255 
(.84) 
1.109 
(.64) 
1994 
 
-30.46 
(.00) 
0.069 
(.00) 
0.083 
(.02) 
-0.805 
(.00) 
2.586 
(.00) 
2.703 
(.17) 
0.058 
(.83) 
0.087 
(.94) 
1.050 
(.60) 
1996 -30.48 
(.00) 
0.062 
(.04) 
0.081 
(.02) 
-0.768 
(.00) 
2.463 
(.00) 
2.641 
(.17) 
0.130 
(.62) 
0.612 
(.58) 
1.202 
(.53) 
1998 -28.69 
(.00) 
0.046 
(.13) 
0.051 
(.11) 
-0.797 
(.00) 
2.917 
(.00) 
2.626 
(.14) 
0.169 
(.50) 
0.407 
(.69) 
1.108 
(.53) 
2000 -31.28 
(.00) 
0.101 
(.00) 
0.025 
(.48) 
-0.776 
(.00) 
2.885 
(.00) 
2.80 
(.15) 
0.385 
(.15) 
0.156 
(.89) 
1.267 
(.51) 
2002 -27.82 
(.00) 
0.042 
(.09) 
0.039 
(.13) 
-0.842 
(.00) 
2.615 
(.00) 
2.535 
(.08) 
0.068 
(.74) 
0.067 
(.94) 
2.060 
(.16) 
2003 -28.69 
(.00) 
0.066 
(.01) 
-.012 
(.96) 
-0.818 
(.00) 
2.649 
(.00) 
2.459 
(.11) 
0.074 
(.73) 
0.118 
(.89) 
2.068 
(.18) 
Note: Figures in parenthesis are the probability values indicating the significant level of each explanatory variable. 
(Source: A compilation of outputs of microfit computer program, 1980-2003)   
The coefficients of the dummy variables representing AFTA, CER and MERCUSOR 
indicate that in recent years, two members of these regional FTAs trade with each other well   251
above the trade of a pair of countries in which both are not members of any regional FTAs.
88 In 
2003 for example, two members of AFTA trade 14 times (e
2.649 = 14.13) more with each other 
than a pair of countries that both of them do not belong to any regional FTAs and this statistical 
result is very significant (at almost 100% level of confidence). In the same year, two members of 
CER and MERCUSOR trade with each other 12 times (e
2.459 = 11.69) and 8 times (e
2.068 = 7.91) 
more in comparison with a pair of countries which are not members of any regional FTA with the 
statistical results significant at 11% and 18% respectively. Unlike AFTA which shows significant 
evidence of intra-bloc trade intensifying effect since the beginning of the study period (1980), 
this effect is only evident since 1998 (significant at 17% level) for CER and 2002 for 
MERCUSOR (significant at 16% level). 
The coefficients of EU and NAFTA dummy variables show similar characteristics. Both 
EU and NAFTA do not show an intra-bloc trade intensifying effect for any period of the study. 
Interestingly, the signs of EU and NAFTA dummy variables are negative from 1980 until 1992 
with the signs changing to positive in 1994. Also, the dummy coefficients of these two regional 
groupings are not significant for all the years of study. This implies that a pair of EU and NAFTA 
members trade with each other about a similar magnitude in comparison to a pair of countries 
that do not belong to any regional FTAs. In other words, this result suggests that EU and NAFTA 
do not have an intra-bloc trade intensifying effect before as well as after the formation of their 
economic groupings.  
                                                 
88 It should be made clear that the regression results (i.e. of year 2003) of Table 10.3 are different from the result 
shown in Table 10.2. This is because the regression results shown in Table 10.3 are of the econometric model 
incorporating dummy variables AFTA, CER, EU, MERCUSOR and NATFA.    252
10.3  The Effects of AFTA on Trade  
10.3.1  Examining the Trade Patterns of AFTA Countries  
The other objective of this study is to examine how the trade of AFTA countries with 
members as opposed to non members has been carried out for the period of study. To shed some 
light to this question, this study analyses trade patterns of all six original members of AFTA to 
examine how trade has changed, especially between periods before and after the formation of this 
economic grouping. The analysis of this part of study focuses primarily on the growth of trade, 
the ratio of intra against extra AFTA trades as well as graphic presentation of trade patterns of 
Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand, the six original member 
countries of AFTA.  
10.3.1.1 Brunei 
Figure 10.1 
Brunei's Trade With Partner Countries
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(Source: Table 10.4)   253
Brunei’s external trade fluctuated extremely for the period of study. As can be seen from 
Figure 10.1 and Table 10.4, the country’s trade with the whole world in 1980 was in the amount 
of slightly over US$5 billion, but it dropped to a low US$2.4 billion in 1988 before gradually 
increased again to reach US$5.3 billion in 2003. Although Brunei’s trade with AFTA 6 countries 
before the formation of AFTA never exceeded US$1 billion, the country’s trade immediately 
surpassed the US$1 million mark in the year that AFTA was established (1992) and its trade 
remained above that level thereafter.  
Table 10.4 
Brunei’s Trade with Partner Countries in Million US Dollars 
 
AFTA 6   Non AFTA 6 
Years World  Value 
Growth  
(%) 
%  
of World  Value 
Growth  
(%) 
%  
of World  Ratio
∗ 
1980 5,084  723      14.2  4,360      85.8  0.17 
1981 4,662  755  4.4  16.2  3,907  -10.4  83.8  0.19 
1982 4,540  621  -17.7  13.7  3,918  0.3  86.3  0.16 
1983 4,111  672  8.2  16.3  3,438  -12.3  83.6  0.20 
1984 3,818  717  6.7  18.8  3,100  -9.8  81.2  0.23 
1985 3,582  821  14.5  22.9  2,761  -10.9  77.1  0.30 
1986 2,449  537  -34.6  21.9  1,912  -30.7  78.1  0.28 
1987 2,539  676  25.9  26.6  1,863  -2.6  73.4  0.36 
1988 2,445  599  -11.4  24.5  1,845  -1.0  75.5  0.32 
1989 2,739  712  18.9  26.0  2,026  9.8  74.0  0.35 
1990  3,214  882  23.9  27.4  2,331  15.1 72.5 0.38 
1991  3,890  967  9.6  24.9  2,922  25.4 75.1 0.33 
1992 3,776  1,060  9.6  28.1  2,715  -7.1  71.9  0.39 
1993 3,914  985  -7.1  25.2  2,929  7.9  74.8  0.34 
1994 3,983  1,393  41.4  35.0  2,590  -11.6  65.0  0.54 
1995 4,376  2,425  74.1  55.4  1,950  -24.7  44.6  1.24 
1996 4,690  2,622  8.1  55.9  2,067  6.0  44.1  1.27 
1997  4,767  1,510  -42.4  31.7  3,256  57.5 68.3 0.46 
1998 3,872  1,093  -27.6  28.2  2,779  -14.6  71.8  0.39 
1999 3,956  1,124  2.8  28.4  2,831  1.9  71.6  0.40 
2000 4,222  1,583  40.8  37.5  2,638  -6.8  62.5  0.60 
2001  4,608  1,342  -15.2  29.1  3,265  23.8 70.9 0.41 
2002  5,064  1,391  3.7  27.5  3,672  12.5 72.5 0.38 
2003 5,387  1,422  2.2  26.4  3,964  8.0  73.6  0.36 
Note: Ratio
∗ = Trade Value AFTA 6/Non AFTA 6 
(Source: UNCOMTRADE Database)   254
AFTA appeared to produce a negative impact on Brunei’s trade with the rest of the world 
soon after its establishment. As indicated by Figure 10.1 the country’s trade with the rest of the 
world dropped below that of AFTA 6 in 1995 and 1996, and the trade with the rest of the world 
only increased again after 1996. Nevertheless, Brunei’s trade with the rest of the world increased 
tremendously from the early 2000s, while its trade with AFTA 6 countries seems to be stagnant.  
10.3.1.2 Indonesia 
Figure 10.2 
Indonesia's Trade With Partner Countries
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(Source: Table 10.5) 
As shown in Figure 10.2 and Table 10.5, Indonesia’s external trade increased steadily 
with a clear upwards trend starting from 1986. This upwards trend was, however, interrupted by 
Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998 causing a huge drop in Indonesia’s external trade. In 1980 its 
total external trade was only US$32.7 billion, but the trade increased threefold to US$107.2 
billion in 2004. As can be observed from Figure 10.2, AFTA appeared to have positive impact on 
Indonesia’s trade with AFTA 6 countries as its trade with these countries increased tremendously 
after this economic grouping was established.     255
Table 10.5 
Indonesia’s Trade with Partner Countries in Million US Dollars 
AFTA 6  Non AFTA 6 
Growth  %  Growth   %   
Years World Value  (%) of  world  Value  (%) of  World  Ratio
∗ 
1980  32,732  4,110     12.6  28,633     87.5  0.14 
1981 35,268  4,387  6.7  12.4  30,881  7.9  87.6  0.14 
1982 38,823  6,797  54.9  17.5  32,026  3.7  82.5  0.21 
1983 37,491  7,393  8.8  19.7  30,097 -6.0  80.3  0.25 
1984 35,752  4,436 -40.0  12.4  31,315  4.0  87.6  0.14 
1985 28,842  2,955 -33.4  10.2  25,887 -17.3  89.8  0.11 
1986 25,505  2,618 -11.4  10.3  22,886 -11.6  89.7  0.11 
1987 29,231  2,676  2.2  9.2  26,554 16.0  90.8  0.10 
1988 32,149  3,071  14.8  9.6  29,078  9.5  90.4  0.11 
1989 38,131  3,970  29.3  10.4  34,161 17.5  89.6  0.12 
1990 47,390  4,279  7.8  9.0  43,110 26.2  91.0  0.10 
1991 54,865  5,535  29.4  10.1  49,330 14.4  89.9  0.11 
1992 61,094  6,833  23.5  11.2  54,261 10.0  88.8  0.13 
1993 64,696  7,227  5.8  11.2  57,741  6.4  89.2  0.13 
1994 72,036  8,648  19.7  12.0  63,388  9.8  88.0  0.14 
1995 85,995  10,035 16.0  11.7  75,959 19.8  88.3  0.13 
1996 92,651  12,076 20.3  13.0  80,575  6.1  87.0  0.15 
1997 94,898  13,623 12.8  14.4  81,275  0.9  85.6  0.17 
1998 75,709  12,555 -7.8  16.6  63,153 -22.3  83.4  0.20 
1999 72,317  11,694 -6.9  16.2  60,622 -4.0  83.8  0.19 
2000 95,252  16,274 39.2  17.1  78,978 30.3  82.9  0.21 
2001 86,847  14,079 -13.5  16.2  72,768 -7.9  83.8  0.19 
2002 88,146  15,805 12.3  17.9  72,341 -0.6  82.1  0.22 
2003 93,326  17,348  9.8  18.6  75,978  5.0  81.4  0.23 
2004 107,188  21,976  26.7  20.5  85,212  12.2  79.5  0.26 
                          
Note: Ratio
∗ = Trade Value AFTA 6/Non AFTA 6 
(Source: UNCOMTRADE Database) 
In terms of proportion, Indonesia’s trade with AFTA 6 countries as a percentage of its 
trade with the world was 12.6 % in 1980. The ratio fluctuated slightly in the next few years 
before it became stable soon after AFTA formation. The ratio then increased at a faster rate 
thereafter and stood at 26.7 % in 2004. Although the ratio of Indonesia’s trade with the rest of the 
world recorded a decreasing trend in comparison to its trade with AFTA 6 countries, its trade 
with both groups of countries in nominal terms continued to increase enormously throughout the 
study period as shown in Table 10.5.   256
10.3.1.3 Malaysia 
Malaysia recorded an impressive external trade growth for the period of study. Its external 
trade stood at only US$23.7 billion in 1980 and continued to increase every year. Over the 24-
years study period, Malaysia external trade grew about 10 times to reach US$229.1 billion in 
2004. Prior to the formation of AFTA in 1992 Malaysia’s trade with AFTA 6 countries was low 
and erratic, although in nominal terms Malaysia’s trade with AFTA 6 countries increased 
steadily, especially after the formation of AFTA. As indicated by Figure 10.3, AFTA appeared to 
have positive impact not only to Malaysia’s trade with AFTA members but also to its trade with 
the rest of the world.  
 
Figure 10.3 
Malaysia's Trade With Partner Countries
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(Source: Table 10.6) 
In terms of trade proportion, Malaysia’s trade with AFTA 6 countries in 1980 was 19.7% 
of its trade with the whole world. The AFTA 6 countries’ share of Malaysia’s external trade did 
not experience big changes for the study period with the share only hovered between 19% and   257
25%, with the highest share was recorded in the year that AFTA was established. The share 
dropped slightly thereafter and in 2004 the ratio stood at 23.8 %. Despite this, Malaysia’s trade 
with the rest of the world continued to increase tremendously in nominal terms. In 1980 the trade 
stood at US$18.9 billion but it increased almost 10 times to US$174.5 billion in 2004. 
Table 10.6 
Malaysia’s Trade with Partner Countries in Million US Dollars 
 
 
AFTA 6  Non AFTA 6 
Growth %  Growth  % 
Years World Value (%)  of World   Value  (%) of  World  Ratio
∗ 
1980  23,673  4,675     19.7  18,998     80.3  0.25 
1981 23,241 5,204 11.3  22.4  18,037  -5.1  77.6  0.29 
1982 24,386 6,102 17.3  25.0  18,283  1.4  75.0  0.33 
1983 27,328 6,484  6.3  23.7  20,843  14.0  76.3  0.31 
1984 30,436 7,089  9.3  23.3  23,346  12.0  76.7  0.30 
1985 28,147 6,865 -3.2  24.4  21,281  -8.8  75.6  0.32 
1986 24,561 5,340 -22.2  21.7  19,220  -9.7  78.3  0.28 
1987 30,499 6,917 29.5  22.7  23,582  22.7  77.3  0.29 
1988 37,341 8,122 17.4  21.8  29,219  23.9  78.2  0.28 
1989 46,635  10,412  28.2  22.3  36,233  24.0  77.7  0.29 
1990 57,283  13,805  32.6  24.1  43,478  20.0  75.9  0.32 
1991 69,548  17,032  23.4  24.5  52,515  20.8  75.5  0.32 
1992 79,844  19,952  17.1  25.0  59,892  14.0  75.0  0.33 
1993 91,519  21,777 9.1  23.8  69,742  16.4  76.2  0.31 
1994 117,928  27,147 24.7  23.0  90,781  30.2  77.0  0.30 
1995 148,898  32,845 21.0  22.1  116,052  27.8  77.9  0.28 
1996 154,342  36,580 11.4  23.7  117,761  1.5  76.3  0.31 
1997 155,506  36,784  0.6  23.7  118,722  0.8  76.3  0.31 
1998 130,467  30,045 -18.3  23.0  100,422  -15.4  77.0  0.30 
1999 148,460  34,334 14.3  23.1  114,126  13.6  76.9  0.30 
2000 178,515  44,266 28.9  24.8  134,248  17.6  75.2  0.33 
2001 160,111  37,584 -15.1  23.5  122,526  -8.7  76.5  0.31 
2002 171,888  41,161  9.5  23.9  130,727  6.7  76.1  0.31 
2003 186,187  44,451  8.0  23.9  141,735  8.4  76.1  0.31 
2004 229,148  54,590 22.8  23.8  174,557  23.2  76.2  0.31 
                          
Note: Ratio
∗ = Trade Value AFTA 6/Non AFTA 6 
(Source: UNCOMTRADE Database) 
10.3.1.4 The  Philippines 
The Philippines external trade grew rapidly over the study period, with pronounced 
increases after the middle of the 1990s as indicated by Figure 10.4 and Table 10.7. In 1980 its   258
external trade was only US$14.1 billion; it then increased 6 times to US$83.5 billion in 2003. As 
regard to the Philippines’s trade with AFTA 6 countries, in 1980 the trade was only US$938 
million. In the following few years the trade fluctuated slightly, while an upward trend only 
emerged clearly after the formation of AFTA. In nominal terms, the Philippines’ trade with 
AFTA 6 countries increased impressively soon after AFTA was established. In 1992 the 
country’s trade with AFTA 6 countries stood at US$1.9 billion, but the trade increased sixfold to 
US$13.9 billion in 2004. As indicated by Figure 10.4, AFTA appeared to bring positive impact 
on the Philippines’s trade with AFTA members as well as to its trade with non members.  
Figure 10.4 
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(Source: Table 10.7)   259
 
Table 10.7 
The Philippines’ Trade with Partner Countries in Million US Dollars 
 
 
AFTA 6  Non AFTA 6 
Growth %  Growth  % 
Years World Value  (%) of  World  Value  (%) of  World Ratio
∗ 
1980  14,082  938     6.7  13,143     93.3  0.07 
1981 14,199  1,094  16.6  7.7  13,105  -0.3  92.3  0.08 
1982 10,717 908  -17.0  8.5  9,809  -25.2  91.5  0.09 
1983 12,977  1,114  22.7  8.6  11,863  20.9  91.4  0.09 
1984 11,814  1,321  18.6  11.2  10,493 -11.5  88.8  0.13 
1985 10,073  1,313  -0.6  13.0  8,759  -16.5  87.0  0.15 
1986 10,234 887  -32.4  8.7  9,346  6.7  91.3  0.09 
1987 12,519  1,198  35.1  9.6  11,320  21.1  90.4  0.11 
1988 15,803  1,285  7.3  8.1  14,517  28.2  91.9  0.09 
1989 18,990  1,651  28.5  8.7  17,338  19.4  91.3  0.10 
1990 21,226  1,845  11.8  8.7  19,381  11.8  91.3  0.10 
1991 21,683  1,779  -3.6  8.2  19,903  2.7  91.8  0.09 
1992 25,254  1,942  9.2  7.7  23,312  17.1  92.3  0.08 
1993 29,984  2,753  41.8  9.2  27,231  16.8  90.8  0.10 
1994 36,220  3,969  44.2  11.0  32,251  18.4  89.0  0.12 
1995 45,736  5,512  38.9  12.1  40,224  24.7  87.9  0.14 
1996 54,990  6,866  24.6  12.5  48,124  19.6  87.5  0.14 
1997 63,530  8,255  20.2  13.0  55,275  14.9  87.0  0.15 
1998 60,791  8,009  -3.0  13.2  52,781  -4.5  86.8  0.15 
1999 67,403  9,422  17.6  14.0  57,981  9.9  86.0  0.16 
2000 71,701  11,148 18.3  15.5  60,552  4.4  84.5  0.18 
2001 63,421  9,562  -14.2  15.1  53,859 -11.1  84.9  0.18 
2002 70,496  10,821 13.2  15.3  59,675  10.8  84.7  0.18 
2003 75,570  12,854 18.8  17.0  62,715  5.1  83.0  0.20 
2004 83,548  13,984  8.8  16.7  69,563  10.9  83.3  0.20 
                          
Note: Ratio
∗ = Trade Value AFTA 6/Non AFTA 6 
(Source: UNCOMTRADE Database)  
In terms of the trade ratio, the Philippines’ trade with AFTA 6 countries in 1980 was 
6.7% of its trade with the whole world. The ratio showed an erratic pattern for the next few years 
until AFTA was established. After the formation of AFTA, the proportion of the country’s trade 
with AFTA 6 countries increased steadily; up from 7.7 % in 1992 to 16.7 % in 2003. Meanwhile, 
the Philippines’s trade with the rest of the world also increased impressively in nominal terms   260
despite the rest of the world’s share of the country’s external trade showed a slightly decreasing 
trend – from 93.3% in 1980 to 83.3% in 2004. In the year when AFTA was established the 
Philippines’ trade with non AFTA members was US$23.3 billion, it then increased to US$69.6 
billion in 2004. 
10.3.1.5 Singapore 
Figure 10.5 
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(Source: Table 10.8) 
Singapore’s external trade increased enormously throughout the study period. The 
nominal value of trade recorded in 1980 was US$43.4 billion, and the value increased nearly 10 
times to US$339.5 billion in 2004 as indicated by both Figure 10.5 and Table 10.8. Singapore 
emerged as the biggest trading nation among AFTA members both in terms of its trade with 
members as well as its trade with the rest of the world. In nominal terms, Singapore’s trade with 
AFTA 6 countries stood at US$ 11.8 billion in 1980. The trade then increased to US$ 32 billion 
in 1992, the year that AFTA was established. The country’s trade with AFTA 6 countries 
continued to increase at a fast rate thereafter and reached a record US$85.4 billon in 2004.   261
Notwithstanding this, however, its trade with the rest of the world also increased tremendously 
throughout the study period. From the value of only US$31.5 recorded in 1980, trade increased to 
US$103.4 billion in 1992, and reached US$254 billion in 2004.   
As shown in Table 10.8, Singapore’s trade with AFTA 6 countries as the ratio of its trade 
with the entire world experienced only small changes for the period of study. In 1980, 1992 and 
2004 its trade ratios stood at 27.2%, 23.7% and 25.2% respectively. Consequently, Singapore’s 
trade ratio with the rest of the world remained above 70 % for most of the 24 years study period. 
Table 10.8 
Singapore’s Trade with Partner Countries in Million US Dollars 
 
 
AFTA 6  Non AFTA 6 
Growth %  Growth % 
Years World Value  (%) of  World  Value  (%) of  World Ratio
∗ 
1980 43,378  11,798      27.2  31,579      72.8  0.37 
1981 48,539  12,490  5.9  25.7  36,049  14.2  74.3  0.35 
1982 48,955  15,716 25.8  32.1  33,238  -7.8  67.9  0.47 
1983 49,990  17,064  8.6  34.1  32,926  -0.9  65.9  0.52 
1984 52,710  14,774 -13.4  28.0  37,935  15.2  72.0  0.39 
1985 49,065  12,211 -17.3  24.9  36,835  -2.9  75.1  0.33 
1986 47,889  11,326 -7.2  23.7  36,562  -0.7  76.3  0.31 
1987 61,072  13,957 23.2  22.9  47,114  28.9  77.1  0.30 
1988 82,969  18,573 33.1  22.4  64,396  36.7  77.6  0.29 
1989 94,206  20,535 10.6  21.8  73,670  14.4  78.2  0.28 
1990 113,260  25,022  21.9  22.1  88,237  19.8  77.9  0.28 
1991 124,842  30,303  21.1  24.3  94,539  7.1  75.7  0.32 
1992 135,441  32,052  5.8  23.7  103,389  9.4  76.3  0.31 
1993 158,886  39,908  24.5  25.1  118,977  15.1  74.9  0.34 
1994 199,493  55,630  39.4  27.9  143,863  20.9  72.1  0.39 
1995 242,237  65,826  18.3  27.2  176,411  22.6  72.8  0.37 
1996 255,592  69,256  5.2  27.1  186,335  5.6  72.9  0.37 
1997 256,082  69,142  -0.2  27.0  186,939  0.3  73.0  0.37 
1998 209,912  55,013 -20.4  26.2  154,898  -17.1  73.8  0.36 
1999 224,932  60,039  9.1  26.7  164,893  6.5  73.3  0.36 
2000 271,570  76,960  28.2  28.3  194,610  18.0  71.7  0.40 
2001 236,714  66,127 -14.1  27.9  170,586  -12.3  72.1  0.39 
2002 240,666  69,617  5.3  28.9  171,048  0.3  71.1  0.41 
2003 270,967  72,003  3.4  26.6  198,963  16.3  73.4  0.36 
2004 339,513  85,459  18.7  25.2  254,054  27.7  74.8  0.34 
                          
Note: Ratio
∗ = Trade Value AFTA 6/Non AFTA 6 
(Source: UNCOMTRADE Database)   262
10.3.1.6 Thailand 
Figure 10.6 
Thailand's Trade With Partner Countries
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(Source: Table 10.9) 
As shown in Figure 10.6 as well as Table 10.9, Thailand’s external trade was less 
impressive as compared to other AFTA countries at the beginning of the study period. Thailand’s 
external trade was only US$16.0 billion in 1980 and was almost stagnant for few years before it 
started to increase in 1986. Thereafter, Thailand’s external trade grew impressively to reach 
US$158.0 billion in 2003. As regard to Thailand’s trade with AFTA 6 countries, the country’s 
trade was US$2.2 billion in 1980. The trade increased only marginally over the years to reach 
US$8.0 billion in 1991. After AFTA was established in 1992 Thailand’s trade with AFTA 6 
countries increased at a faster rate to reach US$ 24.9 billon in 2004. Meanwhile, Thailand’s trade 
with the rest of the world also increased as fast as its trade with AFTA 6 countries for post AFTA 
period. In nominal terms, the country’s trade with the rest of the world was only US$13.8 billion 
in 1980, it increased almost 5 times to US$ 63.6 billion in 1992 and reached US$130.1 billion in 
2004.    263
The ratio of Thailand’s trade with AFTA 6 countries as a proportion of its trade with the 
world did not change significantly. In 1980, 1992 and 2003 the ratios stood at 13.6%, 12.8% and 
16.1% respectively. Consequently, the ratio of Thailand’s trade with the rest of the world also did 
not experience big changes and remained above 80% throughout the study period. 
Table 10.9 
Thailand’s Trade with Partner Countries in Million US Dollars 
 
 
AFTA 6  Non AFTA 6 
Growth %  Growth % 
Years World Value   (%) of  World  Value  (%) of  World  Ratio
∗ 
1980  15,955  2,166     13.6  13,788     86.4  0.16 
1981 17,089 2,191  1.2  12.8  14,897  8.0  87.2  0.15 
1982 15,483 2,220  1.3  14.3  13,263  -11.0  85.7  0.17 
1983 16,647 2,356  6.1  14.2  14,291  7.8  85.8  0.16 
1984 17,930 2,714 15.2  15.1  15,216  6.5  84.9  0.18 
1985 16,359 2,715  0.0  16.6  13,643  -10.3  83.4  0.20 
1986 17,959 2,553 -6.0  14.2  15,405  12.9  85.8  0.17 
1987 24,614 3,566 39.7  14.5  21,047  36.6  85.5  0.17 
1988 39,792 4,333 21.5  10.9  35,458  68.5  89.1  0.12 
1989 45,677 5,505 27.0  12.1  40,171  13.3  87.9  0.14 
1990 56,196 6,697 21.7  11.9  49,498  23.2  88.1  0.14 
1991 65,823 8,033 19.9  12.2  57,790  16.8  87.8  0.14 
1992 72,924 9,304 15.8  12.8  63,620  10.1  87.2  0.15 
1993 83,102  11,447 23.0  13.8  71,655  12.6  86.2  0.16 
1994 99,672  15,047 31.4  15.1  84,624  18.1  84.9  0.18 
1995 126,685  19,668 30.7  15.5  107,017  26.5  84.5  0.18 
1996 127,471  19,707  0.2  15.5  107,763  0.7  84.5  0.18 
1997 119,843  18,441 -6.4  15.4  101,401  -5.9  84.6  0.18 
1998 95,225  14,381  -22.0  15.1  80,843  -20.3  84.9  0.18 
1999 108,189  16,651 15.8  15.4  91,537  13.2  84.6  0.18 
2000 129,598  20,863 25.3  16.1  108,734  18.8  83.9  0.19 
2001 126,302  19,208 -7.9  15.2  107,093  -1.5  84.8  0.18 
2002 136,099  23,245 21.0  17.1  112,854  5.4  82.9  0.21 
2003 154,999  24,880  7.0  16.1  130,118  15.3  83.9  0.19 
                          
Note: Ratio
∗ = Trade Value AFTA 6/Trade Value Non AFTA 6 
(Source: UNCOMTRADE Database)  
10.3.2  The Effect of AFTA on Trade of Member vis-à-vis Non Members 
The other question of interest of this study is to examine the effect of AFTA on trade of 
member in comparison to non-member countries. This question is different from that already   264
examined in Section 10.2.3. While the former examined the effect of regional FTAs on trade of 
members against other countries which do not become members to any regional FTAs, this part 
of research examines the effect of AFTA on trade of member vis-à-vis non AFTA members.     
In order to shed some light to this question, an adjustment needs to be made to the 
regression model previously specified as equation 10.4. The adjustment produces a new model: 
Log (TRINij) = α + β1 log (GDPi x GDPj) + β2 log (PGDPi x PGDPj) + β3 log (DIST12ij) 
 + φ DAFTA + μij.            (10.5)  
This new econometric model allows the examination of the effect of AFTA on trade of members 
in comparison to non-members. While controlled variables remain the same in this new model, 
but only AFTA dummy variable (taking the value of 1 if both countries are AFTA members and 
0 otherwise) is included. Under the new model the coefficient of AFTA dummy variable tells us 
how big is the difference of trade between AFTA member countries in comparison to their trade 
with non-members. 
Regression analyses of the new model performed over the same 990 pairs of countries on 
alternate years basis for the period 1980-2003 produce 13 regression results, the summary of 
which are presented in Table 10.10.
89 Table 10.10 shows, as expected, that the value of 
coefficients of covariates or controlled variables INPT, LGDP, LPGDP, and LDIST12 are about 
the same as those of the covariates of regression results produced by regression model of Section 
10.2.3. As shown in Table 10.10, the 13 coefficients of AFTA dummy variable are positive, 
above 2 and highly significant throughout the study period. This indicates that trade between two 
AFTA member countries is higher than their trade with non members. In 2003 for example, two 
                                                 
89 Full statistical results of econometric model 10.4 are presented in Appendix 5.   265
AFTA member countries trade with each other about 14 times (e
2.611 = 13.61) higher than they 
trade with non-member countries. 
Table 10.10 
The Effect of AFTA on Trade of Members vis-à-vis Non Members 
 
Estimated Coefficients and Probability 
Values of Controlled Variables  
 
Year 
 
INPT 
 
LGDP 
 
LPGDP 
 
LDIST12 
 
Estimated Coefficients 
and P-Values of AFTA 
Dummy variable 
1980 -35.67 
(.00) 
0.166 
(.00) 
0.187 
(.00) 
-0.902 
(.00) 
3.029 
(.00) 
1982 -37.11 
(.00) 
0.208 
(.00) 
0.199 
(.00) 
-0.988 
(.00) 
2.680 
(.00) 
1984 -33.76 
(.00) 
0.132 
(.00) 
0.211 
(.00) 
-0.943 
(.00) 
2.538 
(.00) 
1986 -35.46 
(.00) 
0.131 
(.00) 
0.217 
(.00) 
-0.788 
(.00) 
3.228 
(.00) 
1988 -33.86 
(.00) 
0.126 
(.00) 
0.139 
(.00) 
-0.824 
(.00) 
3.125 
(.00) 
1990 -31.68 
(.00) 
0.080 
(.02) 
0.125 
(.00) 
-0.797 
(.00) 
3.009 
(.00) 
1992 -33.07 
(.00) 
0.126 
(.00) 
0.076 
(.04) 
-0.832 
(.00) 
2.876 
(.00) 
1994 -30.35 
(.00) 
0.060 
(.04) 
0.084 
(.02) 
-0.819 
(.00) 
2.557 
(.00) 
1996 -30.35 
(.00) 
0.064 
(.05) 
0.083 
(.02) 
-0.798 
(.00) 
2.409 
(.00) 
1998 -28.50 
(.00) 
0.046 
(.11) 
0.055 
(.08) 
-0.834 
(.00) 
2.855 
(.00) 
2000 -30.75 
(.00) 
0.102 
(.00) 
0.032 
(.36) 
-0.851 
(.00) 
2.749 
(.00) 
2002 -27.65 
(.00) 
0.042 
(.00) 
0.040 
(.12) 
-0.861 
(.00) 
2.578 
(.00) 
2003 -28.54 
(.00) 
0.066 
(.00) 
-0.003 
(.98) 
-0.837 
(.00) 
2.611 
(.00) 
(Source: A compilation of outputs of microfit computer program, 1980-2003)      
The overall results of the regression analysis provided in Table 10.10 show two 
interesting features. First, an intra-bloc trade intensifying effect emerged in the AFTA bloc even 
before AFTA was officially established in 1992. This is implied by the value of the coefficients 
of AFTA dummy variable which have been positive and significant since the beginning of the 
study period. For example, in 1980 the coefficient was 3.029 which means that two AFTA 
members trade with each other 21 times (e
3.029 = 20.7) than their trade with other countries, and   266
interestingly the coefficients remain above 3 until 1990 with the exceptions of the years 1982 and 
1984. Secondly, the intra-bloc trade intensifying effect of AFTA is in fact higher at the early 
years of the study period. This intra-bloc trade intensifying effect slightly and gradually becomes 
less pronounced for period after AFTA agreement was signed and especially so in late 1990s 
onwards. This result suggests two implications. First, it lends support to the notion that a trading 
bloc can itself be a “natural trading bloc” as expounded by Krugman (1991b, 5-25) and AFTA 
probably falls into this category.
90 Second, although the AFTA agreement has specific provisions 
giving favourable treatment to members over non-members, in practice AFTA appears to have 
characteristics of an “open trading bloc” whereby although tariff concessions are given to 
members initially, these concessions are soon willingly extended to non members by individual 
countries.
91 
10.3.3  Trade Creation and Trade Diversion of AFTA 
As already discussed in details in Chapter 7, trade creation and trade diversion are two 
concepts introduced by Viner (1950). Under Viner’s framework, trade creation is associated with 
welfare gains to member countries (of customs unions) due to the expansion of trade among 
them. The welfare gains come from a shift in the locus of production from a high cost member to 
a lower cost member country.  Meanwhile, trade diversion is associated with welfare loss not 
only to non members but to member countries as well. Trade diversion occurs due to a shift in the 
location of production from a low cost third country to a higher cost member country. According 
                                                 
90 As already discussed in Chapter 6, a natural trading bloc refers to a situation whereby the existence of high 
concentration of trades among members is due to proximity between them while high transportation costs hinder 
trade with non members. According to Krugman (1991b), as long as countries establish a trading bloc along natural 
lines then its establishment would not have harmful effect on non-members.   
 
91 The exposition of the concept of “open regionalism” is primarily due to Shang-Jin Wei and Jeffrey Frankel (1995). 
They relate this concept to a situation in which members of a trading bloc collectively lower their external barriers on 
goods from non-members in addition to the reduction of barriers among themselves, although the degree of 
liberalization towards non-members need not be as high as that between members.   267
to Viner the welfare loss is the result of preferential treatments given to imports that come from 
another member of a customs union.  
For this part of study, adjustments are introduced to the defining concepts of trade 
creation and trade diversion. This is unavoidable because of difficulties faced in gathering data to 
establish whether a good is shifted from one location of production to another location due to the 
formation of AFTA. For the purpose of assessing trade creation and trade diversion of AFTA, 
trade creation is said to be evident if intra AFTA trade increases (“gross” trade creation) while at 
the same time extra AFTA trade also increases (“net” trade creation). In contrast, trade diversion 
is observed if intra AFTA trade increases but extra AFTA trade decreases.  
This part of study proceeds in two stages. At the first stage intra and extra AFTA 
counterfactual trades are estimated by the use of a forecasting technique. The estimated intra 
AFTA counterfactual trade (i.e. trade among members of AFTA 6 countries) as well as extra 
AFTA counterfactual trade (i.e. trade of AFTA 6 countries with the rest of the world) are then 
compared with their respective actual trades for the post AFTA period of 1992-2003. At the 
second stage, a test of difference (t-test) is performed to statistically examine whether AFTA 
creates or diverts trade. As already detailed out in Chapter 9, the decision rules adopted for 
establishing trade creation and trade diversion of AFTA are as follows: 
1)  “Actual” trade creation is observed if the existence of “gross” trade creation is significant 
while at the same time the existence of “net” trade creation is also significant.
92 
2)  “Actual” trade diversion is observed if the existence of “gross” trade creation is 
significant while “net” trade creation is inexistence, or if its existence is not significantly 
different from zero. 
                                                 
92 Definitions and explanation about “gross” and “net” trade creation were already discussed in details in Chapter 9.   268
10.3.3.1  Intra and Extra AFTA Actual Trades  
Intra AFTA actual trade for the post AFTA period is calculated by summing up all six 
original AFTA members (Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand) 
bilateral trades with each other (for the period 1992-2002). Similarly, extra AFTA actual trade is 
established by summing up bilateral trade of the six AFTA members with the rest of the world for 
the same period. The value of intra and extra AFTA actual trades are provided in Table 10.11. 
Table 10.11 
Actual Intra and Extra AFTA Trades in Million US Dollars 
Actual Trade  
Year  Intra AFTA  Growth (%)  Extra AFTA  Growth (%)  Ratio
∗ 
1992  71,145     307,191     0.23 
1993 84,099  18.2  348,277  13.4  0.24 
1994 111,837  33.0  417,498  19.9 0.27 
1995 136,313  21.9  517,616  24.0 0.26 
1996  147,110  7.9 542,628 4.8  0.27 
1997  147,757  0.4 546,870 0.8  0.27 
1998 121,099  -18.0  454,879  -16.8 0.27 
1999 133,266  10.0  491,993  8.2  0.27 
2000 171,097  28.4  579,764  17.8 0.30 
2001 147,905  -13.6  530,101  -8.6 0.28 
2002  162,041  9.6 550,320 3.8  0.29 
2003 172,963  6.7  613,475  11.5 0.28 
Total  1,606,632     5,900,612     0.27 
 Note:  Ratio
∗ = Intra AFTA/Extra AFTA Actual Trades 
  (Source: Author’s own calculation based on UNCOMTRADE Database) 
As shown in Table 10.11, both intra and extra AFTA actual trades increased enormously after 
AFTA was established except for the years 1998 and 2001. Intra AFTA actual trade increased 
more than double from US$71.2 billion in 1992 to US$173 billion in 2003. Likewise, extra 
AFTA actual trade also increased by about the same proportion from US$307 billion to US$613 
billion for the same period.   269
10.3.3.2  Intra and Extra AFTA Counterfactual Trades  
The estimation of intra and extra AFTA counterfactual trades begins by identifying the 
most appropriate trend-model to capture the correct representation of the trend of trade of AFTA 
6 countries. The model selection process begins by examining six trend-models to ascertain 
which model fits the data most appropriately for pre-AFTA period covering 22 years (1970 – 
1991). Once a trend-model is identified, this model is used to forecast the likely trade under a 
hypothetical assumption that AFTA was never been established (in 1992). For this purpose the 
extrapolated amount of trade is termed as counterfactual trades. The six trend-models examined 
are linear, quadratic, growth, logarithm, S and exponential. Statistical results of the six trend-
models fitting intra and extra AFTA trade data are respectively provided in Table 10.12a and 
Table 110.12b. 
Table 10.12a 
Statistical Results of Trend Models Fitting Intra AFTA Trade Data 
Number of Observations: 22 
Period: 1970-1991 
Statistics of Trend Models 
Goodness-of-fit Tests  Linear Quadratic Growth logarithm  S  Exponential 
Multiple R  0.9305  0.9729  0.9722  0.7587  0.7082  0.9722 
R Square  0.8659  0.9465  0.9451  0.5756  0.5015  0.9451 
Adjusted R Square  0.8617  0.9430  0.9434  0.5623  0.4860  0.9434 
                    
  (Source: Outputs of SPSS computer program) 
Table 10.12b 
Statistical Results of Trend Models Fitting Extra AFTA Trade Data 
Number of Observations: 22 
Period: 1970-1991 
Statistics of Trend Models 
Goodness-of-fit Tests  Linear Quadratic Growth logarithm  S  Exponential 
Multiple R  0.9474  0.9740  0.9673  0.7884  0.7388  0.9672 
R Square  0.8975  0.9487  0.9356  0.6216  0.5458  0.9356 
Adjusted R Square  0.8943  0.9454  0.9336  0.6098  0.5316  0.9336 
                    
  (Source: Outputs of SPSS computer program)   270
 Table 10.12a and Table 10.12b suggest that the quadratic model appears to be the best 
among the six trend-models at capturing the most appropriate trend of both intra and extra AFTA 
trade data. As can be seen from these two Tables, all measures of goodness-of-fit – Multiple R, R 
Squared and Adjusted R Squared – show that quadratic model produces the highest statistical 
scores among all six trend-models. Therefore, the quadratic model is selected as the forecasting 
tool to extrapolate counterfactual trade under the assumption that AFTA was never been 
established.93 Based on intra and extra AFTA actual trade data of 22 years prior to the formation 
of AFTA (1970-1991), an extrapolation is then performed with the use of the chosen quadratic 
trend model as the forecasting tool. The results of intra and extra AFTA trade forecasts 
(counterfactual trades) in comparison to actual trades for each year from 1992 through 2003 are 
provided in Table 10.13. 
Table 10.13 
Actual and Counterfactual Trades of AFTA 6 Countries in Million US Dollars 
 
Actual Trade  Counterfactual Trade  Gross Trade  Net Trade 
Year 
Intra 
AFTA 
Extra 
AFTA Intra  AFTA  Extra  AFTA Creation  Creation 
1992 71,145 307,191  56,782  260,500  14,363  46,691 
1993 84,099 348,277  60,810  281,060  23,289  67,217 
1994 111,837 417,498  64,969  302,440  46,868  115,058 
1995 136,313 517,616  69,262  324,660  67,051  192,956 
1996 147,110 542,628  73,687  347,700  73,423  194,928 
1997 147,757 546,870  78,244  371,560  69,513  175,310 
1998 121,099 454,879  82,935  396,260  38,164  58,619 
1999 133,266 491,993  87,757  421,780  45,509  70,213 
2000 171,097 579,764  92,712  448,120  78,385  131,644 
2001 147,905 530,101  97,800  475,300  50,105  54,801 
2002 162,041 550,320  103,020  503,300  59,021  47,020 
2003 172,963 613,475  108,370  532,120  64,593  81,355 
 
Total 1,606,632  5,900,612  976,348  4,664,800  630,284  1,235,812 
Note:  Gross Trade Creation = Intra AFTA Actual Trade – Intra AFTA Counterfactual Trade  
  Net Trade Creation = Extra AFTA Actual Trade – Extra AFTA counterfactual Trade 
(Source: Author’s own calculation UNCOMTRADE Database)   
                                                 
93 Another analysis is also performed by constructing graphs for all six trend-models fitting both intra and extra 
AFTA trade data. Consistent with the statistical results provided in Table 10.12a and Table 10.12b, these graphs, 
presented as Appendix 4 show that quadratic model is the most appropriate model for purposes of forecasting.   271
 
As can be seen from Table 10.13, intra and extra AFTA actual trades are higher that their 
respective counterfactual trades each year for post AFTA period. This literally means that both 
“gross” and “net” trade creation are in existence for period after the formation of AFTA.  
10.3.3.3  Statistical Tests of Trade Creation and Trade Diversion 
To statistically ascertain whether AFTA creates or diverts trade, intra and extra AFTA 
actual as well as counterfactual trades derived in Section 10.3.3.2 are used to perform the test of 
difference. The test of difference is an appropriate test to examine if the difference between 
actual and counterfactual trades is statistically significant.  In other words, the test of difference is 
employed to examine whether or not the existence of “gross” and “net” trade creation is 
significant. The statistical results of the test of difference are presented in Table 10.14. 
Table 10.14 
Test Statistics of Gross and Net Trade Creation 
 
Paired Samples Test
5.3E+10 1.999E+10 5.8E+09 4.0E+10 6.5E+10 9.100 11 .000
1.0E+11 5.733E+10 1.7E+10 6.7E+10 1.4E+11 6.222 11 .000
Intra AFTA bloc trade,
actual - Intra AFTA bloc
trade, counterfactual
Pair
1
Extra AFTA bloc trade,
actual - Extra AFTA bloc
trade, counterfactual
Pair
2
Mean Std. Deviation
Std. Error
Mean Lower Upper
95% Confidence
Interval of the
Difference
Paired Differences
t df Sig. (2-tailed)
 
(Source: Output of SPSS computer program) 
Table 10.14 shows that 2 pairs of differences are tested. Pair 1 is the test to ascertain if the 
existence of “gross” trade creation is significant, while Pair 2 is to establish the same conclusion 
for “net” trade creation. Following the decision rules adopted for establishing trade creation and   272
trade diversion of AFTA as already highlighted in Section 10.3.3, this study shows that AFTA 
essentially creates trade.   
10.4 Conclusion 
One of the important results obtained in this part of study suggests that of the five 
regional FTAs examined – AFTA, CER, EU, MERCUSOR and NAFTA – trade among member 
countries of three of them, AFTA, CER and MERCUSOR, is well above the trade of countries 
that do not belong to any regional FTAs. Meanwhile, trade among member countries of EU and 
NAFTA is of a similar magnitude to that of countries that do not participate in any regional 
FTAs. Another important result suggests that, for the period of this study, AFTA member 
countries do not only record a continuing increase in trade amongst themselves, but also with the 
rest of the world. Consistent with this, results obtained from the forecasting technique used in this 
part of the study also imply that AFTA actually creates rather than diverts trade. This means that 
the formation of AFTA does not only increase trade among members, but it also boosts trade with 
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CHAPTER ELEVEN 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
11.1 General  Synthesis 
This thesis has argued that throughout the history of trade, there have been significant 
changes to thinking about international trade particularly among politicians, policy makers and to 
a lesser extent, economists. During the early trading years of the first century, in which trading 
activities were already extensively carried out among cities around the Mediterranean Sea, the 
social position of traders was low as trade was viewed as having harmful effects on human 
morality. The negative view on trade changed significantly during the era of mercantilism, during 
which time trade was viewed as an important tool for improving national prosperity and 
economic wealth. Mercantilists were, however, extremely in favour of exports, but strenuously 
against imports, arguing that exports are good, while imports are bad for a country.  
The mercantilist view of trade was supplanted by the idea of free trade during the era of 
classical economics, which emerged in the 1770s with the argument that both exports and imports 
are good; therefore, they should be welcomed because both contribute equally to improve 
economic wellbeing. The ideological belief favouring free trade during this time was straight 
forward as the majority of economists argued for the adoption of a free trade policy for all 
countries around the globe.  
Trade policies become more complex during the era of neoclassical economics which 
emerged in the 1870s. Although economists in general still agree about the virtues of free trade, 
they also realize that in some circumstances the virtues of free trade, at least in theory, could 
break down – such as trade under increasing returns to scale and the possibility of gains by 
manipulating the of terms of trade – therefore, under these circumstances, free trade would not be   274
an optimum policy choice. Partly due to the inability of the free trade theory to show gains from 
free trade in all circumstances, the idea of free trade faces difficulty to be accepted by policy 
makers and the general public in many countries of the world. This led to the emergence of the 
“freer trade” idea in the middle of twentieth century, particularly after the end of the Second 
World War. In contrast to free trade, freer trade idea emphasizes the cooperation of all trading 
nations to collectively liberalize their trade regimes. One important tenet underlining this thinking 
is that trade liberalization is good, although it has never been envisaged as a vehicle to achieve 
free trade for the whole world. Two means are generally advanced by proponents of freer trade in 
their quest for trade liberalization. These are multilateralism, pursued under the auspices of the 
GATT/WTO, and regionalism, established through the signing of regional free trade agreements. 
Apparently at present, the idea of freer trade is the dominant thinking among policy makers, 
politicians and the general public.    
11.2  Summary and Findings of the First Part of the Study 
Mercantilism is a term used to explain economic thinking and practice, which was 
dominant for about two and a half centuries between the 1500s and 1750s. Fundamentally, 
mercantilists believed that international trade is important because it can be used as a vehicle to 
achieve multiple interrelated objectives: (1) accumulating treasure (or bullion), (2) enriching 
national wealth, (3) achieving a favourable balance of trade, (4) maximizing employment 
opportunities, (5) protecting home industries and (6) strengthening state power (Coats 1992, 46). 
In order to achieve these objectives, the conduct of international trade must hinge on one 
important principle; exports must be promoted while imports must be restrained (Backhouse 
2002, 58; Roll 1992, 62).   275
Trade between countries during the era of mercantilism was carried out under enormous 
restrictions in consonance with the prevailing thinking of that time (Hunt 2002, 21). The 
mercantilist economics which was centred on competitive struggles between nations, propounded 
that economic relations with other countries are “zero-sum-game”, whereby one country’s gains 
could only be achieved at the expense of another (Appleyard and Field 1995, 19). This thinking, 
thus, exerted great influence on the trade policies of many countries (Backhouse 2002, 58). 
The free trade idea emerged during the era of classical economics is primarily due to 
Adam Smith. In the Wealth of Nations (1776), Smith expounded free trade theory while he 
examined and criticized mercantilist economics. He argued that free trade would improve the 
economic wellbeing of any nations. From the 1770s until the early nineteenth century, the 
discussion over the benefits of free trade among economists was hinged on the notion that the 
price of certain goods would be cheaper through importing because the absolute cost of 
production is lower in other countries. The absolute cost advantage as a determinant of trade is, 
however, unable to show the benefits of free trade for a situation in which one country has 
absolute lower costs in producing all goods that it trades with another. The answer to this 
question came in 1817 when David Ricardo expounded the theory of comparative cost advantage. 
Ricardo expounded that international trade is still beneficial to both exporting and importing 
countries even if only one country has absolute cost advantages in all goods. 
Trade practices in the early part of classical economics were characterized by the 
continuation of the commercial policies of the previous period, which leaned towards mercantilist 
thinking. However, by the end of eighteenth century the economic arguments in favour of free 
trade began to be accepted by both policy makers as well as the general public. Nevertheless, 
during the period of classical economics a spectacularly controversial debate occurred in Britain   276
over the protectionist Corn Laws, enacted in 1815 with the of aim of ensuring adequate supply of 
corn and stabilizing the price of agriculture produce (Grampp 1993, 39). 
The Corn Laws drew massive protests from many groups in Britain, which finally 
resulted in the repeal of the law in 1846. At least three forces that worked in tandem, leading to 
the demise of the Corn Laws. Firstly, the poor economic conditions faced by ordinary people in 
the early nineteenth century, in particular due to the cyclical declining state of manufacturing and 
poor harvest of grain, thus created concerns about food security (Morley 1881, 190). Secondly, 
the emergence of the Anti-Corn Law League, a strong lobbying group led by Richard Cobden 
that pressed the British government to repeal the law. Finally the adoption of free trade ideology 
by the majority of legislatures and bureaucrats, headed by Robert Peel who became British Prime 
Minister in 1841.   
During the early period of neoclassical economics, Alfred Marshall extended the 
exposition of trade theory by systematically developing and refining analytical methods with the 
use of geometrical diagrams in addition to descriptive reasoning. In particular, Marshall (1924, 
157) incorporated into the “value of representative bales” of trade between two countries not only 
the value of labour, as used by classical economics, but also the value of capital and investment 
in the analysis of demand and supply of internationally traded goods.  
In the early twentieth century significant economic debates occurred, questioning the 
validity of the theory of comparative cost advantage, which is primarily based on the labour 
theory of value. The sweeping and sternest criticisms of this theory probably came from Bertil 
Ohlin who did not only question the validity of theory but rejected it altogether. Having rejected 
the labour theory of value, Ohlin (1933) expounded a different approach to theorizing   277
international trade. In developing a new trade theory, Ohlin gave consideration to the importance 
of the element of regions in analysing the interdependence system of pricing.  
Taking into account the mechanism of price formation, Ohlin contended that one 
important condition for trade to occur is that some goods can be produced more cheaply in 
money costs in one country as compared to others. The goods are cheaper in a particular country 
because in them are embodied relatively great quantities of factors of production which are 
cheaper in comparison to other countries. Therefore, those cheaper goods will be exported, while 
other goods, which can be produced more cheaply in other countries, are imported. Although this 
line of reasoning seems somewhat similar to the argument underlining absolute cost advantage as 
the cause of international trade, nevertheless, there exists a sharp difference. While the reason 
behind the absolute cost advantage has not clearly indicated why costs of production are different 
in different countries, Ohlin expounded the idea that the cheapness of goods is due to the 
abundant availability of factors of production. 
In the 1970s and 1980s there was a renewed interest among some trade economists to 
incorporate economies of scale into the theory of trade, although the effects of increasing returns 
on trade had been the subject of discussion since the 1920s. Helpman (1984, 326) noted that 
increasing returns to scale had been recognized as important since they have implications for the 
explanation of trade patterns, gains from trade as well as for commercial policies.       
The findings of theoretical research associated with the incorporation of economies of 
scale into international trade theory triggered another bout of debate about the virtues of free 
trade. Krugman (1987, 131-144) argued that new trade models based on increasing returns raised 
doubt on the extent to which actual trade can be explained by comparative advantage; therefore, 
government interventions in trade through import tariffs and export subsidies may be beneficial.   278
Notwithstanding this, however, Jagdish Bhagati (1989,1-34) noted that he was puzzled by 
Krugman’s argument, and insisted that the new trade models emphasizing increasing returns are 
merely additional examples to the previous theoretical circumstances whereby free trade would 
not be an optimum policy under the existence of market failures, thus a government could act to 
its national advantage by devising appropriate policy interventions. 
The new bout of debates about the virtue of free trade among economists calmed down by 
the end of the 1990s. Bhagwati (1998, 4) observed that the academic scenario during this period 
witnessed the return of economist “defectors” from free trade doctrine to the fold, and there was 
an “harmony” of agreement among prominent economists for the case of pursing free trade 
policy. A significant reason for the return was due to the recognition among economists of two 
important propositions: (1) if market failures remain unfixed, then pursing free trade policy can 
harm rather that help and (2) if market failures are fixed through suitable policy interventions, 
then free trade can be used to exploit the potential gains from trade. Within the second 
proposition, economists emphasis that if market failures arise in domestic markets, then the most 
appropriate policy interventions would be to devise policies to correct those domestic market 
failures, while free trade is maintained externally. 
11.3  Summary and Findings of the Second Part of the Study 
Regionalism of economies has a long historical record, although they have existed in 
slightly different forms at different times. During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries they 
occurred in parallel with the move towards the formation of nation-states, which was pervasively 
pursued in many parts of the world. This effort brought along the establishment of a kind of 
“customs-union”, in which uniformed tariffs were set for imports from other politically 
independent states. The earliest form of regionalism is argued to occur between England and   279
Scotland in which a customs union was established through the Act of Union in 1703. This was 
followed by the formation of customs union in France after the conclusion of thee French 
Revolution in 1789. In Germany, the German Customs Union or the Zollverein was formed in 
1834 involving 18 small states and territories. The confederation of Switzerland in 1848 as well 
the unification of Italian states in 1860 resulted in a similar form of customs union. 
In the modern history, particularly after the end of WW2, the regionalism of economies 
through the signing of regional trading agreements arguably occurs in two waves. The first wave 
began in 1950s and lasted until the 1970s, while the second wave started in the mid-1980s. The 
first wave emerged in Europe with the signing of the Treaty of Rome in 1957 involving Belgium, 
France, West Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands to establish the EEC. In contrast 
to the first wave which started in Europe, the second (and current) wave of regionalism, which 
emerged in the mid-1980s, started in the American continents with the signing of free trade 
agreement between the US and Israel in 1985 as well as another free trade agreement involving 
the US and Canada in 1988. This was soon followed by the signing of MERCUSOR in 1992 and 
NAFTA in 1994.  
In Africa, the second wave of regionalism gave a new lease of life to many economic 
groupings which was originally established during the first wave but having all sorts of 
implementation problems. As a result the UEMOA was established out of the CEAO and the 
COMESA was resurrected. Another important regionalism that occurred during the second wave 
was the establishment of Australia-New Zealand Close Economic Relations (CER) in 1983. In 
Asia, only one important economic grouping that was established during the second wave, the 
ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA).         280
 AFTA was officially established in January 1992 with the aim of enhancing trade among 
member of ASEAN countries. From the perspective of economics, a number of economic 
benefits are to be gained by members of ASEAN as they gradually liberalize their trade in the 
course of fulfilling their commitments for the implementation of AFTA. This proposition, 
however, holds only in the context of the “second-best policy option” that ASEAN member 
countries have chosen to follow. In theory, ASEAN member countries would stand to enjoy 
greater economic benefits had they chosen trade policies along the “first-best option”, that is, 
adopting unilateral and non discriminatory trade liberalization (Bhagwati 1993, 23). 
11.4  Summary and Findings of the Third Part of the Study 
Empirical studies on the effects of regionalism on trade have produced inconclusive 
findings, thus justifying this part of study, undertaken to re examine these issues with the use of a 
different approach and technique of analysis. One of the objectives of this study is to examine the 
effects of formal regional FTAs on trade of member vis-à-vis non member countries. In 
particular, the specific question of interest is whether the formation of regional FTAs results in 
boosting trade among members in comparison to trade with non-members. To investigate this 
question a specific gravity model is employed. The gravity model used in this study is essentially 
a regression model of bilateral trade between countries. For this model, total trade (imports plus 
exports) is specified as the endogenous variable, while income, income per capita and distance 
between two trading partners are used as explanatory variables.
94 In addition, dummy variables 
are included in the model for the purpose of capturing the effects of regional FTAs on trade. Due 
to the limitation of data availability only five dummy variables are included into the model in 
                                                 
94 As discussed in Chapter 10, the original econometric model incorporating total trade as the endogenous variable is 
plagued with the problems of heteroscedasticity and functional form. To correct these problems an adjusted 
econometric model is constructed by transforming the data. The adjusted model specifies trade intensity as the 
endogenous variable while explanatory variables remain the same.  
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which each dummy variable represents a particular regional free trade area. These dummy 
variables (take the value of 1 if both trading partners are members and 0 otherwise) are AFTA, 
CER, EU, NAFTA and MERCUSOR. 
The coefficients of the dummy variables representing AFTA, CER and MERCUSOR 
indicate that in recent years, two members of these regional FTAs trade with each other well 
above the trade of a pair of countries in which both are not members of any regional FTAs. In 
2003 for example, two members of AFTA trade 14 times (e
2.649 = 14.13) more with each other 
than a pair of countries that both of them do not belong to any regional FTAs and this statistical 
result is very significant (at almost 100% level of confidence). In the same year, two members of 
CER and MERCUSOR trade with each other 12 times (e
2.459 = 11.69) and 8 times (e
2.068 = 7.91) 
more in comparison with a pair of countries which are not members of any regional FTA with the 
statistical results significant at 11% and 18% respectively. Unlike AFTA which shows significant 
evidence of intra-bloc trade intensifying effect since the beginning of the study period (1980), 
this effect is only evident since 1998 (significant at 17% level) for CER and 2002 for 
MERCUSOR (significant at 16% level). 
The coefficients of EU and NAFTA dummy variables show similar characteristics. Both 
EU and NAFTA do not show an intra-bloc trade intensifying effect for any period of the study. 
Interestingly, the signs of EU and NAFTA dummy variables are negative from 1980 until 1992 
with the signs changing to positive in 1994. Also, the dummy coefficients of these two regional 
groupings are not significant for all the years of study. This implies that a pair of EU and NAFTA 
members trade with each other about a similar magnitude in comparison to a pair of countries 
that do not belong to any regional FTAs. In other words, this result suggests that EU and NAFTA 
do not have an intra-bloc trade intensifying effect before as well as after the formation of their 
economic groupings.   282
The other question of interest in this study is the examination of the effect of AFTA on 
trade of member in comparison to non member countries. The regression results obtained to 
answer this question show that the coefficients of the AFTA dummy variable are positive, above 
the value of 2 and highly significant throughout the study period. This suggests that trade of two 
AFTA member countries is higher than their trade with non members. In 2003 for example, two 
AFTA member countries trade with each other about 14 times (e
2.611 = 13.61) higher than they 
trade with non members. The results also show that an intra-bloc trade intensifying effect 
emerged in AFTA-bloc even before AFTA was officially established in 1992. In fact, the intra-
bloc trade intensifying effect of AFTA is higher at the early years of the study period. This intra-
bloc trade intensifying effect gradually becomes less pronounced after the AFTA agreement was 
signed and especially so in the late 1990s.  
These regression results, therefore, suggest two implications. First, they lend support to 
the notion that a trading bloc can itself be a “natural trading bloc” as expounded by Krugman 
(1991b, 5-25) and AFTA probably falls into this category. Second, although the AFTA 
agreement has specific provisions giving favourable treatment to members over non-members, in 
practice AFTA appears to have characteristics of an “open trading bloc” (Wei and Frankel 1995), 
whereby, although tariff concessions are given to members initially, these concessions are soon 
willingly extended to non-members by individual countries. 
The other important objective of this study is to examine the question of whether AFTA 
creates or diverts trade. In order to answer this question this part of the study proceeded in two 
stages. At the first stage intra and extra AFTA counterfactual trades are estimated by the use of a 
forecasting technique. The estimated intra AFTA counterfactual trade (i.e. trade among members 
of AFTA countries) as well as extra AFTA counterfactual trade (i.e. trade of AFTA countries 
with the rest of the world) are then compared with their respective actual trades for the post   283
AFTA formation period of 1992-2003. At the second stage, a test of difference (t-test) is 
performed to statistically examine whether AFTA creates or diverts trade. The results obtained in 
this part of study suggest that AFTA essentially creates rather than diverts trade. 
11.5 Policy  Implications 
It is interesting to note that throughout history, free trade did not only exist merely as a 
theoretical exposition but it was adopted into trade policies of a number of countries particularly 
in Europe. These countries, notably Britain, the Netherlands, Belgium and Switzerland managed 
to cling to unilateral free trade policies for quite a long period of time between the 1850s and 
1890s (O'Rourke and Williamson 1999). These unilateral free trade policies, however, came to an 
end with the outbreak of the First World War in 1914. 
For the post WW2 period, free trade has failed to emerge as a dominant force in the 
setting of trade policies in almost all countries. Instead, the twentieth and twenty-first centuries 
has witnessed the emergence of the freer trade idea, whereby, policy makers in many countries 
are reluctant to embrace unilateral free trade but are willing to pursue liberalized trade policies 
provided other countries do so. This is exemplified by the outcomes of negotiations conducted 
under the auspices of the GATT and WTO. To a certain extent this freer trade thinking is 
probably justified especially in the practical world of politics. Furthermore, the theory of trade 
itself has few caveats in suggesting the adoption of outright free trade policies for all countries 
because under some circumstances a country can gain more by departing from a free trade policy, 
although the gain could be obtained at the expense of others.  
Problems faced by countries adopting the free trade policy during the period between the 
1870s and 1890s highlighted an important lesson for the world. It appeared that during this 
period, countries adopting unilateral free trade especially Germany and France suffered from   284
“grain invasion” from the New World and the United States (Gomes 2003, 258). Since countries 
outside Europe, generally, were less open and erected more barriers to imports, these two 
countries found that their agriculture producers lost market share (both in domestic and foreign 
countries). This problem, coupled with a prolonged business cycle downturn they experienced in 
this period, caused them to make a break from a unilateral free trade policy by raising tariffs as 
well erecting other barriers. This experience suggests that a world with harmonized but liberal 
trade policy regimes, involving cooperation of all countries, is more sustainable in comparison to 
a world where only a few countries adopt unilateral free trade policies.    
The empirical results of this study indicate that, for several reasons, AFTA is a step in the 
right direction in its quest for trade liberalization. First, the results suggest that AFTA has the 
characteristics of a natural trading bloc, so its establishment probably does not harm non-member 
countries. Second, AFTA shows that it is an open trading bloc, whereby, although tariff 
reductions had initially been given to members, but these concessions were soon be extended to 
other countries as well. Finally, the results of the study suggest that AFTA essentially creates 
rather than diverts trade. This means that AFTA’s establishment not only increases trade between 
member countries but it also boosts trade with the rest of the world.    
11.6  Limitations and Further Research 
Due to the unavailability of data, the empirical component of this study takes into account 
only the six original members of AFTA. It might be possible that the results of this study would 
be different if all 10 AFTA member countries were included in the empirical investigation. 
Future research may be able to incorporate all AFTA member countries in studying the effects of 
AFTA on trade, particularly when trade data from countries such as Cambodia, Laos and 
Myanmar are more readily available.    285
To examine trade creation and trade diversion of AFTA, this study employed a 
forecasting technique based on a trend analysis to extrapolate counterfactual trades of AFTA 
countries under the assumption that AFTA did not come into existence (in 1992). Under this 
assumption, trade value of AFTA countries (for the post-AFTA period) is assumed to follow the 
previous 22-years (1970-1991) trend. This is admittedly quite a strong assumption because in the 
real world things change frequently. Therefore, it would be possible that the results found in this 
part of the study do not hold if different assumptions and techniques to calculate the 
counterfactual trade of AFTA were employed. Nevertheless, since the empirical investigation of 
this study only tries to approximate the theory with reality, the results obtained have shed 
additional light on the question of whether AFTA creates or diverts trade.    286
APPENDICES 
Appendix 1: List of Sample Countries 
Europe 
1)  Austria 
2)  Belgium 
3)  Denmark 
4)  Finland 
5)  France 
6)  Germany 
7)  Hungary 
8)  Ireland 
9)  Italy 
10) Netherlands 
11) Norway 
12) Poland 
13) Portugal 
14) Spain 
15) Sweden 
16) Switzerland 
17) United Kingdom 
 
Oceania 
18) Australia 
19) New Zealand 
 
North America 
20) Canada 
21) Mexico 
22) United States 
 
South America 
23) Argentina 
24) Brazil 
25) Chile 
26) Columbia 
27) Ecuador 
28) Peru 
 
Asia 
29) Bangladesh 
30) Brunei 
31) China 
32) India 
33) Indonesia 
34) Japan 
35) Malaysia   287
36) Pakistan 
37) Philippines 
38) Singapore 
39) South Korea 
40) Thailand 
 
Other Countries 
41) Israel 
42) Kenya 
43) Kuwait 
44) Saudi Arabia 
45) Turkey 
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Appendix 2: Alternative Tests of Non-Nested Regression Models 
****************************************************************************** 
 Dependent variable is TTRADE03 990 observations used from    1 to  990         
 Regressors for model M1:                                                       
 INPT            GDP03           PGDP03          DIST12                         
 Regressors for model M2:                                                       
 INPT            GDP03A          PGDP03A         DIST12                         
****************************************************************************** 
 Test Statistic                  M1 against M2                   M2 against M1  
     N-Test                      -7.1486[.000]                  -25.5766[.000]  
    NT-Test                      -7.0616[.000]                  -25.2962[.000]  
     W-Test                      -6.6719[.000]                  -21.4210[.000]  
     J-Test                       *NONE*                          *NONE*        
    JA-Test                       5.7503[.000]                   15.1088[.000]  
  Encompassing     F(  2, 984)   17.5707[.000]     F(  2, 984)  117.2177[.000]  
******************************************************************************
* 
 Model M1:    DW    2.0059 ;R-Bar-Squared    .37450 ;Log-likelihood   -24656.2  
 Model M2:    DW    1.9481 ;R-Bar-Squared    .25218 ;Log-likelihood   -24744.6  
 Model M1+M2: DW    2.0190 ;R-Bar-Squared    .39484 ;Log-likelihood   -24638.8  
 Akaike's Information Criterion of M1 versus M2=  88.4105 favours M1            
 Schwarz's Bayesian Criterion of M1 versus M2=  88.4105 favours M1              
****************************************************************************** 
 (Source: Output of microfit computer program) 
 
Note: In Appendix 2, explanatory variables GDP03 and PGDP03 used in model M1, 
respectively represent the combination of income and per capita income of two trading 
countries in multiplicative interaction terms while those of GDP03A and PGDP03A 
represent additive interaction terms (model M2). The test results (N-Test, NT-Test, W-
Test, J-Test and JA-Test) show that neither model M1 nor model M2 outperforms the 
other as null hypothesis of both tests, M1 against M2 and M2 against M1 reject each other 
(the results of the tests are indeterminate because the difference of influence of the two 
models over bilateral trade is very marginal). Notwithstanding this, however, both 
Alkaike Information Criterion and Schwarz Bayesian Criterion indicate that model M1 
which represents multiplicative interaction terms is favourable over model M2.   289
Appendix 3: Non-Nested Tests by Simulation 
****************************************************************************** 
 Dependent variable in model M1 is TTRADE03                                     
 Dependent variable in model M2 is LOG(TTRADE03)                                
 990 observations used from    1 to  990. Number of replications 100            
****************************************************************************** 
   Estimates of parameters of M1             Estimates of parameters of M2      
                 Under M1  Under M2                        Under M2  Under M1   
 INPT            7.59E+09  3.75E+10        INPT            -26.3260    *NONE*   
 GDP03              .0000     .0000        LGDP03            1.0448    *NONE*   
 PGDP03            3.0729   36.0195        LPGDP03         -.018209    *NONE*   
 DIST12         -672981.1  -4237465        LDIST12          -.92164    *NONE*   
 Standard Error  1.59E+10  6.56E+11        Standard Error    1.5887    *NONE*   
 Adjusted Log-L  -24656.2  -27251.8        Adjusted Log-L  -21680.2    *NONE*   
****************************************************************************** 
                                                                                
                 Non-Nested Test Statistics and Choice Criteria                 
****************************************************************************** 
 Test Statistic                  M1 against M2                   M2 against M1  
     S-Test  100 replications     *NONE*                        -35.6579[.000]  
    PE-Test                       *NONE*                          2.5931[.010]  
    BM-Test                       *NONE*                          1.6329[.102]  
    DL-Test                       *NONE*                          6.7655[.000]  
 Sargan's Likelihood Criterion for M1 versus M2=  -2976.0       favours M2      
 Vuong's  Likelihood Criterion for M1 versus M2=-396.1056[.000] favours M2      
****************************************************************************** 
 S-Test is the SC_c test proposed by Pesaran and Pesaran (1995) and is          
 the simple version of the simulated Cox test statistic.                        
 PE-Test is the PE test due to MacKinnon, White and Davidson.                   
 BM-Test is due to Bera and McAleer.                                            
 DL-Test is the double-length regression test statistic due to Davidson         
 and MacKinnon.  
****************************************************************************** 
                                                              
 (Source: Output of microfit computer program)                                  
 
Note:  Appendix 3 shows, linear function is used for model M1 while log linear function is used 
for model M2. Test statistics of M2 against M1 show that all four tests (S-Test, PE-Test, 
BM-Test and DL-Test) are significant, suggesting the log linear model (M2) is favourable 
over the linear model. These test results are also supported by Sargan’s Likelihood 
Criterion as well as Vuong’s Likelihood Criterion. This suggests that log linear model is 
the better model to be used in the regression analysis.   290
 
Appendix 4: Ordinary Least Squares Estimation of Model 10.3                      
****************************************************************************** 
 Dependent variable is LTRIN03                                                 
 990 observations used for estimation from    1 to  990                        
****************************************************************************** 
 Regressor              Coefficient       Standard Error         T-Ratio[Prob] 
 INPT                     -28.6936             1.4952           -19.1907[.000] 
 LGDP03                    .065894            .026837             2.4553[.014] 
 LPGDP03                 -.0011846            .028126           -.042118[.966] 
 LDIST12                   -.81773            .069894           -11.6995[.000] 
 AFTA                       2.6486             .42771             6.1925[.000] 
 CER                        2.4598             1.5631             1.5736[.116] 
 EU                        .074373             .21781             .34147[.733] 
 NAFTA                      .11813             .91142             .12961[.897] 
 MERCUSOR                   2.0683             1.5636             1.3228[.186] 
****************************************************************************** 
 R-Squared                     .25657   R-Bar-Squared                   .25051 
 S.E. of Regression            1.5593   F-stat.    F(  8, 981)   42.3204[.000] 
 Mean of Dependent Variable  -32.3259   S.D. of Dependent Variable      1.8011 
 Residual Sum of Squares       2385.2   Equation Log-likelihood        -1840.0 
 Akaike Info. Criterion       -1849.0   Schwarz Bayesian Criterion     -1871.1 
 DW-statistic                  1.7832                                          
****************************************************************************** 
                                                                               
                                                                               
                               Diagnostic Tests                                
****************************************************************************** 
*    Test Statistics  *        LM Version        *         F Version           
****************************************************************************** 
*                     *                          *                             
* A:Serial Correlation*CHSQ(   1)=  11.6477[.001]*F(   1, 980)=  11.6673[.001] 
*                     *                          *                             
* B:Functional Form   *CHSQ(   1)=   1.6918[.193]*F(   1, 980)=   1.6776[.196] 
*                     *                          *                             
* C:Normality         *CHSQ(   2)=  87379.6[.000]*       Not applicable        
*                     *                          *                             
* D:Heteroscedasticity*CHSQ(   1)=   2.2511[.134]*F(   1, 988)=   2.2516[.134] 
****************************************************************************** 
   A:Lagrange multiplier test of residual serial correlation                   
   B:Ramsey's RESET test using the square of the fitted values                 
   C:Based on a test of skewness and kurtosis of residuals                     
   D:Based on the regression of squared residuals on squared fitted values       291
Appendix 5: Ordinary Least Squares Estimation of Model 10.4                     
 
****************************************************************************** 
 Dependent variable is LTRIN03                                                 
 990 observations used for estimation from    1 to  990                        
****************************************************************************** 
 Regressor              Coefficient       Standard Error         T-Ratio[Prob] 
 INPT                     -28.5397             1.4748           -19.3510[.000] 
 LGDP03                    .066145            .026675             2.4797[.013] 
 LPGDP03                 -.3833E-3            .027804           -.013786[.989] 
 LDIST12                   -.83718            .058047           -14.4224[.000] 
 AFTA                       2.6109             .42254             6.1790[.000] 
****************************************************************************** 
 R-Squared                     .25333   R-Bar-Squared                   .25030 
 S.E. of Regression            1.5595   F-stat.    F(  4, 985)   83.5471[.000] 
 Mean of Dependent Variable  -32.3259   S.D. of Dependent Variable      1.8011 
 Residual Sum of Squares       2395.6   Equation Log-likelihood        -1842.2 
 Akaike Info. Criterion       -1847.2   Schwarz Bayesian Criterion     -1859.4 
 DW-statistic                  1.7868                                          
****************************************************************************** 
                                                                               
                                                                               
                               Diagnostic Tests                                
****************************************************************************** 
*    Test Statistics  *        LM Version        *         F Version           
****************************************************************************** 
*                     *                          *                             
* A:Serial Correlation*CHSQ(   1)=  11.2476[.001]*F(   1, 984)=  11.3079[.001] 
*                     *                          *                             
* B:Functional Form   *CHSQ(   1)=   1.6332[.201]*F(   1, 984)=   1.6260[.203] 
*                     *                          *                             
* C:Normality         *CHSQ(   2)=  86033.5[.000]*       Not applicable        
*                     *                          *                             
* D:Heteroscedasticity*CHSQ(   1)=   2.1277[.145]*F(   1, 988)=   2.1280[.145] 
****************************************************************************** 
   A:Lagrange multiplier test of residual serial correlation                   
   B:Ramsey's RESET test using the square of the fitted values                 
   C:Based on a test of skewness and kurtosis of residuals                     
   D:Based on the regression of squared residuals on squared fitted values       292
Appendix 6: Graphs Fitting Alternative Trend-Models 
 
Graph A1 – Linear, Quadratic and Growth Models of Extra AFTA Trade 
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(Source: Output of SPSS computer program)  293
Graph A2 – Logarithmic, S and Exponential Models of Extra AFTA Trade 
0E0
1E11
2E11
3E11
4E11
5E11
6E11
7E11
01 0 2 0 3 0 4 0
Sequence
Observed
Logarithmic
S
Exponential
extra AFTA bloc trade
 
  (Source: Output of SPSS computer program)   294
Graph A3 – Linear Quadratic and Growth Models of Intra AFTA Trade 
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Graph A4 – Logarithmic, S and Exponential Models of Intra AFTA Trade 
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  ( Source: Output of SPSS computer program) 
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